MANUFACTURING
CONSENT

The Political Economy
of the Mass Media

EDWARD S. HERMAN

and

NOAM CHOMSKY

With a new introduction by the authors

Pantheon Books, New York

The Iran-contra scandals were blamed on the President's easygoing
habits, though the people had every opportunity to know this was his
way of doing things or not doing before they put him in the White
House, not once but twice.

James Reston

They who have put out the people's eyes, reproach them of their
blindness.

John Milton

Contents

Introduction xi
Preface lix

A Propaganda Model 1

Worthy and Unworthy Victims 37

Legitimizing versus Meaningless Third World Elections:
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua 87

The KGB -Bulgarian Plot to Kill the Pope: Free-Market
Disinformation as "News" 143

The Indochina Wars (I): Vietnam 169

The Indochina Wars (II): Laos and Cambodia 253

Conclusions 297

Appendix 1

The U.S. Official Observers in Guatemala, July 1-2, 1984 309

Viii CONTENTS

Appendix 2

Tagliabue's Finale on the Bulgarian Connection:
A Case Study in Bias 313

Appendix 3

Braestrup's Big Story: Some "Freedom House Exclusives" 321

Notes 331
Index 395

TABLES

Mainstream Madid Usage of "Genocide" for Kosovo, East Timor,
Turkey, and Iraq xxi

I-I Financial Data for Twenty-four Large Media Corporations
(or Their Parent Firms), December 1986 6

1-2 Wealth of the Control Groups of Twenty-four Large Media

Corporations (orTheiT Parent Companies), February 1986 9

1-3 Affiliations ofthe Outside Directors of Ten Large Media
Companies (or Their Parents) in 1986 11

1- 4 Experts on Terrorism and Defense on the "McNeil-Lehrer News

Hour," January 14, 1985, to January 27, 1986 25

2- 1 Mass-Media Coverage ofWorthy and Unworthy Victims(l):

A Murdered Polish Priest versus One Hundred Murdered
Religious in Latin America 40

2-2 The Savageries Inflicted on Worthy and Unworthy Victims,
as Depicted in the A^ew V&r^; r/mes 45

2- 3 Mass-Media Coverage ofWorthy and Unworthy Victims (2):

A Murdered Polish Priest versus Two Murdered Officials ofrhe
Guatemalan Mutual Support Group 84

3- 1 Topics Included and EXcluded in the New York Times's Coverage

ofthe Salvadoran Election ofMarch 25, 1984 132

3-2 Topics Included and Excluded in the New York Times's Coverage
ofthe Nicaraguan Election Planned for November 4i 1984 134

3-3 Topics Included and Excluded in the New York Times's

Coverage ofthe Nicaraguan Election of November 4j 1984 135

Introduction

BOOK CENTERS IN WHAT WE CALL A "PROPAGANDA
model," an analytical framework that attempts to explain the perform-
ance of the U.S. media in terms of the basic institutional structures and
relationships within which they operate. It is our view that, among their
other functions, the media serve, and propagandize on behalf of, the
powerful societal interests that control and finance them. The represen-
tatives of these interests have important agendas and principles that they
want to advance, and they are well positioned to shape and constrain
media policy. This is normally not accomplished by crude intervention,
but by the selection of right-thinking personnel and by the editors' and
working journalists' internalization of priorities and definitions of news-
worthiness that conform to the institution's policy.

Structural factors are those such as ownership and control, depend-
ence on other major funding sources (notably, advertisers), and mutual
interests and relationships between the media and those who make the
news and have the power to define it and explain what it means. The
propaganda model also incorporates other closely related factors such
as the ability to complain about the media's treatment of news (that is,
produce "flak"), to provide "experts" to confirm the official slant on the
news, and to fix the basic principles and ideologies that are taken for
granted by media personnel and the elite, but are often resisted by the
general population, i In our view, the same underlying power sources that
own the media and fund them as advertisers, that serve as primary defin-
ers of the news, and that produce flak and proper-thinking experts, also
playa key role in fixing basic principles and the dominant ideologies.
We believe that what journalists do, what they see as newsworthy, and
what they take for granted as premises of their work are frequently well
explained by the incentives, pressures, and constraints incorporated into
such a structural analysis.

XU INTRODUCTION

These structural factors that dominate media operations are not all-
controlling and do not always produce simple and homogeneous results.
It is well recognized, and may even be said to constitute a part of an insti-
tutional critique such as we present in this volume, that the various parts
of media organizations have some limited autonomy, that individual and
professional values influence media work, that policy is imperfectly en-
forced, and that media policy itself may allow some measure of dissent
and reporting that calls into question the accepted viewpoint. These con-
siderations all work to assure some dissent and coverage of inconvenient
facts. ~ The beauty of the system, however, is that such dissent and incon-
venient information are kept within bounds and at the margins, so that
while their presence shows that the system is not monolithic, they are
not large enough to interfere unduly with the domination of the official
agenda.

It should also be noted that we are talking about media structure and
performance, not the effects of the media on the public. Certainly, the
media's adherence to an official agenda with little dissent is likely to
influence public opinion in the desired direction, but this is a matter of
degree, and where the public's interests diverge sharply from that of the
elite, and where they have their own independent sources of information,
the official line may be widely doubted. The point that we want to stress
here, however, is that the propaganda model describes forces that shape
what the media does; it does not imply that any propaganda emanating
from the media is always effective.

Although now more than a dozen years old, both the propaganda
model and the case studies presented with it in the first edition of this
book have held up remarkably welJ.3 The purpose of this new Introduc-
tion is to update the model, add some materials to supplement the case
studies already in place (and left intact in the chapters that follow), and
finally, to point out the possible applicability of the model to a number of
issues under current or recent debate.

UPDATING THE PROPAGANDA MODEL

The propaganda model, spelled out in detail in chapter t, explains the
broad sweep of the mainstream media's behavior and performance by
theiT corporate character and integration into the political economy of
the dominant economic system. For this reason, we focused heavily on
the rise in scale of media enterprise, the media's gradual centralization

INTRODUCTION xiii

and concentration, the growth ofmedia conglomerates that control many
different kinds of media (motion picture studios, TV networks, cable
channels, magazines, and book publishing houses), and the spread of the
media across borders in a globalization process. We also noted the grad-
ual displacement of family control by professional managers serving a
wider array ofow-Tiers and more dosefy subject to market discipline.

All of these trends, and greater competition for advertising across
media boundaries, have continued and strengthened over the past dozen
years, making for an intensified bottom-line orientation. Thus, cen-
tralization of the media in a shrinking number of very large firms has
accelerated, virtually unopposed by Republican and Democratic admin-
istrations and regulatory authority. Ben Bagdikian notes that when the
first edition of his Media Monopoly was published in 1983, fifty giant
firms dominated almost every mass medium; but just seven years later, in
1990, only twenty-three firms occupied the same commanding position.

Since 1990, a wave of massive deals and rapid globalization have
left the media industries further centralized in nine transnational con-
glomerates-Disney, AOL Time Warner, Viacom (owner of CBS), News
Corporation, Bertelsmann, General Electric (owner of NBC), Sony,
AT&T-Liberty Media, and Vivendi Universal. These giants own all the
world's major film studios, TV networks, and music companies, and a
sizable fraction of the most important cable channels, cable systems,
magazines, major-market TV stations, and book publishers. The largest,
the recently merged AOL Time Warner, has integrated the leading Inter-
net portal into the traditional media system. Another fifteen firms round
out the system, meaning that two dozen firms control nearly the entirety
ofmedia experienced by most U.S. citizens. Bagdikian concludes that "it
is the overwhelming collective power of these firms, with their corporate
interlocks and unified cultural and political values, that raises troubling
questions about the individual's role in the American democracy. "5

Of the nine giants that now dominate the media universe, all but Gen-
eral Electric have extensively conglomerated within the media, and are
important in both producing content and distributing it. Four ofthem-
Disney, AOL Time Warner, Viacom, and News Corporation-produce
movies, books, magazines, newspapers, TV programs, music, videos,
toys, and theme parks, among other things; and they have extensive dis-
tribution facilities via broadcasting and cable ownership, retail stores,
and movie-theater chains. They also provide news and occasional inves-
tigative reports and documentaries that address political issues, but the
leaders of these pop-cultural behemoths are mainly interested in enter-
tainment, which produces large audiences with shows like ABC TV's

XIV INTRODUCTION

Who V^nts to Be a Millionaire and CBS-TV's Survivor^ or with movies
like Disney's Lion King that also make possible the cross-selling "syner-
gies" that are a focal point oftheir attention and resources.

Important branches of the media such as movies and books have had
substantial global msrKets for many years> but only in the past two
decades has a global media system come into being that is having major
effects on national media systems, culture, and politics.^ It has been
fueled by the globaiization of business more generally, the associated
rapid growth of global advertising, and improved communications tech-
nology that has facilitated cross-border operations and control. It has
also been helped along by government policy 3Dd the consolidation of
neoliberal ideology. The United States and other Western governments
have pressed the interests of their home-country firms eager to expand
abroad, and the Internstional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank
have done the same, striving with considerable success to enlarge trans-
national corporate access to media markets across the globe. Neoliberal
ideology has provided the intellectual rationale for policies that have
opened up the ownership of broadcasting stations and cable and satellite
systems to private transnational invest 01$.

The culture and ideology fostered in this globalization process relate
largely to "lifestyle" themes and goods and their acquisition; and they
tend to weaken any sense of community helpful to civic life. Robert
McChesney notes that "the hallmark of the global media system is its
relentless, ubiquitous commercialism."? Shopping channels, "infomer-
cials," aild product placement are booming in the global media system.
McChesney adds that "it should come as no surprise that account after
account in the late 1990$ documents the fascination, even the obsession,
of the world's middle class youth with consumer brands and products. "8
The global media's "news" attenrion in recent years, aside from reporting
on crusades such as "Operation Allied Force" (the NATO war against
Yugoslavia) and on national elections, has been inordinately directed to
sensationalism, as in their obsessive focus on the O. J, Simpson trial, the
Lewinsky scandal, and the deaths of two of the West's supercelebrities.
Princess Diana and John F. Kennedy, Jr.

Globalization, along with deregulation and national budgetary pres-
sures, has also helped reduce the importance of noncommercial media
in country after country. This has been especially important in Europe
and Asia, where public broadcasting systems were dominant (in contrast
with the United States and Latin America). The fmancial pressures on
public broadcasters has forced them to shrink or emulate the commercial
systems in fund-raising and programming, and some have been fully

INTRODUCTION

XV

commercialized by policy change or privatization. The global balance of
power has shifted decisively toward commercial systems. James Ledbet-
ter points out that in the United States, under incessant right-wing polit-
ical pressure and fmancial stringency, "the 90s have seen a tidal wave of
commercialism overtake public broadcasting," with public broadcasters
"rushing as fast as they can to merge their services with those offered by
commercial networks. "9 And in the process of what Ledbetter calls the
"mailing" of public broadcasting, its already modest differences from the
commercial networks have almost disappeared. Most important, in their
programming "they share either the avoidance or the defanging of con-
temporary political controversy, the kind that would bring trouble from
powerful patrons. "10

Some argue that the Internet and the new communications technolo-
gies arc breaking the corporate stranglehold on journalism and opening
an unprecedented era of interactive democratic media. And it is true
and important that the Internet has increased the efficiency and scope
of individual and group networking. This has enabled people to escape
the mainstream media's constraints in many and diverse cases. Japanese
women have been able to tap newly created Web sites devoted to their
problems, where they can talk and share experiences and information
with their peers and obtain expert advice on business, fmancial, and per-
sonal matters, r Chiapas resisters against abuse by the Mexican army and
government were able to mobilize an international support base in 1995
to help them publicize their grievances and put pressure on the Mexican
government to change its policies in the region. 12 The enlarged ability of
Bolivian peasants protesting against World Bank privatization programs
and user fees for water in 2000, and Indonesian students taking to the
streets against the Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia in 1998, to commu-
nicate through the Internet produced a level of publicity and global
attention that had important consequences: Bechtel Corporation, owner
of the newly privatized water system in Bolivia that had quickly doubled
water rates, backed off and the privatization sale was rescinded; the pro-
tests and associated publicity, along with the 1998 fmanciaJ crisis, helped
drive Suharto from office.

Broader protest movements have also benefited from Internet-based
communication. When the leading members of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) attempted in 1998 to push through in secret a Multilateral
Agreement on Invesnnent that would have protected further the rights of
international investors as against the rights of democratic bodies within
states, the Internet was extremely valuable in alerting opposition forces
to the threat and helping mobilize an opposition that prevented accept-

XVi INTRODUCTION

ance of this agreement.''' Similarly, in the protest actions against the
^XTO meetings in Seattle in November 1999 and the IMF and World
Bank annual gatherings in Washington, D.C., in April 2000, communi-
cation via the Internet played an important role both in organizing the
protests and in disseminating information on the events themselves that
countered the mainstream me-dia's hostile portrayal of these protests .

However, although the Internet has been a valuable addition to the
communications arsenal of dissidents and protesters, it has limitations as
a critical tool. Foi one thing, iho&e whose information needs are most
acute are not well served by the Internet-many lack access, its databases
are not designed to meet their needs, and the use of databases (and effec-
tive use of the Internet in general) presupposes knowledge and organiza-
tion. The Internet is not an instrument of mass communication for those
lacking brand names, an. already existing large audience, andlor large re-
sources. Only sizable commercial organizations have been able to make
large numbers aware of the existence of their Internet offerings. The
privatization of the Internet's hardware, the rapid commercialization
and concentration of Internet portals and servers and their integration
into non-Internet conglomerates-the AOL-Time Warner merger was a
giant step in that direction-and the private and concentrated control
of the new broadband technology, together threaten to limit any future
prospects of the Internet as a democratic media vehicle.

The past few years have witnessed a rapid penetration of the Internet
by the leading newspapers and media conglomerates, all fearful of being
outflanked by small pioneer users of the new technology, and willing
(and able) to accept losses for years while testing out these new waters.
Anxious to reduce these losses, however, and with advertisers leery ofthe
value of spending in a medium characterized by excessive audience con-
trol and rapid surfing, the large media entrants into the Internet have
gravitated to making familiar compromises-more attention to selling
goods, cutting back on news, and providing features immediately attrac-
tive to audiences and advertisers. The Boston Globe (a subsidiary ofthe
New York Times) and the Washington Post are offering e-commerce goods
and services; and Ledbetter notes that "it's troubling that none of the
newspaper portals feels that quality journalism is at the center of its strat-
egy because journalism doesn't help you sell rhings."16 Former New

York Times editor Max Frankel says that the more newspapers pursue
Internet audiences, "the more will sex, sports, violence, and comedy
appear on their menus, slighting, if not altogether ignoring, the news of
foreign wars orwelfare reform. "17

New technologies are mainly introduced to meet corporate needs, and

INTRODUCTION XVII

those of recent years have permitted media firms to shrink staff even as
they achieve greater outputs, and they have made possible global distri-
bution systems that reduce the number of media entities. The audience
"interaction" facilitated by advancing interactive capabilities mainly help
audience members to shop, but they also allow media firms to collect
detailed information on their audiences, and thus to fine-tune program
features and ads to individual characteristics as well as to sell by a click
during programs. Along with reducing privacy, this should intensify com-
mercialization.

In short, the changes in politics and communication over the past
dozen years have tended on balance to enhance the applicability of the
propaganda model. The increase in corporate power and global reach,
the mergers and further centralization of the media, and the decline of
public broadcasting, have made bottom-line considerations more influ-
ential both in the United States and abroad. The competition for adver-
tising has become more intense and the boundaries between editorial
and advertising departments have weakened further. Newsrooms have
been more thoroughly incorporated into transnational corporate em-
pires, with budget cuts and a further diminution of management enthusi-
asm for investigative journalism that would challenge the structures of
power.

Over the past dozen years, sourcing and flak have also strengthened as
mechanisms of elite influence. Media centralization and the reduction in
the resources devoted to journalism have made the media more depend-
ent than ever on the primary defmers who both make the news and subsi-
dize the media by providing accessible and cheap copy_ They now have
greater leverage over the media, and the public relations firms working
for these and other powerful interests also bulk larger as media sources.
Alex Carey, Stuart Ewen, John Stauber, and Sheldon Rampton have
helped us see how the public relations industry has been able to utilize
journalistic conventions to serve its-and its corporate clients'-ends.
Studies of news sources reveal that a significant proportion of news origi-
nates in public relations releases. There are, by one count, 20,000 more
public relations agents working to doctor the news today than there are
journalists writing il.

The force of anti-communist ideology has possibly weakened with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the virtual disappearance of socialist
movements across the globe, but this is easily offset by the greater ideo-
logical force of the belief in the "miracle ofthe market" (Reagan). The
triumph of capitalism and the increasing power of those with an interest
in privatization and market rule have strengthened the grip of market

XVlll INTRODUCTION

ideology, at least among the elite, so that regardless of evidence, markets
are assumed to be benevolent and even democratic ("market populism"
in Thomas Frank's phrase) and nonmarket mechanisms are suspect, al-
though exceptions are allowed when private firms need subsidies, bail-
outs, and government help in doing business abroad. When the Soviet
economy stagnated in the 1980s, it was attributed to the absence of mar-
kets; when capitalist Russia disintegrated in the 1990s, this was blamed
not on the now ruling market but on politicians' and workers' failMie to
let markets work their magic. 20 Journalism has internalized this ideology.
Adding it to the residual power of anticommunism in a world in which
the global power of market institutions makes nonmarket options seem
Utopian gives us an ideological package ofimmense strength.

These changes, which have strengthened the applicability ofthe prop-
aganda model, have seriously weakened the "public sphere," which refers
to the array ofplaces and forums in which matters important to a demo-
cratic community are debated and information relevant to intelligent cit-
izen participation is provided. The steady advance, and cultural power, of
marketing and advertising has caused "the displacement of a political
public sphere by a depoliticized consumer culture. "21 And it has had
the effect of creating a world of virtual communities built by advertisers
and based on demographics and taste differences of consumers. These
consumption- and style-based clusters are at odds with physical commu-
nities that share a social life and common concerns and which participate
in a democratic order. 22 These virtual communities are organized to buy
and sell goods, not to create or service a public sphere.

Advertisers don't like the public sphere, where audiences are relatively
small, upsetting controversy takes place, and the settings are not ideal
for selling goods. Their preference for entertainment underlies the grad-
ual erosion of the public sphere under systems of commercial media,
well exemplified in the history of broadcasting in the United States over
the past seventy-five years. ^3 But entertainment has the merit not only
of being better suited to helping sell goods; it is an effective vehicle for
hidden ideological messages. Furthermore, in a system of high and
growing inequality, entertainment is the contemporary equivalent of
the Roman "games of the circus" that diverts the public from politics
and generates a political apathy that is helpful to preservation ofthe sta-
tus quo.

It would be a mistake to conclude from the fact that the public buys
and watches the offerings of the increasingly commercialized media
that the gradual erosion ofthe public sphere reflects the preferences and
free choices ofthe public either as citizens or consumers. The citizenry

INTRODUCTION XIX

was never given the opportunity to approve or disapprove the wholesale
transfer of broadcasting rights to commercial interests back in 19341^^
and the pledge made by those interests, and subsequently by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) itself, that public service offerings
would never be buried in favor of the entertainment preferred by adver-
tisers, was never fulfilled. 26 The public is not sovereign over the media-
the owners and managers, seeking ads, decide what is to be offered, and
the public must choose among these. People watch and read in good part
on the basis of what is readily available and intensively promoted. Polls
regularly show that the public would like more news, documentaries, and
other information, and less sex, violence, and other entertainment, even
as they do listen to and watch the latter. There is little reason to believe
that they would not like to understand why they are working harder with
stagnant or declining incomes, have inadequate medical care at high
costs, and what is being done in their name all over the world. If they are
not getting much information on these topics, the propaganda model can
explain why: the sovereigns who control the media choose not to offer
such material.

UPDATING THE CASE STUDIES

In the case studies presented in chapters 2 through 6, we examine the dif-
ferences in treatment of situations broadly similar in character, except for
the political and economic interests at stake. Our expectation is that news
as well as editorial opinion will be strongly influenced by those interests
and should display a predictable bias. We would anticipate, for example,
that an election held by a client-state government favored by U.S. offi-
cials would be treated differently by the media than an election held by a
government that U.S. officials oppose. It will be seen in chapter 3 that in
the important elections analyzed there this dichotomous treatment and
bias was displayed to an extraordinary degree.

Worthy and Unworthy Victims

In chapter 2, we compare the media's treatment of victims of enemy
states and those of the United States and U.S. client states. Our predic-
tion is that the victims of enemy states will be found "worthy" and wilJ
be subject to more intense and indignant coverage than those victimized

XX INTRODUCTION

by the United Stales or h& clients, who are implicitly "unworthy." It is
shown in chapter 2 that a 1984 victim of the Polish Communists, the
priesT Jerzy Popieluszko, not only received far more coverage than Ajch-
bishop Oscar Romero, murdered in the U.S. client-state El Salvador in
1 980; he was given more coverage than the aggregate of one hundred reli-
gious victims killed in U.S. client states, although eight of those victims
were U.S. citizens.

This bias is politically advantageous to U.S. policy-makers, for focus-
ing on victims of enemy states shows those states to be wicked and
deserving of U.S. hostility; while ignoring U.S. and client-state victims
allows ongoing U.S. policies to proceed more easily, unburdened by the
interference of concern over the politically inconvenient victims. It is not
a credible reply that difficulty in getting evidence on "unworthy" victims
can account for the application of such a gross double standard, as an
alternative press with meager resources has been able to gather a great
deal of material on their mistreatment from highly credible sources, such
as major human rights organizations and church representatives. Fur-
thermorCj only political factors can explain the differences in gua/j'ry of
treatment of worthy and unworthy victims noted throughout this book,
illustrated in chapter 2 by the more antiseptic reporting of the abuse of
unworthy victims (even U.S. women raped and murdered in El Salvador)
and the greater indignation and search for responsibility at the tOP m the
case of worthy victims.

That the same massive political bias displayed earlier in the coverage
of Popieluszko and the hundred religious victims in Latin America con-
tinues today is suggested by the media's usage of the word "genocide" in
the 1990S, as shown in the accompanying table. "Genocide" is an invidi-
ous word that officials apply readily to cases of victimization in enemy
states, but rarely if ever to similar or worse cases of victimization by the
United States itself or allied regimes. Thus, with Saddam Hussein and
Iraq having been U.S. targets in the 1990s, whereas Turkey has been an
ally and client and the United States its major arms supplier as it engaged
in its severe ethnic cleansing of Kurds during those years, we find former
U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith stating that "while Turkey represses its
own Kurds, its cooperation is essential to an American-led mission to
protect Iraq's Kurds from renewed genocide at the hands of Saddam
Hussein. "28 Turkey's treatment of its Kurds was in no way less murder-
ous than Iraq's treatment of Iraqi Kurds, but for Galbraith, Turkey only
"represses," while Iraq engages in "genocide."

INTRODUCTION Xxi

Mainstream Media Usage
of "Genocide" for
Kosovo, East Timor, Turkey, and Iraq i

I.NO.OFTIMES 2.N0. OFEDS,r 3.NEWS 4. FRONT

WORD APPLIED OP-EDS DOING ARTICLES PAGE
TO SERBS, THE SAME

TURKS, ETC.'

COUNTRlESrDATES

1. SerbsJKosovo
1998-1999 220

2. IndonesialEast

Timor,

1990-1999 33

3. Turkey/Kurds,
1990-1999 14

4.IraqJKurds,

1990- 1999 132
5. Iraq Sanctions,

1991- 1999 18

59 "8 41

7 17 4

2 8 I

51 66 24

1 10 1

1. Mainstream media used in this tabulation, based on a Nexus database
search, were the Los Angeles Times, the New Yink Times, Wbshingtori PoUy
Neivsii^eek, and Time.

2. The numbers in columns 2 and 3 do not add up to the total in column 1,
which also includes letters, "World Briefmgs," and summary items.

The table shows that the five major print media surveyed engage in a
similar biased usage, frequently using "genocide" to describe victimiza-
tion in the enemy states, but applying the word far less frequently to
equally severe victimization carried out by the United States or its allies
and clients. We can even read who are U.S. friends and enemies from the
media's use of the word. Thus, with the United States and its NATO
allies warring against Yugoslavia in 1999, aHegedJy in response to that
country's mistreatment of the Kosovo Albanians, official denunciations
of that mistreatment flowed through the media, along with the repeated
designation of the abuses as "genocidal." The same pattern applies to the
Iraqi regime's abuse of its Kurdish population-after it had ceased to be a
U.S. ally29-an enemy state, official denunciations, harsh sanctions, and
parallel media treatment.

xxu

INTRODUCTION

On the other hand, Turkey and Indonesia have long been U.S. alhes
and client states and recipients of military and economic aid. In conse-
quence, and Just as the propaganda model would predict, the media not
only gave minimal attention to the severe abuse of the Kurds by Turkey
throughout the 1990s, and to the Clinton administration's lavish help to
Turkey's implementation of that ethnic-cleansing program, they rarely
applied the word "genocide" to these Turkish operations.

Similarly, the word was not often applied to the Indonesian mistreat-
ment of the East Timorese, who were subjected to another wave of terror
as Indonesia tried to prevent or defeat a U.N. -sponsored referendum on
independence in 1999. The United States, after helping Suharto take
power in 1965 in one of the great bloodbaths of the twentieth century,'^
and after supporting his dictatorship for thirty-two years, also gave him
CiMcial military and diplomatic aid when he invaded and occupied East
Timor from 1975.31 In 1999, as Indonesia attempted to prevent the in-
dependence referendum in East Timor by violence, the United States
maintained its military aid programs and refused to intervene to stop the
killing} on the ground that what is happening "is the responsibility of the
government of Indonesia, and we don't want to take that responsibility
away from them" (as stated by Defense Secretary William Cohen in a
press conference of September 8j 1999). This was long after Indonesia
had killed thousands and destroyed much of East Timor. Shortly there-
after, under considerable international pressure, the United States in-
vited Indonesia to leave the devastated country.

We have shown elsewhere that in 1975 and later the U.S. media treated
the East Timorese as unworthy victims, saving their attention and indig-
nation for the almost simultaneous killings under Pol Pot in Cambodia.
The victims of Pol Pot, a Communist leader, were worthy, although after
he was ousted by the Vietnamese in 1978, Cambodians ceased to be wor-
thy, as U.S. policy shifted toward support of Pol Pot in exile. The East
Timorese remained unworthy in the 1990S, as the table suggests.

As the leader of the faction insisting on harsh sanctions against Iraq
following the 1991 Persian GulfWar> the United States itself was respon-
sible for a very large number of Iraqi civilians deaths in the 1990s. John
and Karl Mueller assert that these "sanctions of mass destruction" have
caused the deaths of "more people in Iraq than have been slain by all
so-called weapons of mass destruction [nuclear and chemical] through-
out all history."33 A large fraction of the million or more killed by sanc-
tions were young children; UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy
pointed out that "if the substantial reduction in child mortality through-
out Iraq during the 1980s had continued through the 1990s, there would
have been half a million fewer deaths ofchildren under five in the country

INTRODUCTION XXIU

as a whole during the eight year period 1991 to 1998. "34 However, as
these deaths resulted from U.S. policy, and Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright declared on national television that these soo.ooo child deaths
were "worth it/'^* we would expect the U.S. media to find these victims
unworthy, to give them little attention and less indignation, and to find
the word "genocide" inapplicable to this case. The table shows that this
expectation was realized in media practice.

The case for severe media bias suggested by the usage of genocide
shown in the table is strengthened by the fact that, despite the great
media attention to and indignation over the abuse of the Kosovo Albani-
ans by the Serbs in 1998-1999, this mistreatment was almost certainly
less severe than that meted out to the Kurds in Turkey in the 19905 and
to the East Timorese by the Indonesian army and paramilitary forces in
East Timor in 1999. Deaths in Kosovo on all sides in the year before the
NATO bombing were estimated by U.S. and other Western sources to
number no more than 2,000, and the Serb assault and expulsions that
followed and accompanied the NATO bombing campaign also appear to
have resulted in deaths in the low thousands (an intensive postwar search
for graves had yielded some 3,000 bodies by August 2000, not all of them
Albanian civilians or necessarily victims of the Serbs). 36 Deaths in the
Turkish war on the Kurds in the 1990S were estimated to be 30,000 or
more, a large fraction Kurdish civilians, with refugee numbers running to
2 to 3 million. In East Timor, where the Indonesian military organized
and collaborated with a paramilitary opposition to a U.N. -sponsored in-
dependence referendum held on August 30, 1999, an estimated 5,000 to
6,000 East Timorese civilians were slaughtered even before the referen-
dum vote that rejected Indonesian rule, which unleashed a furious In-
donesian army-paramilitary assault on East Timorese.

The double standard reflected in the politicized use of "genocide" is
applicable to the treatment of news events more broadly, with the media
regularly focusing on the abuse of worthy victims and playing down or
neglecting altogether the plight of unworthy victims. As an illustration,
we may consider the contrasting media treatment of the alleged killing of
some forty Albanians by the Serbs at Racak, Kosovo, on January 15,
1999, and the Indonesian army-militia killing of "up to 200" East Timo-
rese atLiquica in East Timor on April 6, 1999,'* The former was seen as
useful by U.S. officials,39 who were trying to ready the U.S. and Western
publics for an imminent NATO attack on Yugoslavia. Although the facts
in the Racak killings, which occurred in the course of fighting between
the Serbian military and Kosovo Liberation Army insurgents within
Yugoslavia, were and remain in dispute-and recent evidence raises fur-
ther doubts about the NATO-KLA account of events there''0-the deaths

XXIV INTRODUCTION

were immediately denounced and featured by U.S. and NATO officials
as an intolerable "massacre." The U.S. mainstream media did the same
and gave this reported massacre heavy and uncritical attention. This
helped create the moral basis for the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia that
began on March 24, 1999.

The Liquica killings of East Timorese seeking refuge in a Catholic
church by Indonesian-organized militia forces were indisputably a "mas-
s acre ; ' apparently involved many more victims than at Racak, and it took
place in a territory illegally occupied by a foreign state (Indonesia). It was
also neither a unique event nor was it connected to any warfare, as in
Kosovo— it was a straightforward slaughter of civilians. But U.S. officials
did not denounce this massacre-in fact, active U.S. support of the In-
donesian military continued throughout this period and up to a week
after the referendum, by which time 85 percent of the population had
been driven from their homes and well over 6,000 civilians had been
slaughtered. The U.S. mainstream media followed the official lead. For
a twelve-month period following the date of each event, the mentions
of Racak by the five media entities cited in the table exceeded mentions
of Liquica by 4.1 to i, and mentions of "massacre" at the two sites was
in a ratio of 6.7 to i. The greater length of accounts of the Racak event
elevates the ratio to 14 to 1 as measured by word count. Newsweek,
which mentioned Racak and its "massacre" nine times, failed to mention
Liquica once.

Thus, with the cooperation of the media, the Racak killings were effec-
tively used by U.S. officials to ready the public for war, not only by their
intensive coverage but also by their taking the official allegations of mas-
sacre at face value. In the same time frame, the media's treatment of the
indisputable massacre at Liquica was insufficient in volume or indigna-
tion to mobilize the public, in accord with the U.S. policy of leaving the
management of events in East Timor to the U.S. ally Indonesia.

Legitimating Versus IVIeaningless
Third World Elections

In chapter 3 we show that the mainstream media have followed a govern-
ment agenda in treating elections in client and disfavored states. In El
Salvador in the 1980s, the U.S. government sponsored several elections
to demonstrate to the U.S. public that our intervention there was ap-
proved by the local population; whereas when Nicaragua held an election
in 1984, the Reagan administration tried to discredit it to prevent legiti-

INTRODUCTION XXV

mation of a government the administration was trying to overthrow. The
mainstream media cooperated, fmding the Salvadoran election a "step
toward democracy" and the Nicaraguan election a "sham," despite the
fact that electoral conditions were far more compatible with an honest
election in Nicaragua than in EI Salvador. We demonstrate that the
media applied a remarkable dual standard to the two elections in accord
with the government's propaganda needs.

This same bias is apparent in the press treatment of more recent elec-
tions in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Kenya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, and
Uruguay. Cambodia and Yugoslavia were the only two of these seven
ruled by a party strongly objectionable to U.S. policy-makers, and it is in
these cases that the New York Times warned of serious problems: As re-
gards Cambodia, it asserted that "flawed elections are worse than none,"
and that "the international community must proceed cautiously, lest a
rigged election give Mr. Hun Sen a veneer oflegitimacy."42 In reporting
on the Yugoslavian election of September 2000, in which US. officials
intervened openly to prevent the reelection of Slobodan Milosevic, the
Times and media in general repeatedly warned of the possibility of fraud
and a rigged election. ^he case of Kenya, where US. policy toward
the ruling government was ambivalent, here also the Times was skeptical
of election quality, noting that "holding elections is not enough to assure
democratic government" and stressing the need for "an independent
electoral commission less bound to political parties" and "independent
broadcast media, allowing opposition voices to be heard outside election
periods. "44

But in the other four elections, organized and won by governments
strongly favored by the US. State Department, there were no suggestions
that "flawed elections are worse than none" and no featuring of the threat
of fraUd; the importance of an independent electoral commission and
broadcast media was not pressed, and in each case the election was found
to be a step toward democracy and hence legitimizing.

In the case of Mexico, long subject to one party (PRJ) rule, but sup-
ported by the U.S. government over the past several decades, the Times
has regularly found the Mexican elections encouraging, in contrast with
past fraudulent ones which, at the time, the editors also contrasted favor-
ably with those in the more distant past! It has featured expressions of
benevolent intent and downplayed structural defects and abuses. Thus,
in its first editorial on the 1988 election that brought Carlos Salinas de
Gortari to power, the Times noted that prior elections were corrupt (the
PRI "manipulated patronage, the news media and the ballot box"), but it
stressed that PRI candidate Salinas "comends" that political reform is
urgent and "calls for clean elections, "45 The editors questioned whether

XXvi INTRODUCTION

"his party" will "heed his pleas," a process of distancing the favored can-
didate from responsibility for any abuses to come. In the editorials that
followed, the Times did not suggest possible ongoing electoral fraud,
""manipulated patronage," or media controls and bias, although this elec-
tion was famous for a convenient "computer breakdown" in the election
aftermath, which turned Carlos Salinas from an expected loser into a
winner. Just three years later, however, at the time of the 1991 election,
the editors stated that "as long as anyone can remember, Mexican elec-
tions have been massively fraudulent" as it prepared readers for new
promises of a cleanup.46 But all through this period and later, the Times
(and its media rivals) did not focus on fraud or call these elections rigged;
in both news stories and editorials they portrayed these deeply flawed
elections as steps toward democracy and legitimizing.

In the 1983 Turkish election, held under military rule, with harsh
censorship and only three parties "led by politicians sympathetic to the
military government" allowed to run, the Times found that "Turkey Ap-
proaches Democracy. "47 Similarly, in Uruguay's 1984 election, under
another military regime that jailed the leading opposition candidate and
also refused to allow a second major candidate to run, but organized by a
government approved by the U.S. State Department, the Times once
again found that "Uruguay is resuming its democratic vocation . . . the
generals are yielding to the infectious resurgence of democracy in much
of Latin America. "48

The Russian election of 1996 was important to the United States and
its allies, as Boris Yeltsin, the ruler who was carrying out their favored
policies of privatization and the integration of Russia into the global
financial system, was seriously threatened with defeat. The Yeltsin gov-
ernment had presided over a 50 percent fall in national output and large
income declines for 90 percent of the population, while the hugely
corrupt privatization process provided windfalls to a small minority, in-
cluding an important criminal class. The social welfare and health care
systems had disintegrated under Yeltsin's rule, contributing to a startling
rise in infectious diseases and mortality rates. Just before the 1996 elec-
tion campaign, Yeltsin's popularity rating was 8 percent That he could
win reelection in such circumstances suggests-and reflects-a seriously
flawed election.

However, with the Yeltsin regime strongly backed by the U.S. govern-
ment and its Western allies, the New Yorii Times once again found this
election "A Victory for Russian Democracy," and so did the U.S. main-
stream media in general. For that paper of record, electoral flaws were
slighted or ignored, and its editors declared the very fact of holding
an "imperfect" election "a remarkable achievement. "49 The same bias

INTRODUCTION XXvii

was evident in reporting on the March 2000 Russian election, won by
Yeltsin's anointed heir and former KGB operative Vladimir Putin. Putin
had built his popularity by conducting a brutal counterinsurgency war
against Chechnya, and his electoral success rested heavily on the fact that
the powerful state TV and radio stations campaigned furiously on his
behalf and denigrated and gave no broadcasting time to his opponents.
A September 2000 expose of th«; Putin election campaign by the expatri-
ate Moscow Times, based on a six-month investigative effort, uncovered
compelling evidence of election fraud, including ballot stuffing, ballot
destruction, and the creation of 1.3 million "dead souls" inflating the
election rolls. 50 The U.S. mainstream media, however, never found any
evidence of fraud at the time of the election, and they have been reluctant
to report the findings of the Moscow Times Study.'' Putin is another "re-
former," like Yeltsin, supported by the West, so that it follows once again
that for the mainstream media a flawed ejection — hardly admitted to be
flawed — remains better than none.s^

The KGB-Bulgarian Plot to
Assassinate the Pope

During the Reagan era (1981-88), there was a concerted effort to demo-
nize the Soviet Union, in order to support a major arms buildup and a
new, more aggressive policy in the Third World and globally. The Soviet
Union was described as an "Evil Empire" and accused of sponsoring in-
ternational terrorism as well as abusing its own and client-nation peo-
ples. 53 \S7hen the would-be assassin Mehmet Ali Agca shot Pope John
Paul II in Rome in May 1981, this provided the basis for one of the most
successful propaganda campaigns of the Cold War era.

Although the pope's assailant was a Turkish fascist and member of a
violently anti-left party in Turkey, after a seventeen-month stint in an
Italian prison Agca "confessed" that he had been hired by the KGB and
Bulgarians. This confession was convenient, fitting well the interests of
the dominant Italian parties anxious to discredit the powerful Italian
Communist party as well as the Reagan administration's "Evil Empire"
campaign. 1 1 was extremely suspicious for other reasons, coming so belat-
edly, and after numerous visits to Agca by Italian secret service represen-
tatives, judges, and papal agents, all with a political ax to grind, and with
the secret service notorious for ideological extremism and willingness to
doctor evidence. 54

But the mainstream media accepted this story with astonishing gulli-

XXviii INTRODUCTION

bility-the possibility of coaching and pressure on Agca to name the
KGB and Bulgarians, much discussed in the Italian media, was almost
never mentioned as even a theoretical possibility. And the weakness of the
alleged Soviet motive, the sheer stupidity of the enterprise if Soviet-
based, and the complete lack of confirmatory evidence was almost en-
tirely ignored by the media (as described in chapter 4). When the case
was lost in an Italian court in 1986, despite a substantial Italian govern-
ment investment and effort, for the U.S. mainstream media this merely
reflected the peculiarities of the Italian system of justice; the continued
absence of hard evidence led to no reassessment of the case or reflections
on their own role.

In the years that followed, two developments threw some light on the
case. One is that the Soviet and Bulgarian archives were opened up, and
Allen Weinstein of the Center for Democracy gained permission from
Bulgarian authorities in 1991 for members of his investigative commis-
sion to look at the Bulgarian Interior Ministry's secret service files. After
a stint in Bulgaria, Weinstein returned home having failed to locate any
confirmatory evidence of Bulgarian or KGB involvement. The Los Ange-
les Times, New York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek, and Time, each of
which had reported Weinstein's initiative and impending trip to Bulgaria
in 1991, all failed to inform their readers ofhis negative fmdings.

Later in 1991, at Senate hearings on the confirmation of Robert Gates
as head of the CIA, former CIA officers Melvin Goodman and Harold
Ford testified that the CIA's analysis of the Bulgarian Connection had
been seriously compromised and politicized in support of the Reagan era
anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. Goodman testified that not only had
the CIA found no evidence of Soviet or Bulgarian involvement in the
shooting, but that based on the CIA's "very good penetration of the Bul-
garian secret services" its professionals had concluded that a Bulgarian
Connection did not exist. 56

This testimony, which was a brutal coup de grace to the claims of a
connection, put the media on the spot. It was now clear that in their
enthusiastic support of the plot they had seriously misled their readers
and performed badly as news purveyors and analysts, although serving
well the propaganda needs of their government. But as in 1986, after
the case against the Bulgarians was dismissed in an Italian court for in-
sufficient evidence, none of them felt any obligation to explain their fail-
ures and apologize to their readers. They reported the CIA revelations
tersely, with some still claiming that while the connection had not been
proved it had not been disproved either (ignoring the frequent impos-
sibility of proving a negative)." But in general the mainstream media

INTRODUCTION

XXIX

moved quickly on without reassessing their performance or the fact that
they and their media colleagues had been agents of propaganda.

The New York Times, which had been consistently supportive of the
connection in both news and editorials, not only failed to report Wein-
stein's negative findings from the search of the Bulgarian files, it also
excluded Goodman's statement on the CIA's penetration of the Bulgar-
ian secret services from their excerpts from his testimony. The Times had
long maintained that the CIA and the Reagan administration "recoiled
from the devastating implication that Bulgaria's agents were bound to
have acted only on a signal from Moscow. "58 But Goodman's and Ford's
testimony showed that this was the reverse of the truth, and that CIA
heads William Casey and Robert Gates overrode the views of CIA pro-
fessionals and falsified evidence to support a Soviet linkage. The Times
was not alone in following a misleading party line, but it is notable that
this paper of record has yet to acknowledge its exceptional gullibility and
propaganda service.

VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA

Vietnam: Was the United States a
Victim or an Aggressor?

In chapters 5 through 7, we show that media coverage of the Indochina
wars fits the propaganda model very well. The United States first in-
tervened in Indochina immediately after World War II in support of
French recolonization, after which it carried out a twenty-one-year effort
(1954-75) to impose a government in the southern half ofVietnam that
U.S. officials and analysts consistently recognized as lacking any substan-
tial indigenous support, and in opposition to local nationalist-though
Communist-forces that were understood to have a mass base. U.S.
leaders operated on the belief that their overwhelming military might
would not only enable them, but entitled them, to force submission to a
minority government of U.S. choice.

By normal word usage this would make the U.S. effort in Vietnam a
case of "aggression." The mainstream media, however, rarely if ever
found U.S. policy there to be other than highly moral and well inten-
tioned, even if based on miscalculation ofits costs-to us (see chapter 5).
The media readily accepted that we were protecting "South Vietnam"-a

XXX INTRODUCTION

U.S. creation ruled by a dictator imported directly from the United
States-against somebody else's aggression, vacillating in their identifica-
tion of the aggressor between North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, China,
or the resistance in South Vietnam engaging in "internal aggression"! It is
compelling evidence of the propaganda service of the mainstream media
that throughout the war they accepted this basic propaganda assumption
of the war managers, and from that era up to today, we have never found
a mainstream editorial or news report that characterized the U.S. war
against Vietnam, and then all of Indochina, as a case of aggression.

After the United States terminated the military phase of the war in
1975, it maintained and enforced an eighteen-year boycott of the coun-
try that it had virtually destroyed. According to Vietnamese estimates,
the war had cost them 3 million killed, 300,000 missing, 4.4 million
wounded, and 2 million harmed by toxic chemicals; and its land was left
ravaged by bombs and Rome plows as well as chemical weapons. With
58,000 killed, the U.S. death toll from the war was under one-tenth of i
percent of its population; Vietnam's death toll was 17 percent of its popu-
lation, and only Vietnam's people were attacked by chemical warfare and
had their countryside devastated.

Nevertheless, U.S. officials and the mainstream media continued to
view the U.S. role in the war as creditable, the United States as the vic-
tim. President George Bush stated in 1992 that "Hanoi knows today that
we seek only answers without the threat of retribution for the past."59
That is, the Vietnamese had done things to us that might justify retribu-
tion on our part, but we only seek answers regarding our men missing
in action. 60 New York Times foreign affairs commentator Leslie Gelb justi-
fied classifying Vietnam an "outlaw" on the grounds that "they had killed
Americans. "61 This reflects the common establishment view, implicit in
Bush's comment, that nobody has a right of self-defense against this
country, even if it intervenes across the ocean to impose by force a gov-
ernment that the people of that country rej eel.

U.S. Chemical Warfare in Indochina

It is also of interest how the media have treated the massive use of chemi-
cals during the Vietnam War and the horrifying aftermath for the vic-
tim country. In 1961 and 1962 the Kennedy administration authorized
the use of chemicals to destroy rice crops in South Vietnam-in violation
of a U.S. tradition as well as international law (Admiral William Leahy,
in response to a proposal to destroy Japanese rice crops in 1944, stated
that this would "violate every Christian ethic I have ever heard of and

INTRODUCTION XXxi

all known laws of war").62 Between 1961 and 1971, however, the U.S.
Air Force sprayed 20 million gallons of concentrated arsenic-based and
dioxin-laden herbicides (mainly Agent Orange) on 6 million acres of
crops and trees, besides using large quantities of the "super tear gas"
CS and vast amounts of napalm and phosphorus bombs.*'-* An estimated
13 percent of South Vietnam's land was subjected to chemical attacks.
This included 30 percent of its rubber plantations and 36 percent of
its mangrove forests, along with other large forest areas, destroyed by
toxic chemicals in programs that included multiple "large-scale inten-
tional effon[s] combining defoliation with incendiaries to produce a
forest fire in South Vietnam."64 A 1967 study prepared by the head of
the Agronomy Section of the Japanese Science Council concluded that
U.S. anticrop warfare had already ruined more than 3.8 million acres of
arable land in South Vietnam, killing almost 1,000 peasants and over
13,000 livestock. ^5 Xhis policy of attempting to force enemy capitula-
tion by destroying its food supply was not only contrary to the rules of
wafj*' it was notable in that it "first and overwhelmingly affected small
children.,, 67

Laos was also subjected to chemical attacks in 1966 and 1969, directed
at both crops, and vegetation along communication routes. And in Cam-
bodia, some 173,000 acres of rubber plantations, crops and forests were
heavily sprayed with Agent Orange in the spring of 1969.** The Cambo-
dian government complained bitterly at the violation of its neutrality by
this inhumane and illegal action, but Cambodia was too small and weak
for its voice to be heard or for it to be able to mobilize a legal or other
defense. Although the U.N. General Assembly did strongly condemn the
use of chemical agents as contrary to international law by an 83'tO-3 vote
in 1969) it was powerless to act against the United States, and there was
no "international community" mobilization to halt its use of chemical
warfare in Cambodia or elsewhere in Indochina.

During the Vietnam war, the use of chemicals was reported and criti-
cized in the U.S. media when first disclosed in 1966, but the subject was
quickly dropped. The illegality of chemical warfare and a poljcy of star-
vation, and their effects on the victim population, were virtually unre-
ported. There were exceptions, such as Orville Schell, Jr.'s 1971 Look
magazine article "Silent Vietnam: How we invented ecocide and killed a
country," but they were rare indeed. After the war, because of the effects
of Agent Orange on U.S. soldiers, there was some coverage of this chem-
ical warfare campaign; but the vastly greater impact on the direct targets
ofrbis warfare in South Vietnam remained close to invisible. Of 522 arti-
cles in the New York Times, the Wa^ington Post, the Los Angeles Times,
Netostveeki and Time during the 1990S that mentioned Agent Orange and

XXXU INTRODUCTION

Vietnam together, the vast majority focused on the hann done to U.S.
service personnel; only nine articles acknowledged the targeting of food
crops (thiry-nine mentioned forest cover alone as the target); only eleven
discussed in any detail the impact on Vietnamese and the Vietnamese
environment; only three characterized the use of Agent Orange as a
"chemical weapon" or "chemical warfare;" and in only two articles was it
suggested that its use might constitute a war crime.

The WiiH Street Journal did have a lead story on this topic in February
1997, reporting that as niany as 500,000 children may have been born
with dioxin-related deformities and that birth defects in the South were
four times those in the North.™ The article did acknowledge U.S. re-
sponsibility for this disaster but contended that "the United States, emo-
tionally spent after losing the war, paid no heed." But the United States
did pay heed to the flight of the "boat people" and was not too exhausted
to enforce a vigorous boycott of the target of its aggression, even ifit took
no responsibility whatever for the condition of its victims.

The large-scale application of chemical weapons, and napalm, in Viet-
nam was confmed to the South. One reason for this was that North Viet-
nam had a government with links to other countries, so that the use of
these barbarous and illegal weapons against it would have been widely
publicized. South Vietnam was occupied by the United States and its
client regime, so that the victimized people of the South were voiceless
and could be treated with unlimited savagery. This of course contra-
dicted the claim that we were protecting them against aggression, but the
media not only underplayed the savagery, they failed to call attention to
the contradiction and its significance. New "ibrk Times journalist Barbara
Crossette did report that the U.S. failure to get involved in studying the
effects of chemical warfare in Vietnam had been unfortunate, because as
this country had used it heavily in the South but not in the North, this
made Vietnam a controlled experiment in the effects ofdioxin on humans
from which much could be learned of benefit to ourselves. But neither
Crossette nor any other mainstream reporter had anything to say about
the fact that the United States had used dioxin only on the ones it was
allegedly protecting against aggression, nor did they suggest that this
constituted a serious war crime, or that this counuy might have an obli-
gation to help those it had victimized.

During the 1980s, the Reagan administration mounted a major propa-
ganda campaign over alleged victims of "Yellow Rain" In Cambodia
and Laos, claiming that chemical warfare had been employed there by
the Soviet Union through its Vietnam proxy. This propaganda effort
eventually collapsed following the U.S. Army's own inability to confirm
this warfare and, more important, the fmding that the alleged Yellow

INTRODUCTION SXXili

Rain was bee feces, not chemicals. ''^ Nevertheless, this campaign re-
ceived vastly more publicity than the real and large-scale chemical war-
fare carried out by the United States in Indochina. The Wall Street
Journal, which had heavily featured Yellow Rain and expressed the great-
est indignation at this display of Communist evil, never mentioned the
U.S. employment of chemicals in that area during its Yellow Rain cam-
paign. The Joumafs publisher, Peter Kann, eventually wrote that the
Vietnam war record had clarified "who were the good guys and who were
the bad guys," definitively shown by "the poisoned fields of Laos" (his
euphemism for Yellow Rain). 73 In short, Kann places the massive reaJ-
world use of chemical warfare by the United States in Orwell's black hole
and demonstrates Communist evil by purring forward the discredited
claim of Yellow Rain that his paper has still not admitted to be fraudu-
lent.

But the more important facts are these: that with the help of the
media, the Soviet Union was effectively linked to the use of this ugly
weapon, based on false evidence; while by treating the real and large-
scale use of chemical weapons in Indochina by the United States in very
low key up to this very day, the media have helped convey the impression
that this country is a moral force on this issue and opposes use of this ter-
rible weapomy. U.S. leaders have opposed the use of chemical warfare-
by enemy states-but it is a different maner when they choose to use
such weapomy themselves, or when a client state does the same.''*

Rewriting Vietnam War History

There have been thousands of books written on the Vietnam War,7S and
that war has been a brooding omnipresence in the U.S. culture since its
end in 1975. For the dominant elite the war represents an era in which
resistance to national policy and the associated rise of formerly apathetic
sectors of society caused a "crisis of democracy."'* Those unruly sectors
and the dissidents are seen as having damaged the cultural and political
framework and imposed unreasonable impediments to the use of force,
the laner referred to as the "Vietnam syndrome." Within the umuly sec-
tors and among the dissidents, of course, the "Sixties" are viewed as an
era of liberation, of cultural and moral advance, and a temporary surge of
democratization.

The propaganda model would lead us to expect mainstream media
retrospectives on the war to reflect elite perspectives, portraying the
1960s as a dark age and the U.S. role in the war as, at worst, a case of
good intentions gone awry. Focusing here on their treatment of the war

XXXiv INTRODUCTION

over the past decade, we see that the media have mainly repeated and
elaborated several apologetic themes already entrenched by the end of
the war.

One theme has been that the U.S. intervention was justified by the fact
of "communism on the march" (editorial, Washington Post, April 30,
2000). It was argued from the beginning that the Communist advance in
Vietnam was part of a global communist conspiracy, a position main-
tained in the face of the splir and hostility between China and the Soviet
Union, tension between China and North Vietnam, and the absence of
any evidence that North Viemam was anybody's tool. In his book In Ret-
mspect,77 former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara admits that he
and his colleagues made a serious error on this point. But neither he nor
the other establishment figures who have used this argument have ever
questioned the U.S. right to intervene by force to stop the "march of
communism" in a country where the Communists had led a nationalist
revolution, were recognized by all official and nonofficial authorities to
command the suPPOrt of a large majority of the population, and where
their defeat would require open aggression, mass killing, and the virtual
destruction of a distant society.

Closely related was the theme that we were protecting "South Viet-
nam" and the "South Vietnamese," who "let the Americans take over the
fighting" (editorial, Washington Post, April 30, 1995). A subtheme of this
line is that we "let down" the South Vietnamese. But as noted earlier.
South Vietnam as a political entity was a U.S. concoction and the U.S.
war managers recognized that most of the southern population sup-
ported the side the United States was fighting. This explains why the
main thrust of U.S. violence was directed to the South, where napalm,
B-S2 bombing raids, chemical warfare, the itlstitutionaliy.ed killing of
civilians, and a scorched-earth policy were used to destroy the base of
the popular movement.''* We also noted earlier that this ferocious U.S.
assault on the South-which contradicted the claim that we were pro-
tecting South Vietnamese-remains invisible in the U.S. media.

Another important theme in the mainstream media for many years has
been the notion that the United States was the victim in the Vietnam war,
the Vietnamese the cruel villains. This remark. able inversion of reality has
been accomplished by two processes: first, by a massive suppression of
evidence on the consequences of the war for the Vietnamese; and second,
by demonizing the victims, based in large measure on "the national beat-
ification of POWs [prisoners of war] and the myth of POWs. as. martyrs.
s.tiU being tortured byVietnam."19

The only Vietnamese allowed modest attention in the media have been
those mobilized to fight the U.S. war and who were "let down";8o the vast

INTRODUCTION XXXV

numbers killed or damaged by the U.S. assault have been treated as
"unworthy victims." The overwhelming preoccupation of officials, jour-
nalists, pundits, and intellectuals with media outreach has been on U.S.
victims and the effects of the war on this country. Robert McNamara's
widely publicized book, supposedly a mea culpa and moral tract, is no-
table for the fact that his notion of the war's "high costs," and the error
and guilt he feels, extend only to U.S. lives and the effects of the war on
"the political unity of our society."81 He offers neither regrets, moral
reflections, nor apologies for his country having invaded, mercilessly
bombed, ravaged the land, and killed and wounded millions of innocent
people in a small distant peasant society in pursuit of its own political
ends.

In a remarkable cultural process, also, the victims have been turned
into the villains. As we describe in chapter 5, in an attempt to prolong the
war President Richard Nixon seized on the question of the adequacy of
Vietnamese accounting for our military personnel who were captured
(POWs) and those missing in action (MIAs). He succeeded in keeping
the war going, and some 16,000 more U.S. soldiers and untold numbers
ofVietnamese died in the further fighting in the purported interest of
missing paws. But although there has never been any credible evidence
that a single POW was hidden by the North Vietnamese, this claim be-
came an article offaith and cult that dominated U.S. policy toward Viet-
nam for many years.

The myth also became the basis ofpopular culture accounts in movies
such as The Deer Htmler^ Uncommon Valors Ro. W: The Escape, and
Missing in Action, in which Rambo-like heroes slaughter evil Vietnamese
as they save our betrayed and tormented POWs. These movies turned
history on its head. As Vietnam war historian H. Bruce Franklin points
out, "America's vision of the war was being transformed. The actual
photographs and TV footage of massacred villagers, napalmed children,
Vietnamese prisoners being tortured and murdered, wounded GI's
screaming in agony, and body bags being loaded by the dozen for ship-
ment back home were being replaced by simulated images of American
POWs in the savage hands of Asian communists. "83 The powerful cul-
tural myth of abused POWs as the central feature of the Vietnam war not
only allowed the war to be extended; it helped justify the U.S. failure to
aid its victim in accord with end-of-war promises and it provided the
basis for an eighteen-year economic war against the victim country. It
also functioned as a potent agent of militarization and force weakening
the "Vietnam syndrome."

In his recent book Vietnam and Other American Fantasies, H. Bruce
Franklin, who had previously exposed the fallacies and cult qualities of

XXXvi INTRODUCTION

the POW-MIA myth, addressed this issue once again, as well as other
fantasies (such as the claim that the antiwar activists often spit at return-
ing veterans). 84 Franklin's book was reviewed in the Los Angeles Times
but was otherwise only twice mentioned in passing in the U.S. main-
stream press. On the other hand, a book by Michael Lind, Vietnamj The
Necessary War,^^ which explains that the war was justifiable because com-
munism was on the march, U.S. "credibility" was at stake, and the Viet-
namese communists were cruel and ruthless-demonstrated in part by
their refusal to surrender and consequent responsibility for those killed
by U.S. bombs! -was treated differently. It received forty-four reviews
and was mentioned twenty-seven other times in the mainstream media,
and Lind was given Op-Ed space in both the New York Times and the
Washingl07\ Post, among other opportunities.

In his review of Lind's book, Vietnam War historian Uoyd Gardner
noted that any U.S. "credibility" problem that arose in connection with
[he Vietnam war was a creation of the war managers themselves and
flowed from their own decisions; and Gardner also comments, after ana-
lyzing a series of Lind arguments in defense of the war, that "the evidence
simply washes away his positions like a sand castle on the beach. "86 But
Lind was saying what the elite wants said, and Franklin was not, so that
mainstream media treatment followed accordingly.

Laos

Laos's Plain of Jars was subjected to some of the heaviest bombings of
civilian targets in history, especially after 1968, when Washington was
compelled under domestic pressure ro enter negotiations with North
Vietnam and had ro terminate its bombing there. It turned to Laos,
although that small peasant country was a marginal facror in the wars;
but Nixon and Kissinger could hardly leave U.S. bombers inactive. Over-
ail, some 2 million tons of bombs were dropped on Laos. These raids
wiped out 353 villages and killed thousands of civilians, and they con-
tinue ro kill now, as the Plain was saturated with hundreds of millions
of "bombies"-tiny antipersonnel weapons specifically designed to kill
and maim. With their 20-ro-30 percent failure-to-explode rate, they re-
mained as potential killers, and their casualty rate is still high, estimates
running from hundreds ro 20,000 or more per year, half of them deaths
and half of the victims children, s?

There have been efforts to deal with this humanitarian catastrophe.
The British-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has been trying ro
remove the lethal objects, but the British press reports that the United

INTRODUCTION XXXVii

States is "conspicuously missing from the handful of western organiza-
tions that have followed MAG," though it has finally agreed to train some
Laotian civilians. The British press also reports, with some annoyance,
that the United States has refused to provide MAG specialists with "ren-
der harmless procedures," Still treated as a state secret for weapons three
decades old.^' The U.S. mainstream media have treated in very low key
the continuing human toll suffered in Laos and have maintained almost
complete silence concerning the U.S. non-cooperativeness in attempts to
alleviate a crisis dating back to the "secret war" against Laos, which again
was "secret" only by tacit propaganda service of the mainstream media
(see chapter 6).

Cambodia

Important changes have occurred in Cambodia since 1988, including
Vietnam's withdrawal from that country, elections held under UN aus-
pices, and the death of Pol Pot. We noted in chapter 7 that, after the Viet-
namese had ousted Pol Pot in December 1978, although the United
States and its allies had denounced Pol POt as "another Hitler" commit-
ting "genocide," they quickly became his supporter, allowing him to re-
tain Cambodia's UN. seat and otherwise aiding and protecting him in
his Thailand refuge. Vietnam was severely punished-by harsh sanctions
and by U.S. support for a Chinese invasion to teach Vietnam a lesson-
fOt having terminated Pol Pot's atrocities! President Carter's National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski stated in 1979 that "I encouraged
the Chinese to support Pol Pot. I encouraged the Thai to help D,K.
[Democratic Kampuchea, Pol Pot's forces]. Pol Pot was an abomination.
We could never support him but China could. "9o In the late 1980s and
early 1990$, as the Vietnamese sought to end their isolation by exiting
from Cambodia, but insisted as a condition for withdrawal that Pol Pot
and his Khmer Rouge be excluded from returning to power, the United
States objected, and insisted, with eventual success, that the Khmer
Rouge be included as a contestant party in the post-occupation settle-
ment. ''i

What dominated U.S. policy and led to its support of Pol Pot was the
classic rule that the enemy of my enemy (Vietnam) is my friend, and per-
haps also the new tilt toward China, also hostile toward Vietnam. The
support of Pol Pot was awkward, given the prior denunciations of his
policies, but the mainstream media handled it with aplomb, and the U.S.
public was almost surely completely unaware that the United States had
become his ally and supporter. (The explicit statement of support by

XXXVlll INTRODUCTION

Brzezinski quoted above was never mentioned in the New York Times, the
Washington Post, or Newsweek; it was quoted once in both the Los Angeles
Times and Time.)

However, in the late 1990S, after Vietnam had left Cambodia and US.
officials' anti- Vietnam passions had subsided, and Pol Pot was no longer
a useful instrument of anti-Vietnam policy, U.S. officials and pundits
rediscovered Pol Pot's and the Khmer Rouge's villainy and candidacy for
war crimes trials. The media handled the previous "tilt" toward Pol Pot
mainly by evasion, essentially blacking out the years i979-95> or vaguely
intimating that the US. had supported him for reasons of "realpolitik,"
but avoiding both details on the nature and magnitude of support as well
as any reflections on the morality of backing "another Hitler." The New
York Times's summary of "Pol Pot's Rise and Fall" (April 17, 1998) hsts
for "i 979-1990; Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge are given refuge at Thai bor-
der where they fight back against the Vietnamese." "Given refuge" is mis-
leading: they were given economic and military aid and political support
by the United States and its allies. The Times's main reporter on Cambo-
dia in early 1998, Seth Mydans, repeatedly blacked out mention of US.
support, referring to "the decade-long civil war that followed" Pol Pot's
ouster (April 13), and a nineteen-year "guerilla insurgency in the jungles
of western and northern Cambodia" (April 17).

The Boston Globe, New York Times, Washington Post, and Loi Angeles
Times, editorializing on the death of Pol Pot on April 17,1998, were uni-
formly indignant over his crimes and regretful at his escape from justice,
but all avoided mentioning the long US. support of the criminal-as well
as the U.S. contribution to the first phase of a "Decade of Genocide. "92
The Waihingion Post blacked out the inconvenient fifteen-year period of
support of Pol Pot with this summary: "After the nightmare of Khmer
Rouge rule and genocide, the United States and its allies pumped mil-
lions of donars into Cambodia to help rebuild and to hold elections."^^

It is enlightening to compare the media's treatment of Pol Pot and
Indonesian leader Suharto, who was also in the news in 1998, as Indone-
sia suffered a financial crisis that-along with popular resistance to the
dictatorship— eventually led to his ouster. Pol Pot was described in the
editorials and news columns of April 1998 as "crazed," a "killer," "war
criminal," "mass murderer," "blood-soaked," and as having engineered a
"reign of terror" and "genocide." But in 1998 and 1999, and in earlier
years as well, while Suharto was occasionally referred to as a "dictator"
and running an "authoritarian" regime, he was never a "killer" or "mass
murderer" or one responsible for "genocide." The terminological double
standard is maintained reliably throughout the mainstream media.

Less obvious but equally interesting is the difference in willingness

INTRODUCTION XXXix

to identify the responsible parties for the killings of Pol Pot and Suharto.
In the case of Pol Pot, there is no uncertainty or complexity: editorials
and news articles uniformly make him and the Khmer Rouge leadership
clearly and unambiguously responsible for all deaths in Cambodia dur-
ing the period 1975-78. He was the "man who slaughtered two million"
(USA Today)i "the executioner" (Boston Glebe) who "presided over the
deaths" of his victims [Wbshington Post), "the man who drove Cambodia
to ruin" (New York Times).

But in Suhano's case, we move to an ambiguous responsibility, which
means none at all: in the New York Times, for example, "a 1965 coup led to
the massacres of hundreds of thousands of supposed communists" (edi-
torial, Aug. 23, 1996), where we have no agent doing the killing; or "a
wave of violence that took up to soo.ooo lives and led Suharto to seize
power from Sukarno in a military coup" (Seth Mydans, Aug. 7, 1996),
where the massacre not only has no agent, but is falseLy situated before
the takeover of power by Suharto. In a later piece, Mydans states that
"more than 500,000 Indonesians are estimated to have died in a purge of
leftists in 1965, the year Mr. Suharto came to power" (April 8, 1997).
Note the passive voice, never used in connection with Pol Pot, the word
"purge" instead of "slaughter" or "massacre," and the continued failure
to identify the agent.

In the case of East Timor, also, the Times is uncertain about the source
of the killing: "This is one of the world's sadder places, where 100,000 to
200,000 people died from 1974 in a brutal civil war and the consequent

invasion through combat, execution, disease and starvation " (Steven

Erlanger, Oct. 21, 1990). In addition to the lack of a clear agent, this sen-
tence seriously misrepresents the facts-the civil war was shorr and left
small numbers dead; and the invasion was not "consequent" to a brutal
civil war, except in Indonesian propaganda.

Another important difference in the treatment of the "worthy" victims
of Pol Pot and the "unworthy" victims of Suharto is in the willingness to
explain away the killings. With Pol Pot, as we describe in chapter 7, the
background of the first phase of the genocide was completely blacked out
in the mainstream account-there is no qualification to Pol Pot's respon-
sibility as a killer because his forces had undergone terrible damage and
sought vengeance for the crimes they had suffered; nor are any deaths in
Pol Pot's years of rule to be explained by the starvation and disease
already pervasive in April 1975. No, the only mentionable background is
his Paris training and Communist fanaticism.

But with Suharto we encounter a whole new world of contextualized
apologetics. For many years the main protective formula was that the
1965—66 killings were "a result of a failed coup," which "touched off

Xl INTRODUCTION

a wave of violence," or followed an "onslaught from the left."95 This
formula, invoked repeatedly, suggests that the mass killings were pro-
voked and thus maybe justified by a prior "onslaught." The writers never
explain why a failed coup could possibly justify a large-scale slaughter,
but the hint is left hanging. In more recent years, usually in connection
with the explanation and rationalization of the continuation of a dicta-
torship, the media regularly juxtaposed political repression with "stabil-
ity" and "growth": "the signs of his success are everywhere," although
Suharto has brought these gains "hy maintaining a tight grip on power
and suppressing public criticism and political opposition. "96 These state-
ments, from the Netv York Times, offer a kind of context that the paper
never gives to Castro, let alone a Pol Pot, and it shows an apologetic that
runs deep.

This apologetic extends to the Suharto invasion and occupation of
East Timor. For years, Nev: York Times reporters have claimed that In-
donesia invaded in the midst of a civil war,97 when in fact that civil war
was over well before the invasion. The paper's news coverage of East
Timor actually fell to zero as the Indonesian attacks and killings in East
Timor reached a deadly peak in 1977-78, a slaughter that elsewhere
would be called "genocidal." And although Indonesia occupied East
Timor in violation of standing UN. rulings till its induced exit in 1999,
the paper's reporters repeatedly referred to East Timor as a "disputed
province" and East Timorese resistance as "separatist," thereby internal-
izing and explicitly legitimizing the aggression and occupation. 98

The bias and gentle treatment of Suharto and the Indonesian govern-
ment in the media is once again correlated with US. policy support that
dates back to the military coup and slaughters of 1965. These were
greeted with enthusiasm by US. officials-then Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara referred to the events as one of the "dividends" of
U.S. support for the Indonesian military-and the "boiling bloodbath"
(Time) and "staggering mass slaughter" (New \brk Times) were also seen
in the media as a "gleam of light" Games Reston in the New iiirfe Times').^
U.S. military and economic aid and diplomatic protection continued
throughout the years of the Suharto dictatorship, and the media's finding
him a good genocidist followed accordingly.

New York Times reporter David Sanger differentiated Suharto and post-
1990 Saddam Hussein-before 1990 he was a U.S. ally-saying "Mr.
Suharto is not hoarding anthrax or threatening to invade Australia. "loo
That is, Suharto's invasion, mass killing, and long illegal occupation of
East Timor is given zero weight, and his slaughter of somewhere between
500,000 and 2 million people within Indonesia some years back is also

INTRODUCTIOK xli

not mentioned. This tells us all we need to know about how good and
bad genocidists fare in the Western propaganda system.

FURTHER APPLICATIONS

In his book Golden Rule, political scientist Thomas Ferguson argues that
where the major investors in political parties and elections agree on an
issue, the parties will not compete on that issue, no matter how strongly
the public might want an alternative. He contends that for ordinary vot-
ers to influence electoral choices they would have to have "strong chan-
nels that directly facilitate mass deliberation and expression. "101 These
would include unions and other intermediate organizations that might,
through their collective power, cause the interests of ordinary voters to be
given greater weight in the political system.

The propaganda model, and the institutional arrangements that it re-
flects, suggests that the same forces that preclude competition among the
parties on issues on which the major investors agree, will also dominate
media choices and rule OUt "mass deliberation and expression" on those
issues. For example, polls regularly indicate that, except in periods of war
and intense war propaganda, the public wants a smaller defense budget
and favors a spending shift from defense to education and other civil
functions. But because the major investors agree that a large defense
budget is desirable, the two dominant parties compete only on whether
the one or the other is st.inting on military expenditures, with both prom-
ising to enlarge it (as both George W. Bush and Al Gore did in the presi-
dential election campaign of 2000). And the mainstream media do the
same, limiting debate to the terms defined by the two parties and exclud-
ing deliberation and expression of the position that large cuts are desir-
able. The alternative presidential candidate, Ralph Nader, called for such
cuts, but the media denied him a voice on the issues, some of them
explicitly defending his exclusion from the presidential debates on the
grounds that the options afforded by the two parties sufficed.

The U.S. corporate community has favored an immense defense
budget — currently more than five times the size of that of a steadily weak-
ening Russia, the second biggest spender-because of the great benefits
its members derive from military spending. These include weapons and
other contracting business, direct and indirect subsidies in research,104
and the role played by military power in supporting the global economic
expansion in which many U.S. transnational corporations are active

Xlii INTRODUCTION

participants and beneficiaries. Business also benefits from the market-
opening actions of trade agreements and from the supportive operations
of the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF. But these trade agreements
and the activities of the international fmancial institutions have generated
controversy and political struggle, because while their benefits to busi-
ness are dear, their costs are borne heavily by workers forced to compete
in a global job market. Furthermore, globalization and trade agreements
strengthen the political as well as the economic powei of the coipoiate
community, in part because they shift decision-making authority from
democratic polities to bankers and technocrats who more reliably serve
the transnational corporate interest. Here also, as in the case of defense-
versus civilian- oriented budgets, polls show a sharp dichotomy between
corporate and public preferences, with the latter generally hostile to the
agreements and institutional arrangements favored by business, los

The propaganda model fits well the media's treatment of this range
of issues. Consider, for example, their coverage of the passage of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the subsequent
Mexican financial crisis and meltdown of 1994-95. Polls taken before
its enactment consistently showed substantial majorities opposed to
NAFrA-and later to the bailout of investors in Mexican securities-but
the elite in favor. Media editorials, news coverage, and selection of
"experts" in opinion columns were heavily skewed toward the elite pref-
erence; their judgment was that the benefits of NAFTA were obvious,
were agreed to by all qualified authorities, and that only demagogues and
"special interests" were opposed. 10'' The "special interests" who might be
the "losers" included women, minorities, and a majority of the work-
force. The media dealt with the awkward fact that poUs showed steady
majority opposition to the agreement mainly by ignoring it, but occasion-
ally they suggested that the public was uninformed and didn't recognize
its own true interests. The effort of labor to influence the outcome of
the NAFTA debates was sharply attacked in both the New \brk Times and
the Washington Post, with no comparable criticism of corporate or govern-
mental (U.S. and Mexican) lobbying and propaganda. And while labor
was attacked for its alleged position on these issues, the press refused to
allow the actual position to be expressed.

In December 1994, only eleven months after NAFrA went into effect,
Mexico suffered a major financial crisis, induding a massive flight of cap-
ital, a devaluation ofthe currency, and a subsequent bailout by the IMF
that required Mexico to carry out painful deflationary measures. Despite
the fact that the meltdown occurred within a year of the introduction of
NAFTA, which the media had portrayed as ushering in a prospective

INTRODUCTION xliii

golden age of economic advance, they were unanimous that NAFTA
was not to blame. And in virtual lock-step they supported the Mexican
(investor) bailout, despite poll reports of general public opposition in the
United States. Experts and media pundits and editorialists repeatedly
explained that one great merit ofNAFTA was that it had "locked Mexico
in" so that it couldn't alter its overall policy direction or resort to controls
to protect itself from severe deflation and unemployment. They were
oblivious to the profoundly undemocratic nature of this lock-in, made
more questionable by the fact that it had been negotiated by a Mexican
government that ruled as a result of electoral fraud. i'°

More recently, when the growing global opposition to the policies of
the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank led to mass protests at the WTO
conference in Seattle in November and December 1999, and then at the
annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington, D.C., in
April 2000, media coverage ofthese events was derisive and hostile to the
protesters and almost uniformly failed to deal with the substantive issues
that drove the protests. The media portrayed the Seanle protesters as "all-
purpose agitators" {U.S. News & ]Xbrld Report), "terminally aggrieved"
(Philadelphia Inquirer), simply "against world trade" (ABC News), and
making "much ado about nothing" (CNN), but the bases of the protest-
ers' grievances were almost entirely unexplored.'" Similarly, in the case
of the Washington, D.C., protests, the media repeatedly reported on
activists' attire, looks, body odors, fadism, and claimed a lack of "any-
thing that can coherently be called a cause" (Michael Kelly, journalist,
Washington Post), and they continued their refusal to address issues.
There were many informed protesters with coherent agendas at Seanle
and Washington-including reputable economists, social theorists, and
veteran organizers from around the world" 3_but the media did not seek
them out, preferring to stereotype antiglobalization activists as ignorant
troublemakers. On op-ed pages, there was a major imbalance hostile to
the protesters. TV bias was at least as great, and often misleading on the
facts. In his November 29, t999, backgrounder on the WTO, Dan Rather
explained that the organization had ruled on many environmental issues,
implying that those rulings were protective of the environment when in
fact they generally privileged trade rights over environmental needs.

Another notable feature of media reporting on both the Seattle and
Washington, D. C, protests, and a throwback to their biased treatment
of the protests of the Vietnam War era (1965-75),114 was their exaggera-
tion of protester violence, their downplaying of police provocations
and violence, and their complaisance at illegal police tactics designed to
limit all protestor actions, peaceable or otherwise. Although the Seattle

xliv INTRODUCTION

police resorted to force and used chemical agents against many nonvio-
lent protesters well before a handful of individuals began breaking win-
dows, both then and later the media reversed this chronology, stating that
the police violence was a response to protester violence. In fact, the van-
dals were largely ignored by the police, while peaceful protesters were
targeted for beatingSj tear gas, torture with pepper spray, and arrest,
One Nei» York Times anicle went so far as to daira ihat the Seattle pro-
testers had thrown excrement, rocks, and Molotov cocktails at delegates
and police officers; the Times later issued a correction acknowledging that
these claims were false. Dan Rather, who had falsely alleged that the
protesters had "brought on today's crackdown" at Seattle, later suggested
that the Washington protesters were possibly "hoping for a replay of last
year's violence in Seattle," setting this off against "those charged with
keeping the peace" who "have other ideas. "118

In their eighty-seven-page report. Out of Control: Seattle's Flawed Re-
sponse to Protests Against the World Trade Organization, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) stated that "demonstrators [in Seattle] were
overwhelmingly peaceful. Not so the police." The response of the Seattle
police to the protests was characterized by "draconian" violations of civil
liberties, including widespread use of*'chemical weapons, rubber bullets
and clubs against peaceful protesters and bystanders alike." But NBC,
ABC, CBS, CNN, and the New York Times and Washington Post aU ig-
nored the release of the ACLU's findings, which ran counter to their own
uniformly pro-police and ami-protester line.

The media's reversal of chronology and inflation of the threat of ac-
tivist violence, and their low-keyed treatment of numerous illegal police
actions designed to instill fear in those wanting to protest peaceably, 119
provided the enabling ground for both police violence and serious
restrictions on free speech. These increased in scope and sophistication
between Seattle and Washington, and were then applied to squelch pro-
test at the Republican and Democratic conventions in Philadelphia and
Los Angeles in July and August 2000. '20 xhe corporate media's hostility
to the goals of the protests, closely aligned with that of the rest of the cor-
porate establishment, caused their devotion to the First Amendment to
flag in a way it never has when their own rights and privileges have been
at Stake.

As is suggested by the media's treatment of NAFTA and of labor's
right to participate in its debates, as well as the media coverage ofWater-
gate, COINTELPRO, and major events in the earlier history of labor-
management conflict (the Haymarket affair, the Homestead strike, the
post-World War 1 "red scare"), 121 the propaganda model applies to do-

INTRODUCTION xlv

mestic as well as foreign policy issues. Labor has been under renewed
siege in the United States for the past several decades, its condition
adversely affected by the deflationary policies of the early 1980s, corpo-
rate downsizing, globalization, a vigorous business campaign to defeat
unions, and government support of, or indifference to, the damage being
inflicted on unions and workers. There was a major drop in union mem-
bership from the beginning of the Reagan era, with union density falling
from 25 percent in 1980 to J4-5 percent in J996 (and only J0_2 percent in
the private sector). This reflected weakened labor bargaining power and
was accompanied by significant concessions in wages and benefits, more
onerous working conditions, and greater worker insecurity.

President Reagan's firing of !I,000 striking air-controllers in 1981
"put the government seal of approval on strike-breaking and a new era of
industrial relations opened. "122 But you would hardly know this from
reading or listening to the mainstream media. An exceptional t994 Busi-
ness Vdek article noted that "over the past dozen years . . . U.S. industry
has conducted one of the most successful union wars ever," helped by
"illegally firing thousands of workers for exercising their right to organ-
ize," with unlawful firings occurring in "one-third of all representation
elections in the late '80S. "123 But this successful war was carried out
quietly, with media cooperation. The decertification of unions, use of
replacement workers, and long, debilitating strikes like that involving
Caterpillar were treated in a very low key manner. In a notable illustra-
tion of the applicability of the propaganda model, the nine-month-long
Pittston miners' strike that began in April 1989 was accorded much less
attention, and less friendly treatment, than the Soviet miners' strikes of
the summer of that same yesr,

From 1977 through 1999, while the incomes of the top 1 percent of
households grew by 84.8 percent and the top 10 percent by 44.6 percent,
the bottom 60 percent lost ground and the income of the lowest 20
percent fell by 12.5 percent. '^'^ Real hourly earnings of production and
nonsupervisory employees (i.e., the 80 percent of the workforce that
holds working-class jobs) fell by 4.8 percent between 1973 and 1999.^^*
This, along with the adverse trend of social indicators in the same
period.,'-^ suggests that the welfare of the majority declined in this era of
high employment, a "new economy," and a spectacular upswing in the
stock market. In its euphoria phase, which ended abruptly with the col-
lapse of the dot.com market in 1999 and 2000, the mainstream media
hardly noticed that only a minority had been the beneficiaries; 128 they
briefly discovered this issue only under the impetus of Pat Buchanan's
right-wing populist outcries during the 1996 presidential election cam-

xlvi INTRODUCTION

paign. In the 2000 electoral campaign, once again the two major party
candidates said nothing about the failure of the majority to be lifted in
the supposed "rising tide" that would benefit everybody; only Ralph
Nader atld other marginalized candidates did, and as noted, the domi-
nant media found that the agenda of the major parties was all that they
could ask for.

Another Striking application of the propaganda model can be seen in
the media's treatment of the chemical industry and its regulation. Be-
cause of the industry's power, as well as the media's receptivity to the
demands of the business community, the media have normalized a
system described by Rachel Carson in Silent Spring as "deliberately poi-
soning us, then policing the results."'-* Industry is permitted to produce
and sell chemicals (and during the 1990s, bioengineered foods) without
independent and prior proof of safety, and the "policing" by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) has been badly compromised by under-
funding and political limits on both law enforcement and testing, no A
major National Research Council study of 1984 found that there was no
health hazard data available for 78 percent ofthe chemicals in commerce,
and an Environmental Defense Fund update found little change had
occurred a dozen years laler. The federal government's National Toxicol-
ogy Program tests about ten to twenty chemicals a year for carcinogenic-
ity (but not for the numerous other possible adverse effects of chemicals);
but meanwhile five hundred to a thousand new chemicals enter com-
merce annually, so our knowledge base steadily declines. 131

This system works well for industry, however, as it wants to sell with-
out interference, and leaving virtually aU of the research and testing
for safety in its hands, with its members to decide when the results are
worthy of transmission to the EPA, is a classic "fox guarding the chick-
ens" arrangement. The system has worked poorly for the public, and its
inadequacy has been reinforced by the industry's power to influence,
sometimes even capture, the EPA.132 Nevertheless, the industry often
contends that the safety ofchemicals is assured by EPA (or FDA) regula-
tion, 133 which industry does its best to keep weak and which, as noted,
has failed to deal in any way with the great majority of chemicals in the
marker.

With the media's help, the chemical industry has also gained wide
acceptance of its view that chemicals should be evaluated individually
on the basis of an analysis of their risks to individuals and individual
tolerances. But it is very hard to measure such risks and tolerances for
humans — controlled experiments are not possible, damage may show up
only after many years, the forms of damage are hard to know in advance,
chemicals may interact with others in the environment, they may be bio-

INTRODUCTION xlvii

accumulative, and the breakdown products of chemicals may have their
own dangers. Furthermore, if thousands of chemicals enter the environ-
ment, many long-lasting, bioaccumulative, and interacting with other
chemicals, a public policy that ignores theii additive and interactive ef-
fects on people and the environment is deeply flawed and irresponsible.

Poiicy based on the "precautionary principle," bitterly opposed by the
chetnica] industry, with the support of the U.S. government,'^'* would
nor allow chemicals to enter the environment without full tesring, would
prohibit the use of chemicals that accumulate in human tissues and
whose breakdown products are threatening or unknown, and would
compel the use of nonthreatening alternatives for untested and known-
to-be-risky chemicals where such alternatives can be found or developed
at reasonable cOSt.135

In successfully avoiding application of the precautionary principle,
industry spokespersons have argued that the existing system is based on
"sound science." But science does not tell us that industry has any right
to put chemicals into the environment that have any risk at all, let alone
telling us what risks are acceptable-these are political decisions. Fur-
thermore, if the chemicals in the environment have not been tested for all
the variables that are relevant to social choices, such as their long-term
effects on immune systems and reproduction as well as any cancer threat,
and the effects of their breakdown products on the environment-and
none of them have been so tested-the political, not scientific, basis of
"sound science" is evident.

The chemical industry has produced, and long denied any harm from,
innumerable products-from tetraethyl lead in gasoline and PCBs in
batteries to asbestos, DDT, and Agent Orange-that are now well estab-
lished as seriously harmful, only withdrawing them (often only from
domestic use) under overwhelming legal and regulatory pressure. For
the products they have wanted to sell, they have always found scientists
who would testify to their harmlessness (or that claims of harm were
not scientifically proven). There has been a consistent sharp difference
between the results of industry-sponsored science and those of inde-
pendent researchers working the same terrain."* And there have been
numerous cases of fraud in industry testing, industry use of testing labs
that arranged the data to find industry products acceptable, and political
manipulation to weaken regulatory standards. '37

Despite these industry abuses of science, the media have largely ac-
cepted the industry's claim that it supports "sound science," in contrast
with its critics' use of "junk, science." From 1996 through September
1998, 258 articles in mainstream newspapers used the phrase "junk sci-
ence"; but only 21, or 8 percent, used it to refer to corporate abuses of

xlviii INTRODUCTION

science, whereas 160, or 62 percent, applied it to science used by envi-
ronmentalists, other corporate critics, or tort lawyers suing corporations
(77, or 30 percent, didn't fit either of these categories). 138 In short, the
media have internalized mdiistr>''s self-legitimizing usage, just as they
have normalized a status quo of caveat emptor (buyer beware) rather
than of safety first.

The media have also regularly gotten on board in dismissing concerns
about chemical threats as unwarranted "scares," such as the alleged scares
over dioxin and the danger of Aiai on apples. But thes-e and other scares
often turn out to be based on genuine health hazards. '3« Meanwhile, the
media rarely report and examine in any depth the frequent evidence of
the inadequacy of regulation and testing and of the real costS of chemical-
ization of the environmenr.WO por example, the International Joint Com-
mission (IIC), a joint Canadian-U.S. venture dating back to 1978, was
given the formidable task of trying to halt the flow oftoxic chemicals into
the Great Lakes. It reports each year that it is failing, and since t992 has
called for the ending of the manufacture of chlorine as essential to fulfill-
ing its task. The national media virtually ignore this appeal, and the IJC's
U.S. cochairman Gordon Durnil has remarked that "we have a societal
problem about how to deal with this, but 90 percent of the population
doesn't even know there is anything to worry about. "J41 We believe that
the propaganda model helps understand this lack ofknowledge.

In the health insurance controversy of 1992-93, the media's refusal
to take the single-payer option seriously, despite apparent widespread
public support and the effectiveness of the system in Canada, served well
the interests of the insurance and medical service complex. 1^2 xhe un-
Clitical media reponing and commentary on the alleged urgency of fiscal
restraint and a balanced budget in the years 1992-96 fit well the business
community's desire to reduce the social budget and weaken reguls-
tion. i''^ Xhe media's gullibiliry in accepting the claim of a Social Security
system "crisis," which would require policy action some thirty-seven
years ahead if certain conservative guesses were true and a number of
easy corrections were ruled out, served the interests ofconservative ideo-
logues anxious to weaken a highly successful government program and a
security industry eager to benefit from the partial or full privatization of
Social Security. 144 The applicability of the propaganda model in these
and other cases, including the media's handling of the "drug wars,"
seems clear,

INTRaDueTION xlix

CONCLUDING NOTE

The propaganda model remains a useful framework for analyzing and
understanding the workings of the mainstream media-perhaps even
more so than in 1988. As we noted above, the changes in structural con-
ditions that underlie the model, and that we believe strongly and often
decisively influence media behavior and performance, have tended to
increase the model's salience. We noted in the Preface to the first edition
and in chapters 2 and 3, in reference to the media's coverage of the wars
and elections in Central America in the 1980s, that the media's perform-
ance often surpassed expectations of media subservience to government
propaganda demands. This was at least equally true of their performance
in covering the 1991 war against Iraq and NATO's war against Yugo-
slavia in 1999, as we have described earlier and briefly in regard to
Yugoslavia and in detail elsewhere, ue

In our conclusion to the first edition, we emphasized that, as the nega-
tive performance effects of the media result primarily from their struc-
ture and objectives, real change in performance calls for substantial
changes in underlying media organization and goals. In the years since
1988, structural changes have not been favorable to improved perform-
ance, but it remains a central truth that democratic politics requires a
democratization of information sources and a more democratic media.
Along with trying to contain and reverse the growing centralization of the
mainstream media, grassroots movements and intermediate groups that
represent large numbers of ordinary citizens should put much more
energy and money into creating and supporting their own media-as
they did with the Independent Media Centers brought into existence
during the Seattle and Washington, D.C., protests of 1999 and 2000.
These, and other nonprofit community-based broadcasting stations and
networks, and a better use of public-access channels, the Internet, and
independent print media, will be essential for the achievement of major
democratic social and political successes.

Notes to Introduction

1. On a number of issues, such as trade agreements, health care, and the
appropriate size of the military budget, there is a sharp division between
media personnel and the elite on the one hand and the general population on
the other hand, as we discuss below under "Further Applications."

INTRODUCTION

2. This was even true in the Soviet Union, where the media's disclosure of
inconvenient facts on the Afghan war caused the Soviet defense minister to
denounce the press as unpatriotic; see Bill Keller, "Soviet Official Says Press
Harms Army," Ncu>York Times, January 21, 1988.

3. For an accounr of critiques, and the present writers' replies, see Noam
Chomsky, Necessary Illusions (Boston: South End Press, 1989), appendix I;
Edward S. Herman, "The Propaganda Model Revisited," in The Myth offhe
LiberalMedia (New York: Peter Lang, 1999).

4- Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, 6th ed. (Boston: Beacon Press,
2000), p. xxi.

5. Ibid.

6. Edward S. Herman and Robert McChesney, The Global Media (London:

Cassell, 1997).

7. Robert McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 2000), p. 108.

8. Ibid., p. 109.

9. James Ledbetter, "Public Broadcasting Sells; (Out?)," 77t« Naiwn, Decem-
ber /, 1997.

10. Ibid.

11. Stephanie Strom, "Japanese Sites for Women Aim for Empowerment,"
New York Times, December 25, 2000.

12. Mark Fineman, "Military Can't Outflank Rebels in War of Words," Los
Angeles Times, February 21, 1995; Leonard Doyle, "Rebels Try to Advance via
Internet," The ItKkpendem^ March 7, 1995.

13. Jim Shultz, "Bolivia's Water War Victory," Earth Island Journal, Septem-
ber 22, 2000; "Bolivia-The Last Word," April 13, 2000, J Shultz® democra-
cyar.org; "How the Internet Helped Activists," Straits Times (Singapore), May
25, 1998; Marshall Clark, "Cleansing the Earth," Inside htdonesia (Octo-
ber-December 1998).

14. Madelaine Drohan, "How the Net Killed the .MAI," Globe andMail, April
29,1998.

15. Kayte Van Scoy, "How Green Was My Silicon Valley," PC/Computing,
March /, 2000; Keith Perine, "Power to the (Web-Enabled) People," Industry
Standard, April lo, 2000. See also "Further Applications" below.

16. James Ledbetter, "Some Pitfalls in Portals," Columbia Journalism Revieio
(November-December 1999)-

17. Quoted in ibid.

18. Alex Carey, Taking the Risk out of Democracy (Urbana: University of Illi-
nois Press, 5997); John Stauber and Sheldon R3inpton> Tmu SIvdga h Good
for You.' (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995); Stuart Ewen, P/?'
A Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996).

19. MarkDowie, "Introduction," Stauber and Rampton, Toxic Sludge.

20. See Stephen Cohen, Failed Cruiade; America and the Tragedy ofPosr-Com-
munist Russut (New York: Norton, 2000). See also Thomas Frank, One Mar-
ker Under God (New York: Doubleday, 2000).

21. Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, Times of the Technoculture (London:
Routledge, 1999), p. 127.

22. Patricia Aufderheide, "Journalism and Public Life Seen Through the
'Net,'" in Aufderheide, The Daily Planet (Minneapolis: University of Min-

INTRODUCTIOK I i

nesota Press, 2000); Joseph Turow, Breaking Up Amen' ca (Chicago: Univer-
siryofChicago Press, 1997).

23. Herman and McChesney, Global Media, chapters.

24. On the ideological messages borne in commercials, see Erik Barnouw,
The Sponsor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), part 2, chapter t.

25. See Robert McChesney, 7efe£timm«tiicQl»ww, Moss Media, and Democracy

(New York: Oxford, 1993).

26. See Herman, Myth ofthe Liberal Mediae pp. 32-33.

27. For some dramatic evidence on the mainstream media's neglect of these
credible sources, see below, pp. 76-79.

28. Peter Galbraith, "How the Turks Helped Their Enemies," New YoA

Times, February 20, 1999.

29. During the 1980s, when Saddam Hussein was a U.S. ally and recipient of
U.S. aid, his use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in Iraq, which killed
thousands in 1988, did not interfere with support by the Bush administration,
which continued up to the moment of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August

30. 1990. See Mark Phythian, Arming Ira^: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly
Built Saddam's War Machme (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997);
Miron Rezun, Saddam Hussein's Gulf Wars: Ambivalent Stakes in the Middle
East (Westport Conn.: Praeger, 1992).

30. The CIA itself designated the 1965-66 slaughters in Indonesia as "one of
the worst mass murders ofthe 20th century" (quoted in Robert Cribb, ed..
The Indonesian Killings 0/1965-1966 [Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no.
21,1991]). The figure of 500,000 victims in this slaughter, given by the head
oflndonesian state security, must be taken as an absolute minimal figure. For
other estimates that run up to 2 million, see Noam Chomsky and Edward
Herman, The Waihmgtvn Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South
End Press, 1979), pp. 20&-9; Benedict Anderson, "Fetrus Dadi Ratu," NcW
Ufi Review (May- June, 2000).

31. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Patrick Moynihan brags
in his autobiography of how back in 1975 he protected Indonesia from any
effective international action that might have interfered with its aggression:
"The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly inef-
fective in whatever measures it took [regarding the Indonesian invasion of
East Timor]. This task was given to me, and 1 carried it forward with no in-
considerable succeSs." He added, without the slightest expression of regret,
that within a few weeks 60,000 people had been killed m this aggression that
he was protecting. A Dangerous Place (New York: little. Brown, 1978), p. 19.

32. For accounts of this shift, seeJohn Pilger, Hidden Agendas (London: Vin-
tage, 1998), pp. 33-34; Chomsky, Necessary Illusions., pp. 109-10. For the ear-
Uer media treatment of Indonesia in East Timor, see Washington Connection,
pp. [29-204.

33. John and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Ajfairs
(May- June 1999), p. 43-

34. UNICEF, "Iraq Surveys Show 'Humanitarian Emergency,'" Press
Release, August 12, 1999.

35. Leshe Stahl interviewing Madeleine Albright, "60 Minutes," CBS News

Transcript, May 12, 1996.

36. Many KLA. and Serb fighters died in Kosovo, and civiUans were killed by

lii INTRODUCTION

NATO bombs and military actions not aiming to kill civilians. See Jonathan
Steele, "Figuies Put on Serb Killings Too High," Guardian (August 18,
2000). For a fuller discussion, Noam Chomsky, A New Generation Drtnvs the
Line (London: Verso, 2000), chapter 3.

37. John Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom (London: Zed, 1999). See
also Arnold Kohen, "Beyond the Vote: The World Must Remain Vigilant
Over East Timor," Washinglon Post, Septembers, 1999.

38. The source is Western investigators on the scene, including U.S. military
personnel: Linds3y Murdoch, "Horror Lives on for Town of Lquica," The
Age (Australia), April 8, 1999; Barry Wain, "Will Justice Be Served in East
Timor?" Wall Street Journal (Asia edition), April 17, 2000.

39. On the importance of Racak as a basis for mobilizing U.S. allies and the
public for war, see Barton Gellman, "The Path to Crisis: How the United
States and Its Allies Went to War," Washington Post, April 18, 1999; Madeleine
Albright referred to Racak as a "galvanizing incident" (quoted in Bo Adam,
Roland Heine, and Claudius Technau, "1 Felt that Something Was Wrong,"
Berliner Zeitung, April 5, 2000).

40. See Edward Herman and David Peterson, "CNN: Selling Nato's War
Globally," in Philip Hammond and Edward Herman, eds.. Degraded Capabil-
ity:The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (London: Pluto, 2000), PI'. 117-19. More
recently, three Finnish forensic experts, who were members of a panel that
examined the fort)' bodies found at Racak, disclosed that their team found
no support for the alleged mutilations by the Serbs, and the data presented
in the article casts further doubt on the claim that all the victims were exe-
cuted. 0. Raina et al., "Independent Forensic AvUot J^ies. in Armed Conflict
Investigation ofVictims from Racak, Kosovo," Forensic SCience International,
vol. 16 (2001), pp. 171-85.) It is a notable fact that the OSeE has not yet seen
fit to release the original forensic report from which this article's data is
drawn.

41. Herman and Peterson, "CNN: Selling Nato's War Globally."

42. Editorial, "Election Risks in Cambodia," New York Times, November 28,
1997-

43. "Gathering Storm in Serbia?" editohs], Vliishmgum Post, September 11,
2000; "Repudiating IVIr. Milosevic," editorial, YfrkTimet^ September 26,

2000.

44. Editorial, "Kenya's Flawed Election," New York Times, December 31,
1997-

45. Editorial, "Mexico's Radical Insider," New YorkTimes, July 3, 1988.

46. Editorial, "The Missing Reform in Mexico," New York Times, August 24,
1991.

47. Editorial, "Turkey Approaches Democracy," New York Times, November
II, 1983.

48. Editorial, "Victories for Voters in Latin America: Uruguay's S/owBoatto
Democracy," New York Times, December I, 1984.

49. Editorial, "A Victory for Russian Democracy," New York Times, July 4,
1996.

50. "And the Winner Is?" Moscow Times, September 9, 2000. See also Matt
Taibbi, "OSCE-The OrganizstioD for Sanctioning Corrupt Elections;' The
Exile, Issue no. 18/99, September 14-28, 2000.

INrRoDucrlON !iii

51. Of the major mainstream media, only the Los Angeles Times addressed its
findings, with the article "Russia Election Chief Rejects Fraud Claims in
Presidential Vote" (September 13, 2000); a title that features the rejoinder of
Russian officials, not the charges themselves. For a discussion of this artide
seeTaibbi, "OSCE".

52. On the overall atrocious mainstream media reporting on the Russian eco-
nomic and social collapse, as well as on the elections, see Stephen Cohen,
Failed Crusade, chapter i.

53. The Soviet Union did undoubtedly mistreat its own and dient-state
peoples, although the treatment of Russians by the Western-backed "refonn-
ers" since 1991 has hardly been an improvement. However the charge of
sponsorship ofinternational terrorism was inflated and hypocritical given the
West's support of its own very impressive terror networks. See Edward Her-
man, The Real Terror Network (Boston: South End Press, X982); Noam
Chomsky; Piraus and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (New
York: Claremont Research, 1986).

54. See Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of the Bul-
garian Connection (New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1986), chapter 5.

55. The only mainstream report on Weinstein's return with "no startling reve-
lations" (i.e., nothing), was R. C. Longworth, "Probe into '81 Pope Attack
Shon of Funds," Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1994.

56. See "The Gates Hearings: Excerpts from Senate Hearing of Nomination
ofC.I.A. Chief," New York Times, October 2, i99i.

57. See Edward S. Herman and Howard Friel, '"Stacking the Deck' on the
Bulgarian Connection," Lies of Our Times (November 1991); Michael Ross,
"Gates Corrupted CIA Intelligence, Ex-Officials Say," Los Angeles Times,
October 2, 1991; Benjamin Weiser, "Papal-Shooting Analysis: Case Study in
Slanting?" Washington Post, October I, 1991.

58. Editorial, "The Fingerprints on Agca's Gun," New York Times, October
30, 1984-

59. Barbara Crossette, "Hanoi Said to Vow to Give M.I.A. Data," New York
Times, October 24, 1992.

60. For mstny years U.S. officials used the claim that Vietnam had nol ac-
counted for all U.S. prisoners of war and M.I.A.s to justify hostile actions
toward that country. This is discussed later in this Introduction, under "Re-
writing Viernam War History," and in the main text, pp. 240-41.

61. Leslie Gelb, "When to Forgive and Forget: Engaging Hanoi and Other
Outlaws," Neti' York Times, April IS, 1993.

62. Quoted in William Buckingham, Jr., Operation Ranch Hand: TheAir Force
and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961-1971 (Washington: U.S. Air Force,
1982), p. 82.

63. See Arthur Westing, ed.. Herbicides in Wbr:The Long-Term Ecological and
Human Consequences (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1984), pp. 5ff; Hatfield Consul-
rants Ltd., Devehpm£?}i of Impact Miltgatiati Strategies Related to ike Use of
Agent Orange Herbicide in cheAluoi liiltey, Viet Nam, vol. 1 (West Vancouver,
B.C., April 2000).

64. Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, p. 127.

65- Cited in Seymour Hersh, Chemical and Biologicai Waifare (Indianapo-
lis: Babbs-Merrill, 1968), p. 153. See also J, B. Neilands et al.. Harvest of

liv INTRODUCTION

Death: Chemical Vfbrfan in Vietnam and Cambodia (New York: Free Press,
1972).

66. First use of chemicals is contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and

food crop destruction violates numerous international rules of war. The latter
was even illegal according to the rules jgid out in the U.S. Army's own field
manual in use during the Vietnam war. See Edward Herman, Atrocitiet in
Vietnam (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1910), pp. 81-83.

67. Harvard University physician Jean Mayer, "Crop Destruction in Viet-
nam," Science (April 15, 1966).

68. AlistairHay, The Chemical Scythe: Lessons of 2^^,yT and Dwxm (New York:
Plenum Publishing, 1982), pp. 187-94.

69. General Assembly Resolution 2603A (XXIV), December i6, 1969,
"viewed with horror" and strongly condemned the U.S. chemical war.

70. Peter Waldman, "Body Count: In Vietnam, the Agony of Birth Defects
Calls an Old War to Mind," Wall Street Journal, December iz.^ 1997.

71. Barbara Crossette, "Study ofDioxin's Effect in Vietnam Is Hampered by
Diplomatic Freeze," New York Times, August 19, 1992.

72. Matthew Meselson, Julian Robinson and Jeanne Guillemin, "Yellow
Rain: The Story Collapses," Foreign Policy (Fall 1987), pp. 100-117; Edward
S. Herman, "The WaJJ Street Journal as a Propaganda Agency," in Herman,
Myth of the Liberal Media, pp. 103-10.

73. Peter Kann, "Clinton Ignores History's Lessons in Vietnam," Wall Street
Journal, September 9 ■. 1992.

74. When Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran and his
indigenous Kurds in the 1980s, the Reagan and Bush administrations made
no protests and continued to treat him as a valued ally. It was only after he

invaded Kuwait in 1990 that he became a menace and his possession of
"weapons of mass destruction" was deemed intolerable. See citations in note
29 above.

75. In 1999, Uoyd Gardner found that the Barnes & Noble Web site con-
tained 1,920 titles on some aspect of the Vietnam war and over S,c>oo out-of-
print and used books on that topic. "Going Back to Vietnam for a Usable
Past," Newsday, November 14, 1999 (a review of Michael Lind's Necessary
War).

76. For this viewpoint, see Michael Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji
Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press,
1975).

77. Robert McNamara, In Rerrospect:The Tragedy atid Lessons ofVietnam (New
York: Vintage Books, 1996).

78. For details and analysis of this onslaught on the people of South Vietnam,
see Eric Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1991);
Chomsky and Herman, Was-huigton Connection, chap. 5; Bernard Fall, "2000
Years of War in Vietnam," Horizon (Spring 1967), reprinted in Fall, Last
Reflections on a Vfiir (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967); Jeffrey Race, War Comes
to Long A" (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Jonathan Schell,
The Military Half: An Account ofDenruciwn :?} Quang Nga! and Quang Tin
(New York: Vintage, 1968).

79. H. Bruce Franklin, "Antiwar and Proud oflt," 7S« Naiw/j, December ii,
2000.

INTRODUCTION Iv

80. Both Time and Newsweek, in their twenty-fifth-anniversary retrospectives
on the war, featured the exit at war's end and the "desperate South Viet-
namese" seeking escape from "the invading North Vietnamese." Douglas
Brinkley, "Of Ladders and Letters," Time, April 24, 2000; also, Evan
Thomas, "The Last Days of Saigon," Newsweek, May I, 2000. A 1995 Wash-
ington Poif editorial speaks ofthe Vietnam war as a "defeat to the Vietnamese.
They bled, died and finally fled in great numbers from a Communist regime.
..." (April 30, 1995), characteristically not allowing the vast majority ofpeo-
pie in South Vietnam to be "South Vietnamese."

81. McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 319.

82. Full analyses of this history, and the lack of evidence, are provided in

H. Bruce Franklin, M.l.A,, or, Mythmaking in America (Brooklyn, N.Y: Law-
rence Hill Books, 1992), and Viernam and Other American Fantaiiei (Am-
herst: University ofMassachusetts Press, 2000).

83. Franklin, Vietnam and Other American Fantasies, p. 183.

84. For a discussion, which stresses the underreported dissident movement
within the armed forces, see ibid., pp. 61-62.

85. M.ichael Lind, The Necessary War (New York: Free Press, 1999).

86. Gardner, "Going Back to Vietnam for a Usable Past."

87. Barry Wain, "The Deadly Legacy of War in Laos," Asian Wall StreetJour-
nal, January 24, 1997; Ronald Podlaski, Veng Saysana, and James Forsyth,
Accidental Massacre: American Air^Dropped Somblers Have Continued to Maim
and Slaughter Thousands of Innocent Victims, Mainly Children, for the Last 2]
Yexirs in Indochina (Humanitarian Liaison Services, Warren, Vr. 1997). These
three authors, who have worked in Laos, believe the official figure of 20,000
annual casualties is too low.

88. Daniel Pruzin, "US. Clears Laos ofthe Unexploded," Christian Science
Monitor, September 9, 1996.

89. Keith Graves, "US. Secrecy Puts Bomb Disposal Team in Danger," Sun-
day Telegraph, January 4, 1998.

90. Quoted in Strobe Talbott, "Defanging the Beast," Time, February 6,
1989-

91. See Ben Kiernan, "The Inclusion ofthe Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian
Peace Process: Causes and Consequences," in Kiernan, ed., Genocide and
Democracy in Cambodia (New Haven: Yale Council on Southeast Asia Stud-
ies, 1993), pp. 199-272.

92. A study sponsored by the Finnish government was titled Kampuchea:
Decade ofthe Genocide (London: Zed, 1984). It included the years 1970-74,
when the United Stares was heavily bombing the Cambodian countryside, as
part ofthe decade of genocide. This study was ignored in the US. main-
stream media.

93. "Cambodia's Dictator," editorial, Waihington Post, February 10, 1998.

94. See Edward Herman, Myth ofthe Liberal Media, chapter 16, "Suharto:
The Fall of a Good Genocidist"; Edward Herman and David Peterson,
"How the New York Times Protects Indonesian Terror in East Timor," Z Mag-
azine Ouly-August 1999). On the massive scale ofthe Suharto killings, see
note 30 above.

95. For these and other citations, see Herman, Myth ofthe Liberai Media,
chapter 16.

Ivi INTRODUCTION

96. Seth Mydans, "Indonesia's Rising Prosperity Feeds a Parry for Democ-
racy," New YorkTimes, June 21,1996.

97. Herman and Peterson, "How the New York Times Protects Indonesian
Terror."

98. Ibid.

99. James Reston, "A Gleam of Light," New York Times, June 19, 1966.

100- David Sanger, "Indonesia Faceoff: Drawing Blood Without Bombs,"

Neiu York Times, March 8,1998.

101. Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1995), pp. 28-29.

102. For a major study, see Steven KuH, "Americans on Defense Spending: A
Study of US. Public Attitudes, " Report of Findings, Center for Study of Pub-
lic Attitudes, January 19, 1996. On public opposition [o excessive defense
spending even during the Reagan era, see Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers,
RightTurn (New York: Hill &Wang, 1986), pp. 19-24.

103. The two major parties offer voters "a clear-cut choice," so there is "no
driving logic for a third-party candidacy this year," according to the editors of
the New York Times: "Mr. Nader's Misguided Crusade," June 10, 2000.

104. Especially after World War II, the military budget, and therefore the tax-
payer, financed a very large fraction of the basic science that underpinned
advances in the aircraft, computer, and electronics industries, the Internet
economy, mostof the biotech industry, and many others.

105. On the public opposition to the NAFTA agreement, see Herman, Myth
of the Liberal Media, pp. 185-86. A Business It^fee^/Harris poll in early zooo
revealed that only 1 0 percent of those polled called themselves "ftee traders " ;
5i percent called themselves "fair traders" and 37 percent "protectionists."
"Harris Poll: Globalization: What Americans Are Worried About," Business
HSfeefe, April 24, 2000.

106. For more extended accounts, see Herman, Myth ofEhe Liberal Media,
chapter 14; Thea Lee, "False Prophets: The Selling of NAFTA,' Briefing
Paper, Economic Policy Institute, 1995; John McArthur, The Selling of "Free
Trade" (New York: Hill & Wang, 2000).

107. Thomas Lueck, "The Free Trade Accord: The New York Region," New

YorkTimes, November 18, 1993.

108. Editorial, "NAFTA's True Importance," New York Times, November x4,
1993-

109. On the refusal of the administration to allow any labor inputs in arriving
at the NAFTA agreement, contrary to law, and the media's disinterest in this
as well as any other undemocratic features of the creation of this and other
trade agreements, see Noam Chomsky, Vdirld Orders Old and New (New
York; Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 164-78.

110. See Herman, Myth afthe Liberal Media, pp. 183-85.

111. Citations from Seth Ackerman, "Prattle in Seattle: WTO coverage Mis-
represented Issues, Protests," EX7R/A. 'Ganuary-February 2000), pp. 13-17.

112. Rachel Coen, "For Press, Magenta Hair and Nose Rings Defined
Protests," EXTRA.' (July-August 2000). An exception at the time of the
Washington meetings and protests was Eric Pooley's "IMF: Dr. Death?"
Time, April Z4, 2000.

INTRODUCTION Ivii

113. See Walden Bello, "Why Reform of the WTO Is the Wrong Agenda"
(Global Exchange; 2000).

114. Edward P. Morgan, "From Virtual Community lOVinual History: Mass
Media and the American Antiwar Movement in the 1960s," Radical History
Review (Fal 12000); Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1980).

115. Rachel Coen, "Whitewash in Washington: Media Provide Cover as
Police MilnarizesL nc," EXTRA.' Guly-August 2000); Ackerman, "Prattle
in Seattle"; Neil deMause, "Pepper Spray Gets in Their Eyes: Media Missed
Militarization ofPolice Work in Seattle," EXTRA! (March- April 2000).

116. Coen, Ackerman, and deMause items cited in note 115.

117. Nichole Christian, "Police Brace for Protests in Windsor and Detroit,"
New York Times, June 3, 2000.

118. CBS Evening News Repon, April 6, 2000.

119. Zachary Wolfe, National Lawyers Guild legal observer coordinator, con-
cluded that "police sought to create an atmosphere of palpable fear," and that
snyone even trying to hear dissident views ran a risk of police violence "just
for being in the area where speech was taking place." Quoted in Coen,
"Whitewash in Washington."

120. See Rachel Coen, "Free Speech Since Seattle: Law Enforcement's
Attacks on Activists-and Journalists— Increasing.'* EXTRA.' November-
December 2000.

121. See Frank Donner, Protectors ofPrivilege: Red Squads and Police Repression
in UrbanAmerica (Berkeley: Universitj' of California Press, 1990); Elizabeth

Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Entcrprhe: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberal-
ism, 1945—60 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994); William Puette,
Through Jaundiced Eyes: How the Media View Organized Labor (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1992).

122. Kim Moody, Woi-kers in a Lean V^rld (London: Verso, 1997), p. 24.

123. Aaron Bernstein, "The Workplace: Why America Needs Unions, But
Not the Kind It Has Now," Business Week, May 23, 1994.

124. See Jonathan Tasini, Lost in the Margins: Labor and the Media (New York:
FAIR, 1990), pp. 7-9-

125. Jared Bernstein, Lawrence Mishel, and Chauna Brocht, "Any Way You
Cut It: Income Inequality on the Rise Regardless of How It's Measured,"
Briefing Paper, Economic Policy Institute, 2000.

126. Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and John Schmitt, The State ofWbrk-
ingAmerica, 2000-2001 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 20CI), p. 120.

127. Marc Miringoff and Marque-Luisa Miringoff, The Social Health of the
Nation: How America Is Really Doing (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999). This study shows that an index of social health indicators moves with
GDP until the mid-1970s, after which GDP continues to grow but a "social
recession" ensues, with only a slight interruption in the early 1990s.

128. See, among others, Gerald Baker, "Is This Great, Or What?" Financial
Times, March 31, 1998; Richard Stevenson, "The Wisdom to Let the Good
Times Roll," New York Times, December 25, 2000. There were, however,
occasional cautionary notes, as in Anne Adams Lang, "Behind the Prosper-
ity, Working People in Trouble," New York Times, November 20, 2000.

Iviii INTRODUCTION

129. Rachel Carson, Stiem Spring (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1962), p. 183.

130. See Dan Fagin and Marianne Lavelle, Toxic Deception: How the Chemical
Jnduitry Manipulalas Science, Bends the Law, and Endangers Your Health
(Secaucus, N.J.: Birch Lane Press, 1996), chapters 4, 5.

131. Joe Thornton, Pandora's Poison: Chlorine, Health, and a New Environmen-
tal Strategy (Camhndgt: MIT Press, 2000), p. 100.

132. Fagin and Lavelle, Toxic Deception^ chapters 4, 5; Edward Herman, "Cor-
porate Junk Science in [he Media," chapter 17 in Herman, Myth olthe Liberal
Media, pp. 240--44.

133. The publicity director of Monsanto, Phil Angell, stated that "our interest
is in selling as much of it [a bie-engineered product] as possible. Assuring its
safety is the ED.A.'s job." Quoted in Michael PoUan, "Playing God in the
G&rd&n," New YorkTimes Magazine, October 25, 1998.

134. At the January 2000 meeting on the biosafety protocol, the U.S. govern-
ment's insistence on WTO "good science," while the European Union was
urging application of the precautionary principle, almost broke up the meet-
ing. Andrew Pollack, "130 Nations Agree on Safety Rules for Biotech Food,"
New York Times, January 30, 2000; Pollack, "Talks on Biotech Food Turn on a
Safety Principle," New Vorh Times, January 28, 2000.

135. For a good discussion of the case for application of the precautionary
principle, see Thornton, Pandora's Poison, chapters 9-1 1.

136. Fagin-Lavelle, Toxic Deception, chapters 3-5; Herman, "Corporate Junk
Science," pp. 232-34, 237-43,

137- Fagin-Lavelle, Toxic Deception^ chapter 3; Herman, "Corporate Junk Sci*
ence,'" pp. 232-34.

138. Herman, "Corporate Junk Science," p. 235.

139. Ibid., pp. 245-48.

140. Ibid., pp, 234-44.

141. Ibid., p. 240; see also Thornton, Pandora's Poison, chapter 9.

142. John Canham-Clyne, "Health Care Reform: Not JoumalititicaHy
Viable," EX7R/A. ' Guly-August 1993); Canham-CIyne, "When 'Both Sides'
Aren't Enough; The Restricted Debate over Health Care Reform," EXTRA!
Ganuary-February 1994); Vicente Navarro, The Politics of Health Policy: The
US. Reforms, I980-I994 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

143. See Bagdikian, Media Monopoly, pp. xxvii-xxix,

144. See Dean Baker and Mark Weisbrot, Social Security: The Phony Crisis
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

145. Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 114-
ZI.

146. Noam Chomsky, "The Media and the War: What War?" in Hamid
Mowlana et i\.,Tri-uynph oflht Image: The Media'i War in ihs- Persian Gulf—
A Global Perspective (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992); Douglas Kellner,
The Persian Gulf TV War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992); Chomsky, The
Nm> Military Humanism (Monroe, Maine; Common Courage Press, 1999);
Edward Herman, "The Media's Role in U.S. Foreign Policy; The Persian
Gulf War," in Herman, Myth of the Liberal Media, chapter 12; Philip Ham-
mond and Edward Herman, eds.. Degraded Capability: The Media and the
KoiovoCrisis (London: Pluto, 2000).

Preface

In this book, we sketch out a "propaganda MODEL" AND
apply it to the performance of the mass media of the United States.
This effort reflects our belief, based on many years of study of the
workings of the media, that they serve to mobilize support for the
special interests that dominate the state and private activity,! and that
their choices, emphases, and omissions can often be understood best,
and sometimes with striking clarity and insight, by analyzing them in
such terms.

Perhaps this is an obvious point, but the democratic postulate is that
the media are independent and committed to discovering and reporting
the tTUth, and that they do not merely reflect the world as powerful
groups wish it to be perceived. Leaders of the media claim that their
news choices rest on unbiased professional and objective criteria, and
they have support for this contention in the intellectual cornrnunity.2
If, however, the powerful are able to fix the premises of discourse, to
decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear, and think
about, and to "manage" public opinion by regular propaganda cam-
paigns, the standard view of how the system works is at serious odds
with reality.)

The s^cia] .imponance of propaganda in what Walter Lippmann
referred to as the "manufacture of consent" has long been recognized
by writers on public opinion, propaganda, and the political require-
ments of social order.'' Lippmann himself, writing in the early 1920S,
claimed that propaganda had already become "a regular organ of popu-
lar government," and was steadily increasing in sophistication and im-
portance. ^ We do not contend that this is all the mass media do, but
we believe the propaganda function to be a very important aspect of
their overall service. In the first chapter we spell out a propaganda
model, which describes the forces that cause the mass media to playa

!X PREFACE

propaganda role, the processes whereby they mobihze bias, and the
patterns of news choices that ensue. In the succeeding chapters we try
to demonstrate the applicability of the propaganda model to the actual
performance of the media.

Institutional critiques such as we present in this book are commonly
dismissed by establishment commentators as "conspiracy theories," but
this is merely an evasion. We do not use any kind of "conspiracy"
hypothesis to explain mass-media performance. In fact, our treatment
is much closer to a "free market" analysis, with the results largely an
outcome of the workings of market forces. Most biased choices in the
media arise from the preselection of right-thinking people, internalized
preconceptions, and the adaptation of personnel to the constraints of
ownership, organization, market, and political power. Censorship is
largely self-censorship, by reporters and commentators who adjust to
the realities of source and media organizational requirements, and by
people at higher levels within media organizations who are chosen to
implement, and have usually internalized, the constraints imposed by
proprietary and other market and governmental centers of power.

There are important actors who do take positive initiatives to define
and shape the news and to keep the media in line. It is a "guided market
system" that we describe here, with the guidance provided by the
government, the leaders of the corporate community, the top media
owners and executives, and the assorted individuals and groups who are
assigned or allowed to take constructive initiatives.* These initiators are
sufficiently small in number to be able to act jointly on occasion, as do
sellers in markets with few rivals. In most cases, however, media leaders
do similar things because they see the world through the same lenses,
are subject to similar constraints and incentives, and thus feature stories
or maintain silence together in tacit collective action and leader-
follower behavior.

The mass media are not a solid monolith on all issues. Where the
powerful are i n disagreement,, there will be a certain diversity of tactical
judgments on how to attain generally shared aims, reflected in media
debate. But views that challenge fundamental premises or suggest that
the observed modes of exercise of state power are based on systemic
factors wiU be excluded from the mass media even when elite contro-
versy over tactics rages fiercely.

We will study a number of such cases as we proceed, but the pattern
is, in fact, pervasive. To select an example that happens to be dominat*
ing the news as we write, consider the portrayal of Nicaragua, under
attack by the United States. In this instance, the division of elite opin-
ion is sufficiently great to allow it to be questioned whether sponsorship

PREFACE Ixi

of a terrorist army is effective in making Nicaragua "more democratic"
and "less of a threat to its neighbors." The mass media, however, rarely
if ever entertain opinion, or allow their news columns to present materi-
als suggesting that Nicaragua is more democratic than El Salvador and
Guatemala in every non-Orwellian sense of the word;? that its govern-
ment does not murder ordinary citizens on a routine basis, as the
governments of E1 Salvador and Guatemala dO;8 that it has carried out
socioeconomic reforms important to the majority that the other two
governments somehow cannot attempt;' that Nicaragua poses no mili-
tary threat to its neighbors but has, in fact, been subjected to continu-
ous attacks by the United States and its clients and surrogates; and that
the U.S. fear of Nicaragua is based more on its virtues than on its
alleged defects. ^° The mass media also steer clear of discussing the:
background and results of the closely analogous attempt of the United
States to bring "democracy" to Guatemala in 1954 by means of a
CIA-sponsored invasion, which terminated Guatemalan democracy fot
an indefinite period. Although the United States supported elite rule
and helped to organize state terror in Guatemala (among many other
countries) for decades, actually subverted or approved the subversion
of democracy in Brazil, Chile, and the Philippines (again, among oth-
ers)> is "constructively engaged" with terror regimes on a global basis,
and had no concern about democracy in Nicaragua as long as the brutal
Somoza regime was firmly in power, nevertheless the media take gov-
ernment claims of a concern for "democracy" in Nicaragua at face
value."

Elite disagreement over tactics in dealing with Nicaragua is reflected
in public debate, but the mass media, in conformity with elite priorities,
have coalesced in processing news in a way that fails to place U.S.
policy into meaningful context, systematically suppresses evidence of
U.S. violence and aggression, and puts the Sandinistas in an extremely
bad light. 12 In contrast. El Salvador and Guatemala, with far worse
records, are presented as struggling toward democracy under "moder-
ate" leaders, thus meriting sympathetic approval. These practices have
not only distorted public perceptions of Central American realities,
they have also seriously misrepresented U.S. policy objectives, an es-
sential feature of propaganda, as Jacques Ellul stresses:

The propagandist naturally cannot reveal the true intentions of

the principal for whom he acts That would be to submit the

projects to public discussion, to the scrutiny ofpublic opinion, and

thus to prevent their success Propaganda must serve instead

as a veil for such projects, masking true intention. i3

Ixii PREFACE

The power of the government to fix frames of reference and agendas,
and to exclude inconvenient facts from public inspection, is also im-
pressively displayed in the coverage of elections in Central America,
discussed in chapter 3, and throughout the analysis of particular cases
in the chapters that follow.

When there is liuJc or no elite dissent from a government policy,
there may still be some shppage in the mass media, and facts that tend
to undermine the government line, if they are properly undersrood, can
be found, usually on the back pages of the newspapers. This is one of
the strengths of the U.S. system. It is possible that the volume of
inconvenient facts can expand, as it did during the Vietnam War, in
response to the growth of a critical constituency (which included elite:
elements from 1968). Even in this exceptional case, however, it was very
rare for news and commentary to find their way into the mass media
if they failed to conform to the framework of established dogma (post-
ulating benevolent U.S. aims, the United States responding to aggres-
sion and terror, etc.), as we discuss in chapter 5. During and after the
Vietnam War, apologists for state policy commonly pointed to the
inconvenient facts, the periodic "pessimism" of media pundits, and the
debates over tactics as showing that the media were "adversarial" and
even "lost" the war. These allegations are ludicrous, as we show in
detail in chapter 5 and appendix 3, but they did have the dual advantage
of disguising the actual role of the mass media and, at the same time,
pressing the media to keep even more tenaciously to the propaganda
assumptions of state pohcy. We have long argued that the "naturalness"
of these processes, with inconvenient facts allowed sparingly and within
the proper framework of assumptions, and fundamental dissent virtu-
ally excluded from the mass media (but permitted in a marginalized
press), makes for a propaganda system that is far more credible and
effective in putting over a patriotic agenda than one with official censor-
ship.

In criticizing media priorities and biases we often draw on the media
themselves for at least some of the facts. This affords the opportunity
for a classic non sequitur, in which the citations of facts from the
mainstream press by a critic of the press is offered as a triumphant
"proof" that the criticism is self-refuting, and that media coverage of
disputed issues is indeed adequate. That the media provide some facts
about an issue, however, proves absolutely nothing about the adequacy
or accuracy of that coverage. The mass media do, in fact, literally
suppress a great deal, as we will describe in the chapters that follow.
But even more important in this context is the question of the attention

PREFACE Ixiii

given to a fact-its placement, tone, and repetitions, the framework of
analysis within which it is presented, and the related facts that accom-
pany it and give it meaning (or preclude understanding). That a careful
reader looking for a fact can sometimes find it with diligence and a
skeptical eye tells us nothing about whether that fact received the
attention and context it deserved, whether it was intelligible to the
reader or effectively distorted or suppressed. What level of attention it
deserved may be debatable, but there is no merit to the pretense that
becaus.e. cjewitin. fiwas. mBJj Iw. ftmnd. in. the. medi/L hjj «l (iiliijfjW. and.
skeptical researcher, the absence of radical bias and de facto suppres-
sion is thereby demonstrated.'*

One of our central themes in this book is that the observable pattern
of indignant campaigns and suppressions) of shading and emphasis, and
of selection of context, premises, and general agenda, is highly func-
tional for established power and responsive to the needs of the govern-
ment and major power groups. A constant focus on victims of
communism helps convince the public of enemy evil and sets the stage
for intervention, subversion, support for terrorist states, an eiiditss
arms race, and military conflict-all in a noble cause. At the same time)
the devotion of our leaders and media to this narrow set of victims
raises public self-esteem and patriotism) as it demonstrates the essential
humanity of country and people.

The public does not notice the silence on victims in client states)
which is as important in supporting state policy as the concentrated
focus on enemy victims. It would have been very difficult for the
Guatemalan government to murder tens of thousands over the past
decade if the U.S. press had provided the kind of coverage they gave
to the difficulties of Andrei Sakharov or the murder of Jerzy Popie-
luszko in Poland (see chapter 2). It would have been impossible to
wage a brutal war against South Vietnam and the rest of Indochina,
leaving a legacy of misery and destruction that may never be over-
come, if the media had not rallied to the cause, portraying murderous
aggression as a defense of freedom) and only opening the doors to
latiitaj'uJsagrccmem wrTcn tiTc cosis lo cile liueresrs triey represent
became too high.

The same is true in other cases that we discuss, and too many that
we do not.

We would like to express our thanks to the following people for their
assistance in the preparation of this book: James Aronson) Phillip Ber-
ryman, Larry Biros, Frank Brodhead, Holly Burkhalter) Donna Cooper,

Ixiv PREFACE

Carol Fouke, Eva Gold, Carol Goslant, Roy Head, Mary Herman, Rob
Kirsch, Robert Krinsky, Alfred McClung Lee, Kent MacDougall,
Nejat Ozyegin, Nancy Peters, Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Karin Wil-
kinSj Warren Wine, and Jamie Young. The authors alone remain re-
sponsible for its contents.

MANUFACTURING
CONSENT

9

A Propaganda Model

MASS MEDIA SERVE AS A SYSTEM FOR COMMUNICATING
messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to
amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the
values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the
institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated
wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfil this role requires
systematic propaganda, i

In countries where the levers of power are in the hands of a state
ti\iyeaacracy;'Liili*iiTt>DOpt)nVfii;"vomrorVi9t:f-i/it'"iiTCarijY v^ri^fl-^oappiO*
meoted by official censorship, makes it clear that the media serve the
ends of a dominant elite. It is much more difficult to see a propaganda
system at work where the media are private and formal censorship is
absent. This is especially true where the media actively compete, peri-
odically attack and expose corporate and governmental maJfea^ance,
and aggressively portray themselves as spokesmen for free speech and
the general community interest. What is not evident (and remains

2

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

undiscussed in the media) is the limited nature of such critiques, as well
as the huge inequality in command of resources, and its effect both on
access to a private media system and on its behavior and performance.

A propaganda model focuses on this inequality of wealth and power
and its multilevel effects on mass-media interests and choices. It traces
the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news
fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and domi-
nant private interests to get their messages across to the public. The
essential ingredients of our propaganda model, or set of news "filters,"
fall under the following headings: (l) the size, concentrated ownership,
owner wealth, and profit orientation ofthe dominant mass-media firms;
(2) advertising as the primary income source ofthe mass media; (3) the
reliance ofthe media on information provided by government, business,
and "experts" funded and approved by these primary sources and
agents of power; (4) "flak" as a means of disciplining the media; and
^) "anticommunism" as a national religion and control mechanism.
These elements interact with and reinforce one another. The raw mate-
rial of news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the
cleansed residue fit to print. They fix the premises of discourse and
interpretation, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first
place, and they explain the basis and operations of what amount to
propaganda campaigns.

The elite domination of the media and marginalization of dissi-
dents that results from the operation of these filters occurs so natu-
rally that media news people, frequently operating with complete
integrity and goodwill, are able to convince themselves that they
choose and interpret the news "objectively" and on the basis of pro-
fessional news values. Within the limits of the filter constraints they
often are objective; the constraints are so powerful, and are built into
the system in such a fundamental way, that alternative bases of news
choices are hardly imaginable. In assessing the newsworthiness of the
U.S. government's urgent claims of a shipment of MIGs to Nicaragua
on November 5, 1984, the media do not stop to ponder the bias that
is inherent in the priority assigned to government-supplied raw mate-
rial, or the possibility that the government might be manipulating the
news,^ imposing its own agenda, and deliberately diverting attention
from other material,' It requires a macro, alongside a micro- (story-
by-story), view of media operations, to see the pattern of manipula-
tion and systematic bias.

Let us turn now to a more detailed examination ofthe main constitu-
ents of the propaganda model, which wiU be applied and tested in the
chapters that follow.

A PROPAGANDA MODEL 3

1.1. SIZE, OWNERSHIP, AND
PROFIT ORIENTATION OF

THE MASS MEDIA:
THE FIRST FILTER

In their analysis of the evolution of the media in Great Britain, James
Curran and Jean Seaton describe how, in the first half of the nineteenth
century, a radical press emerged that reached a national working-class
audience. This alternative press was effective in reinforcing class con-
sciousness: it unified the workers because it fostered an alternative
value system and framework for looking at the world, and because it
"promoted a greater collective confidence by repeatedly emphasizing
the potential power of working people to effect social change through
the force of 'combination' and organized action. "4 This was deemed a
major threat by the ruling elites. One MP asserted that the working-
class newspapers "inflame passions and awaken their selfishness, con-
trasting their current condition with what they contend to be their
future condition- a condition incompatible with human nature, and
those immutable laws which Providence has established for the regula-
tion of civil society."5 The result was an attempt to squelch the work-
ing-class media by libel laws and prosecutions, by requiring an
expensive security bond as a condition for publication, and by imposing
various taxes designed to drive out radical media by raising their costs.
These coercive efforts were not effective, and by mid-century they had
been abandoned in favor of the liberal view that the market would
enforce responsibility.

Curran and Seaton show that the market did successfully accomplish
what state intervention failed to do. Following the repeal of the punitive
taxes on newspapers between r853 and 1869, a new daily local press
came into existence, but not one new local working-class daily was
established through the rest of the nineteenth century. Curran and
Seaton note that

Indeed, the eclipse of the national radical press was so total that
when the Labour Party developed out of the working-class move-
ment in the first decade of the twentieth century, it did not obtain
the exclusive backing of a single national daily or Sunday paper. «

One important reason for this was the rise in scale of newspaper enter-
prise and the associated increase in capital costs from the mid-
nineteenth century onward, which was based on technological

4

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

improvements along with tlie owners' increased stress on reaching large
audiences. The expansion of the free market was accompanied by an
"industrialization of the press." The total cost of establishing a national
weekly on a profitable basis in 1837 was under a thousand pounds, with
a break-even circulation of 6>2O0 copies. By 1867) the estimated start-up
cost of a new London daily was 50,000 pounds. The Sunday Express,
launched in 1918, spent over two million pounds before it broke even
with a ckcuIatiQa of Q.v,ex ^5.0,000.'

Similar processes were at work in the United States, where the
start-up cost of a new paper in New York City in 1851 was 569,000; the
public sale of the St. Louis Democrat in 1872 yielded $456,000; and city
newspapers were selling at from $6 to $18 million in the 1920s.8 The cost
of machinery alone, of even very small newspapers, has for many
decades run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars; in 1945 it could
be said that "Even small-newspaper publishing is big business . . . [and]
is no longer a trade one takes up lightly even if he has substantial
cash-or takes up at aU if he doesn't."9

Thus the first filter-the limitation on ownership of media with any
substantial outreach by the requisite large size of investment-was
applicable a century or more ago, and it has become increasingly effec-
tive over time. '° In 1986 there were some 1,500 daily newspapers, n,000
magazines, 9,000 radio and I,sao TV stations, 2,400 book publishers,
and seven movie studios in. the United States-over 25,000 media
entities in all. But a large proportion of those among this set who were
news dispensers were very small and local, dependent on the large
national companies and wire services for all but local news. Many more
were subject to common ownership, sometimes extending through vir-
tually the entire set of media variants.

Ben Bagdikian stresses the fact that despite the large media numbers,
the twenty-nine largest media systems account for over half of the
output of newspapers, and most of the sales and audiences in maga-
zines, broadcasting, books, and movies. He contends that these "consti-
tute a new Private Ministry of Information and Culture" that can set
the national agenda.

Actually, while suggesting a media autonomy from corporate and
government power that we believe to be incompatible with structural
facts (as we describe below), Bagdikian also may be understating the
degree of effective concentration in news manufacture. It has long been
noted that the media are tiered, with the tOp tier- as measured by
prestige, resources, and outreach-comprising somewhere between ten
and twenty-four systems.'^ It is this top tier, along with the government
and wire services, that defines the news agenda and supplies much of

A PKOPACANDA MODEL 5

the national and international news to the lower tiers of the media, and
rhus for the general puhJic, '* Centralization within the top tier was
substantially increased by the post-World War II rise of television and
the national networking of this important medium. Pre-television news
markets were local, even if heavily dependent on the higher tiers and
a narrow set of sources for national and international news; the net-
works provide national and international news from three national
sources, and television is now the principal source of news for the
public's The maturing of cable, however, has resulted in a fragmenta-
tion of television audiences and a slow erosion of the market share and
power of the networks.

Table i-i provides some basic financial data for the twenty-four
media giants (or their controlling parent companies) that make up the
top tier of media companies in the United States.'^ This compilation
includes: (I) the three television networks: ABC (through its parent.
Capital Cities), CBS, and NBC (through its ultimate parent. General
Electric fGEl); (2) the leading newspaper empires: York Times,

Washington Post, Los Angeles Times (Times-Mirror), Wall Street Journal
(Dow Jones), Knight-Ridder, Gannett, Hearst, Scripps-Howard, New-
house (Advance Publications), and the Tribune Company; (3) the major
news and general-interest magazines: Time, Newsweek (subsumed
under Washington Post), Reader's Digest, TV Guide (Tdangle), and U.S.
News & World Report; (4) a major book publisher (McGraw-Hill); and
(5) other cable-TV systems of large and growing importance: those of
Murdoch, Turner, Cox, General Corp., Taft, Storer,17 and Group W
(Westinghoust). Many of these systems are prominent in more than one
field and are only arbitrarily placed in a particular category (Time, Inc.,
is very important in cable as well as magazines; McGraw-Hill is a major
publisher of magazines; the Tribune Company has become a large force
in television as well as newspapers; Hearst is important in magazines
as well as newspapers; and Murdoch has significant newspaper interests
as well as television and movie holdings).

These twenty-four companies are large, profit-seeking corporations,
owned and controlled by quite wealthy people. It can be seen in table
i-i that all but one of the top companies for whom data are available
have assets in excess of $i billion, and the median size (middle item by
size) is $2.6 billion. It can also be seen in the table that approximately
three-quaners of these media giants had after-tax profits in excess of
$100 million, with the median at $183 million.

Many of the large media companies are fully integrated into the
market, and for the others, too, the pressures of stockholders, directors,
and bankers to focus on the bottom hne are powerful. These pressures

6 MANUfACTURING CONSENT

TABLE 1-1

Financial Data for Twenty-four
Large Media Corporations
(or Their Parent Firms),
December 1986

PROFITS PROFITS
TOTAL BEFORE AFTER TOTAL

ASSETS TAXES TAXES REVENUE

COMPANY ($ MILLIONS) ($ MILLIONS) ($ MILLIONS) ($ MILLIONS)

Advauge

2,500

NA

NA

2,200

Publications

(Newhous*)'

Capital

5,191

%%%

448

4,124

Cities/ABC

CBS

J^TO

.7.

370

4,754

Cox Communi-

1,111

17.

87

743

cations^

Dow Jones &

Co.
Gannett

1,236

331

183

1,135

3,365

540

27'

2,B0I

General Electric

34,591

3,689

2,492

36,725

Hearst^

4,040

NA

215

2,100

(1983)

(1983)

Knight-Ridder

1,947

2.7

140

1,911

McGraw-Hill

1,463

296

154

1,517

News Corp.

377

170

3,822

(Murdoch)-

New York

1,405

2»

132

1,565

Times

Reader's

NA

75-110

NA

1,400

Digest*

(1985)

(1985)

Scripps-Howard*"

NA

NA

NA

1,062

Storer'

1,242

(-17)

537

Ttft

1,257

(-11)

C-53)

500

Time, Inc.

4,230

626

37.

3,762

Times-Mirror

2,929

4«

2,948

Triangles

NA

NA

NA

730

Tribune Co.

2,589

523

293

2,030

Turner

i,904

(-185)

(-187)

570

Broadcasting

U.S. News &

200-1-

NA

NA

140

World Report*

A PROPAGANDA MODEL 7

PROFITS PROFITS

TOTAL BEFORE AFTER TOTAL

ASSETS TAXES TAXES REVENUE

COMPANY ($ millions;) ($ millions;) ($ MILLIONS) (s millions;)

Washington 1,145 205 100 J^15
Post

Westinghouse 8,482 801 670 10,731

NA = not available

t The a$«t tOtal is taken from Forbes magazine's wealth total for the New-
house family for 1985; the total revenue is for media sales only, as reported
Ln Advem:sing Age, June 29, 1987.

I. Col: Communications was publicly owned until 1985, when it was merged
into another Cox family company, Cox Eotifpris^s. The data presented
here arc for year-end 1984, the last year of public ownership and disclosure
of substantial financial information.

J, Data compiled in William Barrett, "Citizens Rich," Fvrbtt, Dec. 14, 1987.

4. These data are in Australian dollan and are for June 30, 1986; at that date

the Australian dollar was worth 68/100 of a u.S. dollar.

J. Data for 1985, as presented in the Nev! York Timtt, Feb. 9, 1986.

5, Total revenue for media sales only, as reported Lq Advniising AgSy June 29,
1987.

7- Storer came under the control of the Wall Street &rm Kohlberg Kravis
Rob«ns & Co. in 1985; the data here are for Decembei i984j tiit last p^iiod
of Storer autonomy and publicly available information.

I, Total revenue for media sales only; from Advtnising Age, June 29, 1987.

9. Total assets as of 1984-S5j based on "Mort Zuckerman, Media's New
Mogul," fiw/K/tft Oct. 14, 1985; total revenue from /^rftwiirin.y 4pi June
29, 1987.

have intensified in recent years as media stocks have become market
favorites, and actual or prospective owners of newspapers and televi-
sion properties have found it possible to capitalize increased audience
s.ize snd sjdvertismg, reveaucfi into multiplied values of the media fran-
chises-and great wealth.^* This has encouraged the entry of specula-
tors and increased the pressure and temptation to focus more
intensively on profitability. Family owners have been increasingly di-
vided between those wanting to take advantage of the new opportuni-
ties and those desiring a continuation of family control, and their splits

8 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

have often precipitated crises leading finally to the sale of the family
interest, i?

This trend toward greater integration of the media into the market
system has been accelerated by the loosening of rules limiting media
c'D.p.c^vi^YiU'CVi;, cTQ?,^-^ffTAT'i!n\pj 'ktiv tvTiWtili by TjOTj-TTifctii^i Compa-
nies. There has also been an abandonment ofrestrictions-previously
quite feeble anyway--on radio-TV commercials, entertainment-
mayhem programming, and "fairness doctrine" threats, opening the
door to the unrestrained commercial use of the airwaves. ^1

The greater profitability of the media in a deregulated environment
has also led to an increase in takeovers and takeover threats, with even
giants like CBS and Time, Inc., directly attacked or threatened. This
has forced the managements of the media giants to incur greater debt
and to focus ever more aggressively and unequivocally on profitability,
in order to placate owners and reduce the attractiveness of their proper-
ties to outsiders,22 They have lost some of their limited autonomy to
bankers, institutional investors, and large individual investors whom
they have had to solicit as potential "white knights. "23

While the stock of the great majority of large media firms is traded
on the securities markets, approximately two-thirds of these companies
are either closely held or still controlled by members of the originating
family who retain large blocks of stock. This situation is changing as
family ownership becomes diffused among larger numbers of heirs and
the market opportunities for selhng media properties continue to im-
prove, but the persistence offamily control is evident in the data shown
in table 1-2. Also evident in the table is the enormous wealth possessed
by the controlling families of the top media firms. For seven of the
twenty-four, the market value of the media properties owned by the
controlling families in the mid-1980s exceeded a billion dollars, and
the median value was close to half a billion dollars.24 These control
groups obviously have a special stake in the status quo by virtue oftheir
wealth and their strategic position in one of the great institutions of
society. And they exercise the power of this strategic position) if only
by establishing the general aims of the company and choosing its top
management. 2S

The control groups of the media giants are also brought into close
relationships with the mainstream of the corporate community through
boards of directors and social links. In the cases of NBC and the Group
W television and cable systems, their respective parents, GE and West-
inghouse, are themselves mainstream corporate giants, with boards of
directors that are dominated by corporate and banking executives.
Many of the other large media firms have boards made up predomi-

A PROPAGANDA MODEL 9

TABLE 1-2

Wealth of the Control Groups of
Twenty-four Large Media
Corporations (or Their Parent
Companies), February 1986

CONTROLLING

HELD BY

FAMILY

CONTROL

COMPANY

OR GROUP

GROUP (ft)

Advance

Newhouse family

Closcdy hc:ld

Publications

Capital Cities

Officers and

20.7 (Warren

directors (ODs)

Buffett, 17.8)

CBS

00,

20.6'

Cox Com-

Cox family

36

municatioas

Dow Jones & Co.

Bancroft-Cox

54

families

Gaanett

00,

i;

Genera] Electric

00,

Under l

Hearst

Hear«t family

33

Knighi-Riddci

Knight and Ridder

18

families

McGraw-Hill

McGraw family

C.20

News Corp.

Murdoch family

4'

New York Times

Sulzberger family

80

Reader's Digest

Wallace estate

NA

managed by

trustees; no

personal

beneficiaries

Scripps.

Scripps heir*

NA

Howard

Storer

00,

8.4

Tift

00,

4.8

Time, Inc.

00,

10.7 (Luce 4.6,

Temple 3.2)

Times-Mirror

Chandlers

35

Triangle

Ajifi^nbe rgs

Closely held

Tribune Co.

McCormick heirs

16.6

Turner

Turner

80

PERCENTAGE OF VALUE OF
VOTING STOCK CONTROLLING

STOCK
INTEREST
(5 MILLIONS)

2,200^

711 ^

551 P
1,900^

1,500'

95"^

]7]P
1,500''
447''

450^

300^
F

450
NA

143'
406*

1,600^
273^
222^

Broadcasting

10

MANUfACTURING CONSENT

PERCENTAGE OF
VOTING STOCK

CONTROLLING

VALUE OF

COMPANY

CONTROLLING
FAMILY
OR GROUP

HELD BY
CONTROL
GROUP C*)

STOCK
INTEREST
(I MILLIONS)

U.S. News & World

Zuckerman

Closely held

1762

Report
Washington Post
Westinghouse

Graham family
ODs

50+

Under I

Sources: P means taken from proxy statements and computed from ttOCk
values as of February 1986; F means taken from Forbes magazine's annual
esiimate of wealth holdings of the very rich.

1. Thc« holdings include Willisim Paley's 8.1 percent and a 12.2 percent
holding of Laurence Tisch through an investment by Loews. Later in the
year, Loews increased its investment to 24.9 percent, and Laurence Tisch
soon thereafter became acting chief executive officer.

2, This is the price paid by Zuckerman when he bought U.S. Neva in 1984.
See Gwen Kinkead, "Mort Zuckerman, Media's New Mogul," Formne,
Oct. 14, 1985, p. 196.

nantly of insiders, a general characteristic of relatively small and
owner-dominated companies. The larger the firm and the more widely
distributed the stock, the larger the number and proportion of outside
directors. The composition of the outside directors of the media giants
is very similar to that of large non-media corporations. Table 1-3 shows
that active corporate executives and bankers together account for a
little over half the total of the outside directors often media giants; and
the lawyers and corporate-banker retirees (who account for nine of the
thirteen under "Retired") push the corporate total to about two-thirds
of the outside-director aggregate. These 95 outside directors had direc-
torships in an additional 36 banks and 255 other companies (aside from
the media company and their own firm of primary affiliation).26

In addition to these board linkages, the large media companies all do
business with commercial and investment bankers, obtaining lines of
credit and loans, and receiving advice and service in selling stock and
bond issues and in dealing with acquisition opportunities and takeover
threats. Banks and other institutional investors are also large owners of
media stock. In the early 1980s, such institutions held 44 percent of the
stock of publicly owned newspapers and 35 percent of the stock of

K PROPAGANDA WODEL H

TABLE 1-3

AFFILIATIONS OF THE OUTSIDE
DIRECTORS OF TEN LARGE
MEDIA COMPANIES (OR THEIR
PARENTS) IN 1986*

PRIMARY AFFILIATION

NUMBER

PERCENT

Corporate executive

39

41.1

Lawyer

8

8.'

Retired (former corporate e:tccutive or banker)

13(9)

13.7 (9.5)

Banker

8

8.'

Consultant

•

'.2

Nonprofit organization

15

15.8

Other

8

8.'

Total

95

100.0

OTHER RELATIONSHIPS

Other directorships (bank directorships)

255 (36)

Former government officials

15

Member of Council on Foreign Relations

20

* Dow Jones & Co.; Washington Post; New York Times; Time, Inc.; CBS;
Times-Mirror; Capital Cities; General Electric; Gannett; and Knight'Rkl-
der.

publicly owned broadcasting companies.'^ These investors are also
frequently among the largest stockholders of individual companies. For
example, in 1980-81, the Capital Group, an investment company sys-
tem, held 7.1 percent of the stock of ABC, 6.6 percent of Knight-
Ridder, 6 percent of Time, Inc., and 2.8 percent of Westinghouse.
These holdings, individually and collectively, do not convey control,
but these large investors can make themselves heard, and their actions
can affect the welfare of the companies and their managers. If the
managers fail to pursue actions that favor shareholder returns, institu-
tional investors will be inclined to sell the stock (depressing its price),
or to listen sympathetically to outsiders contemplating takeovers. These

12 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

investors are a force helping press media companies toward strictly
market (profitability) objectives.

So is the diversification and geographic spread of the great media
companies. Many of them have diversified out of particular media fields
into others that seemed like growth areas. Many older newspaper-based
media companies, fearful of the power of television and its effects on
advertising revenue, moved as rapidly as they could into broadcasting
and cable TV. Time, Inc., also, made a major diversification move into
cable TV, which now accounts for more than half its profits. Only a
small minority of the twenty-four largest media giants remain in a single
media sector. 30

The large media companies have also diversified beyond the media
field, and non-media companies have established a strong presence in
the mass media. The most important cases of the latter are GE, owning
RCA, which owns the NBC network, and Westinghouse, which owns
major television-broadcasting stations, a cable network, and a radio-
station network. GE and Westinghouse are both huge, diversified mul-
tinational companies heavily involved in the controversial areas of
weapons production and nuclear power. It may be recalled that from
1965 to 1967, an attempt by International Telephone and Telegraph
(IIT) to acquire ABC was frustrated following a huge outcry that
focused on the dangers of allowing a great multinational corporation
with extensive foreign investments and business activities to control a
major media outlet." The fear was that ITT control "could compro-
mise the independence of ABC's news coverage of political events in
countries where IIT has interests. "^^ The soundness of the decision
disallowing the acquisition seemed to have been vindicated by the later
revelations of ITT's political bribery and involvement in attempts to
overthrow the government of Chile. RCA and Westinghouse, however,
had been permitted to control media companies long before the ITT
case, although some of the objections applicable to ITT would seem to
apply to them as well. GE is a more powerful company than ITT, with
an extensive international reach, deeply involved in the nuclear power
business, and far more important than IIT in the arms industry. It is
a highly centralized and quite secretive organization, but one with a
vast stake in "political" decisions. 33 GE has contributed to the funding
of the American Enterprise Institute, a right-wing think tank that sup-
ports intellectuals who will get the business message across. With the
acquisition of ABC, GE should be in a far better position to assure that
sound views are given proper attention,-^ The lack of outcry over its
takeover of RCA and NBC resulted in part from the fact that RCA
control over NBC had already breached the gate of separateness, but

A PR.OPAGANDA MODEL 13

it also reflected the more pro-business and laissez-faire environment of
the Reagan era.

The non-media interests of most of the media giants are not large,
and, excluding the GE and Westinghouse systems, they account for
only a small fraction of their total revenue. Their multinational out-
reach, however, is more significant. The television networks, television
syndicators, major news magazines, and motion-picture studios aU do
extensive business abroad, and they derive a substantial fraction of their
revenues from foreign sales and the operation of foreign affiliates.
Reader's Digest is printed in seventeen languages and is available in over
160 countries. The Murdoch empire was originally based in Australia,
and the controlling parent company is still an Australian corporation;
its expansion in the United States is funded by profits from Australian
and British affihates.^s

Another structural relationship of importance is the media compa-
nies' dependence on and ties with government. The radio-TV compa-
nies and networks all require government licenses and franchises and
are thus potentially subject to government control or harassment. This
technical legal dependency has been used as a club to discipline the
media, and media policies that stray too often from an establishment
orientation could activate this threat. ^6 The media protect themselves
from this contingency by lobbying and other political expenditures, the
cultivation of political relationships, and care in policy. The political
ties of the media have been impressive. Table 1-3 shows that fifteen of
ninety-five outside directors of ten of the media giants are former
government officials, and Peter Dreier gives a similar proportion i n his
study of large newspapers." In television, the revolving-door flow of
personnel between regulators and the regulated firms was massive dur-
ing the years when the oligopolistic structure of the media and networks
was being established,

The great media also depend on the government for more general
policy support. All business firms are interested in business taxes, inter-
est rates, labor policies, and enforcement and nonenforcement of the
antitrust laws. GE and Westinghouse depend on the government to
subsidize their nuclear power and military research and development,
and to create a favorable climate for their overseas sales. The Reader's
Digesti Timet Newsweek, and movie- and television-syndication sellers
also depend on diplomatic support for their rights to penetrate foreign
cultures with U.S. commercial and value messages and interpretations
of current affairs. The media giants, advertising agencies, and great
multinational corporations have a joint and close interest in a favorable
climate of investment in the Third World, and their interconnections

14

MANXJFACTURISG CONSENT

and relationships with the government in these pohcies are symbiotic.

In sum, the dominant media iirms are quite large businesses; they are
controlled by very wealthy people or by managers who are subject to
sharp constraints by owners and other market-profit-oriented forces;40
and they are closely interlocked, and have important common interests,
with other major corporations, banks, and government. This is the first
powerful filter that wUl affect news choices.

1.2. THE ADVERTISING
LICENSE TO DO BUSINESS:
THE SECOND FILTER

In arguing for the benefits of the free market as a means of controlling
dissident opinion in the mid-nineteenth century, the Liberal chancellor
of the British exchequer, Sir George Lewis, noted that the market
would promote those papers "enjoying the preference of the advertising
public. "41 Advertising did, in fact, serve as a powerful mechanism
weakening the working-class press. Curran and Seaton give the growth
of advertising a status comparable with the increase in capital costs as
a factor allowing the market to accomplish what state taxes and harass-
ment failed to do, noting that these "advertisers thus acquired a de facto
licensing authority since, without their support, newspapers ceased to
be economically viable."42

Before advertising became prominent, the price of a newspaper had
to cover the costs of doing business. With the growth of advertising,
papers that attracted ads could afford a copy price well below produc-
tion costs. This put papers lacking in advertising at a serious disadvan-
tage: their prices would tend to be higher, curtailing sales, and they
would have less surplus to invest in improving the salability of the paper
(features, attractive format, promotion, etc.). For this reason, an adver-
tising-based system wiU tend to drive out of existence or into marginal-
ity the media companies and types that depend on revenue from sales
alone. With advertising, the free market does not yield a neutral system
in which final buyer choice decides. The advertisers* choices influence
media prosperity and survival. 43 The ad-based media receive an adver-
tising subsidy that gives them a price-marketing-quality edge, which
allows them to encroach on and further weaken their ad-free (or ad-
disadvantaged) rivals." Even if ad-based media cater to an affluent
("upscale") audience, they easily pick up a large part of the "down-

A PROPAGANDA MODEL 15

scale" audience, and their rivals lose market share and are eventually
driven out or marginalized.

In fact, advertising has played a potent role in increasing concentra-
tion even among rivals that focus with equal energy on seeking advertis-
ing revenue. A market share and advertising edge on the part of one
paper or television station will give it additional revenue to compete
more effectively-promote more aggressively, buy more salable fea-
tures and programs-and the disadvantaged rival must add expenses it
cannot afford to try to stem the cumulative process of dwindling market
(and revenue) share. The crunch is often fatal, and it helps explain the
death of many large-circulation papers and magazines and the attrition
in the number of newspapers.

From the time of the introduction of press advertising, therefore,
working-class and radical papers have been at a serious disadvantage.
Their readers have tended to be of modest means, a factor that has
always affected advertiser interest. One advertising executive stated in
1856 that some journals are poor vehicles because "their readers are not
purchasers, and any money thrown upon them is so much thrown
away. "46 The same force took a heavy toll of the post- World War II
social-democratic press in Great Britain, with the Daily Herald, News
Chronicle, and Sunday Citizen failing or abSorbed into establishment
systems between 1960 and 1967, despite a collective average daily read-
ership of 9.3 million. As James Curran points out, with 4.7 million
readers in its last year, "the Daily Herald actually had almost double
the readership of The Times, the Financial Times and the Guardian
combined." What is more, surveys showed that its readers "thought
mare highly of their paper than the regular readers of any other popular
newspaper," and "they also read more in their paper than the readers
of other popular papers despite being overwhelmingly working

class "47 The death of the Herald, as well as of the News Chronicle

and Sunday Citizc-ru was in large measure a result of progressive stran-
gulation by lack of advertising support. The Herald, with 8.1 percent
of national daily circulation, got 3.5 percent of net advertising revenue;
the Sunday Citizen got one-tenth of the net advertising revenue of the
Sunday Times and one-seventh that of the Observer (on a per-thou-
sand-copies basis). Curran argues persuasively that the loss of these
three papers was an important contribution to the declining fortunes
of the Labor party, in the case of the Herald specificaUy removing a
mass-circulation institution that provided "an alternative framework of
analysis and understanding that contested the dominant systems of
representation in both broadcasting and the mainstream press. "48 A
mass movement without any major media support, and subject to a

16 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

great deal of active press hostility, suffers a serious disability, and
struggles against grave odds.

The successful media today are fully attuned to the crucial impor-
tance of audience "quality": CBS proudly tells its shareholders that
while it "continuously seeks to maximize audience delivery," it has
developed a new "sales tool" with which it approaches advertisers:
"Client Audience Profile, or CAP, will help advertisers optimize the
effectiveness of their network television schedules by evaluating audi-
ence segments in proportion to usage levels of advertisers' products and
services."49 In short, the mass media are interested in attracting audi-
ences with buying power, not audiences per se; it is affluent audiences
that spark advertiser interest today, as in the nineteenth century. The
idea that the drive for large audiences makes the mass media "demo-
cratic" thus suffers from the initial weakness that its political analogue
is a voting system weighted by income!

The power of advertisers over television programming stems from
the simple fact that they buy and pay for the programs-they are the
"patrons" who provide the media subsidy. As such, the media compete
for their patronage, developing specialized staff to solicit advertisers
and necessarily having to explain how their programs serve advertisers'
needs. The choices of these patrons greatly affect the welfare of the
media, and the patrons become what William Evan calls "normative
reference organizations, "5o whose requirements and demands the
media must accommodate if they are to succeed.

For a television network, an audience gain or loss of one percentage
point in the Nielsen ratings translates into a change in advertising
revenue of from $80 to $100 million a year, with some variation depend-
ing on measures of audience "quality." The stakes in audience size and
affluence are thus extremely large, and m a market system there is a
strong tendency for such considerations to affect policy profoundly.
This is partly a matter of institutional pressures to focus on the bottom
line, partly a maner of the continuous interaction of the media or-
ganization with patrons who supply the revenue dollars. As Grant
Tinker, then head of NBC-TV, observed, television "is an advertising-
supported medium, and to the extent that support falls out, program-
ming will change. "52

Working-class and radical media also suffer from the political dis-
crimination of advertisers. Political discrimination is structured into
advertising allocations by the stress on people with money to buy. But
many firms will always refuse to patronize ideological enemies and
those whom they perceive as damaging their interests, and cases of

A PBOPACANOA MODEL 17

overt discrimination add to the force of the voting system weighted by
income. Public-television station WNET lost its corporate funding
from Gulf + Western in 1985 after the station showed the documentary
"Hungry for Profit," which contains material critical of multinational
corporate activities in the Third World. Even before the program was
shown, in anticipation of negative corporate reaction, station officials
"did all we could to get the program sanitized" (according to one station
source).53 The chief executive of Gulf + Western complained to the
station that the program was "virulently anti-business if not anti-
American," and that the station's carrying the program was not the
behavior "of a friend" of the corporation. The London £conomi,s/ says
that "Most people believe that WNET would not make the same mis-
take again. "54

In addition to discrimination against unfriendly media institutions,
advertisers also choose selectively among programs on the basis of their
own principles. With rare exceptions these are culturally and politically
conservative. 5^ Large corporate advertisers on television will rarely
sponsor programs that engage in serious criticisms of corporate activi-
ties, such as the problem of environmental degradation, the workings
of the military-industrial complex, or corporate support of and benefits
from Third World tyrannies. Erik Bamouw recounts the history of a
proposed documentary series on environmental problems by NBC at a
time of great interest in these issues. Barnouw notes that although at
that time a great many large companies were spending money on com-
mercials and other publicity regarding environmental problems, the
documentary series failed for want of sponsors. The problem was one
of excessive objectivity in the series, which included suggestions of
corporate or systemic failure, whereas the corporate message "was one
of reassurance. "56

Television networks learn over time that such programs will not sell
and would have to be carried at a financial sacrifice, and that, in
addition, they may offend powerful advertisers.^^ With the rise in the
price of advertising spots, the forgone revenue increases; and with
increasing market pressure for financial performance and the diminish-
ing constraints from regulation, an advertising-based media system will
gradually increase advertising time and marginalize or eliminate alto-
gether programming that has significant public-affairs content, ss

Advertisers will want, more generally, to avoid programs with serious
complexities and disturbing controversies that interfere with the "buy-
ing mood." They seek programs that will lightly entertain and thus fit
in with the spirit of the primary purpose of program purchases-the

18

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

dissemination of a selling message. Thus over time, instead of programs
like "The Selling of the Pentagon," it is a natural evolution of a market
seeking sponsor dollars to offer programs such as "A Bird's-Eye View
of Scotland," "Barry Goldwater's Arizona," "An Essay on Hotels," and
"Mr. Rooney Goes to Dinner"-a CBS program on "how Americans
eat when they dine out, where they go and why."" There are excep-
tional cases of companies willing to sponsor serious programs, some-
times a result of recent embarrassments that call for a public-relations
offset. 6o But even in these cases the companies wUl usually not want to
sponsor close examination of sensitive and divisive issues-they prefer
programs on Greek antiquities, the ballet, and items of cultural and
national history and nostalgia. Bamouw points out an interesting con-
trast: commercial-television drama "deals almost wholly with the here
a.nd now, a.s processed via advertising budgets," but on public televi-
sion, culture "has come to mean 'other cultures.' . . . American civiliza-
tion, here and now, is excluded from consideration. "61

Television stations and networks are also concerned to maintain
audience "flow" levels, i.e., to keep people watching from program to
program, in order to sustain advertising ratings and revenue. Airing
program interludes of documentary- cultural matter that cause station
switching is costly, and over time a "free" (i.e., ad-based) commercial
system will tend to excise it. Such documentary-cultural-critical
materials will be driven out of secondary media vehicles as well, as these
companies strive to qualify for advertiser interest, although there wUl
always be some cultural-political programming trying to come into
being or surviving on the periphery of the mainstream media.

1.3. SOURCING MASS-MEDIA
NEWS: THE THIRD FILTER

The mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with powerful
sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of inter-
est. The media need a steady, reliable flow of the raw material of news.
They have daily news demands and imperative news schedules that
they must meet. They cannot afford to have reporters and cameras at
all places where important stories may break. Economics dictates that
they concentrate their resources where significant news often occurs,
where important rumors and leaks abound, and where regular press

A Pi?OPACANDA MODEL C9

conferences are held. The White House, the Pentagon, and the State
Department, in Washington, D.C., are central nodes of such news
activity. On a local basis, city hall and the police department are the
subject of regular news "beats" for reporters. Business corporations and
trade groups are also regular and credible purveyors of stories deemed
newsworthy. These bureaucracies turn OUt a large volume of material
that meets the demands of news organizations for reliable, scheduled
flows. Mark Fishman calls this "the principle of bureaucratic affinity:
only other bureaucracies can satisfy the input needs of a news bureauc-
racy."62

Government and corporate sources also have the great merit of being
recognizable and credible by their status and prestige. This is important
to the mass media. As Fishman notes,

Newsworkers are predisposed to treat bureaucratic accounts as
factual because news personnel participate in upholding a norma-
tive order of authorized knowers in the society. Reporters operate
with the attitude that officials ought to know what it is their job

to know In particular, a newsworker will recognize an official's

claim to knowledge not merely as a claim, but as a credible,
competent piece of knowledge. This amounts to a moral division
of labor: officials have and give the facts; reporters merely get
them."

Another reason for the heavy weight given to official sources is that the
mass media claim to be "Objective" dispensers of the news. Partly to
maintain the image of objectivity, but also to protect themselves from
criticisms of bias and the threat of libel suits, they need material that
can be portrayed as presumptively accurate.^ This is also partly a
matter of cost: taking information from sources that may be presumed
credible reduces investigative expense, whereas material from sources
that are not prima facie credible, or that will elicit criticism and threats,
requires careful checking and costly research.

The magnitude ofthe public-information operations oflarge govern-
ment and corporate bureaucracies that constitute the primary news
sources is vast and ensures special access to the media. The Pentagon,
for example, has a public-information service that involves many thou-
sands ofemployees, spending hundreds ofmillions of dollars every year
and dwarfing not only the public-information resources of any dissent-
ing individual or group but the aggregate of such groups. In 1979 and
1980, during a brief interlude of relative openness (since closed down).

10 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

the U.S. Air Force revealed that its public-information outreach in-
cluded the following:

140 newspapers, 690,000 copies per week

Airman magazine, monthly circulation 125,000

34 radio and 17 TV stations, primarily overseas

45,000 headquarters and unit news releases

615,000 hometown news releases

6,600 interviews with news media

3,200 news conferences

500 news media orientation flights

50 meetings with editorial boards

11,000 speeches*^

This excludes vast areas of the air force's public-information effort.
Writing back in 1970, Senator J. W. Fulbright had found that the air
force public-relations effort in 1968 involved 1,305 full-time employees,
exclusive of additional thousands that "have public functions collateral
to other duties. "66 The air force at that time offered a weekly film-clip
service for TV and a taped features program for use three times a week,
sent to 1,139 radio stations; it also produced 148 motion pictures, of
which 24 were released for public consumption.''^ There is no reason
to believe that the air force public-relations effort has diminished since
the 1960S.68

Note that this is iust the air force. There are three other branches with
massive programs, and there is a separate, overall public-information
program under an assistant secretary of defense for public affairs in the
Pentagon. In 1971, an Armed Forces Journal survey revealed that the
Pentagon was publishing a total of 371 magazines at an annual cost of
some $57 million, an operation sixteen times larger than the nation's
biggest publisher. In an update in 1982, the Air Force Journal Interna-
tional indicated that the Pentagon was publishing 1,203 periodicals.
To put this into perspectivCj we may note the scope of public-informa-
tion operations of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
and the National Council of the Churches of Christ (NCC), two of the
largest of the nonprofit organizations that offer a consistently challeng-
ing voice to the views of the Pentagon. The AFSC's main office infor-
mation-services budget in 1984-85 was under $500,000, with eleven
staffpeople.''° Its institution-wide press releases run at about two hun-
dred per year, its press conferences thirty a year, and it produces about
one film and two or rhree slide shows a year. It does not offer film cUps,

k FROFAOANDA MODEL 21

photos, or taped radio programs to the media. The NCC Office of
Information has an annual budget of some $350,000, issues about a
hundred news releases per year, and holds four press conferences annu-
ally.71 The ratio of air force news releases and press conferences to
those of the AFSC and NCC taken together are 150 to I (or 2,200 to
I if we count hometown news releases of the air force), and 94 to I
respectively. Aggregating the other services would increase the differ-
ential by a large factor.

Only the corporate sector has the resources to produce public infor-
mation and propaganda on the scale of the Pentagon and other govern-
ment bodies. The AFSC and NCC cannot duplicate the Mobil Oil
company's multimillion-dollar purchase of newspaper space and other
corporate investments to get its viewpoint across.''^ The number of
individual corporations with budgets for public information and lobby-
ing in excess of those of the AFSC and NCC runs into the hundreds,
perhaps even the thousands. A corporate collective like the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce had a 1983 budget for research, communications, and
political activities of $65 million. By 1980, the chamber was publishing
a business magazine (Nation's Business) with a circulation of 1.3 milhon
and a weekly newspaper with 740,000 subscribers, and it was producing
a weekly panel show distributed to 400 radio stations, as well as its own
weekly panel-discussion programs carried by 128 commercial television
stations.^''

Besides the U.S. Chamber, there are thousands of state and local
chambers of commerce and trade associations also engaged in public-
relations and lobbying activities. The corporate and trade-association
lobbying network community is "a network ofwell over 150,000 profes-
sionals,"'* and its resources are related to corporate income, profits,
and the protective value of public-relations and lobbying outlays. Cor-
porate profits before taxes in 1985 were $295.5 billion. When the corpo-
rate community gets agitated about the political environment, as it did in
the 1970s, it obviously has the wherewithal to meet the perceived threat.
Corporate and trade-association image and issues advertising increased
from $305 milhon in 1975 to 5650 million in 1980.'* So did direct-mail
campaigns through dividend and other mail stuffers, the distribution of
educational films, booklets and pamphlets, and outlays on initiatives
and referendums, lobbying, and political and think-tank contributions.
Aggregate corporate and trade-association political advertising and
grass-roots outlays were estimated to have reached the billion-dollar-a-
year level by 1978, and to have grown to $1.6 billion by 1984.77

To consolidate their preeminent position as sources, government and

22 MASUFACTURING CONSENT

business-news promoters go to great pains to make things easy for news
organizations. They provide the media organizations with facilities in
which to gather; they give journalists advance copies of speeches and
forthcoming reports; they schedule press conferences at hours well-
geared to news deadlines; 78 they write press releases in usable language;
and they carefully organize their press conferences and "photo oppor-
tunity" sessions. ''5 It is the job of news officers "to meet the journalist's
scheduled needs with material that their beat agency has generated at
its own pace. "80

In effect, the large bureaucracies of the powerful subsidize the mass
media, and gain special access by their contribution to reducing the
media's costs of acquiring the raw materials of, and producing, news.
The large entities that provide this subsidy become "routine" news
sources and have privileged access to the gates. Non-routine sources
must struggle for access, and may be ignored by the arbitrary decision
of the gatekeepers. It should also be noted that in the case of the
largesse of the Pentagon and the State Department's Office of Public
Diplomacy,Sl the subsidy is at the taxpayers' expense, so that, in effect,
the citizenry pays to be propagandized in the interest of power-
ful groups such as military contractors and other sponsors of state
terrorism.

Because of their services, continuous contact on the beat, and mutual
dependency, the powerful can use personal relationships, threats, and
rewards to further influence and coerce the media. The media may feel
obligated to carry extremely dubious stories and mute criticism in order
not to offend their sources and disturb a close relationship.82 It is very
difficult to call authorities on whom one depends for daily news Mars,
even if they tell whoppers. Critical sources may be avoided not only
because aftheir lesser availability and higher cost of establishing credi-
bility, but also because the primary sources may be offended and may
even threaten the media using them.

Powerful sources may also use their prestige and importance to the
media as a lever to deny critics access to the media: the Defense
Department, for example, refused to participate in National Public
Radio discussions of defense issues if experts from the Center for
Defense Information were on the program; Elliott Abrams refused
to appear on a program on human rights in Central America at
the Kennedy School of Government, at Harvard University, unless
the former ambassador, Robert White, was excluded as a partici-
pant;S3 Claire Sterling refused to participate in television-network
shows on the Bulgarian Connection where her critics would appear.84
In the last two of these cases, the authorities and brand-name ex-

A PROPAGANDA MODEL 23

pens- were successful in monopolizing access by coercive threats.

Perhaps more important, powerful sources regularly take advantage
of media routines and dependency to "manage" the media, to manipu-
late them into following a special agenda and framework (as we will
show in detail in the chapters that follow).85 Part of this management
process consists of inundating the media with stories, which serve
sometimes to foist a particular line and frame on the media (e.g.,
Nicaragua as illicitly supplying arms to the Salvadoran rebels), and at
other times to help chase unwanted stories off the front page or out of
the media altogether (the alleged delivery of MlGs to Nicaragua during
the week of the 1984 Nicaraguan election). This strategy can be traced
back at least as far as the Comminee on Public Information, established
to coordinate propaganda during World War 1, which "discovered in
1917-18 that one of the best means of controlling news was flooding
news channels with 'facts,' or what amounted to official information. "86

The relation between power and sourcing extends beyond official
and corporate provision of day-to-day news to shaping the supply of
"experts." The dominance of official sources is weakened by the exis-
tence of highly respectable unofficial sources that give dissident views
with great authority. This problem is alleviated by "co-opting the ex-
perts"87_i.e., puning them on the payroll as consultants, funding their
research, and organizing think tanks that wiU hire them directly and
help disseminate their messages. In this way bias may be structured, and
the supply of experts may be skewed in the direction desired by the
government and "the market."88 As Henry Kissinger has pointed out,
in this "age of the expert," the "constituency" of the expert is "those
who have a vested interest in commonly held opinions; elaborating and
defining its consensus at a high level has, after all, made him an ex-
pert."89 It is therefore appropriate that this restructuring has taken
place to allow the commonly held opinions (meaning those that are
functional for elite interests) to continue to prevail.

This process of creating the needed body of experts has been carried
out on a deliberate basis and a massive scale. Back in 1972, Judge Lewis
Powell (later elevated to the Supreme Court) wrote a memo to the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce urging business "to buy the top academic repu-
tations in the country to add credibility to corporate studies and give
business a stronger voice on the campuses. "90 One buys them, and
assures that- in the words of Dr. Edwin Feulner, of the Heritage
Foundation-the public-policy area "is awash with in-depth academic
studies" that have the proper conclusions. Using the analogy of Procter
& Gamble selling toothpaste, Feulner explained that "They sell it and
resell it every day by keeping the product fresh in the consumer's

24 MANUFACTUKING CONSENT

mind." By the sales effortj including the dissemination of the correct
ideas to "thousands of newspapers," it is possible to keep debate
"within its proper perspective. "91

In accordance with this formula, during the 1970S and early 1980s a
string of institutions was created and old ones were activated to the end
of propagandizing the corporate viewpoint. Many hundreds of intellec-
tuals were brought to these institutions, where their work was funded
and their outputs were disseminated to the media by a sophisticated
propaganda etfort. The corporate funding and clear ideological pur-
pose in the overall effort had no discernible effect on the credibility of
the intellectuals so mobilized; on the contrary, the funding and pushing
of their ideas catapaulted them into the press.

As an illustration of how the funded experts preempt space in the
media, table 1-4 describes the "experts" on terrorism and defense issues
who appeared on the "McNeil-Lehrer News Hour" in the course of a
year in the mid-1980s. We can see that, excluding journalists, a majority
of the participants (54 percent) were present or former government
officials, and that the next highest category (15.7 percent) was drawn
from conservative think tanks. The largest number of appearances in
the latter category was supplied by the Georgetown Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies (CSIS), an organization funded by con-
servative foundations and corporations, and providing a revolving door
between the State Department and CIA and a nominally private organi-
zation.93 Qn such issues as terrorism and the Bulgarian Connection, the
CSIS has occupied space in the media that otherwise might have been
filled by independent voices. 94

The mass media themselves also provide "experts" who regularly
echo the official view. John Barron and Claire Sterling are household
names as authorities on the KGB and terrorism because the Reader's
Digest has funded, published, and publicized their work; the Soviet
defector Arkady Shevchenko became an expert on Soviet arms and
intelligence because TifnCj ABC-TV, and the New York Times chose to
feature him (despite his badly tarnished credentials).95 By giving these
purveyors of the preferred view a great deal of exposure, the media
confer status and make them the obvious candidates for opinion and
analysis.

Another class of experts whose prominence is largely a function of
serviceabihty to power is former radicals who have come to "see the
light." The motives that cause these individuals to switch gods, from
Stalin (or Mao) to Reagan and free enterprise, is varied, but for the
establishment media the reason for the change is simply that the ex-

A PROPAGANDA MODEL 25

TABLE 1-4

Experts on Terrorism and
Defense on the
"McNeil-Lehrer News Hour,"
January 14, 1985,
to January 27, 1986*

NO. EXCLUDING % EXCLUDING

CATEGORY OF EXPERT NO. JOURNALLSTS JOURNALLSTS

Government official

24

20

24

27

Former government official

24

20

24

27

Conservative think tank

14

11.7

14

15.7

Academic

12

10

12

13.5

Journalist

31

25.8

Consultant

3

2.5

3

3.4

Foreign government official

5

4.2

5

5.6

Other

7

5.8

7

7.8

Totals

120

100

89

100

* This is a compilation of all appearances on the news hour concerning the
Bulgarian Connection (3), the shooting down of the Korean airliner KAL
007 (5), and terrorism, defense, and arms control (33), from January J 4,
1985, through January 27,1986.

radicals have finally seen the error of their ways. In a country whose
citizenry values acknowledgement of sin and repentance, the turncoats
are an important class of repentant sinners. It is interesting to observe
how the former sinners, whose previous work was of little interest or
an object of ridicule to the mass media, are suddenly elevated to promi-
nence and become authentic experts. We may recall how, during the
McCarthy era, defectors and ex-Communists vied with one another in
tales of the imminence of a Soviet invasion and other lurid stories.''*
They found that news coverage was a function of their trimming their
accounts to the prevailing demand. The steady flow of ex-radicals from
marginality to media attention shows that we are witnessing a durable
method of providing experts who wUl say what the establishment wants
said.9i

26 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

1.4. FLAK AND THE
ENFORCERS: THE FOURTH
FILTER

"Flak" refers to negative responses to a media statement or program.
It may take the form of letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, law-
suits, speeches and bills before Congress, and other modes of com-
plaint, threat, and punitive action. It may be organized centrally or
locally, or it may consist of the entirely independent actions of in-
dividuals.

If flak is produced on a large scale, or by individuals or groups with
substantial resources, it can be both uncomfortable and costly to the
media. Positions have to be defended within the organization and with-
out, sometimes before legislatures and possibly even in courts. Adver-
tisers may withdraw patronage. Television advertising is mainly of
consumer goods that are readily subject to organized boycott. During
the McCarthy years, many advertisers and radio and television stations
were effectively coerced into quiescence and blacklisting of employees
by the threats of determined Red hunters to boycoil products. Adver-
tisers are still concerned to avoid offending constituencies that might
produce flak, and their demand for suitable programming is a continu-
ing feature of the media environment. If certain kinds of fact, posi-
tion, or program are thought Mkely to elicit flak, this prospect can be
a deterrent.

The ability to produce flak, and especially flak that is costly and
threatening, is related to power. Serious fiat has increased in close
parallel with business's growing resentment of media criticism and the
corporate offensive of the 1970S and 1980s. Flak from the powerful can
be either direct or indirect. The direct would include letters or phone
calls from the White House to Dan Rather or William Paley, or from
the FCC to the television networks asking for documents used in put-
ting together a program, or from irate offlcials of ad agencies or corpo-
rate sponsors to media officials asking for reply time or threatening
retaliation.'* The powerful can also work on the media indirectly by
complaining to their own constituencies (stockholders, employees)
about the media, by generating institutional advertising that does the
same, and by funding right-wing monitoring or think-tank operations
designed to attack the media. They may also fund political campaigns
and help put into power conservative politicians who will more directly
serve the interests of private power in curbing any deviationism in the
media.

A PKOFAGANDA MODEL XJ

Along with its other political investments of the 1970S and 1980s, the
corporate community sponsored the growth of institutions such as the
American Legal Foundation, the Capital Legal Foundation, the Media
Institute, the Center for Media and Public Affairs, and Accuracy in
Media (AIM). These may be regarded as institutions organized for the
Specific purpose of producing flak. Another and older fiak-producing
machine with a broader design is Freedom House. The American Legal
Foundation, organized in 1980, has specialized in Fairness Doctrine
complaints and libel suits to aid "media victims." The Capital Legal
Foundation, incorporated in 1977, was the Scaife vehicle for Westmore-
land's S12o-million Mbel suit against CBS.100

The Media Institute, organized in 1972 and funded by corporate-
wealthy patrons, sponsors monitoring projects, conferences, and stud-
ies of the media. It has focused less heavily on media failings in foreign
policy, concentrating more on media portrayals of economic issues and
the business community, but its range of interests is broad. The main
theme of its sponsored studies and conferences has been the failure of
the media to portray business accurately and to give adequate weight
to the business point of view,101 but it underwrites works such as John
Corry's expose of the alleged left-wing bias of the mass media. The
chairman of the board of trustees of the institute in 1985 was Steven V.
Seekins, the top public-relations officer of the American Medical Asso-
ciation; chairman of the National Advisory Council was Herbert
Schmertz, of the Mobil Oil Corporation.

The Center for Media and Public Affairs, run by Linda and Robert
Lichter, came into existence in the mid-1980s as a "non-profit, non-
partisan" research institute, with warm accolades from Patrick Bu-
chanan, Faith Whittlesey, and Ronald Reagan himself, who recognized
the need for an objective and fair press. Their Media Mmitar and
research studies continue their earlier efforts to demonstiatc the liberal
bias and anti-business propensities of the mass media.

AIM was formed in 1969, and it grew spectacularly in the 1970s. Its
annual income rose from $5,000 in 1971 to $1.5 million in the early 1980s,
with funding m.ainly from large corporations and the wealthy heirs and
foundations of the corporate system. At least eight separate oil compa-
nies were contributors to AIM in the early 1980s, but the wide represen-
tation in sponsors from the corporate community is impressive. io4 The
function of AIM is to harass the media and put pressure on them, to
follow the corporate agenda and a hard-line, right-wing foreign policy.
It presses the media to join more enthusiastically in Red-scare band-
wagons, and attacks them for alleged deficiencies whenever they fail to
toe the line on foreign policy. It conditions the media to expect trou-

ZS MANUFACTURING CONSENT

ble (and cost increases) for violating right-wing standards of bias.ios
Freedom House, which dates back to the early 1940s, has had inter-
locks with AIM, the World Anticommunist League, Resistance Inter-
national, and U.S. government bodies such as Radio Free Europe and
the CIA, and has long served as a virtual propaganda arm of the
government and international right wing. It sent election monitors to
the Rhodesian elections staged by Ian Smith in 1979 and found them
"fair," whereas the 1980 elections won by Mugabe under British super-
vision it found dubious. Its election monitors also found the Salvadoran
elections of 1982 admirable. It has expended substantial resources in
criticizing the media for insufficient sympathy with U.S. foreign-policy
ventures and excessively harsh criticism of U.S. client states. Its most
notable publication of this genre was Peter Braestfup's Big Story, which
contended that the media's negative portrayal of the Tet offensive
helped lose the war. The work is a travesty of scholarship, but more
interesting is its premise: that the mass media not only should support
any national venture abroad, but should do so with enthusiasm, such
enterprises being by definition noble (see the extensive review of the
Freedom House study in chapter 5 and appendix 3). In 1982, when the
Reagan administration was having trouble containing media reporting
of the systematic killing of civilians by the Salvadoran army. Freedom
House came through with a denunciation of the "imbalance" in media
reporting from El Salvador. '"^

Although the flak machines steadily attack the mass media, the media
treat them well. They receive respectful attention, and their propagan-
distic role and Mnks to a larger corporate program are rarely mentioned
or analyzed. AIM head. Reed Irvine's diatribes are frequently pub-
lished, and right-wing network flacks who regularly assail the "liberal
media," such as Michael Ledeen,108 are given Op-Ed column space,
sympathetic reviewers, and a regular place on talk shows as experts.
This reflects the power of the sponsors, including the well-entrenched
position of the right wing in the mass media themselves.

The producers of flak add to one another's strength and reinforce the
command of political authority in its news-management activities. The
government is a major producer of flak, regularly assailing, threatening,
and "correcting" the media, trying to contain any deviations from the
established Une. News management itself is designed to produce flak.
In the Reagan years, Mr. Reagan was put on television to exude charm
to millions, many of whom berated the media when they dared to
criticize the "Great Communicator. "Ho

A PROPAGANDA MODEL 29

1.5. ANTI COMMUNISM AS A
CONTROL MECHANISM

A final filter is the ideology of anticommunism. Communism as the
ultimate evil has always been the specter haunting property owners, as
it threatens the very root of their class position and superior status. The
Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions were traumas to Western elites,
and the ongoing conflicts and the well-publicized abuses of Communist
states have contributed to elevating opposition to communism to a first
principle of Western ideology and politics. This ideology helps mobilize
the populace against an enemy, and because the concept is fuzzy it can
be used against anybody advocating policies that threaten property
interests or support accommodation with Communist states and radi-
calism. It therefore helps fragment the left and labor movements and
serves as a political-control mechanism. If the triumph of communism
is the worst imaginable result, the support of fascism abroad is justified
as a lesser evil. Opposition to social democrats who are too soft on
Communists and "play into their hands" is rationalized in similar terms.

Liberals at home, often accused of being pro-Communist or insuffi-
ciently anti-Communist, are kept continuously on the defensive in a
cultural milieu in which anticommunism is the dominant religion. If
they allow communism, or something that can be labeled communism,
to triumph in the provinces while they are in office, the political costs
are heavy. Most of them have fully internalized the religion anyway,
but they are all under great pressure to demonstrate their anti-Commu-
nist credentials. This causes them to behave very much like reactionar-
ies. Their occasional support of social democrats often breaks down
where the latter are insufficiently harsh on their own indigenous radi-
cals or on popular groups that are organizing among generally margin-
alized sectors. In his brief tenure in the Dominican Republic, Juan
Bosch attacked corruption in the armed forces and government, began
a land-reform program, undertook a major project for mass education
of the populace, and maintained a remarkably open government and
system of effective civil liberties. These policies threatened powerful
internal vested interests, and the United States resented his indepen-
dence and the extension of civil liberties to Communists and radicals.
This was carrying democracy and pluralism too far. Kennedy was
"extremely disappointed" in Bosch's rule, and the State Department
"quickly soured on the first democratically elected Dominican Presi-
dent in over thirty years." Bosch's overthrow by the military after nine
months in office had at least the tacit support of the United States. ^'^
Two years later, by contrast, the Johnson administration invaded the

JO MANVFACTVltlNG CONSgNT

Dominican Republic to make sure that Bosch did not resume power.

The Kennedy liberals were enthusiastic about the military coup and
displacement of a populist government in Brazil in 1964.112 A major
spurt in rhe growth of neo-Fascist national-security states took place
under Kennedy and Johnson. In the cases of the U.S. subversion of
Guatemala, 1947-54, and the military attacks on Nicaragua, 1981-87,
allegations of Communist links and a Communist threat caused many
liberals to support counterrevolutionary intervention, while others
lapsed into silence, paralyzed by the fear of being tarred with charges
of infidelity to the national religion.

It should be noted that when anti-Communist fervor is aroused, the
demand for serious evidence in support of claims of "communist"
abuses is suspended, and charlatans can thrive as evidential sources.
Defectors, informers, and assorted other opportunists move to center
stage as "experts," and they remain there even after exposure as highly
unreliable, if not downright liars. Pascal Delwit and Jean-Michel
Dewaele point out that in France, too, the ideologues of anticommu-
nism "can do and say anything. "114 Analyzing the new status of Annie
Kriegel and Pierre Daix, two former passionate Stalinists now pos-
sessed of a large and uncritical audience in France,"* Delwit and
Dewaele note;

If we analyse their writings, we find all the classic reactions of
people who have been disappointed in love. But no one dreams of
criticising them for their past, even though it has marked them
forever. They may well have been converted, but they have not

changed no one notices the constants, even though they are

glaringly obvious. Their best sellers prove, thanks to the support
of the most indulgent and slothful critics anyone could hope for,
that the public can be fooled. Noone denounces or even notices
the arrogance of both yesterday's eulogies and today's diatribes;
no one cares that there is never any proof and that invective is
used in place of analysis. Their inverted hyper-Stalinism- which
takes the usual form of total manicheanism-is whitewashed sim-
ply because it is directed against Communism. The hysteria has
not changed, but it gets a better welcome in its present guise.

The anti-Communist control mechanism reaches through the system
to exercise a profound influence on the mass media. In normal times
as well as in periods of Red scares, issues tend to be framed in terms
of a dichotomized world of Communist and anti-Communist powers,
with gains and losses allocated to contesting sides, and rooting for "our

A PROPAGANDA, MODEL 31

side" considered an entirely legitimate news practice. It is the mass
media that identify, create, and push into the limelight a Joe McCarthy.
Arkady Shevchenko, and Claire Sterling and Robert Leiken, or an
Annie Kriegel and Pierre Daix. The ideology and religion of anticom-
munism is a potent filter.

1.6. DICHOTOMIZATION AND-
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS

The five filters narrow the range of news that passes through the gates,
and even more sharply limit what can become "big news," subject to
sustained news campaigns. By definition, news from primary establish-
ment sources meets one major filter requirement and is readily accom-
modated by the mass media. Messages from and about dissidents and
weak, unorganized individuals and groups, domestic and foreign, are at
an initial disadvantage in sourcing costs and credibility, and they often
do not comport with the ideology or interests of the gatekeepers and
other powerful parties that influence the filtering process."^

Thus, for example, the torture of political prisoners and the attack
on trade unions in Tutkey will be pressed on the media only by human-
rights activists and groups that have little political leverage. The U.S.
government supported the Turkish martial-law government from its
inception in 1980, and the U.S. business community has been warm
toward regimes that profess fervent anticommunism, encourage foreign
investment, repress unions, and loyally support U.S. foreign policy (a
set of virtues that are frequently closely linked). Media that chose to
feature Turkish violence against their own citizenry would have had to
go to extra expense to find and check out information sources; they
would elicit flak from government, business, and organized right-wing
flak machines, and they might be looked upon with disfavor by the
corporate community (including advertisers) for indulging in such a
quixotic interest and crusade. They would tend to stand alone in focus-
ing on victims that from the standpoint of dominant American interests
were unworthy, ns

In marked contrast, protest over political prisoners and the violation
of the rights of trade unions in Poland was seen by the Reagan adminis-
tration and business elites in 1981 as a noble cause, and, not coinciden-
tally, as an opportunity to score political points. Many media leaders
and syndicated columnists felt the_same way. Thus information and

32 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Strong opinions on human- rights violations i n Poland could be obtained
from official sources in Washington, and reliance on Polish dissidents
would not elicit flak from the U.S. government or the flak machines.
These victims would be generally acknowledged by the managers of the
filters to be worthy. The mass media never explain why Andrei Sa-
kharov is worthy and Jose Luis Massera, in Uruguay, is unworthy-the
attention and general dichotomization occur "naturally" as a result of
the working of the filters, but the result is the same as if a commissar
had instructed the media: "Concentrate on the victims ofenemy powers
and forget about the victims of friends. "119

Reports of the abuses of worthy victims not only pass through the
filters; they may also become the basis of sustained propaganda cam-
paigns. If the government or corporate community and the media feel
that a story is useful as weU as dramatic, they focus on it intensively
and use it to enlighten the public. This was true, for example, of the
shooting down by the Soviets of the Korean airliner KAL 007 in early'
September 1983, which permitted an extended campaign of denigration
of an official enemy and greatly advanced Reagan administration arms
plans. As Bernard Gwertzman noted complacently in the New York
Times of August 31, 1984, U.S. officials "assert that worldwide criticism
of the Soviet handling of the crisis has strengthened the United States
i n its relations with Moscow," In sharp contrast, the shooting down by
Israel of a Libyan civilian airliner in February 1973 led to no outcry in
the West, no denunciations for «cold-blooded murder,"*^" and no boy-
cotto This difference in treatment was explained by the New York Times
precisely on the grounds of utility: "No useful purpose is served by an
acrimonious debate over the assignment of blame for the downing of
a Libyan airliner in the Sinai peninsula last week."'^* There was a very
"useful purpose" served by focusing on the Soviet act, and a massive
propaganda campaign ensued.I22

Propaganda campaigns in general have been closely attuned to elite
interests. The Red scare of 1919-10 served well to abort the union-
organizing drive that followed World War I in the steel and other
industries. The Truman-McCarthy Red scare helped inaugurate the
Cold War and the permanent war economy, and it also served to
weaken the progressive coalition of the New Deal years. The chronic
focus on the plight of Soviet dissidents, on enemy kilhngs in Cambodia,
and on the Bulgarian Connection helped weaken the Vietnam syn-
drome, justify a huge arms buildup and a more aggressive foreign
policy, and divert attention from the upward redistribution of income
that was the heart of Reagan's domestic economic program.'^' The
recent propaganda-disinformation attacks on Nicaragua have been

A PROPAGANDA MODEL 33

needed to avert eyes from the savagery of the war in EI Salvador and
to justify the escalating V.S. investment in counterrevolution in Central
America.

Conversely, propaganda campaigns will not be mobilized where vic-
timization, even though massive, sustained, and dramatic, fails to meet
the test of utility to elite interests. Thus, while the focus on Cambodia
in the Pol Pot era (and thereafter) was exceedingly serviceable, as
Cambodia had fallen to the Communists and useful lessons could be
drawn by attention to their victims, the numerous victims of the U.S.
bombing before the Communist takeover were scrupulously ignored by
the V.S. elite press. After Pol Pot's ouster by the Vietnamese, the
United States quietly shifted support to this "worse than Hitler" villain,
with little notice in the press, which adjusted once again to the national
political agenda. '^4 Attention to the Indonesian massacres of 1965-66,
or the victims of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor from 1975
onward^ would also be distinctly unhelpful as bases of media cam-
paigns, because Indonesia is a U.S. ally and client that maintains an
open door to Western investment, and because, in the case of East
Timor, the United States bears major responsibility for the slaughter.
The same is true of the victims of srare terror in Chile and Guaremala,
U.S. clients whose basic institutional structures, including the state
terror system, were put in place and maintained by, or with crucial
assistance from, U.S. power, and who remain U.S. client states. Propa-
ganda campaigns on behalf ofthese victims would conflict with govern-
ment-business-military interests and, in our model, would not be able
to pass through the filtering system, '^s

Propaganda campaigns may be instituted either by the government
or by one or more of the top media firms. The campaigns to discredit
the government of Nicaragua, to support the Salvadoran elections as
an exercise in legitimizing democracy, and to use the Soviet shooting
down of the Korean airliner KAL do? as a means of mobilizing public
suppOrt for the arms buildup, were instituted and propelled by the
government. The campaigns to publicize the crimes of Pol Pot and the
alleged KGB plot to assassinate the pope were initiated by the Reader's
Digesu. with strong follow-up support from NBC-TV, the New York
Times, and other major media companies. '^6 Some propaganda cam-
paigns are jointly initiated by government and media; all of them re-
quire the collaboration of the mass media. The secret of the
unidirectionality of the politics of media propaganda campaigns is the
multiple filter system discussed above: the mass media wUl allow any
stories that are hurtful to large interests to peter out quickly, i f they
surface at all.

34

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

For stories that are usefuly the process will get under way with a series
of government leaks, press conferences, white papers, etc., or with one
or more of the mass media starting the ball rolling with such articles
as Barron and Paul's "Murder of a Gentle Land" (Cambodia), or Claire
Sterling's "The Plot to Kill the Pope," both in the Reader's Digest. If
the other major media like the story, they will follow it up with the-ir
own versions, and the matter quickly becomes newsworthy by familiar-
ity. If the articles are written in an assured and convincing style, are
subject to no criticisms or alternative interpretations in the mass media,
and command support by authority figures, the propaganda themes
quickly become established as true even without real evidence. This
tends to close out dissenting views even more comprehensively, as they
would now conflict with an already established popular belief. This in
turn opens up further opportunities for still more inflated claims, as
these can be made without fear of serious repercussions. Similar wild
assertions made in contradiction of official views would elicit powerful
flak, so that such an inflation process would be controlled by the gov-
ernment and the market. No such protections exist with system-sup-
portive claims; there, flak wUl tend to press the media to greater hysteria
in the face of enemy evil. The media not only suspend critical judgment
and investigative zeal, they compete to find ways of putting the newly
established truth in a supportive light. Themes and facts-even careful
and well-documented analyses-that are incompatible with the now
institutionalized theme are suppressed or ignored. If the theme col-
lapses of its own burden of fabrications, the mass media wiU quietly fold
their tents and move on to another topic. 12s

Using a propaganda model, we would not only anticipate definitions
of worth based on utility, and dichotomous attention based on the same
criterion, we would also expect the news stories about worthy and
unworthy victims (or enemy and friendly states) to differ in quality.
That is, we would expect official sources of the United States and its
client regimes to be used heavily-and uncritically-in connection with
one's own abuses and those of friendly governments, while refugees and
other dissident sources will be used in dealing with enemies. We
would anticipate the uncritical acceptance of certain premises in deal-
ing with self and friends-such as that one's own state and leaders seek
peace and democracy, oppose terrorism, and tell the truth-premises
which will not be applied in treating enemy states. We would expect
different criteria of evaluation to be employed, so that what is villainy
in enemy states wUl be presented as an incidental background fact in
the case of oneself and friends, do What is on the agenda in treating one
case will be off the agenda in discussing the other. i3i We would also

A PROPAGANDA MODEL

35

expect great investigatory zeal in the search for enemy villainy and the
responsibility of high officials for abuses in enemy states, but dimin-
ished enterprise in examining such matters in connection with one's
own and friendly states.

The quality of coverage should also be displayed more directly and
crudely in placement, headlining, word usage, and other modes of
mobilizing interest and outrage. In the opinion columns, we would
anticipate sharp restraints on the range of opinion allowed expression.
Our hypothesis is that worthy victims will be featured prominently and
dramatically, that they wiU be humanized, and that their victimization
win receive the detail and context in story construction that wUl gener-
ate reader interest and sympathetic emotion. In contrast, unworthy
victims will merit only slight detail, minimal humanization, and little
context that wiU excite and enrage.

Meanwhile, because of the power of establishment sources, the flak
machines, and anti-Communist ideology, we would anticipate outcries
that the worthy victims are being sorely neglected, that the unworthy
are treated with excessive and uncritical generosity, 132 that the media's
liberal, adversarial (if not subversive) hostility to government explains
our difficulties in mustering support for the latest national venture in
counterrevolutionary intervention.

In sum, a propaganda approach to media coverage suggests a system-
atic and highly political dichotomization in news coverage based on
serviceabihty to important domestic power interests. This should be
observable in dichotomized choices of story and in the volume and
quality of coverage. In the chapters that follow we wiU see that such
dichotomization in the mass media is massive and systematic: not only
are choices for publicity and suppression comprehensible in terms of
system advantage, but the modes of handling favored and inconvenient
materials (placement, tone, context, fullness oftreatment) differ in ways
that serve political ends.

2

Worthy and
Unworthy Victims

A. PROPAGANDA SYSTEM WILL CONSISTENTLY PORTRAY PEOPLE
abused in enemy states as worthy victims, whereas those treated with
equal or greater severity by its own government or clients will be
unworthy. The evidence of worth may be read from the extent and
character of attention and indignation. We will show in this chapter that
the U.S. mass media's practical definitions afworth are political in the
extreme and fit well the expectations of a propaganda model. While this
differential treatment occurs on a large scale, the media, intellectuals,
and public are able to remain unconscious of the fact and maintain a
high moral and self-righteous tone. This is evidence of an extremely
effective propaganda system.

2.1. JERZY' POPIELUSZKO
VERSUS A HUNDREE) RELIGIOUS
VICTIMS IN LATIN AMERICA

A useful comparison can be made between the mass media's treatment
of Jerzy Popieluszko, a Polish priest murdered by the Polish police in

38 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

October 1984, and the media's coverage of priests murdered within the
U.S. sphere of influence. In our model, Popieluszko, murdered in an
enemy state, will be a worthy victim, whereas priests murdered in our
client states in Latin America will be unworthy. The former may be
expected to elicit a propaganda outburst by the mass media; the latter
will Qat g,eiiu%xc sustuned cQveiag.e.

2.1.1. Quantitative aspects of
coverage.

Table 2-1 shows, on row t, the coverage of Popieluszko's murder and
the trial of his murderers by the New York Times, Time and Newsweek,
and CBS News. Rows 2 through 5 summarize the coverage in the same
media given to religious personnel murdered in Latin America by
agents of U.S. client states Row 2 shows the coverage given seventy-
two individuals in a list of Latin American religious "martyrs" named
by Penny Lernoux in her book Cry of the People; row 3 describes media
coverage of twenty-three priests, missionaries, and other religious
workers murdered in Guatemala between January 1980 and February
1985. Row 4 summarizes the coverage of the murder of Archbishop
Oscar Romero, of £1 Salvador, shot by an assassin in March 1980. Row
5 shows the level of media coverage of four U.S. women religious
workers, murdered in £1 Salvador in December 1980.

The coverage of the Popieluszko murder not only dwarfs that of the
unworthy victims, it constitutes a major episode of news management
and propaganda. Nothing comparable can be found for victims within
the free world. 2 It can be seen that the New York Times featured the
Popieluszko case on its front page on ten different occasions, and the
intensity of coverage assured that its readers would know who Popie-
luszko was, that he had been murdered, and that this sordid violence
had occurred in a Communist state. By contrast, the public would not
have seen mention of the names of Father Augusto Ramirez Monast-
erio, father superior of the Franciscan order in Guatemala, murdered
in November 1983, or Father Miguel Angel Montufar, a Guatemalan
priest who disappeared in the same month that Popieluszko was killed
in Poland, or literally dozens of other rehgious murder victims in the
Latin American provinces, who were sometimes given substantial cov-
erage in the local press of the countries in which the murders took
place.

In fact, none of the extremely prominent victims of murder in Latin

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 39

America, including Archbishop Romero and the four American church-
women, received anywhere near the attention accorded Popieluszko.
We will show below that the quality of treatment of the worthy and
unworthy victims also differed sharply. While the coverage of the wor-
thy victim was generous with gory details and quoted expressions of
outrage and demands for justice, the coverage of the unworthy victims
was low-keyed, designed to keep the lid on emotions and evoking
regretful and philosophical generalities on the omnipresence of vio-
lence and the inherent tragedy ofhuman hfe. This qualitative difference
is already apparent in placement and editorializing: ten front-page
articles on Popieluszko is a statement about importance, as is the fact
of three editorials denouncing the Poles, without a single editorial
denunciation for the murderers of the unworthy victims.

By comparing rows i and 6 of table 2-1, we can see that for every
media category the coverage of the worthy victim, Popieluszko, ex-
ceeded that of the entire set of one hundred unworthy victims taken
together. We suspect that the coverage of Popieluszko may have ex-
ceeded that of aU the many hundreds of religious victims murdered in
Latin America since World War 11, as the most prominent are included
in our hundred. From the table we can also calculate the relative wor-
thiness of the world's victims, as measured by the weight given them
by the U.S. mass media. The worth of the victim Popieluszko is valued
at somewhere between 137 and 179 times that of a victim in the U.S.
client states;3 or,looking at the matter in reverse, a priest murdered in
Latin America is worth less than a hundredth of a priest murdered in
Poland.

The claim is sometimes made that unworthy victims are so treated
by the U.S. mass media because they are killed at a great distance, and
are so unlike ourselves that they are easy to disregard. * Poland, how-
ever, is farther away than Central America, and its cultural and business
links with the United States are not as great as those of Latin American
countries in general. Three of the rehgious victims among the twenty-
three murdered in Guatemala (row 3) were American citizens, a consid-
eration that failed to light a fire under the media. Even the four
American churchwomen raped and murdered by members of the Sal-
vadoran National Guard failed to elicit attention comparable with that
accorded Popieluszko. Their relative valuation by the New York Times
was less than a tenth that of the Polish priest, and we will show later
that the coverage of these American victims displayed considerably less
outrage and passion than that of Popieluszko.^

The coverage of Popieluszko was somewhat inflated by the fact that
his murderers were quickly tried, and in a trial that American reporters

TABLE 2-1

Mass-Media Coverage of Worthy and Unworthy Victims (1):
A Murdered Polish Priest versus One Hundred Murdered

Religious in Latin America

NEW YORK TIMES

Articles

No. 9b

row

inches

No. ft

row

Front-

P.as'

articles

of No. %„f

I T row T

Editorials'
No. ft

row

TIME and NEWSWEEK

Articles !

Column
inches

No. %

of

No.

row

* of

row 1

CBS NEWS

No. of
No. of evening
news news
programs' programs

No. % of No. * of
row I row I

1. Jerzy

Popieluszko,
murdered on
Oct, 19, 1984

2. 72 religious

victims in
Latin Am«rie4,
1964-78)

78 (100) 1183.0 (100) 10 (100)

3 (100) I 16 (100) 313.0 (100)

46 (100) 23 (100)

8 (10.3) 117.5 (9.9) I

(10)

16

(5.1)

3.

23 religious,
murdered in

Guatemala Jan.
19SQ-Feb. 1985*

7

(••0)

" .5

(5 ')

-1

2

(12.5)

34.0

(10 ')

1

2

(4.3)

2

(8 7)

4.

Oscar Romero,
murdered

II

(20.5)

219.0

(IS.5)

• (40)

-1

3

(IS.S)

S6.5

(27.6)

1

13

(2S.3)

•

(17.4)

Mar. IS, 19S0

-1

5.

4 U.S. religious
women, murdered
in EI Salvador,

2.

(33.3)

201.5

(17.0)

3 (30)

3

(31.2)

111.0

(35.5)

1

22

(47.S)

10

(43.5)

Dec. 2, 19S0

-1

6.

Total of
lines 2-5

57

(73.1)

604,5

(51.1)

8 (80)

10

(62.5)

247.5

(79.1)

1

37

(S0.4)

16

(69.6)

1. The media covengt for an 18<inonih period from the time of the first report of the victim's disappearance or murder.

1, Listed in Penny Lemoui:, Cry olehe People (New York: Doubleday, 19S0), pp. A6A~65. We hsve omitted the names of SKven
manyrs who had joined the guerrillas. Lemoui points out that her list is far from complctCj and is composed of only the
better-known victims.

J. The CBS Newi Index begin* in 1975; our blank figure for this category does not cover earlier years.

4: This is a panial listing only, laktn from tabulations of "Religious Killed or 'Disappeared' in Guatemala," put out
periodically by CONFREGUA: Con/erencM <U Religioios de Gvalfmala,

42 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

could freely report. Almost every murder of the Latin American victims
was carried out by official or paramilitary forces in crimes that were
never investigated or prosecuted under law, and were on occasion even
subject to active official cover-ups (as we describe below in connection
with Romero and the four churchwomen). Only in the case of the four
murdered American women, in El Salvador, was there sufficient pres-
sure to force some kind of investigation and legal process. As we will
see, this legal process was barely noted by the mass media (in contrast
with their intense interest in the Popieluszko trial), and the press did
not comment upon or explore the significance of the fact that there was
a relatively serious trial in "totalitarian" Poland, while state murders
were being carried out on a daily basis without any investigations or
trials of the murderers in a number of countries within the U.S. sphere
of influence called "fledgling democracies."

2.1.2. Coverage of the Popieluszko

case

Jerzy Popieluszko was an activist priest and a strong supporter of the
Solidarity movement in Poland. In an effort to eliminate or intimidate
him, members of the Polish secret police abducted him on October 19,
1984. He was bestcDj bound, and gagged, and eventually thrown into
a reservoir. His body was found several days later. In the furor that
ensued, the police directly involved in the killing were quickly identi-
fied and were eventually tried and given stiff jail sentences. As we have
seen, the level of attention given to the case in the United Sfates was
very great. The quality of coverage was also extremely well designed
to score political points, and contrasts sharply with the quality of
coverage of unworthy victims.

2.1.2(a). Fullness and reiteration of the details of the murder and
the damage inflicted on the victim. The coverage of the Popieluszko
murder was notable for the fullness of the details regarding his treat-
ment by the police and the condition of the recovered body. What is
more, these details were repeated at every opportunity. The condition
of the body was described at its recovery, at the trial when the medical
evidence was presented, and during the testimony of the perpetrators
of the crime. ^ At the trial, the emotional strain and guilt manifested by
the police officers were described time and again, interspersed with the
description of how Popieluszko pleaded for his life, and evidence of the

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 43

brutality of the act. Numerous unflattering photos of the policemen on
trial were presented, adding dramatic detail in support of the image of
police viciousness. In the courtroom, the guilty police sit, one with "a
nervous tic on the right side of his face [that] caused his dark mustache
to twitch uncontrollably," with "tear- filled testimony [that] gave the
trial some of its most dramatic moments" [Time, Feb. 18, 1985). The
pohce weep openly or bow their heads in the face of the grisly evidence.
Popieluszko himself was humanized, with descriptions of his physical
characteristics and personality that made him into something more than
a distant victim.'' In sum, the act of violence and its effects on Popie-
luszko were presented in such a way as to generate the maximum
emotional impact on readers. The act was vicious and deserved the
presentation it received. The acts against the unworthy victims were
also vicious, but they were treated very differently.

2.1.2(b). Stress on indignation, shock, and demands for justice. In

a large proportion of the articles on the Popieluszko murder there are
quotations or assertions of outrage, indignation, profound shock, and
mourning, and demands that justice be done. Steady and wholly sympa-
thetic attention is given to demonstrators, mourners, weeping people,
work stoppages, masses held in honor of the victim, and expressions of
outrage, mainly by nonofficial sources. The population "continues to
mourn," "public outrage mounted," the pope is deeply shaken, and
even Jaruzelski condemns the action. The net effect ofthis day-in-day-
out repetition of outrage and indignation was to call very forcible
attention to a terrible injustice, to put the Polish government on the
defensive, and, probably, to contribute to remedial action.

2.1.2(c). The search for responsibility at the top. In article after
article, the U.S. media raised the question: how high up was the act
known and approved? By our count, eighteen articles in the New York
Times stressed the question of higher responsibility, often with aggres-
sive headlines addressed to that point. ^ A number of articles bring in
a Soviet link ("Lawyer Seemingly [sic] Implies a Soviet Link in Slaying
of Priest" Uan. 31, I985]), and Michael Kaufman, of the Times, twice
manages to drag in the plot to kih the pope, which the U.S. press, led
by the New York Times, had been trying to tie in with the Soviets and
Bulgarians. 5 These links to the Soviet Union and the Bulgarian Con-
nection are established by finding someone who says what the reporter
and his paper want to dredge up — in no case was there a trace of
supportive evidence.

Time, Newsweek and CBS News played the same game of aggres-

44 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

sively ralsmg questions about "Hints of a Contract from the Top"

(Time) and "Keeping the Lid on Murder" (NewsweekX and Time raised
questions about possible Soviet involvement as well as the Bulgarian
Connection.

2.1.2(d). Conclusions and follow-up. TheA'w York Times had three
editorials on the Popieluszko case. In each it focused on the responsi-
bility of the higher authorities and the fact that "A police state is
especially responsible for the actions of its police" ("Murderous Po-
land:' Oct. 30, 1984). It freely applied words like "thuggery," "shame-
less," and "crude" to the Polish state. The fact that police officers were
quickly identified, tried, and convicted it attributed to the agitation at
home and abroad that put a limit on villainy. This is a good point, and
one that we stress throughout this book: villainy may be constrained by
intense publicity. But we also stress the corresponding importance of
a refusal to publicize and the leeway this gives murderous clients under
the protection of the United States and its media, where the impact of
publicity would be far greater, lo The Times also fails to note the con-
trast between murderous Poland and murderous EI Salvador-in the
latter country, no murders of Salvadorans by the security forces or the
death squads connected to them have ever resulted in a trial. The
absence of such a comparison, as well as the failure of the Times to
produce an editorial entitled "Murderous El Salvador," illustrates how
a serviceable terrorism is protected in a propaganda mode, ii

2.2. RUTILIO GRANDE AND THE
UNWORTHY SEVENTY. TWO

As shown on table 2-1, the unworthy seventy-two on Penny Lernoux's
list of martyrs were subject to a grand total of eight articles in the New
York Times, one in Newsweek, and none in Time, and they were never
mentioned on CBS News in the years of index coverage (1975-78). A
total of seven names on the Lernoux list were mentioned in the eight
Times articles, and two different ones were discussed in Newsweek,
which means that sixty-three of the murders were blacked out entirely
in these important media vehicles. None of the eight articles in the New
York Times had any details or dramatic quality that might evoke sympa-
thetic emotion. They described the murders as remote events in a
distant world (see the Times's description of the murder of Michael

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY ViCTIMS

45

Jerome Cypher, in table 2-2). But that is a matter of editorial choice.
The drama is there for the asking-only the press concern is missing.

TABLE 2.2

The Savageries Inflicted on Worthy
and Unworthy Victims, as Depicted
in the New York Times

WORTHY VICTIMS
J6rzy Popieluaeko, a Polish priest, murdered on October 19, 1984,

(1) Account al finding of body: "The sources who saw the priest's body on Tuesday,
said it was badly bruised, indicating he had been beaten after he was kidnapped on a

highway near the town of Torun. The autopsy also showed that Father Popicjuszko
had been gagged at Ihe mouth and apparently tied with a rope from neck to feel so
that if he struggled he would strsngle himself, they said. The sources said they could
not coofim repons quoting members of the slain priest's family as saying he had
suffered tcjuries to his jaw and skull" (Dec. 29, 1984).

(2) Account at trial of murderers: "The film showed clearly that the priest's b^nt legs
were tied to a noose around his neck in such a way that ifhe straightened them he would
be strangled. The rope binding his hands had evidently come loose in the water. Several
gags had also worked free and lay covering his clerical collar and the front of his
cassock. From his legs hung a sack of rocks that, according to earlier testimony, had
been carried aU aver Poland for the week that [he three 3$saL/ants were pursuing [he
priest. When the cameras were trained on the priest's face, the narration by a police
officer at the reservoir declared that 'there are clear signs of beating.' This was con-
firmed by medical evidence offered Thursday by Dr. Maria Byrdy, a pathologist, who
said Father Popieluszko had been sTruck more than a dozen times with a club" Gan.
26, 1985).

UNWORTHY VICTIMS

MichaelJerome Cypher, an fimerian priest murdered in Honduras.

"The bodies were found in a dynamited well on an eastern Honduran estate "

Guly 19, 1975). Note: There was no arrest or trial.

Jaiin4 AldnOf a Spanish priest of the Catholic Action Workers movement,
following his arrest in Chile:

"Several days later a body with 10 bullet holes in the back was found in the Mapocho
River. A Spanish consul identified the body as that of Father Alcina" (Oct. 1, 1973).
NOle: There was no arrest or trial.

46 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Archbishop Oscar Amollo Romero, murdeml in EI Salvador on March 24,

1980:

"Archbishop Romero was killed by a saiptr who gOt out of a red car, apparently stood
just insidt the door of the Chapel of the Divine Providence Hospital, fired a single shot
at the prelate and fled. The bullet struck the archbishop in the heart, according to a
doctor at the hospital where the prelate was taken" (Mar. 25, 1980). AbMr There was

no arrest or trial.

Maria Sosario Godoy de Cutotu, st<:rtUry of the Mutual Support Group,
murdered in Guatem.ala on April 4^ 1985:

"The body of the secretary of the Support Group for Families of the Detained and
Disappeared in Guatemala was found Friday in a ravine nine miles south of Guatemala
City, according to a spokesman for the group. The bodies of her brother and young
son were also in the car" (Apr. 7, 1985, p. 5).* Note: There was co arrest or trial.

Jean Donovan, Ita Ford, Dorothy Katet, and <W<ji*ra Clarke, four American
women murdered in EI Salvador, December 4, 1980:

(1) Account at the finding of the bodies:

"Witnesses who found the grave said it was about five feet deep. One woman had been
shot in the face, another in the breast. Two of the women were found with their
blood-stained underpants around their ankles" (Dec. 5, 1980).*

(2) Account at the trial of the murderers:

No description was given, although medicEil testimony was presented to the covutj see
text.

* For details that were not presented in this account, see the accompanying
text.

The murder of one of the seventy-two, Father Rutilio Grande, was
an important landmark in the escalation of violence in El Salvador and
in its effect on the newly appointed conservative archbishop of San
Salvador, Oscar Romero. Rutilio Grande was a Jesuit, the pastor of
Aguilares, and a progressive who helped organize peasants in self-help
groups. He was strongly opposed by the local landlords, police, and
military commanders, but he was a national figure in the Salvadoran
church and was a friend of the archbishop. Rutiho Grande was shot to
death, along with a teenager and a seventy-two-year-old peasant, while
on his way to Mass on March 12, 1977. According to a church autopsy,
the bullets that riddled the priest were of the same caliber as the

WORTHY AND UNWOKTHY VICTIMS

47

Manzer guns used by the police. "By 'coincidence,' all telephone com-
munications in the area were cut off within an hour of the triple assassi-
nation. Police patrols normally active in the region mysteriously
disappeared." 13 Archbishop Romero wrote to the president of El Salva-
dor, Arturo Armando Molina^ urging a thorough investigation, which
was promised. A week later, the church having established that it was
probably pohce bullets that had killed the three victims, Romero wrote
a harsher letter to Molina, noting the absence of a promised official
report and pointing out that comments, "many of them unfavorable to
your government," have been made. With continued inaction, Romero
threatened to refuse church participation in any official government
event unless the murders were investigated and the killers brought to
justice. Romero's biographer writes:

Six weeks later, the lawyer chosen by Romero to follow the case
reported "an embarrassing and clear indifference toward the in-
vestigation on the part of state organizations." A suspect ordered
arrested by a judge was living unconcernedly in El Paisnal, and
no one had ordered the bodies exhumed and examined. The bul-
lets are still in the graves.'^

Rutilio Grande's murder followed a series of forcible expulsions of
foreign clergy by the Molina government and several earlier murders
of church personnel. Romero and the clergy deliberated at great length
on their course of action in response to this escalation of the violence
against them. They tried to get out their messages of concern, but many
were not heard because of newspaper censorship. They finally decided
to take dramatic action: temporary school closings, and implementation
of the previously mentioned threat to refuse to support the government
and other power groups on official occasions.

This entire package of murder and church response was hardly
lacking in drama and newsworthiness. Yet murder, the confrontation of
the desperate church with a repressive state, and the dramatic acts
carried out to try to mobilize support in its self-defense were subject
to a virtual blackout in the U.S. mass media. The murder of Rutilio
Grande was mentioned in Newsweek ("Priests in Peril," Aug. t, 1977),
but it never once reached the audiences of the New York Times, Time,
or CBS News. This was important in allowing the terror to go on
unimpeded. To paraphrase the New York Times editorial on "murder-
ous Poland": no publicity and agitation, no containment of terror.

3(8 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

2.3. ARCHBISHOP OSCAR
ROMERO

The murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero, the highest Catholic church
official in El Salvador, was "big news," and its political implications
were enormous. At the time of his murder, Romero had become the
foremost and most outspoken critic of the policy of repression by
murder being carried out by the U.S. -supported military government.
In his last sermon, he appealed to members of the army and security
forces to refuse to kiU their Salvadoran brethren, a call that enraged the
officer corps trying to build a lower-class military that was willing to
kill freely. Romero had been placed on right-wing death lists and
received threats from the right wing, which from the beginning had
been closely linked to the army and intelligence services, is Only a few
weeks prior to his murder he had written a forceful letter to President
Jimmy Carter opposing the imminent granting of U.S. aid to the junta
as destructive of Salvadoran interests. The Carter administration had
been so disturbed by Romero's opposition to its policies that it had
secretly lobbied the pope to curb the archbishop. 16

Romero, in short, was not merely an "unworthy" victim, he was an
important activist in opposition to the local alliance of army and oligar-
chy and to U.S. policy in El Salvador. The U.S. media's news coverage
of the archbishop's murder and its follow-up reflected well his threat-
ening role, reaching new levels of dishonesty and propaganda service
in their coverage of this and related events.

2.3.1. Details of the murder and
public response

The details of the Romero murder provided by the U.S. mass media
were concise (see table 2-2). While there were expressions of shock and
distress, there were very few quotations and expressions of outrage by
supporters of Romero. There were no statements or quotations suggest-
ing that the murder was intolerable and that the guilty must be found
and brought to justice. The New York Time:: had no editorial condemn-
ing, or even mentioning, the murder. It was quickly placed in the larger
framework of alleged kilhngs by both the left and the right that were
deeply regretted by Salvadoran and U.S. officials.

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 49

2.3.2. The propaganda line: a
reformist junta trying to contain
the violence of right and left

The Salvadoran and U.S. governments contended at the time of
Romero's murder that the kihing going on in El Salvador was being
done by extremists of the right and the left, not by the Salvadoran
armed forces and their agents; and that the government was trying its
best to contain the killings and carry out reforms. John Bushnell, of the
State Department, stated before a House appropriations comminee
that "there is some misperception by those who follow the press that
the government is itself repressive in EI Salvador," when in fact the
violence is "from the extreme right and the extreme left" and "the
smallest pan" of the killings come from the army and security forces. "
This statement was a knowing lie,18 contradicted by all independent
evidence coming out ofEI Salvador and refuted by Archbishop Romero
on an almost daily basis. In his letter to Carter sent on February 17,
1980, the archbishop pointed out that aid to the junta had resulted in
increasing repressive violence by the government, "amassing a total
dead and wounded far higher than in the previous military regimes."
And Romero explained to Caner that the idea that the junta was
reformist was a myth, that "neither the junta nor the Christian Demo-
crats govern the country," but, rather, power is in the hands of the
army, serving itself and the oligarchy.20

What gave Bushnell's statement a certain credibility was the fact that
there had been a "reformist coup" by young army officers in October
1979, and liberals and progressives entered the early junta. However, as
Raymond Bonner points out.

The young, progressive officers who carefully plotted the coup
lost control of it as swiftly as they had executed it. Their ideals
and objectives were subverted by senior, more conservative of-
ficers who had the backing of [U.S. Ambassador] Devine and the
U.S. Embassy in EI Salvador and key Carter administration offi-
cials in Washington.2i

The progressive elements on the junta found themselves entirely with-
out power, and gradually exited or were forced out, along with large
numbers from the cabinet and administration. Jose Napole6n Duarte
joined the junta in March to serve as a fig leaf and public-relations
agent of the army, but all those who were not satisfied to serve in that
role departed. 22

50

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Once the old-guard military had seized control from the progressive
officers in October 1979, it began a general war of extermination against
aU progressive individuals and organizations in El Salvador. By the end
of May, church sources reported 1,844 civilian deaths already in 1980,
a figure that reached 10,000 by the end of the year, almost all at the
hands of the government. A guerrilla war was forced on the center and
left by the policy of unconstrained violence of the Carter-supported
government. The government was not centrist and reformist-it was a
military regime of the right, closely linked to the terrorist force
ORDEN and the death squads, and it used them regularly as proxies.
The paramilitary groups were not uncontrollable-they were doing
what the army wanted them to do. The paramilitary forces and death
squads of El Salvador had extensive interlocking relationships with the
official military and security forces and their U.S. counterparts. There
was a revolving door of personnel, close cooperation in sharing infor-
mation, funding of the paramilitary groups by the official forces, and
a division of labor between them. The paramilitary did jobs for which
the official forces wished to disclaim responsibility. 23

Although the paramilitary group ORDEN was formally abolished at
the time of the October 1979 coup, ir was secrerly maintained and had
a close relationship with the regular military establishment. According
to one detailed account.

The reformers had officially abolished ORDEN, rhe old informa-
tion network. But . . . military officers suspicious of the young
reformers secretly reestablished and expanded much of the old
intelligence system into a grass-roots intelligence network that fed
names of suspected subversives to military and paramilitary death
squads. Four days after the coup, D'Aubuisson said in an inter-
view, he was assigned by members of the high command to help
reorganize ANSESAL [an intelligence communication network]
inside a military compound under the chief of staffs office— out
of the reach of civilians in ehe new jUDea.^^

This secret assignment ofD'Aubuisson was confirmed by junta member
Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, and then Deputy Defense Minister
Colonel Nicholas Carranza.^s

The U.S. mass media, however, followed the Bushnell fonnula virtu-
ally without deviation: there was a "civil war between extreme right and
leftist groups" (New York Times, Feb. 25, 1980); the "seemingly well
meaning but weak junta" was engaging in reforms but was unable to
check the terror (Time, Apr. 7. 1980). The U.S. mass media had fea-

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS SI

rured heavily the reformist character of the revolutionary junta, but

they uniformly suppressed evidence of the powerlessness, frustrations,
and early resignation of the progressives, and their replacement by
civilians willing to serve as "front men" for state terror. Rom4n
Mayorga, an engineer and university professor who had been the unani-
mous choice of the original coup ploners, resigned on January 3, 1980,
along with Guillermo Manuel Ungo "and at least 37 of the highest
ranking government officials, including the heads of all government
agencies."26 But for the media, these events never happened, and the
junta was still a "weak centrist government . . . beset by implacable
extremes" (New York Times editorial, Apr. 28, I98o), not a right-wing
government of massacre. Robin K. Andersen points out that

None of the networks reported the final resignation of the

junta members. Even CBS, which had reported at length on the
appointment of Roman Mayorga, failed to report his resignation,
or any of the others. For television news viewers, these political
developments never happened. Television news coverage omitted
every reference to this all-important political power struggle that
could have accounted for the abuses that continued. . . . The
civilian lack of control, and even their resignation, had no effect
on the way in which the news characterized the junta; it continued
to be labeled moderate. ^7

And the Salvadoran government has continued to be "moderate" and
"centrist" up to today.

Other media suppressions aided in bolstering the myth of the neutral
junta standing between the extreme right and the extreme left. On
March 29, 1980, the New York Times carried a Reuters dispatch noting
the resignation of three high Salvadoran officials, who, according to the
article, "resigned last night in protest against the junta's inability to halt
violence by leftist and rightist forces."28 The preceding day, an AP
dispatch recorded the same resignations, but without any explanation
of the reasons for this. One of the resigning officials. Undersecretary
of Agriculture Jorge Alberto Villacorta, issued a public statement say-
ing that

1 resigned because 1 believed that it was useless to continue in a
government not only incapable of puning an end to the violence,
but a government which itself is generating the political violence

through repression Recently, in one of the large estates taken

over by the agrarian reform, uniformed members of the security

52 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

forces accompanied by a masked person pointed out the directors
OT the self-management group and then these individuals were
shot in front of their co-workers.

It can be seen from the statement that the reference in the Renter's
dispatch to protest "against the junta's inability to halt violence by
leftist and rightist forces" is a gross misrepresentation, and it is evident
that an honest transmission of Villacorta's statement would have con-
tradicted the propaganda line.

At Archbishop Romero's funeral, on March 30, 1980, where ma.ny
thousands gathered to pay tribute, bomb explosions and gunfire killed
some forty people and injured hundreds more. The version of the event
provided by U.S. Ambassador Robert White and the Salvadoran gov-
ernment was that "armed terrorists of the ultra left sowed panic among
the masses and did all they could to provoke the security forces into
returning fire. But the discipline of the armed forces held."3o Joseph
Treaster's account in the New York Times quotes Duarte that the
violence was from the left. It also quotes a junta statement that the army
was strictly confined to its barracks, and Treaster says, "T.here was no
sign of uniformed government forces in the plaza before or during the
shooting." No other version of the facts is mentioned. However, a
mimeographed statement on March 30, signed by twenty-two church
leaders present at the funeral, claimed that the panic had been started
by a bomb thrown from the national palace, followed by machine-gun
and other shots coming from its second floor.^' This account was sup-
pressed by Treaster and was never mentioned in the New York Times.

In a follow-up article of April 7, 1980, Treaster repeats that on March
30 the junta ordered all military forces into their barracks, and that they
obeyed "even though they knew leftists with weapons were pouring into
the central plaza." Treaster asserts this government claim as fact, and
he continues to suppress sources and evidence that contradict this
government allegation. He also fails to explain why the leftists would
indiscriminately shoot their own people paying homage to the arch-
bishop.32

The title of Treaster's article of April 7, 1980, is "Slaying in Salvador
Backfires on Rebels." The article reads as follows:

The murder of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero two weeks ago
and the killing of 30 at his funeral may have benefited, rather than
hurt, the ruling civilian-military junta, in the view of many diplo-
mats, businessmen and Government officials.

The extreme right is being blamed for the killing of the Arch-

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 53

bishop and the extreme left is being blamed for the shooting and
bombing that turned the crowded central plaza into chaos as
Archbishop Romero was being eulogized.

"It's not so much that the junta gained," said Robert E. White,
the United States Ambassador to EI Salvador, "but that its oppo-
nents on the extreme right and left have lost prestige. The net
result is a boost in prestige for the junta."

We may note how the title of the article transforms the murder of the
leader of the dissident forces (and then of his followers at the funeral)
from amoral issue deserving outrage into a question of political advan-
tage, and turns that against the rebels. 1 1 would be hard to imagine the
New York Times publishing an article on Popieluszko headed "Slaying
in Poland Backfires on Solidarity Movement," featuring perhaps the
playing up by the official press of demonstrator aggressiveness or vio-
lence. Note also how the question of identifying the killer of Romero,
and the government's obligation to seek justice, has been pushed into
the background. Finally, there is the statement that "the extreme left
is being blamed" for the deaths in the plaza. Use of the passive voice
allows Treaster to avoid specification of just who is blaming the ex-
treme left. He mentions as his sources for the article as a whole "many
diplomats, businessmen and Government officials "-he doesn't even
pretend to have talked to ordinary Salvadorans or church representa-
tives-but his only citation near the statement that "the extreme left
is being blamed" is the then-U.S. ambassador, Robert White. By relying
only on government handouts and carefully avoiding readily available
conflicting evidence and alternative views, the Times once again found
the means of applying the usual formula of a deadly right offsetting a
deadly left, with the junta favored by the U.S. government once more
placed in the middle-with enhanced prestige!

2.3.3. Misrepresentation of
Romero's views

As we noted earlier, Romero was unequivocal in laying the blame for
the violence in El Salvador on the army and security forces, and he
viewed the left and popular groupings as victims provoked into self-
defense by violence and injustice. The peoples' organizations, he told
Carter, are "fighting to defend their most fundamental human rights"
against a military establishment that "knows only how to repress the

54 MANUFACTOSINC CONSENT

people and defend the interests of the Salvadorean oligarchy." And in
his di,ary, Romero completely repudiated the idea that the army was
reacting to somebody else's violence-the security forces are instru-
ments "of a general program of annihilation of those on the left, who
by themselves would not commit violence or further it were it not for
social injustice that they want to do away with."33 Thus Joseph
Treaster's statement on the front page of the New York Times that
Romero "had criticized both the extreme right and the extreme left for
widespread killing and torture in El Salvador" (Mar. 31, 1980) is
straightforward lying: Romero never accused the left of torture or
widespread kiUing, he never equated the right and the left, and he was
quite clear that the government (an agent of the right) was the primary
killer. In this respect, Romero's perception, essentially the same as that
privately conveyed to the press by the U.S. government, was grossly
falsified in public by both the government and press.

Interestingly, a year later, in an article marking the anniversary of
the assassination of Archbishop Romero, Edward Schumacher, of the
Times, noted that under Romero's successor. Archbishop Rivera y
Damas, "the church has moved to a more centrist position in the civil
war between the Government and the guerrillas. "35 Of course, if the
church now takes a centrist position, as opposed to its position under
Romero, this constitutes an admission that the theme played by
Treaster and the Times a year previously of an even-handed Romero
was a lie (which it was). Is it possible that the Times always finds the
church in the middle and is lying one year later as well? The question
must remain open, as his successor has been much more circumspect
than Romero. The wilhngness ofthe right wing and the army to murder
people like Romero might have affected Archbishop Rivera y Damas' s
ability to speak his mind freely and forced public caution. The point
does not arise for Schumacher and the Times. 36

2.3.4. The loss of interest in
responsibility at the top

With Popieluszko, the media tried hard to establish that there was
knowledge of and responsibility for the crime at higher levels of the
Polish government. Soviet interest and possible involvement were also
regularly invoked. With Romero, in contrast, no such questions were
raised or pressed.

The media did note that Romero opposed aid to the Salvadoran

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 55

junta (which Carter provided anyway), but they failed to convey the
depth of his hostility to U.S. policy and the importance of his opposi-
tional role (although it was far more threatening to U.S. pohcy than
Popieluszko was to the Soviet Union). The press never mentioned the
special emissary sent by Carter to the pope in an attempt to bring
Romero into line, or the fact that the head of the Jesuit order in Central
America was called to Rome, probably in response to this U.S. pres-
sure." The media also suppressed Romero's appeal to the military to
refuse to kill, a fact that would have made much clearer how strongly
opposed he was to the official policies, and how convenient his murder
was to the rulers of £1 Salvador.

Although Romero was far and away the most important establish-
ment figure aligned with the popular movements, the media pretended
at first that the affihation of his killers was a complete mystery. The
Washington Post supposed an equal likelihood of a left- or right-wing
source, and the Miami Herald noted on March 27 that "Both stood to
benefit from any chaos his death might have created." (No American
paper suggested that Popieluszko might have been murdered by Soli-
darity sympathizers to discredit the Polish government.) This foolish-
ness was the minority position-the bulk of the press suggested that the
killer was probably a rightist, but of obscure connection. The reliable
Duarte suggested that the killing was too professional to be indige-
nous-it must have been a contract job from the outside. This view was
dutifully repeated by the New York Times, Time, Newsweek, and CBS
News. 38

If, as seemed very likely, the killer was a Salvadoran rightist, or
someone in their employ, what was his connection, if any, with the army
and security forces? We saw earlier that the linkages between the death
squads and the army were close: there was at least some degree of
common command, shared operations, and mutual protection. Could
the killer have been a member of the armed forces? Given the links of
the army to the paramilitary forces, wasn't it hkely that they knew who
killed Romero? The U.S. mass media did not raise, let alone press, these
questions. When D'Aubuisson's link to the murder became public
knowledge, the media failed to make this a big issue, and his close
relations to the official forces were not examined and discussed. This
is evidence of a propaganda system at work.

Any possible U.S. connection to the crime was, of course, "far out,"
and could not be raised in the U.S. media. That we don't do this sort
of thing is an ideological premise of the patriotic press, no matter what
the facts of recent history tell us.^^ But still, the question might have
been raised whether the environment that the United States was help-

56

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

ing to create in El Salvador, training and aiding a murderous army
whose violence had driven Romero to passionate opposition, made the
United States indirectly guilty of the murder? The press never dis-
cussed this point either. The Times quotes Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance on the murder: "Two weeks ago I wrote the Archbishop and said:
'We share a repugnance for the violence provoked by both extremes
that is taking the lives of innocent people. We deplore the efforts of
those seeking to silence the voices of reason and moderation with
explosives, intimidation and murder.' The paper points out that the
letter from Vance was in reply to Romero's appeal to cease supplying
arms. The article failed to include the gist of Romero's argument, and
it did not quote that part of Vance's letter that rejected the archbishop's
appeal. The report also did not take note of Vance's serious misre-
presentation of the archbishop's position when he says that "We share
a repugnance [for] . . . both extremes"; Romero attributed the killings
to the army and the right, not "both extremes." We may note also that
while Romero was victimized by the very forces that Vance supported,
and Romero's forecasts seem to be vindicated by his own murder, there
is no hint in the account of any irony or criticism of Vance and his
associates. Here the press cannot plead lack of knowledge. As later
conceded, the media knew very well that the security forces were the
source of the violence.

2.3.5. Murder unavenged-or
triumphant

The assassins of Archbishop Romero were never "officially" discovered
or prosecuted, and he joined the ranks of the tens of thousands of other
Salvadorans murdered without justice being done. But in contrast with
Popieluszko, the U.S. mass media seemed quite uninterested in who
committed the act or in demanding just retribution.

Subsequently, a great deal of evidence became available showing
that Roberto D'Aubuisson was at the center of a conspiracy to murder
Romero. On the basis of numerous interviews with Arena party activists
and U.S. officials, and examination of State Department cables, investi-
gative reporters Craig Pyes and Laurie Becklund claimed in 1983 that
D'Aubuisson had planned the assassination with a group of active-duty
military officers, who drew straws for the honor of carrying out the
murder.*' Former ambassador Robert White, who had access to State
Department cables and other inside information during his tenure in

WORTHY AND IJKWORTHY VICTIMS 57

office, also stated before a congressional committee in February 1984
that "beyond any reasonable doubt" D'Aubuisson had "planned and
ordered the assassination" of Archbishop Romero, and White gave
details on the planning meeting and the subsequent execution of the
trigger man to keep him quiet. Further evidence of D'Aubuisson's
involvement in the murder came to light with the confession of Roberto
Santivanez, a former high official in Salvadoran intelligence. According
to Santivanez, the murder of Romero was planned and carried out by
D'Aubuisson with the aid of former national guardsmen of Somoza, but
"under the protection of General Garcia and Colonel Carranza."43
Pyes's and Becklund's informants also indicated that D'Aubuisson was
a subordinate and political ally of Carranza, who was the number two
man in the Salvadoran military until his ouster under U.S. pressure in
December 1980. Carranza then moved over to head the Treasury Pohce.
D'Aubuisson also worked with the National Guard's G-2 central intelli-
gence office while the guard was headed by General Eugenio Vides
Casanova. Pyes and Becklund write that "During the time Vides com-
manded the Guard, active-duty military officers working with the G-2
were linked in State Department cables to the March 1980 assassination

of Archbishop Oscar Amulfo Romero Note that Vides Casanova

became minister of defense, the post he still holds, under the Duarte
government.

In short, there was substantial evidence concerning the identity of
Romero's murderers, and there were significant links of the murders to
the highest officials of the Salvadoran military establishment. In fact,
a judicial investigation in EI Salvador headed by Judge Atilio Ramirez
quickly pointed a finger at D'Aubuisson and General Medrano, a U.S.
protege in £1 Salvador. But Ramirez soon fled the country after several
threats and an attempt on his life, and active pursuit of the case in El
Salvador ended. In exile. Judge Ramirez claimed that the criminal-
investigation group of the police didn't arrive at the scene of the crime
till four days after it was committed, and that neither the police nor the
attorney general provided his court with any evidence. He concluded
that there was "undoubtedly" a "kind of conspiracy to cover up the
murder" from the very beginning.

Needless to say. Judge Ramirez's testimony was not featured in the
U.S. media, nor was the accumulating evidence of D'Aubuisson's in-
volvement given significant play. It was back-page material at best,
treated matter-of-factly and never put in a framework of indignation
and outrage by the use of emotive language or by asking allies of
Romero to comment on the evidence, and it never elicited strident
demands for justice. To this day one will find no mention of the fact

58 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

that the effective rulers of this "fledgling democracy" are military of-
ficers who were closely associated with D'Aubuisson and his cabal and
may well have been implicated in the assassination.

After D'Aubuisson was caught in a raid on May 8, 1980, with docu-
ments showing that he was planning a coup and with evidence of his
involvement in the murder of Romero, he was arrested and faced with
the threat of trial and imprisonment. An assembly of the entire officer
corps of the Salvadoran army-seven hundred strong-was quickly
convened, and demanded his release. He was turned loose shortly
thereafter, with the concurrence of the minister of defense."*^ The
documents found in his possession dropped out of sight. The security
forces also raided the legal-aid office of the archbishopric, removing all
of their ffles bearing on the assassination. At the previously mentioned
meeting of the Salvadoran officer corps. Colonel Adolfo Majano, the
last of the reformers in the "reformist" junta of 1979, was denounced,
and he quickly exited from the junta, to be replaced by yet another
hard-liner. The army had expressed its solidarity with the hard-line-
death-squad right, and the junta was adjusted to meet this new threat
to the image of a reformist junta, with Duarte advanced to president,
serving as a figurehead for the benefit of Congress and the media, to
ensure that arms would flow to the killers.

The U.S. mass media gave little notice to this important display and
consolidation of the power of the extreme right, and the semi-official
vindication of the murderers of Archbishop Romero. This was telling
evidence about the nature of power in El Salvador and the fictional
quality of the claim that the government was centrist or reformist.
Unbiased media would have featured and explained the meaning of this
information. But these facts contradicted the Carter-Reagan mythol-
ogy, so the media predictably remained silent about these events and
continued to perpetuate the myth. On November 29, 1980, following the
massacre of the leaders of the opposition in San Salvador, the Times
suggested that there is "a severe challenge to the credibility" ofthe gov-
ernment, but there is no hint that the revolt of May 1980 had changed
their view of April 28 that this was a "weak centrist government."

The media also adjusted nicely, then and later, to the rehabilitation
of the probable murderer of Romero and his reintegration into the
official power structure. As D Aubuisson sought high office and eventu-
ally became president of the Salvadoran legislature, the U.S. mass
media did not focus on his record as the probable organizer of the
murder of Archbishop Romero and as the acknowledged leader ofthe
death squads and amass murderer. Even the open anti-Semitism of this
Fascist was kept under the rug.'*'' We would submit that if an anti-

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 59

Semite and professional assassin, who was suspected of liaving orga-
nized the murder of Popieluszko in Poland, ran for office and became
head of the Polish legislature, there might have been a raised eyebrow
or two in the U.S. media.

Throughout this period, media coverage adopted a central myth
contrived by the government, and confined its reporting and interpreta-
tion to its basic premises: the "moderate government" that we support
is plagued by the terrorism of the extremists of the left and right, and
is unable to bring it under control. The U.S. government and the media
understood very well that the violence was overwhelmingly the respon-
sibility of both the U.S. -backed security forces, which were, and re-
main, the real power in the country, and the paramilitary network they
created to terrorize the population. But this truth was inexpressible. To
this day the media maintain the central myth of earlier years, long after
having conceded quietly that it was a complete fabrication. Reporting
on the prospects for peace in El Salvador, Lindsey Gruson comments
that "Today, death squads of the right and left no longer terrorize the
population into submission and silence," thanks to the success of Presi-
dent Duarte and his U.S. supporters in moving the country toward
democracy-exactly as a propaganda model would predict."*^

2.4. COVERAOE OF THE
SALVADORAN NATIONAL
GUARE)S' MURDER OF THE
FOUR U.S.
CHURCHWOMEN AND
ITS FOLLOW-UP

On December 2, 1980, four U.S. churchwomen working in £1 Salva-
dor-Maura Clarke, Jean Donovan. Ita Ford, and Dorothy Kazel-
were seized, raped, and murdered by members of the Salvadoran
National Guard. This crime was extremely inconvenient to the Carter
administration, which was supporting the Salvadoran junta as an al-
leged "reformist" government and trying to convince the public and
Congress that that government was worthy of aid. While temporarily
suspending military aid to El Salvador, the Carter administration
sought a quick and low-keyed resolution of the case. It resumed aid at
the drop of an announced rebel offensive, and-eontrary to its pro-
mises-before there was any investigatory response by the Salvadoran

60

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

government. A commission headed by William P. Rogers was quickly
sent to El Salvador to inquire into the facts and offer U.S. aid in an
investigation. The commission reported that it had "no evidence sug-
gesting that any senior Salvadoran authorities were implicated in the
murders themselves," but there is no indication that it ascertained this
by any route beyond asking the authorities whether they were involved.
The commission acknowledged that justice was not thriving in El Sal-
vador,*' but it proposed no independent investigation, merely urging
'the Salvadoran junta to pursue the case vigorously. It noted that the
junta promised that the truth "would be pursued wherever it led any-
where in the country at any level. "so Rogers was later to concede that
perhaps he was a bit optimistic in expecting the Salvadoran junta to
pursue the case seriously.51

With the arrival of the Reagan administration, the already badly
compromised concern to find the culprits diminished further, and the
dominance of the interest in protecting the client regime in El Salvador
became still more overwhelming. It was quickly clear that the whole
business could be forgotten-along with the thousands of Salvadorans
already killed-exceptfor the demands of public relations. The willing-
ness to support any feasible cover-up was also quite evident. Secretary
of State Alexander Haig stated before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs that the evidence "led one to believe" that the four women were
killed trying to run a roadblock-a shameless lie that was soon acknowl-
edged as such by the State Department. The Reagan ambassador to
the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, went Haig one better, suggesting that the
four women were political activists for the "Frente"-as with Haig's
statement, an outright lie-hinting quite broadly that they were fair
game. 53

Although Kirkpatrick also asserted that the Salvadoran government
"unequivocally" was "not responsible" for the murders, evidence was
soon available that showed that members of the National Guard had
killed the four women. The administration then moved to the position
that it was clear that the local guardsmen had "acted alone." This was
asserted and reiterated despite the absence of any supportive investiga-
tion, and important leads suggesting the contrary were ignored. A
propaganda model would expect that this preferred government expla-
nation would be honored by the mass media, and that in contrast with
the Popieluszko case, where useful points could be scored by searching
for villainy at the top, the mass media would now be less eager to find
that which their government was anxious to avoid.

The difference between the murder of the four women and the

WORTHY UNWORTHY VICTIMS

61

thousands of others uninvestigated and unresolved in El Salvador was
that the families of these victims were Americans and pressed the case,
eventually succeeding in getting Congress to focus on these particular
murders as a test case and political symbol. This forced these killings
ooto the political agenda. A trial and convictions were ultimately re-
quired as a condition for certification and aid to the military govern-
ment of El Salvador. Both the Reagan administration and the
Salvadoran military were thus obligated to "see justice done "-in this
one instance. It took three-and-a-half years for justice to triumph in
this one case, with a lid still kept on top-level involvement. It was a
challenge to the mass media to present these murders, and the delayed
and aborted outcome, in such a way as to keep indignation low and to
downplay the quality of a system that murdered the women and had
to he forced to find a set of low-level personnel guilty of the crime
(which it took them years to do). The media met this challenge with
flying colors.

2.4.1. Details of the savagery

The finding of Popieluszko's body was front-page news for the New
York Times-in fact, the \a\i\sAfailure to find his body made the front
page-and in aU the media publications analyzed here, the details of
his seizure, the disposition of his body, and the nature of his wounds
were recounted extensively and with barely concealed relish (see table
2-2)_ These details were also repeated at every opportunity (and, most
notably, at the trial). The finding of the bodies of the four women, by
contrast, was a back-page item in the TimeSy and in all four of the media
institutions in our sample the accounts of the violence done to the four
murdered women were very succinct, omitted many details, and were
not repeated after the initial disclosures. No attempt was made to
reconstruct the scene with its agony and brutal violence, so that the
drama conveyed in the accounts of Popieluszko's murder was entirely
missing. The murder of the four churchwomen was made remote and
impersonal.

The Time account, for example, after giving the names of the vic-
tims, says, "Two of the women had been raped before being shot in the
back of the head." The New York Times account, shown in table 2-2,
is also quite succinct. The Rogers Commission report pointed out that
one of the victims had been shot through the back of the head with a
weapon "that left exit wounds that destroyed her face." The Rogers

62 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

report also noted that those present at the disinterment found "exten-
sive" wounds and that "the bodies were also bruised." Raymond Bon-
ner's account, in Weakness and Deceit, noted that

In the crude grave, stacked on top of each other were the bodies
of four women. The first hauled out of the hole was Jean Donovan,
twenty-seven years old, a lay missionary from Cleveland. Her face
had been blown away by a high calibre bullet that had been fired
into the back of her head. Her pants were unzipped; her under-
* wear twisted around her ankles. When area peasants found her,
she was nude from the waist down. They had tried to replace the
garments before burial. Then came Dorothy Kazel, a forty-year-
old Ursuline nun also from Cleveland. At the bottom of the pit
were MaryknoU nuns Ita Ford, forty, and Maura Clarke, forty-
nine, both from New York. AJJ the women had been executed at
close range. The peasants who found the women said that one had
her underpants stuffed in her mouth; another's had been tied over
her eyes. All had been raped.

We may note the failure of Time and the New York Times to mention
the bruises (which both of these publications mentioned and repeated,
as regards Popieluszko); the failure to mention the destruction ofJean
Donovan's face; the suppression of the degrading and degraded use of
the nuns' underwear;** the failure to give the account of the peasants
who found the bodies. These and other details given by Bonner and
suppressed by Time and the New York Times (and also Newsweek and
CBS News) add emotional force and poignancy to the scene. Such
details are included for a Popieluszko, but not for four American
women murdered by a U.S. client state. The Rogers report also pointed
out that the forensic surgeons sent to the scene of the crime by the
junta, at the urging of Ambassador Roben White, refused to perform
an autopsy on the ground that no surgical masks were available. This
touch, which would have cast the junta and its agents in a bad light,
was also omitted from U.S. media accounts.

In the Popieluszko case, both the finding of the body and the trial
were occasions for an aggressive portrayal of the details of the act of
murder and the condition of the body. The mass-media reticence on
such matters at the time of the finding of the bodies of the four women
was exceeded by their restraint at the trial. Lydia Chavez, of the New
York Times, who attended the trial, notes that there were eight hours
of testimony and seven hours of argument that focused on the women's
work in El Salvador "and on the details of their kidnappings and

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 63

deaths," but heT article gave no details whatsoever on the medical
evidence.

2.4.2. Lack of indignation and
insistent demands for justice

In the Popieluszko case, the press conveyed the impression of intoler-
able outrage that demanded immediate rectification. In the case of the
murder of the four American women, while the media asserted and
quoted government officials that this was a brutal and terrible act, it was
not declared intolerable, and the media did not insist on (or quote
people who demanded) justice. The media relied heavily, on "senior
officials" of the U.S. and Salvadoran governments, who expressed a
more resigned view of the situation and were prepared to allow the
Salvadoran system of justice to work things out. Correspondingly, the
media also moved into a philosophical vein-the women, as Time
points out, were "victims of the mindless, increasing violence" of El
Salvador (Dec. 15, 1980). With Popieluszko, it was live government
officials who committed the crime, not blind forces (that are hard to
bring to book).

Even the funeral and memorial services for the women in the United
States were not allowed to serve as an occasion for outrage and a
demand for justice. For the most part, they were ignored and sup-
pressed. The York Times (Dec. 8, 1981) gave a tiny, back-page, UPI
account of the memorial service for Sister Dorothy Kazel, featuring the
apolitical statement by Bishop Anthony M. Pilla that "The life of a
missionary has never been easy or glamorous."

We must consider, too,, that as Ambassador Kirkpatrick indicated,
the victims may have been asking for it. As Newsweek observed (Dec.
15,1980), "The violence in El Salvador is likely to focus with increasing
ferocity on the Roman Catholic Church. Many priests and nuns advo-
cate reform, and some of them are militant leftists. Such sentiments
mean trouble, even for more moderate members of the clergy. (Note
here also the impersonality of "the violence"-nowhere in the article
is there a suggestion that the U.S. -backed government initiated, and
was doing the bulk of, the murdering.) In the case of Popieluszko, by
contrast, the media never once suggested that he was a regrettable
victim of escalating conflict between the state and rebellious forces (or
between East and West). That situation was much simpler than the one
in El Salvador: Popieluszko was murdered by officials of the state, and

64 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

this was intolerable. The complexities and resort to philosophical in-
anities about unallocable "violence" are reserved for deaths in the
provinces.

2.4.3. The lack of zeal in the
search for villainy at the top

As we saw earlier, in the Popieluszko case the mass media eagerly,
aggressively, and on a daily basis sought and pointed to evidence of
top-level involvement in the killing. In the case of the killings of the
four women, we can observe a completely different approach. Here the
media found it extremely difficult to locate Salvadoran government
involvement in the murders, even with evidence staring them in the
face. Their investigatory zeal was modest, and they were happy to
follow the leads of ("Trust me") Duarte and U.S. officials as the case
unfolded. They played dumb. The Salvadoran army and security forces
had been killing Salvadorans, in the same way they had killed the four
women, for months. What is more, the churches with which the women
were connected had been recently threatened by the army. More direct
evidence was that local peasants had been forced to bury the bodies by
the local military. But the media did not use this information to help
them find the locus of the murders.

The initial line of the U.S. and Salvadoran governments was that
there was no proof of military involvement, although the military's,
concealment of the bodies was not proper. A statement issued by the
junta on December 8 claimed that the murderers were "terrorists ofthe
extreme right,"55 and Duarte reiterated this view to the press, which
passed it along. In keeping with the government line, twenty days after
the murders, the New York Times still spoke only of "unidentified
assailants," although the leads to the National Guard were already
plentiful, and it repeated the Rogers report finding that the security
forces may have tried to "conceal the deaths" after the bodies had been
found. 56

Gradually, so much evidence seeped out to show that the women had
been murdered by members of the National Guard that the involve-
ment of government forces could no longer be evaded. A two-part
process of "damage limitation" ensued, expounded by Salvadoran and
U.S. officials and faithfully reflected in the media. One was a distinction
between the government and the National Guard. In the Popieluszko
case, the reader was never allowed to forget that the murdering police

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 6S

were part of the Polish government. In the case of the four American
women, it was barely evident in the mass media that the killers had any
connection with the Salvadoran government. This was in keeping with
the basic myth, also consistently foHowed by the media, that the Sal-
vadoran government was reformist and centrist, trying to control kill-
ings by extremists of the right and left." This fabrication allowed a
two-track system of massive killing by the army and its affiliates and
simultaneous claims of regret by the reformers unable to control the
extremists. This was reminiscent of the heyday of mass murder in
Argentina, when the New York Times regularly portrayed the junta and
people like the recently convicted General Videla as moderates "unable
to control the right-wing extremists" who were killing people.

The most important goal of the immediate damage-containment
process was to stifle any seriotis investigation ofthe responsibility ofthe
officials of the Salvadoran government. The Salvadoran strategy was
foot-dragging from beginning to end, as the idea of convicting soldiers
for killing anybody was contrary to Salvadoran practice, and, moreover,
there is little doubt that the responsibility for the crime went high. The
U.S. official strategy, once it was clear that the National Guard was
responsible for the kiUing, was to get the low-level killers tried and
convicted-necessary to vindicate the system of justice in EI Salvador,
at least to the extent of keeping the dollars flowing from Congress-
while protecting the "reformers" at the top. On September 30, 1981,
Ambassador Deane Hinton stated with assurance that the local national
guardsmen "were acting on their own," although internal State Depart-
ment documents of the time recognized that the Salvadoran investiga-
tion had been a joke, and other evidence existed suggesting top-level
involvement. 59 Nonetheless, the official position was clear. To go along *
with the official line, the mass media had to stop investigating high-level
involvement and even to suppress evidence emerging from other
sources. And so they proceeded to do this.

After a two-month investigation of the murders, the reporter John
Dinges filed a story through Pacific News Service that showed the
murders to have been preplanned in some detail.'''' First, there were
intercepted radio communications indicating military discussions ofthe
arrival ofthe women at the airport, and other evidence of close surveil-
lance of their flight plans, all suggesting a coordinated and extensive
military operation. Second, a former deputy minister of planning de-
scribed to Dinges a half-hour presentation by Salvadoran Defense
Minister Guillermo Garcia in the national palace, denouncing the nuns
and priests in the very area of the murders and stating that something
must be done, only two weeks prior to the murders.

66

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

In a remarkable feat of self-censorship, most of the mass media
completely ignored the Dinges findings. Dinges's report appeared in the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and some fifteen other papers,
but not a word of it found its way into the New York Times, Time,
Nevaweek, or CBS News, and its leads were not pursued by any media.
Instead, the media kept repeating the assurances of Duarte and U.S.
officials that they were satisfied that the killings did not go beyond the
local national guardsmen, and that the matter would be pursued dili-
gently through proper legal channels.

In March 1984, Colonel Roberto Santivanez, a high official in Sal-
vadoran intelligence, agreed to "talk" about the death-squad network
in El Salvador, and his claims found their way onto CBS News and the
front page of the New York Times. Santivanez gave highly credible
details about the murder of the four women, indicating that the act had
been committed on the specific order of Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casa-
nova, who was in charge of the zone in which the killings took place.
Colonel Casanova was transferred to another assignment two weeks
after the murder as part of the official cover-up. His first cousin Eu-
genio Vides Casanova, the minister of defense chosen by Duarte and
head of the National Guard in December 1980, knew about the murder
order by his cousin, as did Duarte. Although this crushing evidence
implicated a high officer in the murder and the current minister of
defense and Duarte in the cover-up, there was no follow-up to this
story, no connection back to the Dinges story of high-level discussions
of the need to do something about the rehgious workers-no editorials,
no indignation, and no pressure for action.

In sum, the leads provided by Dinges, and the testimony of Santi-
vanez, strongly suggest that the killing of the women was based on a
high-level decision. The evidence is even clearer that middle-level
officials of the government ordered the killing, and that the highest-
level officials engaged in a continuing and systematic cover-up. In the
Polish case, the evidence of top-level involvement was never forthcom-
ing, bur the issue was pursued by the U.S. mass media relentlessly. In
the case of the four churchwomen, where the evidence of top-level
involvement was abundant, the U.S. mass media failed to press the
matter, or even to engage in the pursuit of obvious investigative leads.

We cannot describe here the full details ofthe failure ofthe Salvado-
ran process of justice, which never moved forward except under U.S.
pressure and threats. The mass media did at one point berate the
Salvadoran government for "stonewalling" the investigation,63 but the
media entirely failed to capture the depth and scope ofthe stonewalling
process, or to remark on its significance in this "fledgling democracy,"

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 67

and they generally transmitted Salvadoran and U.S. government claims
about the state of the process without sarcasm or expressions of out-
rage. If they had given full details, the Salvadoran government would
have been thoroughly discredited. Thus, the extensive evidence con-
cerning official Salvadoran refusals to take action or to interrogate
relevant witnesses, and concerning threats to witnesses, lawyers, and
judges-which would have been aired with delight if applicable to a
Polish investigation-were ignored.

A few illustrations of the Salvadoran proceedings will have to suffice
here. Two years after the crime, for example*

. . .-the prosecutors expressed ignorance of the testimony [in the
court record] of former guardsman Cesar Valle Espinoza, dated
August 9, 1982, which quotes Subsergeant Colindres Aleman as
stating on December 2, 1980, that there were "superior orders" to
apprehend the women. They were also ignorant of the statement
offormer National Guard Sergeant Dagoberto Martinez, taken by
the FBI in Los Angeles, California, which establishes the exis-
tence of a cover-up of the crime as early as December 1980.64

A second illustration of the process: two of three judges assigned to the
case resigned for fear of their Mves. As we noted. Judge Ramirez, who
was investigating the Romero murder, fled for the same reason. This
line of evidence has cumulative weight, but it was never treated as a
whole by the press (and was barely mentioned as individual items of
back-page news). A third illustration: according to former ambassador
Robert White, two national guardsmen who might have been able to
link higher-ranking officers to the murders of the women were killed
by military death squads, then listed as missing in action. A final
illustration: when the Salvadoran triggermen were finally assigned at-
torneys, one of the three, Salvador Antonio Ibarra, was prepared to
defend the men seriously. His colleagues pressed Ibarra to abide by the
statement that "the possibility of a cover-up had been thoroughly
investigated" and rejected. He refused to go along with this request,
with the consequence that on October 3°, 1983, Ibarra was seized by the
National Guard and tortured at its headquarters.^^ Released only under
U.S. pressure, Ibarra fled the country, leaving the way clear for a lawyer
team that would accept the notion that there had been a "thorough
investigation" of top-level involvement. This last incident alone made
it into the mass media in isolated and fleeting treatment; the others, and
the package, were not featured in the free press.

The U.S. government also engaged in a systematic cover-up--of

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 69

blatantly prejudged the case. The only plausible rationale for the U.S.

cover-up is that the administration wanted to minimize adverse public-
ity concerning the performance of its murderous client. Information on
what was really going on, or its own internal analyses of the case or
appraisals of the Salvadoran legal process, would make the client look
bad. The administration hoped that the case would "go away," but until
that happened, it wanted the publicity flow to be under its control.

Part of the reason the administration wanted control was to allow it
to claim reasonable progress in the pursuit of the case whenever the
military government was due for more money. As with other right-wing
satellites, "improvement" is always found at money-crunch time. In its
July 1982 certification report, the State Department found that "sub-
stantial progress" had been made in the case and predicted a trial in
the fall of 1982. In early 1983J the certification report noted "significant
developments" in the case. This manipulation of evidence to protect
the flow of arms and money to the regime would not be easy with full
disclosure— or with a critical and honest press.

This cover-up of the SaJvadoran judicial process, even though four
murdered American women were involved, did not arouse the press to
indignation or satire, nor did it cause them to provide more than mini-
mal coverage of the inquiry.

2.4.4. The trial-five national
guardsmen for $19.4 million

The trial of the five immediate killers of the four women should have
been presented in a Kafkaesque framework, but the U.S. media played
it very straight. The trial took place three-and-a-half years after the
acts of murder, despite the fact that the triggermen were immediately
identified and despite enormous U.S. pressure. Two of three judges
assigned ro the case had resigned out of fear for theif Mves, and the only
independent defense attorney had fled the country after a session of
torture at National Guard headquarters. The defense at the trial made
no effort to defend the men on the grounds of "orders from above,"
although this is a standard defense in such cases, and significant evi-
dence was available for use in this instance. The mass media failed to
note the point, although it suggests fear, a deal, or both, and although,
as we saw in the Popieluszko case, the media are sometimes immensely
alert to cover-ups. In March 1984, former intelligence officer Santi-

68

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

both the Salvadoran cover-up and the facts of the case. The U.S. mass
media, while briefly noting the Salvadoran stonewalling, failed to call
attention to the equally important lies and suppressions of their own
government. As we have pointed out, both the Carter and Reagan
administrations put protection of its client above the quest for justice
for four U.S. citizens murdered by agents of that government. The U.S.
government's stonewalling to protect its client took many forms. One
was an active collaboration in the Salvadoran cover-up. Former Na-
tional Guard sergeant Dagoberto Martinez was allowed to emigrate to
the United States in December 1980, and although a subsequent inter-
view by the FBI indicated that Martinez admitted knowledge of the
perpetrators of the crime and a failure to report that information-in
violation of Salvadoran law-no action was taken against him. U.S.
officials also reiterated that there was no reason to believe that higher-
level officials knew about the crime or participated in it, when they had
clear knowledge of a cover-up and a refusal to investigate. *i The State
Department also regularly lied about the thoroughness ofthe investiga-
tion. Ambassador Hinton stated in public that national guardsman
Perez Nieto "was thoroughly interrogated and repeatedly denied that
anyone superior to him had ordered him to watch the women." A State
Department cable, however, describes Nieto's testimony as "incom-
plete, evasive, and uncooperative. "68

A second form of official U.S. participation in the cover-up was a
refusal to make public information on the Salvadoran investigation and
evidence uncovered by the United States itself. The Rogers report was
released belatedly, in a version that edited out the original report's
statement about the sad state of the Salvadoran system of justice. In
response to a growing chorus of criticism of the delays. Judge Harold
R. Tyler was appointed by the U.S. government to carry out a further
investigation. His report was kept under wraps for a long time, again
apparently because it had some serious criticism of the Salvadoran
judicial process that would have interfered with Reagan administration
plans to claim progress every time such certification was required.
The families ofthe victims and their attorneys regularly found the U.S.
government unwilling to release information on the case. The argument
given was that the information was sensitive, and that releasing it would
interfere with the legal process in El Salvador. As the Salvadoran
process was a sick joke, moving only in response to U.S. threats, the
official rationale was transparently fraudulent. Furthermore, Duarte
was regularly making statements that the arrested guardsmen were
surely guilty, and that nobody higher than them was involved, which

70 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

vfinez stated that the guardsmen knew that "If they don't name Casa-
nova, they will get out of jail as soon as it is feasible. "7o This testimony
was not referred to in the trial context-the media played dumb.

Like the Salvadoran elections of 1982 and 1984, this trial was
thoroughly American in staging and motivation. As Ana Carrigan put
it:

Security in the courtroom was in the hands of a special Judicial
Protection Unit, formed and trained in Glencoe, Alabama; the
jurors were driven to the courtroom in the morning and returned
to their homes after the verdict in bullet-proof American embassy
vehicles; meals and camp beds were provided by the embassy so
that if necessary the jurors and the staff of the court could sleep
overnight within the protection of the guarded courthouse; and
when the electricity failed, just as the prosecution began to make
its presentation, light was restored by means of hurricane lamps
delivered by embassy staff

The stakes were U.S. dollars. Congress had frozen $19.4 milhon pend-
ing the favorable outcome of the case. Within twenty-four hours of the
decision, the State Department, announcing that justice had been done,
released the money to the charge of Minister of Defense Vides Casa-
nova, who had been head of the National Guard on December 4^ 1980,
when the murders took place, whose first cousin, according to Colonel
Santivanez, had given the direct order to kill, and who had so effectively
protected his cousin and stalled the prosecution ofunderlings for three-
and-a-half years.

In conformity with the predictions of a propaganda model, the mass
media failed entirely to capture the quality ofthis scene-the American
omnipresence, the courtroom security, the failure of the defense to
press the responsibility of the higher authorities, the role of Vides
Casanova, the literal money transaction for justice in this single case,
which dragged on for three-and-a-half years. Newsioeek found the re-
sult a "remarkable achievement," in an article entitled "A Defeat for
a Death Squad" aune 4, 1984), despite the fact that it was the National
Guard that killed the women. The article does stress the difficulties in
bringing and winning the case, and the possibility of a cover-up of
higher-level personnel, but it does not use this information to point up
the nature of the system being supported by the United States. It also
closes out the discussion with reference to the Tyler report discounting
high-level involvement, without quoting the report's acknowledgment
of "some evidence supporting the involvement of higher-ups" or men-

r

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 71

tianing the repon's admission of the limits of its information. No refer-
ence is made to Santivanez or the Dinges report: Newsweek sticks to an
official source, and misreads it.

2.5. TWENTY-THREE RELIGIOUS
VICTIMS IN GUATEMALA,
1980-85

The modern history of Guatemala was decisively shaped by the U.S.-
organized invasion and overthrow aCthe democratically elected regime
of Jacobo Arbenz in June 1954. Since that time, while Guatemala has
remained securely within the U.S. sphere of influence, badly needed
economic and social refonDs were put off the agenda indefinitely, politi-
cal democracy was stifled, and state terror was institutionalized and
reached catastrophic levels in the late 19705 and early 19808. Given the
client status of Guatemala and the fact that the antidemocratic counter-
revolution served important elite interests, a propaganda model sug-
gests that its victims will be "unworthy," which should be reflected in
both the quantity and quality ofmedia attention. Furthermore, whereas
victimization in Soviet client states like Poland and Czechoslovakia is
regularly traced back to the Soviet occupations, a propaganda model
would predict that the U.S. media will not explain the contemporary
Guatemalan environment of state terror as a natural product of the U.S.
intervention in 1954 (and thereafter). On the contrary, we would expect
the United States to be portrayed as a benevolent and concerned by-
stander, trying its very best to curb abuses of right and left extremists.

Before looking at the media's handling of Guatemala, however, let
us step back for a brief review of the crucial period 1945-54 and its
sequel to set the stage for an examination of the media's role in the
£980s. Arbenz and his predecessor, Juan Arevalo, Jed the first demo-
cratic system in Guatemalan history. During the decade of their rule,
newspapers, social groups, unions, peasants, and political parties could
organize without fear of repression or murder. gyj (jjig fragile democ-
racy rested on a base of concentrated land ownership and foreign
control of land and strategic facilities that was a constant threat to its
independence and political freedom, as well as a human disaster. The
struggle for unionization and land reform during the democratic decade
was motivated in part by a desire to build a mass constituency that
would provide an institutional base for democracy.'* Each progressive

72 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

move by both Arevalo and Arbenz was greeted with fierce hostility by
the local oligarchy, the multinational corporate community, and the
U.S. governmentJ4 "Communism" was found to be in control, or a
threat, from the time trade unions were allowed to organize in 1947, and
Arbenz's modest and effective land reform was the last straw.'^ With
U.S. initiative, organization, funding, and direct psychological warfare
and terror operations, a tiny mercenary army ousted Arbenz and in-
stalled an "anti-Communist" regime.

From 1954 to the present day, neither reform nor democracy, let
alone radical change, has been possible in Guatemala. The main reason
for this is that the forces into whose hands the United States delivered
that country in 1954 "bitterly opposed any change that might affect,
however slightly, their entrenched pos.tion,"76 and they had learned
from the 1945-54 lesson that democracy moves inexorably toward re-
form and threats to privilege in a system of extreme inequality. The
very brief interludes of tentative openness after 1954 witnessed the
quick emergence of protective organizations of urban workers and the
peasantry, strikes, and reformist and radical parties and organizations.
As Piero Gleijeses puts it, "in the last months of the Arana period
(I97o-74], the repression had acquired a more selective character, and
on repeated occasions Laugerud [Arana's successor, 1974-78] refrained
from 'settling' strikes by force."77 But the feebleness of the reforms and
the awakened hopes and pressures forced a further choice; and "given
the nacure of the regimcj" the wave of terror thar followed "was the
only logical choice" for the Guatemalan ruling class.

Another reason for the failures of both reform and democracy has
been ongoing U.S. influence. The U.S. establishment found the plural-
ism and democracy of the years 1945-54 intolerable, and it eventually
ended that experiment. In the succeeding thirty-two years of U.S.
guidance, not only has Guatemala gradually become a terrorist state
rarely matched in the scale of systematic murder of civilians, but its
terrorist proclivities have increased markedly at strategic moments of
escalated U.S. intervention. The first point was the invasion and coun-
terrevolution of 1954, which reintroduced political murder and large-
scale repression to Guatemala following the decade of democracy. The
second followed the emergence of a small guerrilla movement in the
early 1960s, when the United States began serious counterinsurgency
eCI) training of the Guatemalan army. In 1966, a further small guerrilla
movement brought the Green Berets and a major CI war in which
10,000 people were killed in pursuit of three or four hundred guerrillas.
It was at this point that the "death squads" and "disappearances" made
their appearance in Guatemala. The United States brought in police

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 73

training in the 1970s, which was followed by the further institutionaliza-
tion of violence. The "solution" to social problems in Guatemala,
specifically attributable to the 1954 intervention and the form of U.S.
assistance since that time, has been permanent state terror. With
Guatemala, the United States invented the "counterinsurgency state."

The special role of the army in the counterinsurgency state gradually
elevated its status and power, and eventually gave it the institutional
capacity to rule Guatemala. As in many U.S. client states, the military
used its power to carve OUt economic opportunities and to steal, directly
or indirectly. 80 The terrorism, thievery, and autonomy of the Guatema-
lan military reached a temporary peak-later surpassed by Rios
Montt- during the reign of Lucas Garcia (1978-82). This overlapped
the brief interlude of the Carter human-rights policy, during which
there was open criticism of the Guatemalan government and a brief and
partial cutoff of arms supply from the United States under congressio-
nal pressure. Even during the Carter years, however, relations with
Guatemala were not hostile-it was as if a child in the family were
naughty and briefly put in the corner. Part ofthe reason for the willing-
ness of the Carter government to provide no new arms supplies was that
the bad boy was in no danger. In El Salvador in 1980, by contrast, where
the Carter administration saw the possibility of a left-wing victory,
support was quickly forthcoming to a right-wing terror regime.

During the Reagan years, the number of civilians murdered in
Guatemala ran into the tens of thousands, and disappearances and
mutilated bodies were a daily occurrence. Studies by Amnesty Inter-
national (AI), Americas Watch (AW), and other human-rights monitors
have documented a military machine run amok, with the indiscriminate
killing of peasants (including vast numbers of women and children), the
forcible relocation of hundreds of thousands of farmers and villagers
into virtual concentration camps, and the enlistment of many hundreds
of thousands in compulsory civil patrols. Reagan, however, visiting
Guatemala in December 1982, commented that head of state Rios
Monn was "totally committed to democracy" and was receiving a "bum
rap" on human-rights abuses. Two months earlier, AI released its re-
port describing sixty different Indian villages in which massacres of
civilians took place in a three-month period, with the total killed ex-
ceeding .2,500.84

The Reagan policy toward Guatemala was, as with South Africa,
"constructive engagement. "8S From the beginning, the administration
strove to embrace and provide arms to the military governments. Ongo-
ing mass murder was merely an inconvenience. One method by which
the administration sought to rehabilitate our relations with the

74 MANUfACTURING CONSENT

Guatemala regimes was by continual lying about their human-rights
record (with Reagan himself setting the standard). Stephen Bosworth,
of the State Department, assured a House committee in July 1981 that
the Lucas Garcia government was successfully attacking the guerrillas
"while taking care to protect innocent bystanders. "86 The State Depart-
ment's Country Report on Human Rights for 1981 also found it impossi-
ble to determine who was doing all the killing in Guatemala, and
disappearances were attributed to the "right" and the "left," but not
to the government. Amnesty International, by contrast, in February
1981, gave detailed evidence that the thousands of murders were almost
entirely governmental in origin, including those of the death squads,
whose victims were targeted in an annex of Guatemala's national palace
under the direct supervision of President Lucas Garcia. S7

With the overthrow of Lucas Garcia, suddenly, as if by magic, the
Reagan administration line altered, and Stephen Bosworth "could not
emphasize strongly enough the favorable contrast between the current
human rights situation in Guatemala and the situation last December.
. .." Melvyn Levitsky, deputy assistant secretary of state for human
rights, told another congressional committee that "the United States
cannot easily sustain a relationship with a government which engages
in violence against its own people," as with the Lucas Garcia regime.

When Lucas Garcia was in power, Bosworth found it a caring regime
that protected the innocent, and the State Department couldn't deter-
mine that the government was doing any killing. With Lucas Garcia
ousted, the State Department discovered that he was an indiscriminate
murderer and assumed a high moral tone about his behavior. That is,
the State Department implicitly conceded that it was lying earlier and
counted on the press not to point this out. Of course, the reason for the
switch was to help make a favorable case for Lucas Garcia' s successor,
Rios Montt. Under Rios Montt there was "a dramatic decline" in
human-rights abuses, according to State Department spokesman John
Hughes in January 1983. Rios Montt is the one whom Reagan found to
be getting a bum rap. But as we noted. Amnesty International found
Rios Montt to be another top-rank murderer, who appears to have
exceeded his predecessor in civilian massacres.

When RlOs Montt was ousted in his turn, once again the State
Department line shifted. It was admitted that things had been terrible
under Rios Montt in 1982, but now there was a dramatic improvement,
and the government was showing "increased sensitivity to human rights
questions."89 It is evident that we have here a consistent pattern that
may be formulated into a quasi-law: in the case of a terrorist state with
which the administration wants "constructive engagement," things are

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 75

always OK and improving; but when that regime is ousted, its record
deteriorates ex post facto and looks most unfavorable compared with
the humanistic and sensitive one now in power! This droll pattern of
identical apologetics for each successor terrorist, and ex post denigra-
tion of the one ousted, is an Orwellian process that the Western press
associates with totalitarian states, but it happens here. And it can only
occur if the mass media are cooperative. They must be willing to
downplay or ignore the large-scale murders going on in Guatemala in
the first place. In that context, the serial apologetics, the lies defending
each murderer, and the mind-boggling hypocrisy will hardly be news-
worthy.

Given the U.S. role in originating and sustaining the Guatemalan

counterinsurgency state, and the fact that that state is dedicated to
blocking the growth of popular organizations (i.e., "anti-Communist"
in Orwellian rhetoric) and has a strong U.S. business presence, a propa-
ganda model would anticipate a lack of media interest in its "unworthy"
'victims and an evasion of the U.S. role in its evolution and practices.
We would expect reports on Guatemala put out by Amnesty Interna-
tional and other human-rights groups to be downplayed or ignored,
despite their spectacular data and horrifying stories. This is a strong test
of the model, as the number of civilians murdered between 1978 and
1985 may have approached 100,000, with a style of killing reminiscent
of Pol Pot. As AI pointed out in 1981:

The bodies of the victims have been found piled up in ravines,
dumped at roadsides or buried in mass graves. Thousands bore the
scars of torture, and death had come to most by strangling with
a garrotte, by being suffocated in rubber hoods or by being shot
in the head.*"

The expectations of a propaganda model are fully realized in this case.
Referring to our table 2-1 comparison of media treatment of twenty-
three religious victims in Guatemala with the coverage accorded Popie-
luszko, only four of the twenty-three were ever mentioned by name in
our media sample, and the twenty-three taken together had approxi-
mately one-twentieth of the space in the New York Times that the
newspaper of record gave to Popieluszko. In the case if the murder in
Guatemala of the American priest Rev. Stanley Rothcr, the New York
Times reported on August 5, 1981, in a tiny back-page article, that three
men had been arrested for questioning in the shooting. What was the
ourcome oithe arrests? Were the arrested persons tried? Readers of the
Times will never know, and the Guatemalan government did not have

76 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

to suffer the embarrassment and pressure of the press raising questions
in this or any of the remaining twenty-two Guatemalan cases.

Along with the minuscule attention to the murder of Guatemalan
priests) the details of the killings were brief) and no sense of outrage
was generated or sustained. The few lengthier articles never discuss
the role of the 1954 coup and the long training and supply relationship
of the United States to the Guatemalan police and anny;92 rather, they
almost invariably put the killings in the format of a civil war with
unexplained atrocities of extremists of the right and left (see "Arch-
bishop Oscar Romero," p. 48). An AP dispatch in the New York Times
of May 16, 1981, is entitled "Four Guatemalans Slain in Leftist-Rightist
Rivalry," The article, which reports on the murder of one of our
twenty-three priests, the Reverend Carlos Galvez Galindo, says: "The
attacks appeared to be related to the long struggle for power between
leftists and rightists." A UPI dispatch in the Times of July 29, 1981,
reporting on the murder of Rev. Stanley Rother, also relates the attack
to "right-wing extremists "-not the Guatemalan government.

Time has Rother and his Guatemalan villagers "caught in the middle

of an undeclared civil war "93 Time never explains the roots of the

civil war, nor the crucial role of the United States in refusing to allow
peaceful social change and installing the institutions of permanent
counterrevolution. Tim£ does, in most unusual fashion, point out that
the government was responsible for the "overwhelming majority" of the
killings, and even more exceptionally, it cites Amnesty International's
evidence that the paramilitary death squads are an ann of the govern-
ment. But the article fails to give illustrations of the scope and quality
of the murders, and retreats, as noted, to the civil-war rationale. Even
more compromising is its framing of the U.S. pohcy debate. According
to Time, "Yet Guatemala confronts the Reagan administration with one
of its toughest foreign policy challenges: on one hand, the country is
viewed as a victim of Cuban-sponsored insurgency, needing U.S. sup-
port; on the other) the government obviously violates human rights."
The dichotomy offered by Time is a bit uneven: the Cuban sponsorship
is a Cold War ploy for which no evidence has ever been given, but it
provides a convenient propaganda framework that is regularly deployed
by the State Department to divert attention from its support of mass
murderers. Tim£ thus elevates it to equality with a real and extremely
serious charge-and without an honest citation even to apolitical hack.
The "on the other hand" is, despite the "obviously)" a gross understate-
ment. The Reagan administration chose to support and provide regular
apologetics for a genocidal government that was using a policy of
massacre to destroy a purely indigenous revolt. The "challenge" for the

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS

77

Reagan administration—quite different from that portrayed by Time-
was how to sell the support of mass murder. Time did its little bit by
unqualified transmission of the claim of a Cuban-based insurgency,
which posed a serious dilemma for policy-making.

The holocaust years 1978-85 yielded a steady stream of documents
by human-rights groups that provided dramatic evidence of a state
terrorism in Guatemala approaching genocidal levels. Many of these
documents had a huge potential for educating and arousing the public,
but as a propaganda model would anticipate, they were treated in our
media sample in a manner that minimized their informational value and
capacity to create and mobilize public indignation. Using a selection of
ten important reports on Guatemala by Amnesty International and
Americas Watch issued in the years 1981-87, we could only find mention
of four of them in our media sample. '4 None of these four made it to
the first page, and none provided the basis for an editorial or the
building up of a press campaign of sustained coverage and indignation.
The spectacular AI report of 1981 on "Disappearances": A Workbook,
describing a frightening development of state terrorism in the Nazi
mold, was entirely ignored in our media sample, as was AI's March 1985

report on "Disappearances" under the Government of General Oscar

Humberlo Mejia Vklores, which if pubJicized would have interfered
with the media's portrayal of the Guatemalan elections of 1984-85 as
exercises in legitimation (as described in the next chapter). AW's 1985
report on the Mutual Support Group was ignored, as was the 1987 study
of human rights in Guatemala during Cerezo's first year. We return to
the Mutual Support Group in the next section. We will see in the next
chapter, too, that the media reported Cerezo's election in a framework
of hopefulness and optimism, despite prior electoral experience in
Guatemala and Cerezo's own expressed doubts about his ability to rule;
the ignoring of AW's retrospective describing the actual results of
Cerezo's presidency reflects the media's general failure to follow up on
the effects of client state elections (as we show in chapter 3 with regard
to El Salvador).

We described earlier the important Americas Watch study
Guatemala Revised: H<ytQ the Reagan Administration Finds "Improve-
ments" in Human Rights in Guatemala, whose most striking and impor-
tant theme was the ex post facto admission by the State Department
that its apologetics for the previous general had been false. This il-
luminating document was ignored in our media sample, except for the
New York Times, which gave it a three-inch article on page 7 under the
benign title "Rights Group Faults U.S. on Guatemala Situation" (Sept.
24,1985). The article describes the report as saying that the administra-

78 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

tion has refused to acknowledge major human-rights abuses in
Guatemala, but it fails to mention the stress on the ex post facto tacit
admission of lying. Mentioning this would, of course, suggest that the
Times's primary source for its "news" is thoroughly untrustworthy. The
last paragraph of the article, which absorbs a quarter of the three inches
devoted to this document, gives a State Department response to the AW
report, which is that AW is "less a human rights organization than it
is a political one." The brazen hypocrisy of this retort would have been
clear and dramatic if the article had given the gist of AW's evidence that
the administration was not merely an apologist for state terrorism in
Guatemala, but was also demonstrably dishonest.

In its concern to protect the Guatemalan generals in their terroristic
assault on the population, the Reagan administration took umbrage at
organizations Uke Amnesty International and Americas Watch and
mounted a systematic campaign in I98I and 1982 to discredit them as
left-wing and politically biased. In a letter dated September IS, 1982,
directed to AI and the Washington Office on Latin America, Assistant
Secretary of State Thomas Enders assailed the reporting of these or-
ganizations as one-sided and apologetic for the "ferocious" and "ter-
rorist attacks "-of the guerrillas. Enders writes that

No one would deny the possibility [sic] of units of the military,
in contravention of stated policy, having been involved in viola-
tions of human rights. What is important is that since March 23
the Government of Guatemala has committed itself to a new
course and has made significant progress '*

This amazing piece of apologetics for an army that was in the midst of
slaughtering thousands of civilians was distributed within Guatemala as
an official U.S. document, and its full text appeared in the Guatemalan
press. AW states:

We find this use of the letter unconscionable in light of the risks
run by human rights investigators in a political climate like
Guatemala's. It also appears to us to be further evidence that the
State Department, like the Guatemalan government, admits no
neutrals in the Guatemalan conflict; the bringer of bad news
becomes, through this reasoning, part of the enemy, to be publicly
discredited if possible,

Americas Watch also indicated that the State Department's substantive
criticisms of AW and AI were not merely incompetent but, more impor-

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 79

tant, were based largely on the assumed truthfulness of Guatemalan
army claims (a form of gullibility displayed clearly in the statement by
Enders quoted above).

As we discussed in chapter i, the government is a primary flak
producer as well as information source. This Guatemala episode is an
important illustration of the government's efforts to silence competing
sources of information. It is interesting that the A'^w York Times never
mentioned or crit.icized this sinister campaign, even though it was
carried out in the context of a policy protecting mass murderers. We
will see in the next chapter that Time magazine cooperated with the
campaign, citing Americas Watch only once on Guatemala, but with the
quahfying explanation that it is "a controversial group that is often
accused of being too sympathetic to the left" (the State Department,
on which Time relies very heavily, is never subject to any adjective
suggesting any bias). The Washington Post (Dec. 4, 1982) had one
back-page article by Terri Shaw, on the Enders letter, which features
the State Department charges in the title-"Embassy Sees 'Disinfor-
mation' on Guatemala: U.S. Report Says Rights Groups are Used"-
and in the text. The author allows the embassy claim, that "the report
never was meant to be made public" to stand unchallenged, and never
refers to the threat posed to human-rights monitors by the release of
such State Department charges. The human-rights groups are allowed
to suggest a State Department intent to discredit, but the word "disin-
formation" is never applied to State Department allegations, and no
serious examination of the content of those charges is provided. This
superficial piece exhausts the sample media's coverage of this State
Department campaign. The AW report Human Rights in Guatemala: No
N^lrah Allowed, which discusses this campaign and the Enders letter,
was never mentioned.

2.6. THE MUTUAL SUPPORT
GROUP MURDERS IN
GUATEMALA

Human-rights monitoring and protective agencies have had a very
difficult time organizing and surviving in the "death-squad democ-
racies" of EI Salvador and Guatemala. Between October 1980 and
March 1983, five officials of the Human Rights Commission ofEI Salva-
dor were seized and murdered by the security forces. In accord with

80 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

a propaganda model, these murders should have been of little interest
to the U.S. mass media, and this expectation is borne out by evidence.
As an illustrative comparison, the New York Times had a grand total of
four back-page articles on these five murders,'* whereas, during the
same period, the Times had thirty-five articles on the Soviet human-
rights activist Natan Sharansky, not all of them on the back pages. The
proportionality of attention fits well our general propaganda-model
analysis of the media's treatment of worthy and unworthy victims.

Guatemala has been even more inhospitable to human-rights organi-
zations than El Salvador. Guatemalan Archbishop Monsignor Prospero
Penados del Barrio asserted in 1984 that "It is impossible for a human
rights office to exist in Guatemala at the present time. "97 "Disappear-
ances" as an institutional form began in Guatemala in the mid-1960s
and eventually reached levels unique in the Western Hemisphere, with
the total estimated to be some 40,000.98 Protest groups that have
formed to seek information and legal redress have been consistently
driven out of business by state-organized murder. The Association of
University Students (AEU) sought information on the disappeared
through the courts in the course of a brief opening in 1966, but after
one sensational expose ofthe police murder of twenty-eight leftists, the
system closed down again. As McClintock points out, "In the next few
years many AEU leaders and member law students were hunted down
and killed."" In the 1970s, a Committee ofthe Relatives ofthe Disap-
peared was organized by the AEU, with headquarters in San Carlos
National University. As Americas Watch points out, "It disbanded after
plainsclothesmen walked into the University's legal aid center on
March lo, 1974, and shot and killed principal organizer, lawyer
Edmundo Guerra Theilheimer, the center's director.'loo Another
human-rights group, the National Commission for Human Rights, was
created in the late 1970S by psychologist and journalist Irma Plaquer.
Her son was murdered, and she herself "disappeared" on October 16,
1980.

According to the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, in
1984 alone there were an average of one hundred political murders and
over forty disappearances per month in Guatemala. These figures are
almost surely an underestimate, as only the disappearances that took
place in and around Guatemala City received any publicity. The greater
number of murders and disappearances occur among rural and Indian
families who do not have the resources to complain and are more
exposed to retaliation.

In this context of murder, fear, and the prior failure of all human-
rights organizations, the Mutual Support Group, or GAM, was formed

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS

81

in June 1984. It was a product of the desperation felt by people seeking
information on the whereabouts of disappeared relatives and willing to
take serious risks to that end. Many of them had suffered enormous
pain in frustrating searches and inquiries that never bore fruit. There
is no legal redress in Guatemala, and nothing useful can be obtained
by appeals to the police or courts of law. Mr. Hicho, looking for his
disappeared daughter, saw some one hundred bodies in the months he
spent at the morgue, and "seventy to seventy-five percent of them had
been tortured. "102 Others took different painful routes in their search.
In early 1985, one woman was told by an army officer that her husband
was still aMve, and that he would see to his return if she slept with him.
She did so, and her husband turned up dead shortly thereafter.

The intention of the organizers of GAM was to seek strength by
collective action, and to use it to gather data and seek redress by
petition and publicity. Their hope for survival and success rested, in
part, on the fact that the chief of state, Mejia Victores, was being built
up by the Reagan administration as another "reformer," and the Rea-
gan-Mejia Victores team was trying to establish the appropriate
"image" to induce Congress to loosen the purse strings. GAM also had
support within Guatemala from Archbishop Penados del Barrio and
other church groups and lay persons, although few felt able to speak
up in the system of unconstrained state terror. Internationally, GAM
received significant political support from progressive and humanitar-
ian political parties and human-rights groups.

Thirty members of the newly organized GAM held a press confer-
ence in Guatemala City in June 1984, denouncing the disappearances
and calling on the government "to intervene immediately in order to
find our loved ones." In the latter part of June, and again in early
August, masses were held in the Metropolitan Cathedral to express
concern over the fate of the disappeared, with the initial services held
by the university rector, Meyer Maldonado, and Archbishop Penados.
A thousand people attended the August mass. On August I, the group
first met with General Mejia Victores, at which time he promised to
investigate the disappearances. In ads placed in the major newspapers
on August 8 and 9, GAM put his promises on the public record. Subse-
quently the group began to call attention to the government's failure
to follow through on the August i promises, and they moved gradually
to other actions. In October 1984 they sponsored a march and mass for
the disappeared at the cathedral-the first mass demonstration in
Guatemala since May I, 1980 (at which time protestors were seized on
the streets and an estimated one hundred were assassinated, or disap-
peared).

82 MASUFACTURING CONSENT

The organization continued to grow, from the initial handful to 225
famihes in November 1984 and then to 1,3°0 in the spring of 1986. Most
of the members were women, a large majority peasant women from the
countryside. They were persistent. After initial petitions, requests,
meetings, and marches, they began to make explicit accusations and
"publicly charge elements of the national security forces as directly
responsible for the capture and subsequent disappearance of our family
members."I04 They asked for an investigation, an accounting, and jus-
tice. They appealed to the constituent assembly and began regular
protests in downtown Guatemala City, banging pots and pans and, on
occasion, peacefully occupying buildings.

Nothing, of course, was done in response to the GAM demands. The
assembly had no powers anyway, but was too fearful even to pass a
resolution of support. The military rulers toyed with GAM. In public,
with the press on hand, Mejia Victores would say, "I don't want to shirk
responsibilities and something has to be done." But when the press was
not there, he said, "It seems as though you are accusing me-and we
don't have them [the disappeared]." "You have them," we said. "We
don't have them," he replied. The military rulers were getting an-
noyed, and phone threats, letters of warning, and open surveillance
intensified. Two days after the exchange between Mejia Victores and
GAM, the tortured bodies of two disappeared associated with GAM
members showed up, one placed in front of his house with his eyes
gouged out and his face barely recognizable.

In a television interview on March 14, 1985, Mejia Victores said that
GAM was "being used by subversion, because if they have problems,
solutions are being found, and they have been given every advantage
to [solve these problems]. "106 A spate of newspaper headlines followed,
stressing government warnings and allegations that GAM was being
manipulated by subversives. In mid-March, General Mejia Victores
was asked on television what action the government would take against
GAM. He replied, "You'll know it when you see it."''*'

On March 30, 1985, GAM leader Hector G6mez Calito was seized,
tortured, and murdered. (The six policemen who had come for him
were themselves assassinated shortly after his death.) 108 He had been
burned with a blowtorch, on the stomach and elsewhere, and beaten on
the face so severely that his lips were swollen and his teeth were broken;
his tongue had been cut out. Then, on April 4^ another leader of GAM,
Maria Rosario Godoy de Cuevas, her twenty-one-year-old brother, and
her two-year-old son were picked up, tortured, and murdered. Her
breasts had bite marks and her underclothing was bloody; her two-year-
old son had had his fingernails pulled out.

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 83

On grounds of newsworthiness, the murders of the two GAM lead-
ers, along with the brother and the child of one of them, would seem
to deserve high-order attention. Their bravery was exceptional; the
villainy they were opposing was extraordinary; the justice of their cause
was unassailable; and the crimes they suffered were more savage than
those undergone by Popieluszko. Most important of all, these were
crimes for which we bear considerable responsibility, since they were
perpetrated by clients who depend on our support, so that exposure and
pressure could have a significant effect in safeguarding human rights.
On the other hand, the Reagan administration was busily trying to enter
into warmer and more supportive relations with the Guatemalan mili-
tary regime and, as we described earlier, was going to great pains to put
the regime in a favorable light. A propaganda model wouJd anticipate
that even these dramatic and horrifying murders would be treated in
alow-key manner and quickly dropped by the mass media-that, unlike
Popieluszko, there would be no sustained interest, no indignation capa-
ble of rousing the public (and disturbing the administration's plans).
These expectations are fully vindicated by the record.

Table 2-3 compares media coverage of the Popieluszko case with that
of the murders of the GAM leaders. It is immediately obvious that the
treatment is radically different in the two cases. The GAM murders
couldn't even make "the news" at Time, Newiweek, or CBS News, The
Neu} York Times never found these murders worthy of the front page
or editorial comment, and we can see that the intensity of its coverage
was slight. The first report of the quadruple murder was on April 7,
1985, in a tiny item on page 5 of the paper in which it is mentioned that
the body of Maria Rosario Godoy de Cuevas was found in her car in
a ravine, along with the bodies of her brother and her young son. In
neither this item nor any succeeding article does the Tim£s provide
details on the condition of the bodies, or mention that the two-year-old
child had his fingernails tom out.^^^

In other respects, too, the Times articles, all written by Stephen
Kinzer, generally employ an apologetic framework. That is, they don't
focus on the murders- who the victims were, the details of the vio-
lence, who did it, why, and the institutional structures and roots of
organized murder of which these are an obvious part. With Popie-
luszko, these were the issues. Kinzer has little or nothing on the details
of the GAM murders and very little on the victims and the experiences
that brought them to GAM, and the question of who did it and what
was being done (or not done) to bring the murderers to justice he hardly
considers. Kinzer takes it for granted that the murders were committed
by agents of the state, but he doesn't say this explicitly, or discuss the

TABLE 2-3

Mass -Media Coverage of Worthy and Unworthy Victims (2):
A Murdered Polish Priest versus Two Murdered Officials
of the Guatemalan Mutual Support Group

Articles'

No. 9b of

row I

NEW YORK TIMES

Column

Inches

Frcnt-

page
articles

Editorials

No. % of No. % of No. % of

row I row 1 row 1

TIME nd NEWSWEEK

No. ft of

row I

Column
Laches

No. ft of

row I

CBS NEWS

No. of No. of
news eveaiag
programs' news

No. ft of No. ft of

row I row I

c

c

St

Ci

o
a;

v>
II
Z
H

Victimt

1. lerzy

Popicluszko,
murdered on
Oct. 19, 1984

2. Hector Orlando

G6mez and Maria
Rosario Qodoy de
Cuevas, murdered
between Mar. 30
and Apr. 6, 1985
(along with a child,
who was tortured)

78 (100) 1183.0 (100) 10 (100)

5 (6.4) 80.0 (6.8)

(100)

16 (tOO) 313.0 (100) 46 (100) 23 (100)

rilti media t.ovC-t Afi« is for "O I8-m.t>nth period from 'he tifllc of the firw rc-.porr nf 'he victirn's disappc f»raoco Of rrturdcr.

WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS 85

background, or provide a framework for evaluating the case. He looks
"objectively" at the scene, quoting some of the GAM survivors in brief
and rhetorical statements that are offset by quotes from the generals:
they approved the formation of GAM (an ambiguous half-truth); they
appointed an investigating committee that "found no evidence of secret
detention centers in Guatemala" (no mention of the composition of the
committee, no counter-evidence, and no mention of issues they may
have overlooked-like disappeared who are murdered); and they deny
any responsibility for the murder of Godoy, her brother, and her son,
who they claim to have been victims of an auto accident. If Kinzer had
given the details of the victims' injuries, this lie would have been
exposed as such, and further questions would have suggested them-
selves.

In article after article, Kinzer repeats that the Mejia Victores gov-
ernment has pledged to return to civihan rule shortly, which helps
deflect attention from the ongoing killing and its causes, and from the
GAM murders under discussion; he also does not tell us just what
"civilian rule" would mean in a terrorist state in which, as he knows,
the effective rulers would be the same military forces. Ho in the Popie-
luszko case, once it was established that the police had committed the
murder, the media spent a great deal of space discussing the police
apparatus and police methods, as well as attending to the responsibility
of the people at higher levels for the murder. Kinzer doesn't discuss
these questions at all. The structure of the Guatemalan murder ma-
chine and how it works would make a good Story, and numerous details
of its operations were available, but this did not fit the government
agenda and the Times format. Similarly, the role of Mejia Victores in
the murder of the GAM leaders-recall his warnings just prior to the
murders, and consider his virtually unlimited discretionary power to
murder or protect the citizenry-is ignored. But once again, the links
to the top in the case of unworthy victims do not fit the propaganda
format. Kinzer does a nice job of making the GAM murders seem to
be part of the natural background-regrettable but inevitable, part of
the complex inheritance of a troubled country, and possibly, it is hoped,
to be rectified when the new civilian government takes power.

In an attempt to gain support abroad, two of the remaining leaders
of GAM, Nineth de Garcia and Herlindo Hideo de Aquino, traveled
to Europe in March and April 1986, after the inauguration of the elected
civilian president, Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo. One of their
most important messages was that killings and disappearances had not
abated at aU during the first three months ofCerezo's presidency, and
that the death squads had actually reappeared and were active in

86 MAt/VFACTUKlNG CONSENT

Guatemala City. Because of H health, Nineth de Garcia canceled her
visits in Washington, D.C., and flew directly from Europe to Chicago,
where she was scheduled to receive the key to the city from Mayor
Harold Washington. As she went through customs in ChicagOj how-
ever, the officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
searched, interrogated, and harassed her for two hours, one of the
customs officials calling her a subversive and a Communist. They also
seized literature she carried and threatened to deport her, despite her
intended brief stopover and valid visa. This intimidation had its effect,
and Nineth de Garcia flew directly to Guatemala. A friend attended the
banquet in her place to accept the key presented by Mayor Washington.

This incident is revealing. It is unlikely that Sharansky or Walesa
would be so treated by the INS, but if by some chance they were, the
press outcry would be great. 1 1 1 When a press conference was held in
Chicago by supporters of GAM to protest this outrage, the major media
did not attend, and neither the press releases nor the follow-up lener
from a congressional group signed by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
could break the silence. The convergence between Reagan administra-
tion policy toward Guatemala and media priorities was complete. (Ac-
cording to two organizers of the Chicago press conference, full
information on this event was given Steve Greenhouse, the Neti? York
Times's reporter in Chicago, but not a word about this incident ap-
peared in the newspaper of record.)

A press release by the Guatemalan army on September 17, 1986,
accused GAM of conducting

... a black campaign of falsehood . . . insults and insolence
directed at the military institution that exceed [the boundaries] of
liberty and tolerance for free speech. The army cannot permit the
insidiousness and truculence of GAM's maneuvers that at-
tempt to compromise the democratic international image of
Guatemala.''^

Although very similar threats preceded the murder of two leaders of
GAM in March and April of 1984, the U.S. mass media entirely ignored
this new information-despite strenuous efforts by GAM, the
Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, and their allies to elicit pub-
licity. As in the past, the unworthiness of these victims remains an
essential ingredient in the Guatemalan army's continued freedom to
kill.

3

Legitimizing versus
Meaningless Third World
Elections:

Xhird world elections provide an excellent testing
ground for a propaganda model. Some elections are held in friendly
client states to legitimize their rulers and regimes, whereas others are
held in disfavored or enemy countries to legitimize their political sys-
tems. This natural dichotomization is strengthened by the fact that
elections in the friendly client states are often held under U.S. sponsor-
ship and with extensive U.S. management and public-relations support.
Thus, in the Dominican Republic in 1966, and periodically thereafter,
the United States organized what have been called "demonstration
elections" in its client states, defined as those whose primary function
is to convince the home population that the intervention is well inten-
tioned, that the populace of the invaded and occupied country wel-
comes the intrusion, and that they are being given a democratic choice. '

The elections in EI Salvador in 1982 and 1984 were true demonstra-
tion elections, and those held in Guatemala in 1984-85 were strongly
supported by the United States for image-enhancing purposes. The

EI Salvador

Guatemala

Nicaragua

88 MANUPACTliRING CONSENT

election held in Nicaragua in 1984, by contrast, was intended to legiti-
mize a government that the Reagan administration was striving to
destabilize and overthrow. The U.S. government therefore went to
great pains to cast the Nicaraguan election in an unfavorable light.

A propaganda model would anticipate mass-media support of the
state perspective and agenda. That is, the favored elections will be
found to legitimize, no matter what the facts; the disfavored election
win be found deficient, farcical, and failing to legitimize-again, irre-
spective of facts. What makes this another strong test of a propaganda
model is that the Salvadoran and Guatemalan elections of 1982 and
1984-85 were held under conditions of severe, ongoing state terror
against the civilian population, whereas in Nicaragua this was not the
case. To find the former elections legitimizing and the Nicaraguan
election a farce, the media would have had to use different standards
of evaluation in the two sets of cases, and, more specifically) it would
have been necessary for them to avoid discussing state terror and other
basic electoral conditions in the Salvadoran and Guatemalan elections.
As we wiU see, the media fulfilled these requirements and met the needs
of the state to a remarkable degree.

In order to demonstrate the applicability of a propaganda model in
these cases, we will first describe the eJecrjon-propaganda framework
that the U.S. government tried to foist on the media; we will then
review the basic electoral conditions under which elections were held
in the three countries; and finally, we will examine how the U.S. mass
media treated each of the three elections.

3.1. ELECTION-PROPAGANDA
FRAMEWORKS

The U.S. government has employed a number of devices in its spon-
sored elections to put them in a favorable light_ It has also had an
identifiable agenda of issues that it wants stressed, as well as others it
wants ignored or downplayed. Central to demonstration-election man-
agement has been the manipulation of symbols and agenda to give the
favored election a positive image. The sponsor government tries to
associate the election with the happy word "democracy" and the mih-
tary regime it backs with support of the elections (and hence democ-
racy). It emphasizes what a wonderful thing it is to be able to hold any
election at all under conditions of internal conflict, and it makes it

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEAMNCLBSS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 89

appear a moral triumph that the army has agreed to support the election
(albeit reluctantly) and abide by its results.

The refusal of the rebel opposition to participate in the election is
portrayed as a rejection of democracy and proof of its antidemocratic
tendencies, although the very plan of the election involves the rebels'
exclusion from the ballot.^ The sponsor government also seizes upon
any rebel statements urging nonparticipation or threatening to disrupt
the election. These are used to transform the election into a dramatic
struggle between, on the one side, the "born-again" democratic army
and people struggling to vote for "peace," and, on the other, the rebels
opposing democracy, peace, and the right to vote. Thus the dramatic
denouement of the election is voter lurnoui, which measures the ability
of the forces of democracy and peace (the army) to overcome rebel
threats.

Official observers are dispatched to the election scene to assure its
public-relations success. Nominally, their role is to see that the election
is "fair." Their real function, however, is to provide the appearance of
fairness by focusing on the government's agenda and by channeling
press attention to a reliable source. ^ They testify to fairness on the basis
of long lines, smiling faces, no beatings in their presence, and the
assurances and enthusiasm of U.S. and client-state officials."* But these
superficialities are entirely consistent with a staged fraud. Fairness
depends on fundamental conditions established in advance, which are
virtually impossible to ascertain under the brief, guided-tour conditions
of official observers. Furthermore, official observers in sponsored elec-
tions rarely ask the relevant questions. ^ They are able to perform their
public-relations function because the government chooses observers
who are reliable supporters of its aims and publicizes their role, and the
press gives them respectful anention.^

"Off the agenda" for the government in its own sponsored elections
are all of the basic parameters that make an election meaningful or
meaningless prior to the election-day proceedings. These include: (I)
freedom of speech and assembly; (2) freedom of the press; (3) freedom
to organize and maintain intermediate economic, social, and political
groups (unions, peasant organizations, political clubs, student and
teacher associations, etc.); (4) freedom to form political parties, orga-
nize members, put forward candidates, and campaign without fear of
extreme violence; and (5) the absence of state terror and a climate of
fear among the public. Also off the agenda is the election-day "coercion
package" that may explain turnout in terms other than devotion to the
army and its plans, including any legal requirement to vote, and explicit
or implicit threats for not voting. Other issues that must be downplayed

90 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

in conforming to the government propaganda format are the U.S. gov-
ernment's role in organizing and funding the election, the internal
propaganda campaign waged to get out the vote, outright fraud, and the
constraints on and threats to journalists covering the election.

Another jssue off the government agenda js the purpose of the elec-
tion. If its role is to influence the home population, spelling this out
might arouse suspicions concerning its authenticity. In the case of the
Vietnam election of 1967 and the EI Salvador elections of 1982 and 1984,
the purpose of the elections was not merely to placate the home public
but also to mislead them on the ends sought. In both instances it was
intimated that an election would contribute to a peaceable resolution
to the conflict, whereas the intent was to clear the ground for intensified
warfare. Nobody who proposed a peace option could appear as a seri-
ous candidate in Vietnam in 1967,' and as we describe below, there was
no peace candidate at aU in El Salvador in either 1982 or 1984, although
the polls and reporters kept saying that peace was the primary concern
of the electorate. This highlights both the fraudulence of these elections
and the urgency that the intentions of the sponsor be kept under wraps.

In elections held in disfavored or enemy states, the U.S. government
agenda is turned upside down. Elections are no longer equated with
democracy, and U.S. officials no longer marvel at the election being
held under adverse conditions. They do not commend the army for
supporting the election and agreeing to abide by the results. On the
contrary, the leverage the dominant party obtains by control of and
support by the army is put forward in this case as compromising the
integrity of the election. Rebel disruption is no longer proof that the
opposition rejects democracy, and turnout is no longer the dramatic
denouement of the struggle between a democratic army and its rebel
opposition. Now the stress is on the hidden motives of the sponsors of
the election, who are trying to legitimize themselves by this tricky
device of a so-called election.

Most important, the agenda of factors relevant to appraising an
election is altered. From the stress on the superficial-long lines and
smiling faces of voters, the simple mechanics of election-day balloting,
and the personalities of the candidates-attention is now shifted to the
basic parameters that were off the agenda in the sponsored election. As
noted by Secretary of State Shultz, "The important thing is that if there
is to be an electoral process, it be observed not only at the moment when
people vote, but in all the preliminary aspects that make an election
meaningful. " Spelling this out further, Shultz mentioned explicitly that
for elections to be meaningful, "rival political groups" must be allowed
"to form themselves and have access to people, to have the right of

LECITIMIZISO VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 91

assembly, to have access to the media."8 These remarks were made
apropos of the 1984 Nicaraguan election. No congresspersons or media
commentators raised any question about whether these criteria should
perhaps be applied to the Salvadoran or Guatemalan ejections sched-
uled during the same year.

In brief, the government used a well-nigh perfect system of Orwel-
Uan doublethink: forgetting a criterion "that has become inconvenient,
and then, when it becomes necessary again, . _. draw[ing] it back from
oblivion for just so long as it is needed. "9 It even acknowledges this fact:
a senior U.S. official told members of the Latin American Studies
Association (LASA) observing the Nicaraguan election:

The United States is not obliged to apply the same standard of
judgment to a country whose government is avowedly hostile to
the U.S. as for a country Uke El Salvador, where it is not. These
people [the Sandinistas] could bring about a situation in Central
America which could pose a threat to U.S. security. That allows
us to change our yardstick, to

But while a government may employ a blatant double standard, media
which adhere to minimal standards of objectivity and are not them-
selves part of a propaganda system would apply a single standard. Did
the mass media of the United States follow a single standard in dealing
with the elections in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, or did
they follow their government's agenda in order to put the Salvadoran
and Guatemalan elections in a favorable light and to denigrate the one
held in Nicaragua?

3.2. BASIC ELECTORAL
CONDITIONS IN EL SALVADOR,
GUATEMALA, AND NICARAGUA,

1982-85

All three of these countries, in which elections were held in the years
1982-85, were in the midst of serious conflict: Nicaragua was being
subjected to regular border incursions by the U.S. -organized and sup-
plied contras. £1 Salvador was in the midst of a combination civil
conflict and externally (U.S.) organized and funded counterinsurgency
war. Guatemala, as we noted earlier, had evolved into a counterinsur-

92 MANUFACTUKINC CONSENT

gency state, with permanent warfare to keep the majority of Indians and
other peasants in their place, and violent repression was structured into
the heart of the political system.

Despite the common feature of ongoing conflict, however, electoral
conditions were far more favorable in Nicaragua than in El Salvador
and Guatemala, for several reasons. First, and crucially important, in
the latter countries, at the time of the elections the army was still
engaged in mass slaughter ofthe civilian population, with the toll in the
tens of thousands in each country and the killing often carried out with
extreme sadism. Nothing remotely similar was true in Nicaragua. These
facts, which are not controversial among people with a minimal concern
for reality, immediately establish a fundamental distinction with regard
to the electoral climate. In countries that are being subject to the terror
of a rampaging murder machine, supported or run by a foreign power,
electoral conditions are fatally compromised in advance, a point that
the media would recognize at once if we were considering the sphere
of influence of some official enemy. 11

A further-and related-distinction was that the ruling Sandinista
government was a popular government, which strove to serve majority
needs and could therefore afford to allow greater freedom of speech and
organization. The LASA report on the Nicaraguan election notes that
their program "implies redistribution of access to wealth and public
services. The state will use its power to guarantee fulfillment of the
basic needs of the majority population." The "logic of the majority,"
the report continues, also imphes the involvement of "very large num-
bers of people in the decisions that affect their lives." 12 Qualified ob-
servers conclude that the Nicaraguan government pursued this logic,
although this fact is excluded from the free press. After citing the

World Bank's observation that "Governments vary greatly in the

commitment of their political leadership to improving the condition of
the people and encouraging their active participation in the develop-
ment process," Dianna Melrose, ofthe charitable development agency
Oxfam, states that "From Oxfam's experience of working in seventy-six
developing countries, Nicaragua was to prove exceptional in the
strength of that Government commitment." 13 The Salvadoran and
Guatemalan governments, by contrast, were ruled by elites that had
been struggling desperately for decades to avoid the very kinds of
reforms the Sandinistas were implementing. Extreme repression was
the longstanding method of control ofthe majority in EI Salvador and
Guatemala, with vigorous and unceasing U.S. support. The aim of this
repression was to keep the populace apathetic and to destroy popular
organizations that might lay the basis for meaningful democracy. The

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 93

Sandinistas were engaged in mobilizing the majority and involving them
in political life, which they could afford to do because their programs
were intended to serve the general population.

A third factor affecting electoral conditions was that in El Salvador
and Guatemala the conflict was internal, and violence against the ma-
jority was integral to the struggle. In Nicaragua, the conflict was one
involving an externally sponsored aggression that had very limited
internal support. The Sandinistas could appeal to nationalist senti-
ments, easily mobilized against Yankee-organized terrorism. The Sal-
vadoran and Guatemalan governments could hardly do the same-the
Salvadoran government especially had to contend with a negative na-
tionalist reaction to obvious foreign (i.e., U.S.) domination and manipu-
lation of its affairs, a fact that reached the level of absurdity when
Duarte, visiting Washington in the fall of 1987, made himself an object
of ridicule throughout Latin America by promptly kissing the American
flag. While the Sandinistas did increasingly crack down on internal
supporters of the contras as the conflict intensified, by the standards the
United States usually applies to this region dissenters were dealt with
remarkably benignly in Nicaragua. In El Salvador and Guatemala, the
ruling elites could not afford such toleration, and repression by large-
scale terror had long been institutionalized in these states.

A fourth factor making for a more benign electoral environment in
Nicaragua, paradoxically, was U.S. hostility and the power of its propa-
ganda machine. Every arrest or act of harassment in Nicaragua was
publicized and transformed into evidence of the sinister quality of the
Sandinista government in the free press of the United States. Mean-
while, as we described in chapter 2, the Guatemalan and Salvadoran
regimes could indulge in torture, rape, mutilation, and murder on a
daily and massive basis without invoking remotely proportional atten-
tion, indignation, or inferences about the quality of these regimes. In
the context, the Nicaraguan government was under intense pressure to
toe the mark, whereas the U.S. satellites were free to murder at will
without serious political cost.

Let us examine briefly how El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua
compared in the individual categories of conditions of a free election,
before we turn to the media treatment of these issues.

3.2.1. Free speech and assembly.

In El Salvador, the right to free speech and free assembly was legally
suspended under a state-of-siege order of March 7, 1980. Decree No.

94 MANUPACTliRING CONSENT

507 of December 3, 1980, essentially destroyed the judicial system,
permitting the armed forces to hold citizens without charge or evidence
for 180 days. Under these rulings, in the thirty months before the March
1981 election, and prior to the 1984 elections, many thousands of civil-
ians were seized, imprisoned, tortured, raped, and murdered outside of
legal processes for alleged "subversive" actions and thoughts. The state
of siege was lifted in early 1982 solely for the six parties contesting the
election, and it was lifted entirely ten days before the election for all
Salvadorans-although, unfortunately, the citizenry was not informed
of this fact until after the election was over and state-of-siege condi-
tions were reimposed." The practice of exposing mutilated bodies for
the edification of the citizenry became institutionalized in the early
1980s in EI Salvador. We described in chapter 2 the difficulty the U.S.
government had in getting underlings jailed, tried, and convicted for
the murder of four American citizens, even under intense U.S. pressure.
The people ofEl Salvador had no protection whatsoever from the state
terrorists, apart from that afforded by the guerrilla army in the regions
under their control. The threat of extreme violence by the state against
dissident speech was acute in El Salvador in 1982 and 1984, and was
incompatible with a free election.

In Guatemala, similarly, during 1984 and 1985, and for many years
before, the actions of the armed forces against alleged subversives was
entirely outside the rule of law. Thousands were seized, tortured, and
killed without warrant and without any individual right to hearing or
trial. As in EI Salvador, mutilation and exposure of the tortured bodies
became conmionplace in the late 1970s and the 1980s. 16 The courts were
dominated by the military, as the latter would simply not execute or
obey a court order of which they disapproved, and the jUdges were not
inclined to challenge the military for reasons of dependency or fear.
Even Viscount Colville of Culross, the special rapporteur of the UN
General Assembly who has been a notorious apologist for the Guatema-
lan regime, after pointing out that over eighty members of the judiciary,
court staff, and legal profession had been murdered in the early 19SOS
and that many others were threatened, says that "Such events make
their mark and cannot quickly be mitigated." 17 Two illustrations of the
lack of court autonomy may be noted here: in May 1983, Ricardo
Sagastume Vidaure, then president of the supreme COUrt, was simply
removed by military order for attempting to bring military personnel
under the jurisdiction of the legal system, is On July 19, 1984, Colonel
Djalmi Dominguez, head of public relations for the army, told the
newspaper Prensa Libre that the army wouldn't tolerate its members
being taken to court on any charges."

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 95

In the early 19SOS, following the mass killings and village destruction
of 1980-83, vast numbers of peasants were resettled in "model villages"
and other places under army control, and over 800,000 males were
made obligatory members of civil patrols with military functions under
close army surveillance. According to the British parliamentary group
that visited Guatemala in 1984, "The civihan patrol system is imple-
mented by terror, and designed also to sow terror People who do

anything out of the ordinary come under immediate suspicion and are
taken by the patrols to the army's desracamienro. Interrogation will be
done by the army, but the killing of murdered suspects [is] often by the
civilian patrols."2Q Bishops Taylor and O'Brien, representing the
Roman Catholic Bishops' Conferences of Scotland and England-Wales
respectively, reponed after their visit to Guatemala in 1984 that

The civilian population is under almost total control by a heavy
army and police presence throughout the country, which we were
able to observe. There is also a nationwide network of civil defense
patrols, military commissioners and informers, and «model vil-
lages" serving in some cases as internment camps for the Indian
population from the areas of conflict. Much of Guatemala resem-
bles a country under military occupation. One of our informants
summed up the situation by saying that the military had estab-
lished a system of "structural control."21

The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, following an on-
site visit in May 1985, also found that freedom of speech and assembly
did not exist in Guatemala:

The right of assembly and freedom of association, considered in
Articles 15 and 16 of the American Convention, are also restricted
and curtailed, because existing security measures in the Develop-
ment Poles and the strict supervision of the Civil Defense Patrols
inhibit residents from taking part in any social, ideological, cultu-
ral or other assemblies or associations. All such meetings, when
they do occur, are subject to surveillance, supervision and control
by the authorities, so they do not enjoy the freedom implied by
such rights. 22

Public demonstrations were permissible in Guatemala during the
1984-85 elections, with three days' advance notice and approval of the
military authorities. In the Guatemalan context, however, this grant of
rights was not meaningful. The delegation of the International Human

96 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Rights Law Group and the Washington Office on Latin America noted
that whatever the election guarantees,

the military and civil defense patrols and the climate of fear also
made it difficult for many Guatemalans to organize and assemble.
One local observer said that years of terror and oppression against
local organizations had demobilized the whole rural population:
"Four cue [peasant league] members were killed in this village
alone. Now it would be very difficult to organize any kind of
group." Civil patrols, police and army checkpoints on highways,
and the need for travel permits for residents of the model villages
impeded free movement. In the rural areas the civil patrols dis-
couraged gatherings because people feared being reported.

It was noted by many observers of the Guatemalan elections that
although the big issues in that country were land distribution and
reform and human rights, no political candidates discussed or ad-
vocated either land reform, or restructuring the military and forcing an
accounting of tens of thousands of "disappearances." One Christian
Democratic adviser explained to the law group that "We Christian
Democrats haven't raised such issues because this isn't the moment to
start a confrontation with either the army or the private sector. "24

In short, despite the "momentary improvement in the conditions of
free speech" that occurred during the election campaign, Guatemala
did not meet the first condition of a free election. The rural masses were
under army discipline and traumatized by mass killings and the absence
of any vestige of rule of law, and the candidates were unable to raise
openly the fundamental issues of the society.

Free speech and rights of assembly were constrained in Nicaragua
in 1984 by social pressures and threats and by a state of siege that had
been terminated some six months prior to the November 1984 election.
Very important differences existed, however, between the Nicaraguan
constraints and those prevailing in El Salvador and Guatemala. Most
important, in Nicaragua the army and police did not regularly seize
alleged subversives, and torture and murder them. Mutilated bodies
have not been put on public display as a part of the system of public
education. What the law group called the "constant, overt political
terror" in Guatemala, based on "numerous documented massacres of
whole villages," and what the former Salvadoran official Leonel Gomez
called the state of "fearful passivity" prevalent in EI Salvador, did not
apply to Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, in 1984, dissidents were able to speak

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 97

freely without fear of murder, and the LASA group noted that "Every
member of our delegation was approached at least once by an irate
citizen as we walked around Managua and other cities. Several of these
encounters turned into heated arguments between the individual who

had approached us and passers-by who joined the discussion These

people did not feel intimidated. "25

Freedom of assembly in Nicaragua was somewhat limited by harass-
ment, but, once again, it was not ruled out by state terror, as was the
case in EI Salvador and Guatemala. The LASA delegation examined
in detail the charges of Sandinista harassment of opposition-group
meetings and found them largely unfounded, concluding that the con-
testing parties "were able to hold the vast majority of their rallies
unimpeded by pro-FSLN demonstrations. . . ."26

Our conclusion is that the first basic condition of a free election was-
partially met i n Nicaragua, but was not met at all in El Salvador and
Guatemala.

3.2.2. Freedom of the press.

In £1 Salvador, the only substantial newspapers critical of the govern-
ment. La Cronica del Pueblo and El Independiente-neither by any
means radical papers-were closed in July 1980 and January 1981, re-
spectively, the firSt because its top editor and two employees were
murdered and mutilated by the security forces, the second because the
army arrested its personnel and destroyed its plant. The church paper
and radio station were repeatedly shut down by bombing attacks, No
paper or station representing the principal opposition has been able to
operate except clandestinely. Over thirty journalists have been mur-
dered in £1 Salvador since the revolutionary junta took power, An
intensified campaign against the press occurred just prior to the 1982
election. On March 10, a death list of thirty-five journalists was cir-
culated by a "death squad," and on March 18 the mutilated bodies of
four Dutch journalists were recovered, None of the murders of jour-
nalists in El Salvador was ever "solved" -they were essentially murders
carried out under the auspices of the state.

In Guatemala, forty-eight journalists were murdered between 1978
and 1985/^ and many others have been kidnapped and threatened.
These -killings, kidnappings, and threats have been a primary means of
control of the media. As in EI Salvador, nobody has yet been ap-
prehended and tried for any of these crimes, which must be viewed as

98

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

murders carried out by the state or with state approval. There are no
papers or radio or television stations in Guatemala that express the
views of the rebels or the majority Indian population or the lower
classes in general. "At most, the variants reflect shades of strictly con-
servative thinldng."29 Given the extreme climate of fear, and threats for
stepping out of line, even the conservative press is cautious and engages
in continuous self-censorship. All the central topics that should be
debated in this terrorized society are carefully avoided,

In Nicaragua, once again, there have been no reported deaths of
journalists by state terrorists, nor even threats of personal violence. In
1984, the majority of the fifty-odd radio stations were privately owned,
and some of them provided their own news programs; four other inde-
pendent producers supplied radio news programs without prior censor-
ship. Foreign radio and television from commercial and U.S.
propaganda sources broadcasting from Costa Rica, Honduras, and else-
where were of growing importance in 1984,^' Two of the three newspa-
pers were privately owned, one supportive of the government but
critical of specific programs and actions, the other violently hostile. The
latter. La Prensa, which represented the small, ultraconservative mi-
nority and supported the contras and a foreign-sponsored invasion of
the country, was allowed to operate throughout the 1984 election, al-
though it was censored. The censorship still allowed the paper to
publish manifestos of opposition groups and a pastoral letter critical of
the regime. No comparable paper has been allowed to exist above-
ground, even briefly, in El Salvador and Guatemala.

There is no doubt that the media in Nicaragua have been under
government constraint, with censorship and periodic emergency con-
trols that seriously encroached on freedom of the press. It should be
noted, however, that Nicaragua is under foreign attack and in a state
of serious warfare. John S. Nichols points out that under the U.S.
Espionage Act of 1917, over one hundred publications were banned
from the mails, and hundreds of people were jailed for allegedly inter-
fering with military recruitment. Furthermore,

Given that the United States was a relatively mature and homoge-
nous political system during World War I and was not particularly
threatened by the fighting, the range of public discussion tolerated
in Nicaragua during the first five years of the revolution was
remarkable. Despite assertions by President Reagan, lAPA, and
others that the control of the Nicaraguan media was virtually
totalitarian, the diversity of ownership and opinion was unusual
for a Third World country, particularly one at war.33

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 99

Our conclusion is that the condition of freedom of the press necessary
for a free election was clearly absent in El Salvador and Guatemala, and
that it was partially met in Nicaragua.

3.2.3. Freedom of organization of
intermediate groups.

Perhaps the most important fact about EI Salvador in the two years
prior to the election of March 1982 was the decimation of popular and
private organizations that could pose any kind of challenge to the army
and oligarchy. As we noted in chapter 2, this was the main thrust of
policy of the revolutionary junta from late 1979 onward, and thousands
of leaders were murdered and numerous organizations were destroyed
or driven underground. The teachers' union was decimated by several
hundred murders; the university was occupied, looted, and closed down
by the army; organized student and professional groups were destroyed
by arrests and killings, and even the peasant union sponsored by the
AFL-CIO (i.e., supporters of the regime) had some one hundred of its
organizers and leaders murdered between October 1979 and the elec-
tion of March ip82.**

In Guatemala, too, intermediate organizations such as peasant and
trade unions, teacher and student groups, and professional organiza-
tions have been regularly attacked by the armed forces since 1954. The
process of demobilization of institutions threatening the dominant
elites culminated in the early 1980s, when by government proclamation
"illicit association" was made punishable by law. AU groups "which
follow, or are subordinated to, any totalitarian system of ideology"
(evidently an exception is made of the Guatemalan armed forces and
the national-security ideology) are illicit. Only the armed forces deter-
mine when illicitness occurs. If General Mejia Victores finds the GAM
mothers to be agents of subversion, they may be killed (see chapter 2).
Unions, peasant groups, student and professional organizations have
grown up periodically in Guatemala, only to be crushed by systematic
murder as soon as their demands were pressed with any vigor. The
1984-85 elections followed the greatest era of mass murder in modern
Guatemalan history-under the regimes of Lucas Garcia, Rios Montt,
and Mejia Victores. Union membership in 1985 was below its 1950 level,
and other urban groups were decimated or inactive; the peasant major-
ity was totally demobilized and under the tight control and surveillance
of the military.

100

MANUFACTUKING CONSENT

In Nicaragua, again the contrast with the two U.S. clients is marked.
Under Sandinista management there was a spurt in union and peasant
organization. A deliberate attempt was made to mobilize the population
to participate in decision-making at the local level and to interact with
higher-level leaders. Oxfam compliments the Nicaraguan government
highly for this etfort, as we pointed out earlier.

There is legitimate debate over the extent to which the grass-roots
and other organizations sponsored by the ruling FSLN are indepen-
dent, and whether they might not be a vehicle for both state propaganda
and coercion. Oxfam America and its parent organization in London
clearly find them constructive. Luis Hector Serra contends that the
grass-roots organizations are relatively autonomous, and that their
close relationship to the leadership of the FSLN "did not obstruct their
capacity to express the concerns of their members at the local level.""
He concludes that the popular organizations were "profoundly demo-
cratic" in their effects of involving the populace in decision-making and
educating them on the possibilities of participation in public life.'^^ The
difference with the organization of the Guatemalan peasantry in "poles
of development," where the essence of the organization was, quite
openly, military control by terror and enforced nonparticipation, is
quite dramatic, whatever one's general assessment of the FSLN popu-
lar organizations may be.

We conclude that on the third basic condition for a free election. El
Salvador and Guatemala did not qualify in the years 1984-85; Nicara-
gua did, at least to a significant degree.

3.. 2.4. Freedom to organize parties,
field candidates, and campaign for

o f f i c e

No party of the left could organize and present candidates in the 1982
and 1984 elections in El Salvador. The Democratic Front (FDR) had
been quickly driven underground. Five of its top leaders were seized
in EI Salvador in November 1980 by official and paramilitary forces, and
were tortured, mutilated, and killed. A year before the March 1982
election, the army published a list of 138 "traitors," which included
virtually all politicians of the left and left-center. Colonel Gutierrez, a
powerful member of the junta, had stated forcefully that the FDR could
not participate in the election because it was a "front" for the guerrillas.
The invitation to the FDR and the FMLN to lay down their arms and

LEOITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 101

compete in the election was thus fraudulent, a fact confirmed by the
admission of the U.S. embassy that the FDR could not safely campaign
in El Salvador, with the accompanying suggestion that they might do
so by means of videotapes sent in from outside the country's borderspS
Subsequently, even Duarte, the preferred candidate of the United
States, was unable to campaign outside San Salvador in 1982 for fear
of murder, and scores of Christian Democratic politicans were killed
in the years 1980-84.39 In short, not only radical but even pro-U.S.,
mildly reformist parties could not escape decimation by political mur-
der during those years.

It should also be emphasized that no party could organize and run
candidates in EI Salvador that put high priority on terminating the war
by negotiations with the rebels. What makes this especially important
is that reporters and observers were unanimous in 1982 that the main
thing the public wanted out of the election was peace. The propaganda
formula for getting out the vote in 1982 was "ballots versus bullets,"
with the implication that ballots were a possible route to a reduction
in the use of bullets. If, in fact, no peace candidate was eligible to run,
the election was a fraud for this reason alone.

Defenders of these elections have argued that there was a substantial
difference between the candidates, especially between D'Aubuisson and
Duarte, so that VOters had a meaningful choice.^ But D'Aubuisson and
Duarte did not disagree on the central issue of interest to the Salvado-
ran people-whether to fight to witii or to strive for a negotiated settle-
ment with the rebels. Both were members of the war party, with only
tactical differences. Although Duarte made occasional demagogic
claims that he would talk with the rebels and bring about peace, he
never spelled out a peace-making agenda, never went beyond suggest-
ing "dialogue" (as opposed to "negotiations," which imply the possibil-
ity of substantive concessions), and never departed from the position
that the rebels should lay down their arms and participate in the new
"democracy" that Duarte and the army had established.

Duarte joined the junta at a moment of severe crisis in March 1980,
when all the progressive civilians had left and immediately after the
murder of the Christian Democratic attorney-general, Mario Zamora,
by the newly prospering death squads. It was clear that the army and
affiliated death squads had embarked on a policy of large-scale massa-
c-re. Duarte provided the fig leaf and apologetics that the army needed
for the second matqnsa.^^ We believe that Duarte never would have
received U.S. support and protection, and could not have survived in
El Salvador, unless he had made it dear that he was in basic accord with
the arms of the U.S. administration and the Salvadoran army. From

102 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

1980 onward, Duarte always accepted fully the pursuit of a military
solution and no compromise with "the subversives" (a phrase that
Duarte uses continually, just as do the army and death- squad leaders).
As Raymond Bonner points out,

The repression in 1980 reached a magnitude surpassed only by the
[first} malanza and was far worse than anything imagined under
General Romero .... By the end of the year the number [mur-
dered] had reached at least 9,000. Every day mutilated bodies,
missing arms or heads, were found: behind shopping centers;
stuffed in burlap bags and left oo dusty rural roads; hurled over
cliffs into ravines. 42

And through all of this, Duarte not only provided the facade of "re-
form," he regularly complimeoted the army for its Joyal service. In a
letter published in the Miami Herald on November 9. 1981, Duarte
wrote that

The armed forces are waging a heroic battle against a cruel and
pitiless enemy supported by great resources of ideological aggres-
sion. This goes parallel with armed aggression. This would

be one more prey in the conquest plan in the Central Ameri-
can region that Moscow has designed to pursue. Immediately
after that its greatest reward would be the North American na-
tion

In brief, the Salvadoran public was never offered the option that the
press itself acknowledged the voters craved.

In Guatemala, as in El Salvador, no parties of the left participated
in the 1984 election for a constituent assembly, and only one crippled
party made a tentative but wholly ineffectual foray in the 1985 presiden-
tial election.43 The main guerrilla movements were, of course, outside
the electoral orbit. Their leaders would have been killed if ap-
prehended, but they would not have participated anyway without a
drastic alteration in basic social and electoral conditions." Even a
centrist party like the Christian Democrats had suffered scores of mur-
ders in the years 1980-83, and the current president of Guatemala, the
Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo, survived three known assassina-
tion attempts. No seriously left party could have qualified in 1984-85
under the laws of "illicit association" mentioned earlier.

The peasant majority was not represented or spoken for by any
candidate. The Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, an organiza-

IBGITIMIZIXG VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 103

tion not able to function within Guatemala, has pointed out that na-
tional political parties that speak for major groups like the working class
or indigenous people "do not exist and ... as a result, these sectors are
institutionally excluded from the political system. "45 Americas Watch
states that one of the civil-patrol system's functions is "to provide
vigilance and control of the local population, preventing any form of
independent political organization. "46 This exclusion of the peasantry
from any political opportunity was reflected in two ways in the 1984-85
elections. One was that in registering for the election, only 3 percent
of the electorate signed up as members of political parties. Another,
more compelhng, is that no candidate in the election urged land reform,
although this was one of the two central issues in Guatemala (the other
being unconstrained army murder, also not an issue in the election,
given the understanding on all sides that the army wUl remain the ruling
force, whoever gains office).

As with Duarte in £1 Salvador, the presence of Vinicio Cerezo as a
candidate, and as the eventual winner in the 1985 election, raises the
question of whether, despite the constraints on the left, Cerezo did not
really offer a significant option to the voting public. Cerezo differen-
tiated himself from his electoral rivals, especially toward the end of the
campaign and the runoff, by expressing compassion for the masses and
a determination to make changes in the human-rights picture and mass
poverty. He occasionally mentioned the need for structural reform,
although he was not specific and stressed that the first requirement was
to reestablish civilian control. He was quite clear, however, that if he
were elected, his power would be nominal at first and would have to
be enlarged while he was in office:

The election wiU not bring automatic transfer of real power to the
president. There will be a handover offormal power. What are my
chances of consolidating that power? Fifty-fifty.'"

During the election campaign, Cerezo never straightforwardly ad-
dressed the question of land reform, and news reports in Guatemala
suggested that he had promised the landowners' lobby that land reform
was not on his agenda. Similarly, he did not promise any legal action
against those who had murdered thousands, nor did he say that he
would dismantle the counterinsurgency state. There would seem to
have been at least a tacit understanding between Cerezo and the mili-
tary that he would protect them against prosecution and preserve their
power and relative autonomy; in fact, he could not do otherwise and
survive. 49 In the year and a half that has elapsed since he took office.

104 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Cerezo has made no meaningful move toward land reform, has sup-
ported the army vigorously against any accounting, and has made no
move to dismantle the civil patrols, the development poles, and other
features of institutionalized terror. The human- rights situation in
Guatemala "remains terrible,"5I although improved (but partly because
higher rates of kilhng are no longer deemed beneficial). The poor, for
whom he expressed so much compassion during the electoral campaign,
have suffered further losses in real income, as Cerezo's "reforms" have
accommodated the demands of the army and oligarchy. He is on very
poor terms with the Mutual Support Group. Thus, the postelection
pattern shows that Cerezo, in part by prior agreement but more deci-
sively by structural constraints, has been entirely unable to serve his
mass constituency. In the 1984-85 electiviil, Cerezo gave the Guatema-
lan people an opportunity to vote for a man of seeming goodwill and
good intentions, but one unable to respond to democratic demands
opposed by the real rulers of the state.

In Nicaragua, in 1984, the spectrum of candidates was much wider
than in EI Salvador, Guatemala, or, for that matter, the United States. 52
The Conservative Democratic party and the Independent Liberal party
both issued strong calls for respect for private property, reduced gov-
ernment control of the economy, elimination of press and other con-
trols, and a foreign policy of greater nonalignment and accommodation.
Both were able to denounce the Sandinistas for the war and to call for
depoliticization of the army and negotiations with the contras. Arturo
Cruz, after lengthy negotiations with representatives of the govern-
ment, chose not to run in the 1984 election. But this was a voluntary
act of Cruz (albeit under heavy U.S. pressure),53 in contrast with the
position of the left in El Salvador and Guatemala, and was not based
on physical threats to his person or limits on his access to the popu-
lace. 54

The FSLN had a strong advantage over the opposition parties as the
party in power, defending the country from foreign attack and having
mobilized the population for their own projects of development. The
LASA group felt that much of the incumbency advantage of the FSLN
was characteristic of governments everywhere, and concluded:

It seems clear that the FSLN took substantial advantage of its
incumbent position and, in some ways, abused it. However, the
abuses of incumbency do not appear to have been systematic; and
neither the nature of the abuses n-)r their frequency was such as
to cripple the opposition parties' campaigns or to cast doubt on

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINOLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS ICS

the fundamental validity of the electoral process Generally

speaking, in this campaign the FSLN did little more to take ad-
vantage of its incumbency than incumbent parties everywhere
(including the United States) routinely do, and considerably less
than ruling parties in other Latin American countries traditionally
have done. 55

We would conclude that the ability of candidates to qualify and nin>
and the range of options, was substantially greater in Nicaragua than
in El Salvador and Guatemala. Furthermore, as aU major political
groups of the left were off the ballot by threat of violence in the latter
two cases, those elections fail to meet still another basic electoral condi*
tion.

3.2.5. Absence of state terror and
a climate of fear

During the years 1980-84 the death squads worked freely in £1 Salva-
dor, in close coordination with the army and security forces. The
average rate of killings of civilians in the thirty months prior to the 1981
election was approximately seven hundred per month. Many of these
victims were raped, tortured, and mutilated. All of this was done with
complete impunity, and only the murder of four American women
elicited-by dint of congressional pressure-any kind of legal action.
Even William Doherty of the American Institute for Free Labor Devel-
opment- a longtime supporter of U.S. pohcy in El Salvador-asserted
before a congressional committee that there was nO system of justice
operative in that country, while Leonel G6meXj a former land-reform
official in El Salvador, told the same committee a bit later that state
terror had put the population in a state of «fearful passivity.

In Guatemala, too, the endemic fear based on years of unconstrained
and continuing army violence was a dominant fact of national life.
According to Americas Watch, writing in early 1985,

Torture, kiUings, and disappearances continue at an extraordinary
rate, and millions of peasants remain under the strict scrutiny and
control of the government through the use of civil patrols and
"model villages!' Guatemala remains, in short, a nation of prison-
er s.^''

106

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

The law group described Guatemala in 1985 as "a country where the
greater part of the people Mve in permanent fear."s8

In the case of Nicaragua, we repeat the central fact that differentiates
it from the U.S. client states: in 1984 its government was not murdering
civilians.** The main fear of ordinary citizens in Nicaragua was of
violence by the contras and the United States.

Our conclusion is that the fifth condition for a free election was met
in Nicaragua, but not in EI Salvador and Guatemala. And our overall
finding is that neither Et Salvador nor Guatemala met any of the five
basic conditions of a free election, whereas Nicaragua met some of
them well, others to a lesser extent.

3.3. THE COERCION PACKAGES
IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA,
AND NICARAGUA

As we noted, in the U.S. government's sponsored elections, voter turn-
out is interpreted as public support for the election and its sponsors.
In disapproved elections (here, Nicaragua), this frame is abandoned,
and voter turnout is either ignored or declared meaningless because of
limited options or coercive threats by the authorities. But the question
of coercive threats should clearly be raised in all cases where this is a
potential problem. As we have just described, the elections in £1 Salva-
dor were held under conditions of military rule where mass killings of
"subversives" had taken place and a climate of fear had been estab-
lished. If the government then sponsors an election and the local mili-
tary authorities urge people to vote, a significant part of the vote should
be assumed to be a result of built-in coercion. A propaganda model
would anticipate that the U.S. mass media make no such assumption,
and they did not.

In El Salvador in 1982 and 1984, voting was also required by law. The
law stipulated that failure to vote was to be penalized by a specific
monetary assessment, and it also called on local authorities to check out
whether voters did in fact vote. This could be done because at the time
of voting one's identification card (ID, cedula) was stamped, acknowl-
edging the casting of a vote. Anybody stopped by the army and police
would have to show the ID card, which would quickly indicate whether
the individual had carried out his or her patriotic duty. Just prior to the
March 1982 election, Minister of Defense Garcia warned the popula-
tion in the San Salvador newspapers that the failure to vote would be

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 107

regarded as an act of treason. And in the 1984 election, "Advertising by
the government and miUtary prior to the elections stressed the obliga-
tion to vote rather than the freedom to vote. "60 Given the climate of
fear, the voting requirement, the ID stamp, the army warning, and the
army record in handling "traitors," it is evident that the coercive ele-
ment in generating turnout in Salvadoran elections has been large. This
is supported by queries made by independent observers on the reasons
why Salvadorans voted. ^1

In Guatemala, as in £1 Salvador, voting was required by law; nonvot-
ers were subject to a fine of five quetzales ($1.25). Also, as in El Salvador,
newspaper ads sponsored by the army assened that it was treasonous
to fail to vote or to vote null or blank. The law group reported that
"many" people expressed fears that nonvoting would subject them to
reprisals, and after the military threats in the week before the election
there was "a widespread belief that failure to vote would be punishable
by more than the f\vt-queizal fine stipulated by law."63

In Nicaragua, while registration was obligatory, voting was not re-
quired by law. Voter-registration cards presented on election day were
retained by election officials, so that the failure to vote as evidenced by
the lack of a validated voter credential could not be used as the basis
of reprisals. 64 Most of the voters appeared to LASA observers to be
voting under no coercive threat-they did not have to vote by law; they
were urged to vote but not threatened with the designation of "traitors"
for not voting; there were no obvious means of identifying nonvoters;
and the government did not kill dissidents, in contrast to the normal
practice in El Salvador and Guatemala.

In sum, Nicaragua did not have a potent coercion package at work
to help get out the vote-as did the Salvadoran and Guatemalan gov-
ernments.

3.4. EL SALVADOR: HOW THE
U.S. MEDIA TRANSFORMED A
"DERANGED KILLING
MACHINE" INTO THE
PROTECTOR OF AN INCIPIENT
DEMOCRACY

In reporting on the 1982 Salvadoran election, the U.S. mass media
closely followed the government agenda. The personalities of the can-
didates, the long Mnes waiting to vote, alleged rebel disruption, and

t08 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

"turnout" were heavily featured. 6s As Jack Spence pointed out, "every
media outlet, particularly the networks, cast the election-day story in

3 framework of voting in the midst of extensive guerrilla violence at
polling places."66 Warren Hoge and Richard Meislin, of the New York
Times, repeated day after day that the rebels were threatening disrup-
tion, Hoge asserting that "The elections have taken on a significance
beyond their outcome because leftist guerrillas mounted a campaign to
disrupt them and discourage voters from going to the polls. "67 This is
a precise statement of the government's propaganda frame. But Hoge
and Meislin never once cited a rebel source vowing disruption, and
nobody else did, either. On election day no voters were killed or polling
stations attacked, and the general level of rebel military activity was
below average. In short, the disruption claims were falsifications of both
plans and election-day results, but as they fit the patriotic agenda they
were given prominence, repeated frequently, and used to establish the
contest between the forces of good and evil.^^ At the election-day dose,
Dan Rather exclaimed, "A triumph! A million people to the polls."
Rather did not regard it as a triumph that the Sandinistas got 700,000
people to the polls-a higher proportion of the population, and without
a voting requirement. The propaganda frame of the government gave
turnout high importance in the Salvadoran election but none in the
Nicaraguan election, and Rather followed Jike a good lap dog.

Neither Rather nor any other media analyst on or before March 30,
1982, noted that voting was required by law in E1 Salvador, and nQt Qne
mentioned the warning by the defense minister, General Guillermo
Garcia, in the San Salvador newspapers that nonvoting was treaso-
nous. The basic parameters were entirely off the media agenda. The
destruction of La CTonica and El Independiente and the murder of
twenty-six journalists prior to the election were unmentioned in dis-
cussing the election's quality and meaning. ''o The army and its allies had
been killing civilians on a massive scale in £1 Salvador, for many months
before (and into) March 1982. Would this not create a climate of fear
and, in conjunction with a state of siege, somewhat encumber free
debate and free choice? The point was rarely even hinted at in the mass
media.

Could candidates run freely and campaign without fear of murder?
Could the rebels qualify and run? After all, if it was a civil war, the
rebels were clearly the "main opposition." Again, the mass media
played dumb. They pretended that this exclusion was not important,
or that it represented a willful boycott by the rebels rather than a refusal
based on conditions unfavorable to a ^iree election and a blatantly

LEOiriJHIZl>!C VERSUS UBAyiKGlESS THIRD WORLD BLECTIOSS lOJ

Stacked deQc. Neither the March 1981 death list nor the Gutierrez
statement that the FDR would not be permitted to run were mentioned
by the mass media in our sample. They never once suggested that the
election plan was to create an electoral environment of extreme coer-
cion and bias in which the rebels could not run, and then use this for
the dramatic game of disruption and triumphant turnout. That the
military agreed to the election because it couldn't lose was never sug-
gested by these media.

The role of the army was summarized by Warren Hoge in the New
York Times:

Is the mihtary playing any role in the election? Members of the
military are not allowed to vote, and the armed forces are pledged
to protect voters from violence and to respect the outcome of the
contest.''!

We may note that the army's mass killing of civilians and systematic
destruction and demobilization of virtually aU popular organizations in
El Salvador over the preceding thirty months, which bears on what
Secretary of State Shultz referred to as the "preliminary aspects that
make an election mean something," is not part of the army's "role" for
Hoge and the Times. Roge repeats the Salvadoran army's pledge, not
only taking it at face value, but never suggesting that it (and the election
itself) was meaningless in a terror state where the "main opposition"
was off the ballot and only the war parties were able to field candidates.
In the propaganda framework, the security forces of client states "pro-
tect elections";?! only those of enemy states interfere with the freedom
of its citizens to vote without constraint.

As noted earlier, observers and reporters in El Salvador all agreed
that the populace was most eager for an end to the war, and government
propaganda even stressed that voting was an important vehicle to that
end- the public was urged to substitute "ballots for bullets." But no
peace party was on the Salvadoran baUot. And after the election was
over, the war went on, and the death squads continued to flourish. This
is in accordance with the hypothesis that the real purpose of the elec-
tion was to placate the home population of the United States and render
them willing to fund more war and terror. It is a poor fit to the hypothe-
sis that the people of EI Salvador had a free choice. An honest press
would point up the failure of the election to substitute "ballots for
bullets." The mass media of the United States did nOt raise the issue.

Nor did the experience of 1982 and its aftermath affect the media's

no MANUFACTURING CONSENT

willingness to follow the patriotic agenda once again in 1984. We will
return to this below in a statistical comparison of the New York Times's
coverage of the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan elections.

3.5. "FIRST STEP: GUATEMALA
OPTS FOR MODERATION""

The U.S. government was less deeply involved in the Guatemalan
elections of 1984 and 1985 than it was in those held in El Salvador, but,
as we saw in chapter 2, the Reagan administration went to great pains
to put a favorable gloss on the murderous regimes of Lucas Garcia, Rios
Monu, and Mejia Victores, and to attempt to reintegrate them fully into
the free-world alliance.''"* It encouraged the 1984-85 elections, provided
advisory and financial support for election management, and gave pub-
lic-relations assistance and sent official observers to help put the elec-
tion in a favorable light. There was little effort made to disguise the fact
that the purpose of the election, from the standpoint of the Reagan
administration and the ruling army, was to alter the international
"image" of Guatemala in order to facilitate aid and loans.

With the administration supporting the new look, but without the
intensity of commitment and propaganda backup brought to bear in El
Salvador, and given the steady stream of reports of ongoing mass
murder in Guatemala, a propaganda model would anticipate a media
response that put the Guatemalan elections in a favorable light, but
with qualifications. There was, in fact, far less coverage than of the
Salvadoran election; what there was had a little more "balance," but the
apologetic framework was still overwhelmingly dominant.

A telling manifestation of bias was the media's ready acceptance of
the Guatemalan elections as meaningful, even though they were admit-
tedly for image-malting, in a context of long-standing army rule and
massacre, and despite new institutional arrangements in the country-
side-the massive relocations of the population^ the "model villages,"
and the civil-defense patrols-that were, on their face, incompatible
with a free election. In an enemy state where an election was held under
comparable conditions, it would be designated a meaningless public-
relations exercise. In the case of Guatemala, however, the civil patrols
and ongoing massacres were rarely mentioned, sources that addressed
these matters were ignored, and the overall tone of the news was
cautiously hopeful and optimistic. It was the consensus that the 1984

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS III

election for a constituent assembly was "encouraging" and an impor-
tant first step, and that the 1985 presidential election "ended [emphasis
added] more than 30 years of military domination" (Newsweek, Jan. 17,
1986). Dan Rather, on CBS News, reported that Cerezo became
Guatemala's "first civilian leader after rhirty years of almost uninter-
rupted military rule" (Dec. 9, 1985). This is ambiguous, but the implica-
tion, directly asserted by Newsweek, is that Cerezo, not the army, rules.
Julio Mendez Montenegro was a civilian president from 1966 to 1970,
but he did not rule, and he was eventually discredited by the fact that
he presided over a huge escalation of army violence. Given the earlier
experience, the fact that the generals had made it clear that the civilian
government was "a project" of the militaryj'* and Cerezo's own ex-
pressed reservations about his power, objective news reporting would
have been careful about an alleged ending of military rule.

As in the case of EI Salvador, the murderous rule ofthe Guatemalan
generals did not delegitimize them for the U.S. mass media nor suggest
any possible justice to the rebel cause. Time noted (Feb. 27, 1984) that
a leftist insurgency "poses a permanent challenge to the regime," but
it did not inquire into the roots of this insurgency or suggest that its
leaders constituted a "main opposition" whose ability to run would be
an "acid test" of election integrity (as they pronounced in Nicaragua).
Time also did not observe that the regime poses a permanent challenge
to the survival of its population. The mass murders ofthe Guatemalan
state were even semi-justified by the unquestioned need to quell insur-
gents- "Much ofthe killing," says Time, "is linked to Mejia's success
against the insurgents." The phrase "linked to" is an apologetic euphe-
mism to obscure the fact that Mejia's "success" was based on the mass
murder of men, women, and children in literally hundreds of destroyed
villages. 1^ Mejia has a "mixed record," with the mass murder offset by
"improvements in some important areas" (the State Department,
quoted by Time). Mejia, says Time, "won support because he has kept
the promises he made after seizing power." Time never explains how
it determined that Mejia "won support," or from whom, other than the
U.S. State Department. Was the press then free to speak out? Did a
system of justice come into being?

In chapter 2 we summarized Americas Watch's demonstration that
the Reagan administration made serial adjustments in its apologetics for
each successive Guatemalan terrorist general, with a lagged^ tacit ac
knowledgment that it had previously been lying. This has no influence
whatsoever on Time's treatment of State Department pronouncements
as authentic truth-the standard from which other claims may be eval-
uated. Thus Time says that "Americas Watch, a controversial group

112 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

that is often accused of being too sympatiietic to the left, called
Guatemala 'a nation of prisoners.' " Time doesn't independently evalu-
ate the quality of sources-the State Department is unchallenged be-
cause it expounds the official and patriotic truth. Americas Watch is
denigrated (and only rarely cited, even with a dismissing put-down)
because it challenges official propaganda. Pravda could hardly be more
subservient to state demands than Time in its coverage of demonstra-
tion elections.

The mass media's sourcing on the Guatemalan election was confined
almost entirely to U.S. officials and official observers, the most promi-
nent Guatemalan political candidates, and generals. Spokespersons for
the insurgents-what in Nicaragua would be labeled the "main opposi-
tion" -the smaller parties, spokespersons for popular organizations,
the churches, human-rights groups, and ordinary citizens, were essen-
tially ignored by the media. Tim£, Newsweek and CBS News almost
never talked to ordinary citizens or spokespersons for the insurgents.
Stephen Kinzer, in the Times, had only one citation to a rebel source
in several dozen articles on Guatemala during the election periods,
although on election day in 1984 he did speak with a number of ordinary
citizens (who gave a much less optimistic view than Kinzer' s usual
sources).

The restricted menu of media sources flows from and reinforces the
media's propensity to adopt a patriotic agenda. U.S. government offi-
cials and observers are always optimistic and hopeful in their state-
ments about sponsored elections. The leading contestant politicians are
also moderately optimistic, as they have a good chance of acquiring at
least nominal power. They do, however, express occasional doubts
about whether the army will relinquish power. This allows the election
drama to assume a slightly different character from that in EI Salvador,
where it was the democratic army "protecting the election" versus the
undemocratic rebels who refused to lay down their arms and partici-
pate. In Guatemala, the frame was: Will the generals keep their promise
to stay in the barracks? The triumph is that they do stay in the bar-
racks-a civilian president takes office and now "rules." The media
then quickly drop the subject, so that whether the army really does
relinquish power to the civilian leaders is never checked out (just as the
"peace" sought by the populace in El Salvador was never considered
in retrospect). In Poland, in January 1947, and Nicaragua, in 1984, and
in enemy states generally, the focus was on the substance of power, and
the extent to which that power shaped the electoral results in advance,
as by limiting the ability of important constituencies to run for office
and compete effectively. Not so for Guatemala.

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 113

If the mass media had enlarged their sources, fundamental condi-
tions would have assumed greater prominence. For example, before
both the July I, 1984, and December 1985 elections in Guatemala, the
Guatemala Bishops' Conference issued pastoral statements that sug-
gested in no uncertain terms and with detailed arguments that condi-
tions in the country were incompatible with a free election. Its pastoral
letter of June 8, 1984, focused on the civil-defense patrols as "suscepti-
ble to manipulation," and it discussed tht disappearances, "insatiable
corruption," and the fact that sociopolitical structures are "not capable
of promoting the welfare of the whole society."79 Stephen Kinzer men-
tioned this report in a Times news article of July 22, 1984, but his
reference is made afler the election of JUly I, and Kinzer did not use
it to frame the discussion of electoral conditions and to arrive at an
assessment of the quality of the election. Furthermore, his summary of
the twenty-seven-page report, that it "denounced torture, electoral
fraud, concentration of wealth and 'massacres of entire families,'"
ignores the quite specific critique of the conditions bearing on an elec-
tion. Time mentioned this pastoral letter briefly; Newsweek and CBS
News never mentioned it.

In connection with the 1985 election, the bishops put forth another
powerful statement, once again questioning whether an election can be
meaningful in "a situation close to slavery and desperation. "80 They
point out that the civil-defense patrols, the "ideology of national secu-
rity," and hunger and impoverishment are not conducive to serious
elections:

In order that the longed-for results be obtained, there must be not
only the freedom at the moment of casting one's vote, but also a
whole series of particular social, political and economic conditions
which are, unfortunately, not happening in Guatemala. In effect
there still persist in Guatemala harsh violence, lack of respect for
human rights and the breaking of basic laws. It is a fact that any
citizen pressured, terrorized or threatened is not fully able to
exercise his/her right to vote or to be elected conscientiously.

This letter was not mentioned in the major media or anywhere else, to
our knowledge, although the bishops are conservative, credible, and
one of the few organized bodies in Guatemala not crushed by state
terror.

There were other dissenting voices in Guatemala-politicians of the
lesser parties, union officials, human-rights groups, lawyers, and ju-
rists-who spoke out occasionally on the Mmits to free electoral condi-

114 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

tions in Guatemala. And there were events of note that threw a power-
fullight on the subject. Most of these were blacked out in the U.S. mass
media. For example,81 on July 4. 1984, the Guatemalan Human, Rights
Commission issued a statement in Mexico saying that the election's
meaning should be viewed in the context of three important facts:
namely, that the requirements for a meaningful election stipulated by
the United Nations in a March 14 statement had not been met; that the
left had been excluded from participation in the election; and that 115
persons had been murdered or disappeared i n the thirty days prior to
the election of July i. This statement, and the facts cited by the commis-
sion, were ignored in the U.S. press.

Consider also the following facts: On May 3, General Oscar Mejia
Vi'ctores removed Ricardo Sagastume Vidaure from his position as
president of the judiciary and the supreme court. On April ii, the
judiciary had issued writs of habeas corpus on behalf of 157 kidnapped
individuals, and Sagastume had protested to Mejia Victores over the
difficulty in proceeding against military abuses. On May 4, Acisco
Valladares Molina, head of the Populist party, noted that Sagastume
had been "fired like a simple subordinate." On May 8, a communique
from the Guatemalan bar association stated that in Guatemala there is
no rule of law, as demonstrated by the constant violation of human
rights and uncontrolled exercise of arbitrary power. By May 8, at least
sixteen judicary officials, including supreme court and court of appeals
magistrates, had resigned in protest at Sagustume's removal.

Stephen Kinzer never discussed any of these events, or their mean-
ing, in the TimeSi nor did any of his colleagues elsewhere in the mass
media. This is in accord with our hypothesis that in elections held in
client states, fundamental electoral conditions, such as the presence or
absence of the rule of law, are off the agenda. The point applies to other
relevant structural conditions. Thus, while Kinzer occasionally men-
tioned the civil-defense patrols, he never described them and their
operations in any detail or tied them in with other institutional struc-
tures of control, and he failed to relate them in a systematic way to army
power. The numerous reports on these coercive institutions and their
terrorist ro]e by Amnesty International, Americas Watch, and the Brit-
ish Parliamentary Human Rights Group were almost never cited by
Kinzer in providing facts relevant to the Guatemalan elections. Al-
though the constituent assembly elected in 1984 produced a new consti-
tution, K.inzer never once discussed the nature of this instrument,
which validated the special army role and structural constraints on
freedom of the press.

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 115

Kinzer was reporting news in a way that fit the Times 's editorial
position and the U.S. government agenda. The Times editorial frame
was that "The military, in power for most of 31 years, has honored its
promise to permit the free election of a civilian president. "82 Kinzer's
news articles of the same period convey the same message — one oft.hem
is entitled "After 30 Years Democracy Gets a Chance in Guatemala"
(Nov. 10, 1985)-whic.h accurately summarizes the contents, although
they contain an undercurrent of reserved final judgment. That central
message was false, however, if the basic conditions of a free election
were not met, if the army's power remained unimpaired, and if these
were confirmed in a written constitution that allows the army freedom
from the rule of law and a license to kill without constraint from the
nominal "democracy. "83 Kinzer could only convey this false message
by ignoring the Sagastume case, the institutional arrangements of the
counterinsurgency state, the ongoing murders, and the omnipresent
fear-i.e., the basic conditions of a free election-and by laying stress
instead on expressions of hope, orderliness of the election processes,
and army promises-i.e., the government's propaganda agenda in a
demonstration election.

In what must be one of the low points of his journalistic career, in
an article of December 27, 1985 ("Guatemala Vote Heartens Nicaragua
Parties"), Kinzer even implies that the Guatemala election establishes
an electoral model for Nicaragua. He describes a Cerezo visit to Nicara-
gua, in which Kinzer features the encouragement Cerezo gives to the
dissident parties that perhaps the power of the Sandinistas can be
broken by patience (implying that Cerezo had broken the power of the
army in Guatemala and was in full command). The article closes with
a quote from an opposition figure: "Ortega is now the last President in
Central America who wears a military uniform, and the contrast is
going to be evident. " Nowhere in the article does Kinzer point out that
army power can not be read from whether the head of state wears a
uniform, or that the rule of the army in Guatemala has not yet been
overcome. He does not refer to the fact that the Guatemalan army has
killed tens of thousands of ordinary civilians. Nor does he show any
recognition of the fact that the election held in Nicaragua was much
more open than that held in Guatemala. On the contrary, this is a fact
that the media, including the New York Times, explicitly and consis-
tently deny, in accordance with state imperatives.

As in the case of El Salvador, the U.S. mass media never suggested
that the exclusion of the Guatemalan insurgent groups rendered the
Guatemalan election meaningless. Kinzer several times mentioned with

u6 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

extreme brevity that the left was off the ballot, but he never asked
anybody to discuss the meaning of this in terms of the options available
to the various segments of society. As coauthor of an important book
on this topic, Kinzer is well aware of the facts.** The vast majority of
Guatemalans are very poor, and they have been entirely excluded from
political participation or representation since 1954. The insurgency
grew out of the parlous condition and exploitation of that mass, and the
absence of any possibility of a democratic process to alleviate injustice
and misery. The ruling army had allowed only parties to run and
civilians to hold office who agreed, tacitly or explicitly, to keep off the
policy agenda all maners of central concern to the impoverished major-
ity. There is no way to measure the strength of popular support for the
insurgents, but in light of the fact that they espouse programs well
oriented to the interests of the general population and have been able
to maintain an insurgency without significant external aid, and that the
army response has been a war against virtually the entire rural popula-
tion, the rebel claim to be a "main opposition" would appear to be
stronger than that of Arturo Cruz and his upper-class Nicaraguan
associates. And if the rebels — or any candidates who would threaten the
army and oligarchy in ways appealing to the majority— cannot qualify
in a Guatemalan election, is it not essentially fraudulent? This was
strongly suggested in both 1984 and 1985 by the Guatemalan Bishops'
Conference, but this respectable source, in contrast with Arturo Cruz
and Robert Leiken, is blacked out. As with EI Salvador, the election was
not evaluated, either in advance or in retrospect, on the basis of whether
or not the fundamental requirements of a free election were met. For
the U.S. government, the insurgents were not a main opposition,
Guatemalan state terror was merely a public-relations inconvenience,
and the elections were fair. The mass media's treatment of the
Guatemalan election reflected well this government propaganda
agenda.

3.6. NICARAGUA: MEDIA
SERVICE IN THE
DELEGITIMIZING PROCESS

In contrast with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan cases, the Reagan
administration was intent on discrediting the Nicaraguan election,
which threatened to legitimize the Sandinista government and thus

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 117

weaken the case for U.S. funding of a terrorist army. The administra-
tion had been berating the Sandinistas for failing to hold an election,
but the actual holding of one was inconvenient. From the inception of
Nicaraguan planning for the election, therefore, the administration
began to express doubts about its quality. And just as it devoted itself
to creating a positive image of the two client-state elections, so it
expended substantial resources to depict the Nicaraguan election in the
worst possible light. The media dutifully followed course, as a propa-
ganda model predicts.

The mass media failed to call attention to the cynicism of first
assaihng Nicaragua for failing to hold an election, and then striving to
have the election either postponed or discredited. Time even cites the
absence of "official delegations [of observers] from the major western
democracies" (Nov. 19, 1984), as if this were evidence of something
discreditable in the election, rather than as a reflection of U.S. power.
There were 450-odd foreign observers in attendance at the Nicaraguan
election, some with superb credentials, observing more freely and at
greater length than the official U.S. observers in El Salvador and

Guatemala. Time and the rest of the mass media paid no attention to
them. ^6

Stephen Kinzer's use of observers is noteworthy. In the case of
Nicaragua, he completely ignored the unofficial observers-many ex-
ceedingly well qualified to observe, as we have noted-and he even
ignored the official Dutch government team, drawn from the center-
right and highly apologetic about atrocities in El Salvador, which
observed both the Salvadoran and the Nicaraguan elections and con-
cluded that the elections in Nicaragua "were more open than in El
Salvador, in the sense that more people were able to take part; that the
opposition did not fear for their lives"; and that "the legitimation ofthe
regime is thus confirmed."87 In Guatemala, by contrast, he cited the
official observer report in both the 1984 and 1985 elections, despite their
great bias and superficiality (see the report discussed in appendix I). In
the 1984 Guatemala election, Kinzer did refer to the report of the
unofficial Human Rights Law Group that we cited earlier, quoting their
statement that the voting process was "procedurally correct," but neg-
lecting to note here and elsewhere their numerous statements to the
effect that "the greater part ofthe population lives in permanent fear"
(p. 4), so that "procedural correctness" has little meaning.

With no U.S. -government-designated official observers available in
Nicaragua, the media relied even more heavily than usual on U.S.
government handouts. It is enlightening to compare this conduited
propaganda of the mass media with the findings of foreign-observer

IIS MANUFACTURING CONSENT

teams on the scene in Nicaragua. For the purpose of this comparison,
which follows, we will use two such reports. One, that of the Irish
Inter-Party Parliamentary Delegation, is The Elections in Nicaragua,
November 1^84. The delegation was composed offoux individuals, three
from right-wing or moderate-right political parties, who spent seven-
teen days in Nicaragua at the time of the election. We will also use as
a basis of comparison of media coverage the previously cited report of
the Is-member delegation sent by the Latin American Studies Associa-
tion (LASA), half of whom had had "substantial field experience" in
Nicaragua itself. This delegation spent eight days in Nicaragua before
the election, traveled in a rented bus, determined their own itinerary,
and "spoke with anyone who we chose to approach (as well as numer-
ous people who spontaneously approached US)."88

3.6.1. Tone of negativism and
apathy

Time magazine hardly attempts to hide the fact that it takes its cues
from Washington. It quotes John Hughes, then a public-relations man
for the State Department (and previously, and subsequently, a colum-
nist for the Christian Science Monitor): "It was not a very good election.
... It was just a piece of theatre for the Sandinistas. "89 Time follows
this cue with a series of denigrating strokes: "The Sandinistas win, as

expected. The Nicaraguan election mood was one of indifference.

. . . The outcome was never in doubt Something of an anticlimax"

(all in the issue of November 19, 1984). In an earlier article (October
29), Time indulged in the same negative refrain: "A campaign without
suspense," voters "too apathetic to go to the polls at all" (this was a
forecast dredged up well before the election). In both articles, "fear"
was also featured heavily. In the Salvadoran election. Time's tone was
different: "There was no denying the remarkable sense of occasion"
(Le., the Reagan administration had a big public-relations investment

in the election); "hundreds of thousands braved the threats, and

sometimes the bullets, of the Marxist-led [FMLN] to join long serpen-
tine polling lines for the country's much awaited presidential elections"
(Apr. 9j 1984).90 In Guatemala too, "Some 1.8 million voters braved
four-hour polling lines, tropical rainstorms and a bewildering array of
political choices to cast ballots in their country's most open and fraud-
free elections in more than a decade" ouly 16, 1984). There is never
apathy or fear of government force in Time's renditions of demonstra-
tion elections.

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 119

Stephen Kinzer, in the Times, also took a far less kindly view of the
election in Nicaragua than of those in Guatemala, giving enormous
attention to election opponents like the U.S. candidate Arturo Cruz
(whereas in Guatemala he almost completely ignored the small parties,
union protesters, rebels, and human-rights groups), and finding more
people voting out of fear than he did in Guatemala, a remarkable
discovery given the circumstances in the two countries. He focuses
steadily on the Sandinistas' efforts to get out the vote, the fact that the
election result is a foregone conclusion, claims of the breaking up of
election rallies, and allegations of unfairness and withdrawals by the
opposition. As with Time, the voters are "philosophical," "enthusiasm
for the election was not universal," and "there was little visible enthusi-
asm." Kinzer did not compare the electoral modalities, range of op-
tions, or other basic conditions in Nicaragua and Guatemala (or El
Salvador). In short, he discussed different questions in his news report-
ing on the elections in Nicaragua and Guatemala, adhering closely to
the propaganda frame. '2

On the alleged negativism and apathy, both the Irish and LASA
delegations noted that voting was not required in Nicaragua and was
entirely secret. Therefore, as the Irish delegation pointed out, the low
rate of abstention is more meaningful and "invalidates predictions that
large sectors of the population were opposed to the election. Further-
more, the percentage of spoiled votes (7.4 percent) is comparable to any
European election in a country with a highly literate population" (p.
7). They also note that

Speaking with one old matij awaiting his turn to vote in a rural
polling station, one member of the delegation inquired: "What
difference do you see between this and any other election in which
you voted?" He replied: "Everything." "In what way?" He simply
shrugged: "Everything is different."

The U.S. media never located anybody like this old man. The Irish
delegation also pointed out that

Some observers from other countries suggested that the people
did not appear enthusiastic as they went to the polls. This is not
surprising as people stood in long queues waiting patiently their
turn to go behind the curtain to mark their ballot paper. One
member of the delegation who had the opportunity to observe
voters in the American election just two days later, noted no
greater enthusiasm for standing in queues there!

120 MANUPACTUBINO CONSENT

It is our belief that the invariable enthusiasm and optimism found by
the U.S. mass media in client-state elections, and the apathy and nega-
tivism found in elections in states disfavored by the U.S. administra-
tion, has nothing to do with electoral realities and must be explained
entirely by an imposed propaganda agenda and the filtering out of
contrary opinion and information.

3.6.2. Ignoring the superior
quality of the Nicaraguan
election

In the propaganda format, a great deal of attention is paid to the
mechanical properties of elections in client states, but not in states
whose elections are being denigrated. This was true in the cases under
discussion. Time (Apr. 9, 1984) described in detail the elaborate elec-
toral preparations in El Salvador, the "tamper-proof procedures, the
use of transparent Lucite ballot boxes, and the indelible-ink marking
and stamping of ID cards. It turned out, however, that the high-tech,
computerized voting procedures weren't understood by the population,
more than half of whom were illiterate. At no point did Time, or its
media colleagues, raise any question about the importance ofimproving
literacy as a necessary prelude to an election; nor did they suggest that
the Lucite boxes might compromise the secrecy of the vote, or that the
stamped ID card might be a coercive instrument helping to explain
turnout.

Nicaragua went to great pains to provide for election secrecy, and
for an easy and intelligible system of voting. For one thing, they had
a massive literacy campaign before the election, making electoral
printed matter generally accessible. Both the Irish and LASA delega-
tions mention this as an electoral plus. Nicaragua also put a high
priority on getting a complete registration list and getting the voters
registered. The Irish delegation noted that "Recent elections in other
Central American countries such as EI Salvador and Guatemala did not
introduce such measures, and there was considerable debate concern-
ing the validity of their registers, which were based on out-of-date
census figures, incomplete official registers of population changes, and
other sources" (p. 5). Nicaragua also deliberately avoided transparent
ballot boxes, ID stamping, and any other mechanism that would allow
the authorities to identify whether or how somebody had voted. LASA
points out that ^

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 121

The ballots were also printed on heavy opaque white paper. The
contrast with Somoza-era elections is striking. The Somozas used
translucent ballots, so virtually everyone assumed that their ballot
was not secret. The same problem occurred in the 1984 elections
in E1 Salvador, where thin-paper ballots were deposited in trans-
parent ballot boxes. The vote in Nicaragua in 1984 was truly a
secret ballot (p. 14).

In Nicaragua, also, there was proportional voting, which made it possi-
ble for the smaller parties to obtain legislative representation. Parties
could also qualify quite easily to participate in the election. In
Guatemala, 4,000 signatures were needed to qualify in 1984, a large
number and not easy for dissident parties to collect in a society witli
daily political murders.

Stephen Kinzer and his associates never mentioned these differ-
ences. More generally, the substantial merits of the Nicaraguan elec-
tions were never contrasted with the procedures in the U.S. client
states, a comparison that would have been most revealing and that
would have thoroughly undermined the Reagan agenda to which the
media were committed in their reporting of the election. Time, as noted,
mentions the compromised Salvadoran procedures as if they were meri-
torious. The Times mentioned the transparent voting boxes in EI Salva-
dor only once (Richard Meislin, on March 25, 1984), repeating without
question the official line that the purpose of the translucent boxes was
to prevent fraud. Any other possibility is unmentioned. Newsweek and
CBS News ignored these matters.

3.6.3. Rebel disruption into the
black hole; turnout no longer an
index of triumph of democracy

In the Salvadoran election, rebel disruption was a central feature of the
government's propaganda frame. Because the rebels opposed the elec-
tion, voting by the people proved their rejection of the rebels and
approval of the army. Turnout was the index of democratic triumph
and rebel defeat. As we saw, the mass media followed this frame with-
out question. In the case of Nicaragua, the propaganda format was
reversed-the rebels were the good guys, and the election held by
the bad guys was condemned in advance. Rebel opposition to the
election- and efforts at disruption-did not make voting and a large

IZ2 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

turnout a repudiation of the rebels and approval of the Sandinistas.

The U.S. mass media once again followed the government agenda,
even though it meant an exact reversal of the standards they had applied
in the Salvadoran election. The contras and their supporters urged the
public not to vote, and interfered with the election process with at least
as much vigor as (and with more killings than) the rebels in El Salvador.
Furthermore, voting was more assuredly secret and the citizens were
not required to vote, or to have ID cards stamped indicating that they
had. And the Sandinistas did not kill ordinary citizens on a daily basis,
as was true in the "death-squad democracies." Thus turnout was far
more meaningful in the Nicaraguan election than in the ones held in
El Salvador and Guatemala-the public was free to abstain as well as
to vote for opposition parties.

The U.S. mass media disposed of this problem mainly by massive
suppression. They simply ignored the contra-U.S. campaign for absten-
tion, waged with threats and attacks on polling places and election
workers; and they buried the fact of an effectively secret vote and the
right not to vote,93 just as, in parallel, they had inflated rebel disruption
efforts in EI Salvador in 1982 and 1984 and buried the voting requirement
and other pressures to vote.

Although the New York Times had gone out of its way to focus on
the "challenge" of rebel opposition and alleged disruption as giving
turnout special meaning in the Salvadoran election of 1982,94 Stephen
Kinzer never once mentioned that the cantras attacked a number of
polhng stations and had issued radio appeals for abstention. For
Kinzer, neither these facts nor the U.S. campaign to discredit were seen
as posing a "challenge" that made turnout meaningful in Nicaragua.

The Irish delegation pointed out that "The Parties of the Demo-
cratic Coordinating Committee [based in the business community! op-
posed the voter registration, and called for a boycott of this process"
(p. 5), and it noted that eleven polhng stations were closed down by
counterrevolutionary activities (p. 7). The public voted in large num-
bers "despite the possible dangers involved," which suggested tc the
Irish delegation that turnout was significant and "showed how impor-
tant the election was to the people" (p. 6). LASA pointed out the
various ways in which the "main opposition" called for voter absten-
tion, and cited the radio warnings broadcast into the country from
Costa Rica threatening that voters would be killed by the contras (pp.
i6, 28). LASA also pointed out that "voter turnout was heavy," with
"more enthusiasm among voters in low-income areas than in more
affluent neighborhoods. -ge Like Time, LASA notes that the turnout did
not quite reahze the expectations of FSLN officials, but unlike Time,

LECiITlMIZINO VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 123

LASA points out that the rate of participation achieved "compares very
favorably with the rates achieved in II other recent Latin American
elections, as well as the 1984 U.S. presidential election ..." (p. 16).97
In sum, the two observer reports discuss rebel disruption in Nicara-
gua, turnout, and the meaning of that turnout. The U.S. mass media,
which had featured these matters heavily in reference to the Salvadoran
election-where they fitted the government's propaganda agenda-
found them entirely unnewsworthy as regards Nicaragua.

3.6.4. The revived sensitivity to
coercion

As we described earlier, the "coercion package" was off the agenda for
the U.S. government and mass media in addressing the Salvadoran and
Guatemalan elections. So was the element of fear engendered by mass
murder and the absence of any rule of law in these U.S. client states.
Coercion and fear were back on the agenda, however, for Nicaragua.
This revival was illustrated with amazing dishonesty and hypocrisy in
Time, which had never mentioned fear and pressures from the govern-
ment as factors possibly explaining turnout in the U.S. -sponsored elec-
tions, even after the murder of 50,000 civilians. In Nicaragua, however,
the "pugnacious" Sandinistas had "an awesome monopoly of force,"
and getting them to "relax their grip," which was "essential for free
electoral competition," was extremely dubious. Time's Central Ameri-
can correspondent George Russell even located a "Latin American
diplomat" who says, "You can't have democracy where there is no
personal liberty at all" (Oct. 8 and May 14, 1984). Russell and Time had
never found the Salvadoran government "pugnacious," with any "awe-
some monopoly of force," or as having a "grip" that needed relaxing
for electoral competition, and personal liberty was never mentioned as
licking or even pertinent to Salvadoran ejections. For the Nicaraguan
election, however. Time found that "The pressure to participate was
high: many citizens feared they would lose precious rationing cards."
Further, "the government had made it clear that it considered failure
to vote a counterrevolutionary stance." Later, quoting Daniel Ortega,
"All Nicaraguans who are Nicaraguans are going to vote. The only ones
who are not going to vote are sellouts" (Nov. 19, 1984).

As we pointed out earlier, both the Guatemalan and Salvadoran
army warned the public that voting was required by law and that
nonvoting was treasonous. These statements were more precisely warn-

124 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

ings, whereas Ortega's was an insult but not a clear threat. Ortega's was
the only such statement of its kind reported, and Time's statement that
the government "made it clear" that nonvoting was "counterrevolu-
tionary" is doubly di shone st-the statement was not clearly a warning,
and "counterrevolutionary" is an invidious word concocted by Time.
The official government position as expressed in the law was that Nica-
raguans did not have to vote. Time suppresses this fact. It suppresses
the secrecy of the ballot and absence of a checkable ID card, so that
there would have been no way to implement a threat even if one had
been made. It suppresses the fact that the Nicaraguan army did not
regularly murder even "counterrevolutionaries," whereas the Salvado-
ran and Guatemalan armies murdered numerous people who weren't
"revolutionaries" but were somehow in the way. In short, propaganda
could hardly be more brazen.

Time 's alleged "fact," that "many" people feared the removal of the
rationing card, is contested by LASA, which states that "in our inter-
views in many neighborhoods in several cities, we found no evidence
that ration cards were being held back or withdrawn ... for any
reason." They note that there were five reports filed with the supreme
electoral council alleging intimidation by threat of withdrawal of ration
cards, "but none of these allegations were sustained upon investiga-
tion" (p. 27). Time does not indicate the source of its evidence and fails
to provide a single illustration of the "many" cases.

We noted earlier that Stephen Kinzer cited more claims of coercion
in the Nicaraguan than the Guatemalan elections, a remarkable jour-
nalistic achievement, given the unchallenged facts about the actual
scale and character of regression in the two states. His playing down
of state terror in Guatemala as a basic factor affecting the quality of the
election in all its dimensions-the ability of candidates to run, freedom
of speech and press, the existence of intermediate groups, endemic fear,
and the meaning of turnout-amounts to massive deceit. His Nicarag-
uan coverage also involved large-scale misrepresentation. He did not
point out the absence of mass killings, and he failed to mention the
absence of a coercion package-no transparent boxes, no requirement
that an ID card be stamped, and no legal obligation to vote. Kinzer's
one notice of the voting requirement in his fourteen articles on the
election amounts to serious deception-he quotes a voter as follows:
" 'I've always voted because it is always required,' he said. 'Of course,
the law says one thing, but after a while one reahzes that voting is part
of patriotism, and patriotism leads to long life.' "98 Kinzer's source
implies but doesn't say directly that voting is not legally required in
Nicaragua, and this murky statement-the closest Kinzer ever comes

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 125

to acknowledging the absence of a voting requirement-is counter-
balanced by his respondent's suggestion that voting may be based on
some kind of threat.

Both the Irish and LASA delegations stressed the superior protection
of secrecy in the balloting, which, in LASA's words, was "meticulously
designed to minimize the potential for abuses" (p. 15). They also em-
phasized the fact that voting was not required by law, and that, contrary
to the U.S. government propaganda expounded by Time and other
media entities, the coercive elements in getting out the vote were small.
Human-rights abuses by the government that contribute to an environ-
ment of fear, LASA pointed out, were "on a very small scale" when
"compared to other nations in the region . . (p. 28). In fact, they note
that fear in Nicaragua is directed more to the United States and the
contras than to the government in Managua.

3.6.5. The "main opposition" to the

fore

As we saw, in El Salvador and Guatemala, the fact that the insurgents
were off the ballot did not faze the U.S. media one bit. Neither did
Duarte's acknowledgment in 1981 that "the masses were with the guer-
rillas" when he joined the junta a year earlier (which would clearly
make them a "main opposition").99 Nor were the media affected by the
army's murder of the opposition leadership in both El Salvador and
Guatemala. In £1 Salvador, the exclusion of the rebels was part of the
U.S. government's electoral plan; they were, therefore, not a "main
opposition," and the debarment and even murder of their leaders did
not compromise election quality. In the Nicaraguan case, in sharp
contrast, the U.S. government worked with a different frame-the
exclusion of its sponsored rebels and any other candidates was a serious
matter that threatened the quality of the election. The media followed
like good little doggies (lap- rather than watch-).

The central dramatic propaganda hne for the Nicaraguan election
pressed by U.S. officials was the alleged struggle of Arturo Cruz to
induce the Sandinistas to create an open system in which he would be
able to compete fairly, the failure of the "Marxists-Leninists" to make
adequate concessions, Cruz's refusal to compete, and the subsequent
"exclusion" of the "main opposition." Cruz, however, was a "main
opposition" only in the propaganda construct of the U.S. government
and mass media. A longtime expatriate (who now concedes that he was

[26 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

on the CIA payroll), with no mass base in Nicaragua, Cruz would
almost certainly have done poorly in a free election. 'o° There is good
reason to believe that Cruz never intended to run, but that he and his
sponsors had held out this possibility precisely to allow the propaganda

frame to be used effectively.IOI

The mass media focused on the Cruz drama heavily and uncritically.
Cruz was given enormous play: he was continually referred to as the
"main opposition" or "leading opponent" of the ruling party (without
any supporting evidence), and his candidacy was made "an acid test of
the Sandinistas' democratic intentions" (Time, Oct. 29, 1984). For the
Times, the election would be a "sham" without Cruz (editorial, Oct. 7,
1984), and its news columns placed "main opposition" Cruz on center
stage, from which vantage point he could regularly denounce the pro-
ceedings as a "farce" or sham.'o^ xhe Times did have one good back-
page article that provided evidence that Cruz had not intended to run
or would not have been allowed to run by his closest Nicaraguan aUies
and U.S. officials, and that his function was, as we stated, to discredit
the election by pretending to be interested, thus capturing press atten-
tion. But this low-keyed article stood alone and did not alter the
unremitting focus on the alleged exclusion of this alleged main opposi-
tion as the centerpiece of the Nicaraguan election drama.

In focusing on an alleged "main opposition" in Nicaragua, which
voluntarily chose not to run, while ignoring a real main opposition in
El Salvador, excluded by force and plan, the mass media simply
adopted without question the government's propaganda framework.
Sources that would speak to the condition of the "main opposition" in
El Salvador and the significance ofits exclusion-both Salvadorans and
foreign observers-were simply ignored. In the case of the Nicara-
guan election, in contrast, Cruz and U.S. government officials were
given the floor to present their themes, which were transmitted on a
daily basis with no accompanying notice of their possible falsity and
manipulative intent, in perfect accord with the expectations of a propa-
ganda model.

The Reagan administration not only dangled Cruz before the media,
it tried hard to induce or bribe other candidates in the Nicaraguan
election to withdraw in order to fulfil the prophecy of a meaningless
election. The brazenness of this intervention by a great power was
remarkable, but the U.S. media gave it minimal attention. They never
denounced it as antidemocratic, they failed to link it to Cruz's campaign
(with its suggestion of a larger effort to discredit by boycott), and they
never suggested that voter "turnout" was more meaningful given the
active U.S. campaign to discredit the election. On October 31, 1984,

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 127

Stephen Kinzer noted that senior U.S. officials confirmed accouncs of
"regular contacts" with the Nicaraguan parties. Kinzer's article is head-
lined "Nicaraguan Parties Cite Sandinista and U.S. Pressure," the
headline and article itself equating the government's aid to, and agree-
ments with, its own political parties with U.S. intervention to get the
Nicaraguan parties to boycott the election! CBS, Netosweek, and Time
ignored the U.S. bribe program entirely. Time gave great emphasis to
the number of candidates and the withdrawal of several, but it never
once mentioned that this was helped along by V.S. connivance, bribes,
and pressure. It even quotes without comment the State Department
fabrication that "it did not try to influence the outcome of the election"
(Nov. 19, 1984). All substantive evidence is placed in the black hole. In
the same article. Time asserts that "the U-S- had pushed hard for
elections in which all parties felt free to participate," a fabrication of
considerable audacity.

As regards the scope of electoral options in Nicaragua, the Irish
delegation noted that "The [political parties] law guarantees participa-
tion to political parties of all ideologies," an interesting point validated
by a range of political opinion in the contesting parties far wider than
that found in £1 Salvador and Guatemala (or the United States).

LASA states that "No major political tendency in Nicaragua was
denied access to the electoral process in 1984" (p. 18). This, of course,
could not be said of £1 Salvador and Guatemala. These important
features of the Nicaraguan law and practice were not mentioned in the
U.S. media or compared with those of the client states.

The Irish delegation stressed two facts about Cruz as the "main
opposition." First,

The delegation found no evidence that these parties [the three
small Cruz-related parties that boycotted the election] had wide
support within the country. Speaking with many political figures,
including representatives of the legitimate opposition parties, it
became clear that the intention of Arturo Cruz to stand for elec-
tion was dubious from the start While considerable coverage

was given to these parties in the international press, members of
the delegation found that their impact among the population was
scant and few people supported their policies (p. 7).

Second, the Irish delegation stressed the fact that the populace was free
not to vote or to spoil votes, and the low level of both, "despite the
abstentionism promoted by" the Cruz parties, deflated their claims to
any serious support (p. 7). The LASA report reached similar conclu-

128 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

sions, based on an extensive review of the evidence, namely: (I) that
"circumstantial evidence" indicates the strong probability that Cruz
had no intention ofrunning, and (2) that he had no mass base and would
have been badly beaten.

In retrospect, Kinzer concedes the fact, although with the customary
propaganda twist. He writes that "Ortega's landshde victory was never
in doubt," because "the opposition was splintered" (and, as he fails to
observe, had no popular base, in contrast to the well-organized San-
dinista party), and "because the Sandinistas controlled the electoral
machinery." Neither he nor anyone else has offered a particle of evi-
dence that Sandinista control over the electoral machinery made the
elections a sham, or to contest the conclusion of the LASA delegation
that "the FSLN did little more to take advantage of its incumbency
than incumbent parties everywhere (including the United States) rou-
tinely do." A few days earlier, Kinzer had quoted Arturo Cruz as
observing that the Sandinistas deserve credit for having overthrown
Somoza and "having broken barriers in Nicaragua that had to be bro-
ken, and that is irreversible," because "the Sandinistas were working
in the catacombs while we in the traditional opposition were out of
touch with the rising expectations of the masses." As Kinzer knows, but
wUl not write, the same was true at the time of the 1984 elections, which
is why the Sandinisu victory was never in doubt. This deceitful dismis-
sal of the 1984 elections is one of Kinzer's many contributions to the
media campaign to contrast the "elected presidents" ofthe four Central
American "democracies" with the Sandinista dictator Ortega, not an
elected president by U.S. government imprimatur. The specific context
was the massive media campaign to attribute the failures of the
Guatemala City peace agreement of August 1987 to the Sandinistas, in
accordance with Reagan administration priorities, on the eve of the
crucial congressional vote on renewed contra aid.'*'*

LASA also stresses the fact that Cruz—effectively representing the
contras, a segment of the local business community, and the United
States— eould have run in the Nicaraguan electioD, with excellent
funding, ample media access, and without fear of being murdered. Even
without Cruz the contras had an electoral voice. LASA notes that

We know of no election in Latin America (or elsewhere) in which
groups advocating the violent overthrow of an incumbent govern-
ment have themselves been incorporated into the electoral pro-
cess, particularly when these groups have been openly supported
by a foreign power. The contras nevertheless had a voice in the
1984 election campaign. Two of the Coordinadora-affiliated par-

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 129

ties, the PSD and the PLC, supported their inclusion in the elec-
tions. And while denying that they represented the contras, Arturo
Cruz and the Coordinadora seemed to endorse and promote their
cause, both within Nicaragua and abroad (p. 18).

LASA also discusses in some detail the U.S. intervention in the elec-
tion, noting the terrorizing overflights by U.S. planes during the elec-
tion campaign, and considering at some length the U.S. efforts to
induce the withdrawal of candidates. LASA reported the claims by both
Liberal and Conservative party figures that the United States offered
specific and large sums of money to get candidates to withdraw from
the election.

3.6.6. The concern over freedom of
the press and assembly

Not only the rights of any and all candidates to run for public office,

but other basic conditions that had been off the agenda in El Salvador
and Guatemala were of deep concern to the U.S. government and mass
media in reference to Nicaragua. The New York Times, Time, Nemtoeek,
and CBS News all put great stress on the trials and tribulations of La
Prensa, although during the Salvadoran election none of them had
even mentioned the destruction by physical violence and murder of La
Cr6nica and Ellndependieme, or the toll of murdered journalists. Mob
violence allegedly organized by the government, and the threat of the
neighborhood defense committees, were featured by Time in Nicara-
gua, whereas ORDEN and the death squads in El Salvador and
Guatemala it had never mentioned as pertinent to election quality.
Basic conditions of a free election were not only back on the media
agenda, but there were strong suggestions that Nicaragua was failing
to meet these conditioZlS. These suggestions were based almost entirely
on quotes from U.S. officials and Cruz and his allies in Nicaragua. The
media never gave evidence of having actually looked into these matters
for themselves or tapped independent sources of evidence.

Richard Wagner, on CBS News (Nov. 3, 1984), citing as usual Ar-
turo Cruz as the "strongest opposition," also mobilizes a single Nica-
raguan citizen (no doubt selected at random) who says: "How can this
be free elections (sic J when we don't have freedom of speech, free-
dom of the press?" Wagner says that "In addition to censorship"
there were food shortages, a deteriorated transportation system, an

130 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

unpopular draft, and church oppositioa, so that "it becomes apparent
why a free and open election is not in the cards." The cynicism in
failing to raise the question of why there are food shortages and a
deteriorated transportation system in Nicaragua is remarkable. Wag-
ner also misses another distinction between Nicaragua and £1 Salva-
dor; the former has an "unpopular draft," whereas in the terror state
of El Salvador there is no draft-instead there is press-ganging of
young men into the army from the slums, refugee camps, and rural
areas, while the young sons of the wealthy live the high life in San
Salvador and Miami (much the same is true in Guatemala and Hon-
duras). Wagner's double standard is also remarkable. In £1 Salvador
in 1982 and 1984 there was far more severe censorship (including out-
right murder), food shortages, a deteriorating transport system, and
church opposition-and more pertinent, a complete exclusion of the
"main opposition" and massive state terror-but these didn't make it
apparent to CBS News that a free and open election was not in the
cards in that U.S. -sponsored election. 'o''

The Irish delegation and LASA, especially the latter, addressed these
issues, gave evidence of having examined them seriously, and came up
with conclusions sharply at odds with the U.S. government-media
portrayals. LASA provided an extensive discussion of the Sandinista
defense committees and the scope of the turbo, violence and interfer-
ence with freedom of assembly, concluding that the total number of
disruptive incidents reported was "quite small," and that the most
serious occurred before the official campaign began. "In spite of Daniel
Ortega's unfortunate statement on these disruptions, there is no evi-
dence that the FSLN had a coherent strategy of stimulating or orches-
trating them" (p. 24). As regards the defense committees, LASA
concluded that they did not seem to be functioning as a spying network
and that there was no serious evidence that they were a force making
for intimidation (p. 27). LASA makes two additional points ignored by
the free press. One is that the electoral commission "placed paid adver-
tisements in the press urging citizens to respect the rights of all political
parties to hold rallies without interference" (p. 24). The second is that
the Cruz rallies that were disrupted were held in violation of the elec-
toral law, which requires permits for campaign rallies and promises
police protection. "In other words, given their decision not to register,
Cniz and the Coordinadora were deliberately campaigning outside of
the legal framework of protections which had been created by the
electoral law" (p. 25). LASA also compares the violence in the Nicarag-
uan election with that elsewhere in the area and in the Nicaraguan
context, concluding that "compared to other nations in the region and

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS I3I

in the face of a war against the contras, such abuses are on a very small
scale" (p. 28).

LASA also discussed freedom of the press, which it regards as one
of the election's most troublesome features. It considers the imposition
of press censorship to have been damaging to the election's quality and
credibility, even though the argument of the Sandinistas, that a country
at war "can't allow a newspaper which is the instrument of the enemy
to publish its opinions freely" (Sergio Ramirez), is viewed as not wholly
unreasonable. Nevertheless, while the censorship was also somewhat
arbitrary and legahstic, LASA concluded that "The opposition could
and did get its message out" (p. 26). And the finding overall was that
the Nicaraguan election "by Latin American standards was a model of
probity and fairness" (p. 32),

The U.S. mass media did not concur, but it is striking how they avoid
comparisons and data. The way in which the media can denounce
restrictions on freedom of the press in Nicaragua after having totally
ignored the question in El Salvador, where restrictions were far more
severe, is remarkable. This process of dichotomization is so internalized
that the writers use the double standard within the same article, appar-
ently unaware of their own bias. In an article in the New York Times
of March I2j 1984, "Clear Choices in Salvador, Murky Plans in Nicara-
gua," Hedrick Smith regards the choices as "clear" in El Salvador,
whereas in Nicaragua the problem is whether in an election the San-
dinistas win "give up significant power and control." Multiple parties
from the far right to the center-right in El Salvador demonstrate clear
choices, but a variety of parties from right to far left in Nicaragua didn't
cause Smith to perceive real choices there, although he didn't explain
why. It apparently never occurs to Smith that there is an issue of
whether the army and United States "will give up power and control"
(and their determination to fight to victory) by the electoral route in El
Salvador.

Are there essential freedoms and absence of coercion in El Salvador
that are necessary for a truly free election? Hedrick Smith talks about
substantive electoral conditions only in Nicaragua. He provides exten-
sive detail on the trials of La Prensa, press censorship, the Sandinista
monopoly of power, and limits allegedly imposed on opposition candi-
dates in Nicaragua. Not a word, however, on death-squad and army
murders of civilians in El Salvador or the Draconian laws of the state
of siege. How many journalists have been killed in El Salvador? Papers
closed? Radio stations blown up? Union leaders and political figures
murdered? These questions are off the agenda in U.S. -staged elections,
and Hedrick Smith ignores them. As a de facto spokesman for his

133 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

government, the Times commentator uses doublethink with as much
insouciance as Reagan and Shultz.

3.7. QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE
OF SYSTEMATIC MEDIA BIAS

To demonstrate more rigorously the structural bias in media coverage
of Third World elections, tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 compare the topics
mentioned in the New York Times in its articles on the Nicaraguan and
Salvadoran elections of 1984. The tables are organized according to the
U.S. government agenda described earlier. The elements in the upper
part ofthe tables are the approved issues-rebel disruption, personali-
ties, election mechanics, etc. -that the government wishes to stress in
its sponsored elections. Below the line are the basic conditions and
other negative elements that are off the agenda in sponsored elections.
Our hypothesis is that the media will follow the agenda, stressing
personalities and other elements above the line in sponsored elections
and playing down basic conditions, whereas in elections like that in
Nicaragua the agenda wiU be reversed-the stress wiU be placed on
basic conditions.

Topics Included and Excluded in the
New York Times 's Coverage
of the Salvadoran Election
of March 25, 1984*

TABLE 3-1

TOPICS

NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF

ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
WITH TOPIC WITH TOPIC

Those compatible with the
U.S. government's agenda
for the Salvadoran election:

1. Democratic purpose and

hopes

2. Rebel disruption

6

21.4

53.6

LeGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 'H

TOPICS

NUMBER OF
ARTICLES DEALING
WITH TOPIC

PERCENTAGE OF
ARTICLES DEALING
WITH TOPIC

Turnout

Election mechanics
Personalities and political

infighting
Official reflections on the
election
7. The army as protector of
the election

7
I.

25.0
32.1
35.7

35.7

17.9

TboBt ixicompatible tbc
U.S. goy«mm«nt'$ agenda
for the Salvadoran election:

10.
M.

12.

13.

r.

16.

17.
18.

19.
20.

21.

22.

The public-rdations
purpose

U.S. investment in the
election

Fraud in the 1982 dection

The existence of free
kpeech and assembly-
legal state of siege

Freedom of the press

Organizational freedom

Limits on the ability of
candidates to qualify
and campaign

Prior state terror and
climate of fear

Power of armed forces,
links to candidates and
parties, as possible
negative factor

L«g3l obligation to vote

L<ga1 penalties for
nOUvoring

Marking of voters' fingers

Stamping identification

cards

L«g3l requirement that
authorities check within
10 days, that voters
have voted

Possible nonlegal threat
to nonvoters from death
squads and security
force*

3

2

0
I

2
I

2

10.7
7.1

•

3.6

0

10.7

3..

14.3
7.1

3..

7.1

134

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF

ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
TOPICS WITH TOPIC WITH TOPIC

23. Use of transparent voting 1 3.6

ums

24. Legal right of tlie securiry O O

forces to an armed
presence at voting
stations

* Based on a study of the 28 articles on the EI Salvador election that appeared
in the Neu York Times between Feb. I and Mar. 30, 1984.

TABLE 3-2

Topics Included and Excluded in the

New York Times' s Coverage
of the Nicaraguan Election
Planneci for November 4, 1984*

NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF

ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
TOPICS WITH TOPIC WITH TOPIC

Tho«« compatible with the
U.S. goTtnuneofs ageada
for the Nicai^ajuan electlom
(Of the 7 items in table 3-1,
■n are blanks except one.)

\. Election mechasics

Those incompatible with the
U.S. govenuQcat's agenda
for the Nicara^uao
electioDJ**

2. The public-relations purpose

3. Free speech

4. Freedom of the press

5. Organizational freedom

315

3
2
•

375

75.0
50.0

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS £33

NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF

ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
TOPICS WITH TOPIC WITH TOPIC

6. Ability of candidates to 5 62.5

qualify and niH

7. Power of the armed forces, 3 37.5

link to state, as negative
factor

* Based on a study of the 8 articles on the forthcoaiing Nicaraguan election
that appeared in the .Vrai York Times between Feb. I and Mar. 30, 1984.

** Many of the topics listed ia Table 3-1 under this subheading are not
reltvant to the Nicaraguan election-all that are covered in the articles
examined are listed here.

TABLE 3-3

Topics Included and Excluded in the
New York Times ' s Coverage
of the Nicaragiaan Election
of November 4,1984*

NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF

ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
TOPICS WITH TOPIC WITH TOPIC

ThOM compatible with the
U.S. govcmm^at's agenda
for tie Nicaraguan election:

L Democratic purpose and

4.8

2. Rebel disruption

0

O

3. Turnout

5

23.8

4. Election mechanics

0

O

5. Personalities and political

3

143

infighting

6. Official reflections on the

3

14.3

election

7. The army as protector of

0

0

the election

136

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF

ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
TOPICS WITH TOPIC WITH TOPIC

ThoM Incompatible with the

U.S. government's ag«nda
for the Nicaraguaa election;

8. The publiC'r^latioDS

7

33J

purpose

9. Sandinista investment in

2

95

the election

10. Fraud in prior elections

NA

NA

11. Free speech and assembly

8

38.1

12. Freedom of the press

•

28"

13. Organizational freedom

2

9.5

14. Limits on the ability of

11

52.4

candidates to qualify

and campaign

15. Prior state terror and

3

14 J

climate of fear

16. Control of armed forces

3

by government

17. Leja) obligation to vote

NA

18. Legal penalties for

NA

NA

nonvoting

19. Marking of voters' fmgers

1

NA

20. Stamping identification

NA

NA

cards

21. L<gal requirement to check

NA

NA

voting

22. Nonlegal threat to

1

4^

nonvoters

23. Us« of transparent voting

NA

NA

24. Security force presence at

NA

NA

voting stations

* Based on a study of 21 news articles appearing between Sept. 5 and Nov.

6, 1984.

NA = Not Applicable

It can readily be seen in table 3-1 that in the Salvadoran election the

Times's news coverage dealt heavily with subjects above the line and
neglected the basic conditions that make an election meaningful in

LECITiMIZlNO VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS

137

advance. We can observe how the Times totally ignores the question of
freedom of the press, organizational freedom, and limits on the ability
of candidates to run.ios Table 3-2 shows how the Times treated the
forthcoming Nicaraguan election in the same two-month period cov-
ered in table 3-1. It is evident that the paper focuses heavily on the
fundamental conditions of a free election, i.e., on topics that it was
entirely ignoring while addressing the Salvadoran election. Table 3-3
shows the breakdown of topics covered by the Times during the Nica-
raguan election later in the year. Again, although the differences are less
marked than the ones in tables 3-1 and 3-2, the substantial attention to
basic conditions in the Nicaraguan case is clear, reflecting editorial
news choices that follow a patriotic agenda. As the basic conditions for
a free election were superior in Nicaragua and the coercive elements
less acute, the emphasis on basic conditions only in the Nicaraguan case
is even more clearly evidence of systematic bias.

3.8. THE MIG CRISIS STAGED
DURING NICARAGUA'S
ELECTION WEEK

As Newsweek pointed out on November 19, 1984, "The story of the
freighter [to Nicaragua, allegedly carrying MIGs] first broke during the
election-night coverage," but at no point does Newstoeek (or Time, the
Times, or CBS News) suggest that the timing was deliberate. The Times,
in its extensive coverage of the MIGs that weren't there, at one point
quotes a Nicaraguan official who suggests that the crisis was purely a
public-relations operation, but that exhausts the Times's exploration of
this point. Although the MIGs weren't there, and the timing was per-
fect for diverting attention from a successful election that the Reagan
adminstration had been attempting to discredit, the ehte media asked
no questions, even in retrospect. The administration claimed that when
the freighter was loaded, satellite observation was blocked so that the
cargo was unknown. The mass media presented this as fact, making no
effort to evaluate the claim.

What the media chose to focus on was administration assessments of
what it mig ht do If MIGs were in fact being delivered. This allowed
the whole frame of discourse to shift to the assumption that the Nica-
raguans had done something (and something intolerable, to boot).
Newsweek, in a retrospective article entitled "The MIGs That Weren't
There," had a lead head: "To bring in high-performance craft indicates

138

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

that they are contemplating being a threat to their neighbors." The fact
that the MIGs u>eren*i brought ifl, as stared in the articJe's very rirle-
that this was a concoction of U.S. officials-doesn't interfere with
imputing an intention to the Nicaraguans based on a nonexistent fact.
The assertion that they were contemplating being a threat, as opposed
to defending themselves against a proxy invasion, is also a patriotic
editorial judgment. Newsweek also says in the text that "All sides ap-
peared to be playing a very clumsy and very dangerous game." This is
an intriguing form of evenhandedness. A person who, admittedly, had
been falsely accused of robbery by an assailant is alleged to be "playing
a dangerous game," along with the attacker who is also the bearer of
false witness.

In the middle of an article on the Nicaraguan election. Time inserts
the government claim that a ship carrying crates of the type used to
transport MIG-2Is was due at a Nicaraguan port. Time never questions
a government propaganda ploy, no matter how blatant, and it offers a
retrospective only when the government tacitly concedes it had deliber-
ately deceived. Like Newsweek and the TimeSt Time allows the govern-
ment to set the agenda with a public-relations statement: If the
Nicaraguans did this, it would be a challenge to the United States. How
then would we react, what are our policy options, etc. The truth of the
claim and the likelihood that this is a manipulative ploy to help remove
the unwanted elections from attention are not discussed; and, naturally,
the fact that this is part of a policy of aggression against a tiny victim
is never raised.

The only credits in the media coverage of the MIG crisis go to CBS
News. On November 6, Dan Rather gave the straight administration
"news" that MIGs might be on their way and that a strategic option
to destroy them was under consideration. On November 7 and 8, how-
ever, perhaps out of a recognition that it had once again been "used,"
CBS gave substantial coverage to Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel
D'Escoto's rebuttal, which allowed him to point out the absurdity of
the Nicaraguan "threat," the tie-in of the MIG claims to the Nicarag-
uan election, and the U.S. refusal to go along with the Contadora peace
proposals.

The MIG ploy was, nevertheless, entirely successful. Atone of crisis
was manufactured, and "options" against the hypothetical Sandinista
"threat" were placed at the center of public attention. The Nicaraguan
c\ection was nor discussed. LASA points out that "The final results of
Nicaragua's election were not even reported by most of the interna-
tional media. They were literally buried under an avalanche of alarmist
news reports" (p. 31). LASA concludes that the Nicaraguan electoral

LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 139

process was manipulated, as the U.S. government claims, but by the
U.S. government itself in its efforts to discredit an election that it did
not want to take place. The Salvadoran and Guatemalan elections
successfully legitimized the U.S. -backed regimes, at least for American
elite opinion. The far more honest Nicaraguan election failed to accom-
plish this, thanks to the loyal service of the media.

3.9. THE ROLE OF OFFICIAL
"OBSERVERS" IN
REINFORCING A
PROPAGANDA LINE

Official observers provide a perfect example of the use of government-
controlled "experts" and "pseudo-events" to attract media attention
and channel it in the direction of the propaganda line. And they regu-
larly succeed in doing this in demonstration elections, no matter how
brief their stay and foolish their comments (see appendix I). The media
take it for granted that official observers are newsworthy: they are
notables, their selection by the government from "reputable" institu-
tions adds to their credibility, and their observations will have effects
on opinion and pohcy. This rationale is in the nature of a self-fulfilling
prophecy; they have effects only because the media accord them atten-
tion. As the official observers reliably commend the elections as fair
without the slightest attention to basic conditions, the media's regular
use of these observers for comments on election quality violates norms
of substantive objectivity in the same manner as the use of any straight
government handout by the Times or Pravda. no

The Nicaraguan election was remarkable for the number of foreign
observers and observer teams. We pointed out earlier that Time men-
tioned 450 foreign observers, but the magazine failed to cite anyone
of them (relying instead, and characteristically, on State Department
handouts). As we saw, the State Department was able to get the media
to follow its agenda, even though this involved them in a blatant rever-
sal of the criteria they had employed the same year in EI Salvador and
Guatemala. It was also able to induce the media to disregard the out-
come of the Nicaraguan election, with the help of the diversionary
MIG ploy. The media also allowed major lies to be institutionalized-
for example, that coercion was greater and pluralistic choices less in the
Nicaraguan than in the Salvadoran and Guatemalan elections, and that

140

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

the latter were legitimizing in a substantive sense, in contrast with
Nicaragua.

These propaganda lies could not have been perpetrated if such re-
ports as those of the Irish delegation and LASA had been accorded
proper weight. LASA actually contacted the major mass-media outlets
and tried to interest them in doing a story on their report. LASA was
turned down by every major outlet. The LASA report is probably the
best-documented and most closely reasoned observer report ever writ-
ten. Its authors are far and away the most qualified group ever to write
such a report, half with field experience in Nicaragua, and the docu-
ment was an official report of the major scholarly organization that
deals with Central America. The authors represent a variety of opin-
ions, on balance liberal but revealing a strong critical capability (and
i n no sense biased, as are the official observer teams to whom the media
accord much attention). Their report covers every issue of importance
and openly confronts and weighs evidence. If one reads the LASA
report, and then the accounts of the Nicaraguan election in Time,
Newstoeekf and the New York Times, it is not so much the difference in
conclusions that is striking but the difference in depth, balance, and
objectivity. LASA offers serious history and context, a full account of
the organization of the election, and a full discussion of each relevant
issue with comparisons to other elections. We believe that an important
reason the mass media failed to use LASA as a source of information
was that its report contradicts in every way the propaganda claims
which the media were disseminating daily and uncritically. Thus its
very credibility, objectivity, and quality were disturbing, and neces-
sitated that it be bypassed by institutions serving a propaganda func-
tion.

3.10. CONCLUDINO NOTE

As we have seen, electoral conditions in Nicaragua in 1984 were far
more favorable than in EI Salvador and Guatemala, and the observer
team of LASA found the election in Nicaragua to have been "a model
ofprobity and fairness" by Latin American standards. In El Salvador
and Guatemala, none of the five basic preconditions of a free election
was met. In both of these countries, state-sponsored terror, including
the public exposure of mutilated bodies, had ravaged the civilian popu-
lation up to the very day of the elections. In both, voting was required
by law, and the populace was obliged to have ID cards signed, testifying

142 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

As we Stressed earlier, the media's adherence to the state propaganda
line is extremely functional. Just as the government of Guatemala could
kill scores of thousands without major repercussion because the media
recognized that these were "unworthy" victims, so today aid to state
terrorists in El Salvador and Guatemala, and the funding of contra
attacks on "soft targets" in Nicaragua, depend heavily on continued
media recognition of "worth" and an appropriate legitimization and
delegitimization. As their government sponsors terror in all three states
(as well as in Honduras), we may fairly say that the U.S. mass media,
despite their righteous self-image as opponents of something called
terrorism, serve in fact as loyal agents of terrorism.

% ff

The KGB-Bulgarian
Plot to Kill
the Pope:

Free-Market Disinformation
as "News"

THE CASE OF THE SALVADORAN, GUATEMALAN, AND NICARAG-
uan elections, the government was the moving force in providing the
suitable frames of analysis and relevant facts, with the mass media's role
mainly that of channeling information and assuring that the govern-
ment's agenda was not seriously challenged. With the shooting of the
pope, in May 1981, and the eventual charges of a KGB-Bulgarian plot,
the mass media played a much larger role in originating the claims and
in keeping the pot boiling from inception to conclusion of the case. ^
In many ways, however, the process was similar. A dominant frame
was eventually produced that interpreted the shooting of the pope in
a manner especially helpful to then-current elite demands. A campaign
quickly ensued in which the serviceable propaganda line was instilled
in the public mind by repetition. Alternative frames were ignored, and
sources inclined toward other ways of looking at the issue were ex-
cluded from the mass media. Facts were selected that fit the dominant
frame; others were passed by even if they bore on the validity of its
premises. 2 At the same time, the dominant sources, who had been

144 MANUFACTUKINO CONSENT

allowed to monopolize mass-media space, complained bitterly that their
voices could not be heard over the din of Soviet propaganda. When the
legal proceeding brought against the Bulgarians in Italy was lost after
a lengthy trial, this was rationalized by the media as far as could be
done. No serious retrospectives were entertained) and, without resolv-
ing the contradictions) the story was then dropped.

What makes the Bulgarian Connection so apt an illustration of the
value of a propaganda model is that there was no credible case for a
Bulgarian Connection from the very beginning) and long before the
Rome trial it had taken on a truly comic aspect. But the mass media
played it straight to the bitter end. An analogous sequence carried out
in Moscow, with the West as the target-with a half-crazed criminal)
after seventeen months in a Soviet prison and some friendly sessions
with the KGB and a prosecutor) implicating employees ofthe American
embassy in a conspiracy to murder, and subsequently changing his
testimony on a daily basis- would have been hooted off the stage in the
West without anyone even bothering to look at alleged evidence. The
Bulgarian Connection) however, although no less absurd, met the crite-
rion of utility.

The case began when Mehmet Ali Agca shot and seriously injured
Pope John Paul II in St. Peter's Square on May 13, 1981. Agca was a
Turkish rightist and assassin long associated with the Gray Wolves, an
affiliate of the extreme right-wing Nationalist Action party. Initial
Western news reports pointed out that Agca was a wanted criminal who
had escaped from a Turkish prison in 1979, and that his durable politi-
cal affiliations had been with the Fascist right. His motives in shooting
the pope were unclear. Agca's friends were violently anti-Communist,
so that, at first, pinning the crime on the East seemed unpromising.

Two factors allowed a KGB-Bulgarian plot to be developed. The
first was that in his travels through Europe in the Gray Wolves under-
ground, which carried him through twelve different countries, Agca had
stayed for a period in Bulgaria. Turkish drug dealers, who had connec-
tjons with the Gray Wolves, also participated in the drug trade in
Bulgaria. There were, therefore, some "links" between Agca and Bul-
garians) minimal facts that would eventually be put to good use.

The second factor was Western elite needs and the closely associated
flare-up of a carefully stoked anti-Communist fervor in the West. At
the first meeting of the Jonathan Institute, in Jerusalem, in July 1979,
at which a large Western political and media contingent were present
(including Claire Sterling, George Will, George Bush, and Robert
Moss),3 the main theme pressed by Israeli Prime Minister Menahem
Begin in his opening address, and by many others at the conference, was

THE KGB-BULGARIAN PLOT TO KILL THt POPE 145

the importance and utility of pressing tiie terrorism issue and of tying
terrorism to the Soviet Union/ Claire Sterling did this in her 19S1
volume The Terror Nelworkt which became the bible of the Reagan
administration and the international right wing, and elevated Sterling
to the status of number one mass-media expert on that subject. Terror-
ism and Soviet evil were the centerpieces of the Reagan administra-
tion's propaganda campaign that began in 1981, designed to support its
planned arms increase, placement of new missiles in Europe, and inter-
ventionist policies in the Third World. Thus the shooting of the pope
by Agca in May 1981 occurred at a time when important Western
interests were looking for ways to tie the Soviet Union to "international
terrorism. "5

4.1. THE STERLING-HENZE-
KALB MODEL

Although the initial media reaction to the shooting was that the roots
of the act would seem to lie in Turkish right-wing ideology and politics,
some rightists immediately seized the opportunity to locate the origins
of the plot in the Soviet bloc. Only six days after the assassination
attempt, the Italian secret-service organization SISMI issued a docu-
ment which claimed that the attack had been announced by a Soviet
official at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact powers in Bucharest, Romania,
and that Agca had been trained in the Soviet Union. Subsequently, this
"infonnation" was shown to have been fabricated by SI5MI or one of
its intelligence sources, but it entered the stream of allegations about
the plot in a book published in West Germany and via further citations
and leaks. 6

The Reader's Digest saw the propaganda opportunity presented by
the assassination attempt quite early, and hired both Paul Henze, a
longtime CIA officer and propaganda specialist, and Claire Sterling to
investigate the topic. Sterling's September 1982 article in the Reader's
Digest, "The Plot to Kill the Pope," was the most important initiator
of the Bulgarian Connection, and its ideas and those of Paul Henze
fonned the basis for the NBC-TV program "The Man Who Shot the
Pope -A Study in Terrorism," narrated by Marvin Kalb and first aired
on September 21, 1982.

The Sterling-Henze-Kalb (SHK) model, in which Agca was an agent
of the Bulgarians (and, indirectly, of the Soviet Union), quickly became

146 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

the dominant frame of the mass media, through the great outreach of
the Reader's Digest and the NBC-TV program (which was repeated in
revised form in January 1983), and the ready, even eager, acceptance of
this view by the other mainstream media. ^ The mass media in our
sample-Newsweek, Time, the New York Times, and CBS News-all
accepted and used the SHK model from the beginning, and retained
that loyalty to the end of the Rome trial in March 1986. In the process
they excluded alternative views and a great deal of inconvenient fact.
Wiihihe Reader's Digest, the Wall Street Journal, the Christian Science
MonilOTi and NBC-TV also firmly adhering to the SHK line, it quickly
established a dominant position throughout the mainstream media.

In the balance of this and the following two sections, we will describe
the SHK model, discuss its weaknesses, and outline an alternative
frame explaining Agca's confession implicating the Bulgarians, which
the media ignored. We will then turn to a closer examination of the
media's gullible reception of the SHK view and its fit to a propaganda
model.

The SHK model had the following essential elements:

1. Motive. In Sterling's Reader's Digest article, the preeminent motive
in the assassination attempt was a Soviet desire to weaken NATO, to
be accomplished by implicating a Turk in the assassination of the pope:
"The Turk was there at St. Peter's to signal Christendom that Islamic
Turkey was an ahen and vaguely sinister country that did not belong
in NATO." This motive was accompanied (and soon supplanted) by the
contention that the shooting was to help quell the Solidarity movement
in Poland by removing its most important supporter. At one point Paul
Henze suggested that the intent of the KGB was perhaps merely to
"wing" the pope, not kill him, as a warning, as in a James Bond movie.
The costs and risks to the Soviet bloc of such a venture were never
discussed by Sterling, Henze, or Kalb.

2. The proof of Soviet and Bulgarian involvement. Before Agca's
confession and his identification of Bulgarians in November 1982, the
evidence on which SHK relied was confined to the fact that Agca had
stayed in Bulgaria in the summer of 1980, and that Turkish drug traders
with links to the Gray Wolves did business in Bulgaria. In November
1982, Agca named three Bulgarians as his alleged accomplices and
claimed to have been hired by the Bulgarians to do the job. He offered
no credible evidence and named no witnesses to any dealings with
Bulgarians, so that the new "evidence" was simply Agca's assertions,
after seventeen months in an Italian prison.

THE KGB-BULGARIAN PLOT TO KILL THE POPE 147

3. The ideological assumptions. As the case looked extremely thin,

especially before Agca's new confession of November 1982, the gaps
were filled by ideological assumptions: This is the kind of thing the
Soviets do. The Soviet Union and Bulgaria have been actively striving
to "destabilize" Turkey.a If there is no hard evidence it is because the
Soviets are consummate professionals who cover their tracks and main-
tain "plausible deniability." The KGB hired Agca in Turkey and caused
him to use a rightist cover to obscure the fact that he was a KGB agent.
Although Agca traveled through eleven other countries, his stay in
Bulgaria was crucial because Bulgaria is a totalitarian state and the
police know everything; therefore they knew who Agca was, and they
must have been using him for their own purposes.'

4.2. PROBLEMS WITH THE
STERLING-HENZE-KALB
MODEL

The basic Sterling-Henze-Kalb model suffered from a complete ab-
sence of credible evidence, a reliance on ideological premises, and
internal inconsistencies. As problems arose, the grounds were shifted,
sometimes with a complete reversal of argument. '°

An initial problem for the model was the Bulgarian-Soviet motive.
In this connection, we should note the extreme foolishness of Sterling's
original suggestion that the Eastern bloc went to the trouble of locating
a Turkish Fascist to shoot the pope in order to make Turkey look bad,
and thereby to loosen its ties to NATO. That such a loosened tie would
follow from a Turkish Fascist shooting the pope is not sensible, nor is
it likely that the conservative Soviet leadership would indulge in such
a fanciful plan even if it had a greater probability of "success. "11 This
theory assumed that Agca would be caught and identified as a Turk,
but that he wouldn't reveal that he had been hired by the Bulgarians
and the Soviets. Subsequently, Sterling suggested that Agca was sup-
posed to have been shot in the square to assure his silence. The amaz-
ingly incompetent KGB failed to accomplish this simple task. SHK also
maintained at various points that Agca may not even have known who
hired him, so he couldn't implicate the East. Later, when Agca claimed
that he had been heavily involved with Bulgarians in Rome, Sterling
and Henze lapsed into silence on the failure of the KGB to maintain
a semblance of plausible deniability.

148 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

SHK finally settled firmly on the idea that quelling the Polish Soli-
darity movement was the real Soviet-Bulgarian motive. But this theory
is as implausible as its predecessor, when we take account of timing and
elementary cost-benefit analysis. Agca was allegedly recruited in Tur-
key long before Solidarity existed. In a variant Sterling version of the
timing of his recruitment, Agca was hired by the Bulgarians in July 1980,
which was still prior to the Gdansk shipyard strike, and thus before
Solidarity appeared a credible threat to Soviet control. The risks and
costs of an assassination attempt would seem heavy-and, in fact, the
costs to the Soviet Union and Bulgaria were severe based merely on the
widespread belief in their involvement, even in the absence of credible
evidence. The supposed benefits from the act are also not plausible.
The assassination of the pope, especially ifblamed on the Soviet Union,
would infuriate and unify the Poles and strengthen their opposition to
a Soviet-dominated regime. And the further costs in damaged relations
with Western Europe-which were extremely important to the Soviet
Union in 1981, with the gas pipeline being negotiated and with the
placement of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe a major Soviet
concern-would seem to militate against taking foolish riskS.

A second problem with the SHK model is that Agca had threatened
to kiU the pope in 1979 at the time of a papal visit to Turkey-again,
long before Solidarity existed. This suggests that Agca and the Turkish
right had their own grievances against the pope and a rationale for
assassinating him that was independent of any Soviet influence. It was
partly for this reason that SHK argue that Agca was recruited by the
Soviet Union in Turkey before the pope's visit there, setting him up for
the later attack. But not only is this pure speculation unsupported by
a trace of evidence, it fails to explain why the entire Fascist press, not
just Agca, assailed the pope's visit in 1979. Was the entire Fascist right
serving Soviet ends? The only time this issue was ever raised in the mass
media, on the "McNeil-Lehrer News Hour" of January 5, 1983, Paul
Henze stated in no uncertain terms that "there was no [press] opposi-
tion" to the pope's visit in 1979. The Turkish journalist Ugur Mumcu,
however, assembled a large collection of citations from the Turkish
rightist press of the time to demonstrate that Henze's statement was
false. '3

A third problem for the SHK model was that Agca was a committed
rightist, and therefore not a likely candidate for service to the Commu-
nist powers (although perhaps amenable to fingering them as co-con-
spirators in a prison context). SHK strove mightily to make Agca out
to be a rootless mercenary, but the best they could come up with was

THE KGB-BULGARIAN PLOT TO KILL THE POPE 149

the fact that Agca didn't seem to have been registered as a member of
the Gray Wolves, u But all his friends, associates, and affiliations from
high school days onward were Gray Wolves, and in his travels through
Europe up to the time of his May 13, IgSl, rendezvous, he moved solely
through the Gray Wolves network. While in prison, Agca addressed a
letter to Alparslan Turkes, the leader of the Nationalist Action Party
of Turkey, expressing his continued commitment and loyalty. This
letter was bothersome to Sterling and Henze as it is inconsistent with
their depiction of Agca as apolitical, and Sterling dismissed it without
argument as a "laughably clumsy forgery." A problem, however, is that
Agca's letter was introduced as evidence in a trial in Ankara by the
Turkish military authorities, usually adequate proof for Sterling of
authenticity. She doesn't mention this fact or examine their case. Ugur
Mumcu devotes five pages of his book Agca Dossier to a detailed ac-
count of the Turkes letter, describing the great pains the authorities
took, including tapping outside experts, to establish its authenticity.
The conclusion on all sides was that the letter was genuine.

A fourth problem with the SHK model is the notion that because of
the efficiency of the Bulgarian secret police, Agca's presence in Sofia
must have been known to them, and he must therefore have been on
their payroll. This assumed efficiency is an ideological assumption un-
supported by any evidence and contradicted by actual Bulgarian and
Soviet performance. There is no evidence that the Bulgarians ever
identified Agca, who was using a false passport. Furthermore, the con-
tention that the Bulgarian police know everything was refuted in impor-
tant testimony during the Rome trial on September 22, Ig85, when Gray
Wolves official Abdullah Catli stated that many Gray Wolves preferred
to traverse Bulgaria because it was easy to hide in the large flow of
Turkish immigrant traffic through that country.

A fifth problem for the SHK model was the fact that Agca seems to
have gotten his gun through the Gray Wolves network, not from the
Bulgarians, who presumably could have slipped it to him quite easily
in Rome. In her Reader's Digesl article. Sterling traced Agca's gun to
Horst Grillmaier, an Austrian gun dealer who, according to Sterling,
had fled behind the Iron Curtain after May 13, IgSl, to avoid question-
ing in the West. It turned out later, however, that Grillmaier was a
former Nazi who specialized in supplying right-wing gun buyers; that
he had not disappeared behind the Iron Curtain at all; and that the gun
had proceeded through a number of intermediaries, to be transmitted
to Agca by a Gray Wolves friend. Sterling handles the disintegration
ofthe original Grillmaier line by simply shifting to a new conspiratorial

150 M ANUFACTORINCi CONSENT

ground: the clever Bulgarians had Agca purchase a gun through a
known Fascist to strengthen the case that Agca was a right-winger who
could not possibly be connected to the Communist powers.

A final set of problems for the SHK model lies in the extraordinary
level of incompetence and gross violations of the principles of plausible
deniability that it attributes to the Bulgarian and Soviet secret police-
features that coexist uneasily with the superspy image invoked else-
where in the model. At various points, SHK contended that the Soviets
and Bulgarians were professionals who could afford to go after the pope
because they would never be implicated themselves. But hiring Agca,
a wanted criminal and a mentally unbalanced rightist, would appear
extremely foolish, as the cover would quickly be blown in the hkely
event that he was caught. In Sterling's initial tale, the KGB wanted him
to be caught--or at least to have his body identified-to discredit
Turkey. With the shift to weakening Solidarity as the motive, the threat
of disclosure of Bulgarian-Soviet involvement would seem very serious.
Yet the Bulgarians and KGB hired Agca and then failed to kill him.
Another anomaly was bringing Agca to Sofia for instructions. If he had
already been recruited in Turkey, wouldn't bringing him to Sofia be a
foolish compromising of his carefully prepared "cover"? If so, doesn't
his visit to Sofia constitute an argument against Soviet and Bulgarian
involvement?

While Agca's November 1982 confession that he had Bulgarian co-
conspirators made the Bulgarian Connection instantly "true" for the
Western media, it wreaked havoc with the SHK model and with the
logic of "plausible deniability." If, as Agca confessed, the Bulgarians
connived with him in Rome, escorted him to St. Peter's Square to plan
the attack, entertained him at their apartments, and participated in the
attack itself, what happens to the logic of the "cover"?

4.3. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL

An alternative explanation of the Bulgarian Connection can be derived
from the questions the U.S. press would surely have raised if an analo-
gous scenario had occurred in Moscow, in which Agca, who had briefly
visited the United States on his travels, and has been in a Soviet prison
for seventeen months after having shot a high Soviet official, now
confesses that three U.S. embassy members were his co-conspirators.
In this case, the U.S. press would have paid close attention to the
convenience of the confession to Soviet propaganda needs, to the sev-

THE KGB-BULGAR.IAN PLOT TO KILL THE POPE 151

enteen-month delay in the naming of Americans, and to the obvious
possibility that Agca had been encouraged or coerced into revising his
story. They would have focused intently on Agca's prison conditions,
his visitors there, his amenability to a "deal" with his captors, and any
evidence in his statements or from other sources that he had been
coached. The fact that Agca had visited the United States, among
twelve countries, would not be considered strong evidence of CIA
involvement, and the press might even have pointed out that a mini-
mally competent CIA would not have brought Agca to Washington for
instructions in the first place.

The alternative model would take the same fact that SHK start out
with-Agca's stay in Sofia, Bulgaria-but interpret it differently. That
visit violates principles of plausible deniability and would be especially
foolish if the KGB had already recruited Agca in Turkey. On the other
hand, it provides a Western propaganda system with the necessary tie
between Agca's terrorist attack in Rome and the Soviet bloc. The
convenience of Agca's confession-to Socialist leader Craxi, to the
Christian Democrats and neo-Fascists in Italy, and to Reagan searching
for a tie-in between "international terrorism" and the Soviet Union-is
also crystal clear, and would immediately suggest to an objective press
the possibility that this "demand" might have elicited an appropriate
"supply" from the imprisoned Agca. The lag in Agca's naming of any
Bulgarians-seventeen months after he entered an Italian prison and
seven months after he had agreed to "cooperate" with the investigating
magistrate, Hario Martella-is also highly suggestive. Why did it take
him so long to name his co-conspirators? Sterling tried to explain this
on the ground that Agca had hopes that the Bulgarians would "spring
him" and gave them time; his successive elaborations of claims and
subsequent retractions she explained in terms of Agca's "signaling" to
his alleged partners. This complex and speculative attempt to rational-
ize inconvenient facts is not necessary; a very straightforward explana-
tion based on Agca's character and affiliations and the inducements
known to have been offered to him (described below) does quite
nicely. Is Furthermore, Sterling's explanation does not account for the
fact that Agca failed to provide serious evidence late in the trial, long
after it was clear that the Bulgarians had not responded to his alleged
signals.

Another suggestive feature of Agca's confession is that it/ollowed the
creation and wide media distribution of the SHK model. During the
course of the investigation of the plot, it was revealed that the impris-
oned Agca had access to newspapers, radio, and television, among other
modes of personal communication with the outside world. It was also

152 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

brought out in the investigation that Agca's "desire for personal public-
ity seems unquenchable .At one point in the Italian investigation,

he abruptly clammed up when the magistrates refused his demand that
journalists be present as he 'confessed.' •• le Agca was interrogated about
a possible Bulgarian connection long before his confession, and was
surely aware that his interrogators would be quite pleased to have him
produce one. And by the fall of 1982 one was being provided to him in
the press and on the screen every day.

We mentioned earlier that the Italian secret-service agency 81 SMI
had actually distributed a piece of disinformation tying the Soviets to
the assassination attempt within days of the attack. At the time of the
shooting, 8ISMI was headed by General Giuseppe 8antovito, a mem-
ber of the extreme right-wing organization Propaganda Due (P-2), and
SISMI and the other intelligence agencies were heavily infiltrated with
P-2 members. A P-2 scandal broke in Italy in March 1981, and by
August 8antovito had been forced to leave 8 1 SMI, but the rightist grip
on this organization was by no means broken.

An important feature of Italian politics in the period from 1966
through 1981 was the protection given by the intelligence services to
right-wing terror, under a program designated the "strategy of ten-
sion." 17 One aspect of this strategy was the carrying out of right-wing
terrorist attacks, which were then attributed to the left, frequently with
[he help of forged documents and planted informers committing per-
jury. The point ofthe strategy was to polarize society, discredit the left,
and set the stage for a rightist coup. Many P-2 members in the armed
forces and intelligence services took part in implementing this program,
and many others were sympathetic to its aims. In July 1984, an Italian
parliamentary commission published its final report on the P-2 conspir-
acy, and it and its accompanying volumes of hearings pointed up the
politicization of the intelligence services, their frequent use of tech-
niques of disinformation, and their connivance with and protection of
right-wing terror. In July 1985 a Bologna court issued a decision in
which it named 818M1 and its officers as having engaged in numerous
forgeries, and also in having collaborated in covering up the Bologna
terrorist bombing of 1980.18

818MI participated in a five-hour interrogation of Agca in December
1981, exploring his link to "international terrorism." Investigating Judge
Martella acknowledges in his long investigative report that he had
spoken to Agca about the possibility of a commuted sentence if he
"cooperated," and the Italian press quoted Agca's lawyer's report ofthe
terms of proposed deals that had been offered to Agca. There were
also a variety of reports in the European and dissident media of pres-

THE KGB-EULG AKIAN PLOT TO KILL THE POPE 153

sures applied to Agca while in prison. A London Sunday Times team
pointed out in May 1983 that the secret services "visited Agca and
warned him that once liis solitary confinement was over, 'the authorities
could no longer guarantee his safety.' "20 According to Orsen Oymen,
a Turkish expert on the case, the Catholic chaplain in Agca's prison.
Father Mariano Santini, had frequent access to Agca and was one of
those who pressed him to cooperate with the authorities.^' There is
some possible confirmation of Santini's pressure tactics in a letter which
Agca addressed to the Vatican, dated September 24, 1982, which com-
plained bitterly of threats to his life emanating from a Vatican emissary.

During the course of the Rome trial, Giovanni Pandico, the principal
Italian state witness in the trial of Mafia leaders in Naples and an
associate of Raphael Cutaia, a Mafia leader who had been in Ascoli
Piceno prison with Agca, claimed in an interview (and subsequently
before the court) that Agca had been coerced, persuaded and coached
to implicate the Bulgarians by Cutolo, Santini, and others. Pandico
claimed that Cutaia himself had been coerced into working on Agca by
threats to himself, and that former SISMI officials Giuseppi Musumeci
and Francesco Pazienza were key initiators of the plot. One of the
important individuals accused by Pandico, Francesco Pazienza, while
denying the charges, gave his own detailed account of who in SISMI
had participated in persuading Agca to talk.

From the inception of the case, there were points suggesting that
Agca was coached while in prison. After his long (and unexplained)
silence, Agca identified the Bulgarians in a photo album allegedly
shown to him for the first time on November 9, 1982. But in a speech
before the Italian parliament, the minister of defense, Lelio Lagorio,
stated that Agca had identified the Bulgarians in September of 1982.
This discrepancy has never been explained, but that Agca saw these
photos for the first time on November 9 is not believable.^^ A key
element in Agca's testimony was his claim to have visited the apartment
of Sergei Antonov, one of the Bulgarians arrested in the "plot," and to
have met his wife and daughter, which was supported by many fine
details regarding Antonov's hobbies and the characteristics of his apart-
ment. The defense, however, was able to show that one feature of
Antonov's apartment mentioned by Agca was in error, although charac-
teristic of the other apartments in Antonov's building, which suggests
that Agca had been supplied information based on observation of other
apartments. More important, the defense was able to establish that at
the time of Agca's visit at which he met Mrs. Antonov, she was out of
the country. Following newspaper publicity given these defense con-
tentions, on June 28, 1983, Agca retracted his claims that he had visited

154 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

the apartment and met Antonov's family. The details he had given
about apartment and family then became inexplicable, except on the
supposition that Agca had been fed information while in prison. In a
number of other instances Agca provided information that bore strong
suspicion of having been provided by officials and agents of the court
or the police. The London Sunday Times reporters, who interviewed
one of the accused Bulgarians in Sofia, wrote that "When asked by
Martella in Bulgaria whether he had any salient physical features,
Vassilev said that he had a mole on his left cheek. In a subsequent
confession, as Vassilev points out, Agca described my mole in the very
same words which I used in describing it here.' "2*

During the course of the Rome trial in 1985-86, no trace was ever
found of the money that Agca claimed he had received from the Bul-
garians. The car that Agca indicated the Bulgarians had used to escort
him around Rome was never located. No witness was ever found who
saw him in his many supposed encounters with Bulgarians. His gun was
transferred to him through the Turkish Gray Wolves network, and
there was no shortage of evidence of his meetings with members of the
Gray Wolves in Western Europe. The note that was found on Agca's
person on May 13, 1981, did not mention any collaborators, and sug-
gested a loose timetable for the assassination attempt and a planned
railroad trip to Naples.

In sum, it is highly probable that Agca was offered a deal to talk, and
that it was made clear to him that the people with power over his
well-being wanted him to implicate the Bulgarians and the Soviet
Union in the assassination attempt. He had access to the SHK model
even before he confessed. His confession was therefore suspect from
the start, and an "alternative model" of inducement-pressure coaching
was plausible and relevant, from the Agca's first implication of Bulgari-
ans. This model became more cogent over time as Agca retracted
strategic claims, and as no confirming evidence of a Bulgarian Connec-
tion was produced. By the same token, the SHK model, implausible
from the beginning, became even less tenable.

4.4. THE MASS MEDIA'S
UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF
THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION

Despite the implausibility of the SHK claim that Agca had been hired
by the Bulgarians and the KGB to shoot the pope, and although it was

THE KGB-BULGARIAN PLOT TO KILL THE POPE 155

sustained by argument that amounted to sheer humbuggery, the Bul-
garian Connection met the standard of utility. In this case, therefore,
as a propaganda model would anticipate, the U.S. mass media accepted
the SHK model as valid, ignored the alternative model, and par-
ticipated in a classic propaganda campaign that got the message of
Bulgarian-Soviet guilt over to the public. Some members of the mass
media helped originate the claim of a Bulgarian Connection, while
others participated only in disseminating the SHK line (and excluding
alternative views and inconvenient information).

The campaign began with Sterling's Reader's Digest article of Sep-
tember 1982, which was closely followed by the NBC-TV program of
September 21, 1982. The outreach of these two statements asserting a
Bulgarian Connection was great, and they were widely reported upon
in the rest of the media in the form of a summary of their claims, with
virtually no questions raised about their validity. With Agca's Novem-
ber 1982 naming of Bulgarians, the mass media began to report the
Bulgarian Connection intensively. This reporting was carried out ex-
clusively within the frame of the SHK model, and for most of the mass
media no serious departures from this model occurred through the
conclusion of the Rome trial in March 1986.24

Agca's naming of the Bulgarians was the key fact that generated news
coverage, providing the basis for reiterated details about the Bulgarians,
explanations of the Bulgarian (and Soviet) motive, and speculation
about the political implications of the charges, if confirmed. A major
characteristic of these news reports was their sheer superficiality, with
the charges never seriously examined but merely regurgitated and
elaborated with odd facts and opinion, and with no departures from the
SHK frame (and no hints of the possible relevance of an alternative
frame). The charges constituted a form of vindication of the SHK
model if taken at face value and presented superficially-i.e., if the
media presentations never considered political convenience, prison
conditions, possible deals, plausible deniability, etc. And this proce-
dure-a reiteration of Agca claims, supplemented by extremely super-
ficial pro-plot speculation-was the principal modality by which the
mass media accepted and pushed the propaganda line.

Newsweek provides a prototype of news coverage within the SHK
framework in its article of January 3, 1983, "The Plot to Kill Pope John
Paul II." The Bulgarian-Soviet motive as portrayed by SHK is reite-
rated through quotes from congenial sources-"a precautionary and
alternative solution to the invasion of Poland" -while nobody is quoted
discussing costs and benefits, the nature of the Soviet leadership, or
Western benefits from Agca's confession. f^ct, Newsweek suggests

156 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

that this charging of the Soviet bloc with the assassination attempt is
a painful embarrassment to Western governments (parroting the SHK
Hne on this point). Newsweek nowhere discusses the seventeen-month
lag in Agca's confession or liis prison conditions, nor does it report in
this (or any later) article the claims and information noted in the
London Sunday Times and the Italian press about inducements or
coercive threats that might have been applied to Agca while in custody.

Agca's evidence is given credibility by Newsweek through several
devices: repeating his claims several times as the core of the story;
stressing in two separate sequences investigative judge Martella's al-
leged honesty, integrity, conscientiousness, etc.; quoting from Italian
officials who say they "have the evidence" that "Agca operated in close
contact with the Bulgarians"; asserting that "all the evidence suggests"
that Agca is "not crazy." But most important is the previously men-
tioned refusal to discuss the premises of the SHK framework or to use
an alternative frame.

Newsweek swallows intact a series of SHK ideological assumptions,
such as that "investigators [read "Paul Henze"] now think" Agca was
probably using the Gray Wolves as a cover; Bulgaria and the Soviet
Union have long been trying "to destabilize Turkey through terrorism"
(quoting Henze directly); in Sofia, Agca's presence "must have come
to the attention of the Bulgarian secret police" (duplicating the fre-
quent SHK error of forgetting their claim that Agca had already been
recruited for the papal assassination attempt in Turkey, as well as
erroneously assuming that the Bulgarian secret police can easily iden-
tify Turks passing through their country). Newsweek states as estab-
lished fact that "Agca had help from a huge set of Bulgarians," although
it provides no evidence for this except assertions by Agca, Italian
officials, and Paul Henze. It reports Agca's numerous transactions with
Bulgarians in Rome without mentioning the problem of plausible deni-
ability and without batting an eyelash at the sheer foolishness of the
scenario. Thh Newsweek article is nonetheless powerful, with its reiter-
ation of many details, its confidently asserted pJots and subplots, its
quotes from many authorities supporting the charges, and its seeming
openness and occasional mention of lack of full proof-but it is apiece
of uncritical propaganda that confines itself strictly within the SHK
frame, with the exception of the single phrase cited earlier.

Initially, the other major media performed quite uniformly in the
same mold-uncritical, trivial, working solely within the bounds of the
SHK model, and entirely bypassing all the hard but obvious questions
raised by the "alternative" model. Of the thirty-two news articles on,
or closely related to, the plot that appeared in the New York Times

THE KGB-BULGAKI AN PLOT TO KILL THE POPE

157

between November I, !982, and January 31, 1983, twelve had no news
content whatever but were reports of somebody's opinion or specula-
tion about the case — or refusal to speculate about the issue. (The Times
carried one news article whose sole content was that President Reagan
had "no comment" on the case.) More typical was the front-page article
by Henry Kamm, "Bonn is Fearful of Bulgaria Tie with Terrorists"
(Dec. 12, 1982), or Bernard Gwertzman's "U.S. Intrigued But Uncertain
on a Bulgarian Tie" (Dec. 26, 1982). In "news report" after news report,
unnamed individuals are "intrigued," their interest is "piqued," evi-
dence is said to be "not wholly convincing," or "final proof is still
lacking!' Four of the Dews articles in the Times were on peripheral
subjects such as smuggling in Bulgaria or papal-Soviet relations. Of the
sixteen more direct news items, only one covered a solid news fact-
namely, Antonov's arrest in Rome. The other fifteen news items were
trivia, such as Kamm's "Bulgarians Regret Tarnished Image" (Jan. 27,
1983), or another Kamm piece entitled "Italian Judge Inspects Apart-
ment of Suspect in Bulgarian Case" (Jan. i2> 1983). AU of these expres-
sions of opinion, doubts, interest, suppositions, and minor detail served
to produce a lot of smoke-which kept the issue of possible Soviet
involvement before the public. They steered quite clear of substantive
issues that bore on motives, quality of evidence, and Turkish and Italian
context.

During the years that followed, to the end of the trial in March 1986,
the mass media, with only minor exceptions, adhered closely and un-
critically to the SHK framework. They not only failed to press alter-
native questions, they also refused to examine closely the premises,
logic, or evidence supporting the SHK case. Part of the reason for this
was the media's extraordinary reliance on Sterling and Henze as
sources (and Kalb's position as a news reporter on NBC-TV), and their
unwillingness to ask these sources probing questions.

4.5. BIASED SOURCING

Sterling and Henze, and to a lesser extent Michael Ledeen, dominated
perceptions of the Bulgarian Connection in the U.S. mass media to a
remarkable degree. Moreover, they affected the course of events in
Italy, as their version of Bulgarian guilt was aired in the Italian media
before Agca named the Bulgarians and may have influenced Martella
as well,^' Sterling and Henze dominated media coverage by virtue of
the very wide distribution of their articles and books on the case, and

158 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

by their extensive and uncritical use as expens by the elite press, news
magazines, and television news and talk shows.^^ Sterling, in addition
to her Reader's Digest anicle, had three substantial pieces in the Wall
Street Journal and several anicles in the New York Times. Her views
were given repeated airing on CBS News, without rebuttal. Henze
accounted for twelve of the fourteen articles on the Bulgarian Connec-
tion case in the Christian Science Monitor between September 1982 and
May 1985, and his articles were used widely elsewhere. The only opin-
ion piece on the Bulgarian Connection that appeared in the
Philadelphia Inquirer during that same period was by Michael Ledeen.
Sterling, Henze, and Ledeen together accounted for 76 percent of the
time in three shows on the subject on the "McNeil-Lehrer News
Hour." No tough questions were asked of them on these shows, and no
dissident voices were heard, perhaps because Sterling and Henze
refused to appear on television shows (or in college debates) with
people who opposed their views, and Henze insisted on approving in
advance any questions to be asked. Thus their initial dominance was
funher enhanced by coercive tactics.^

If we ask the deeper question of why these expens should predomi-
nate in the first place, we believe the answer must be found in the power
of their sponsors and the congeniality of their views to the corporate
community and the mainstream media. Their messages passed quite
easily through the filters of a propaganda system. Sterling was funded
and published by Render's Digest, which gave her enormous outreach
and immediate brand-name recognition. The conservative network is
fond of Sterling, so their large stable of columnists and think-tank
affiliates, like the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) and the American Enterprise Institute, pushes her
views. The Reagan administration was also delighted with Sterling-
despite her frequent denunciations of the CIA and the State Depart-
ment for their cowardice in failing to pursue terrorism and the
Bulgarian Connection with sufficient aggressiveness !-and so were the
New York Times, Time, Newsweek^ CBS News, and many others. Ster-
ling was the outstanding popular expositor of the theme urged upon the
conferees at the Jonathan Institute meeting of July 1979 and advocated
by the Reagan administration team anxious to create a moral environ-
ment for an arms race and global support of counterrevolutionary
freedom fighters. 3° Henze, an old CIA hand and protege of Zbigniew
Brzezinski, was also funded by the Reader's Digest, and Ledeen was
affiMated with both the CSIS and the Reagan political team. I f the
media transmit literal lies by this Big Three-which they did fre-
quently -the flak machines remain silent. As one network official told

THE KGB-BULGARIAN PLOT TO KILL THE POPE 159

one of the authors, if a critic of the Bulgarian Connection were allowed
on the air, the official would "have to make sure that every i was dotted
and / crossed; but with Sterling, there were no problems."

Again in conformity with a propaganda model, it was of no appar-
ent concern to the mass media that Sterling, Henze, and Ledeen were
exceptionally biased sources, immune to the rules of evidence and, in
fact, agents of disinformation. We discussed earlier Sterling's dismis-
sal of Agca's commitment to Turkes and her handling of Agca's gun,
and similar cases could be cited in large number, Sterling's Terror
Network is notable for its guUibihty in accepting at face value claims
fed her by Israeli, South African, and Argentinian secret police, and,
most notably, the Czech Stalinist defector, Jan Sejna,32 whose evi-
dence for a Soviet terror network came from a document forged by
the CIA to test Sejna's integrity!33 A remarkable feature of Sterling's
Time of the Assassins and other writings on the Bulgarian Connection
is her reiterated belief that the Reagan administration and CIA
dragged their feet in pursuing the Red plot because of their interest in
detente.^* And despite her phenomenal sales and uncritical reception
in the U.S. media. Sterling bemoaned the "accepted position, the so-
cially indispensable position ... if you care to move in certain circles
and if you care to be accepted at your job professionally" in the West,
of doubting the Bulgarian Connection, which she attributed to the
success of the KGB in pushing a forty-page booklet on the plot by
Soviet journalist lona Andronov.--^

These evidences of charlatanry did not impair Sterling's credibility
with the U.S. mass media-in fact, the New York Times allowed her
front-page space and a regular role as a reporter of nem on the Bul-
garian connection. By doing this, the Times guaranteed that editorial
pohcy would control the news fit to print. This was displayed fully in
Sterling's front-page news story of prosecutor Albano's report on June
10, 1984. The most important nev.' information in that report-that on
June 28, 1983, Agca had retracted a substantial part of his evidence
against the Bulgarians-was omitted from Sterling's storyj although she
coyly suggested that some undescribed points had been retracted that
were already "corroborated." This was seriously misleading. Agca's
having visited Antonov's apartment and met with his family was never
corroborated, and the details he gave on these matters had previously
been cited by Sterling and Henze as crucial corroboration of his general
claims. His retraction thus led to the important question of how Agca
had learned details about Antonov's apartment without having been
there. This issue was never seriously addressed in the Nets York
Times. 36

160 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Paul Henze was a longtime CIA official who had been head of the
CIA station in Turkey and a specialist in propaganda. Former Turkish
head of state Bulent Ecevit even accused Henze of helping destabilize
Turkey during his term of operations there.'^ Henze never refers in his
"news" articles to his active participation in Turkish affairs as a CIA
official. His writings are notable for their consistent apologetics for
military rule in Turkey, for their dishonesty,38 and for the fact that
Henze openly disdains the use of rules of evidence in proving Soviet
villainy.39

Michael Ledeen, as we saw in chapter I, contends that the mass
media believe Qaddafi more readily than the U.S. government, and
focus more heavily on the victims of state terror in U.S. client states
(Indonesia in East Timor, and Guatemala?) than in enemy and radical
states (Cambodia and Poland?). Again, such absurdities do not reduce
Ledeen's access to the mass media as an expert on the Bulgarian Con-
nection, or on anything else.**

The mass media not only allowed these disinformation sources to
prevail, they protected them against disclosures that would reveal their
dubious credentials. That Henze was a longtime CIA official was almost
never mentioned in the press (never, to our knowledge, on television),
and his consistent apologetics for the Turkish military regime and
frequent lies were never disclosed. In Sterling's case, her numerous
errors of fact, foolish arguments, and wilder political opinions were not
disclosed to readers of the New York Times, Time^ or Newsweek, or
watchers of CBS News or the "McNeil-Lehrer News Hour," and even
"newsworthy" matters bearing on her qualifications were ignored. For
example. Sterling's numerous attacks on the murdered French activist-
radical Henry Curiel resulted in suits for slander brought against her
in Paris. The New York Times has never mentioned these slander suits,
which would put Sterling in a bad light not only because she lost them
in whole or part, but also because of the insight they provide concerning
her sources and methods. Sterling had gotten much of her information
from a French joutnalUt, George Suffert, who was a conduit for French
and South African intelligence, and who had obligingly placed the
African National Congress at the top of his list of "terrorist" organiza-
tions. In her Terror Network, Sterling strongly intimates that Curiel was
a KGB agent, but the French court, on the basis of documents provided
by French intelligence, found no support for this claim. Sterling re-
treated to the defense that her insinuation of Curiel's KGB connection
was merely a "hypothesis" rather than an assertion of fact. The case,
in short, showed that she was a conduit of disinformation, quite pre-

THE KGB-BULGARIAN PLOT TO KILL THE POPE 161

pared to slander a murdered radical on the basis of claims by extreme
right-wing disinformation sources.

Michael Ledeen, a neoconservative activist and disinformationist,
with ready access to the Times^ has also received its close protection.
His book Grave New World was reviewed in the Times by William
Griffith, a Reader's Digest "roving editor" and right-wing MIT political
scientist who found Ledeen's version of the Bulgarian Connection
entirely convincing. ^1 Ledeen was deeply involved with Francesco Pa-
zienza in the "Billygate" affair and had numerous contacts with Italian
intelligence and the Italian extreme right. The Italian Fascist and head
of P-2, Lido Gelli, hiding in Uruguay, instructed one of his accom-
plices to convey a manuscript to Ledeen. Pazienza claimed (and SISMI
head Santovito confirmed) that Ledeen was a member of the Italian
intelligence agency SISMI, with code number Z-3. Ledeen received
over sioo.ooo from SISMI for services rendered, including the supply-
ing of stale U.S. intelligence reports that SISMI then passed off as its
own. Ledeen funneled this money into a Bermuda bank account. His
manipulative activities in Italy were on such a scale that in the summer
of 1984 a newly appointed head of SISMI told the Italian parliament
that Ledeen was a "meddler" and persona non grata in Italy.42 None of
these points was ever disclosed in the Times. 43

4.6. THE PROPAGANDA
AGENDA: QUESTIONS
UNASKED, SOURCES UNTAPPED

There is a close linkage among sources used, frames of reference, and
agendas ofthe newsworthy. When the mass media chose to use Sterling,
Henze, and Ledeen heavily, they simultaneously adopted a frame of
reference in which the Bulgarians and Soviets were presumed guilty,
Agca was an apolitical mercenary, and justice was being promoted by
diligent Judge Martella in free-world Italy. In the propaganda cam-
paign that ensued, hard questions about the quality ofthe SHK model
were simply not asked, and alternative sources and frames were ig-
nored.

A distinction between matters on and off the agenda, such as we used
in the previous chapter, is once again applicable and illuminating. "On
the agenda" are statements by Agca and Martella about Agca's latest

162

MANUFACTURII'iG CONSENT

claims and proofs of Bulgarian involvement, Brzezinski's opinion on
whether the Bulgarians arc likely to have engaged in such an escapade
(they were), or Judy Woodruffs question to Paul Henze as to whether
the Soviets "would have any notion, any desire to try this again" (they
do this kind of thing all the time-just got a little careless here because
"they had got away with so much in ltaly").44 As in the Third World
election cases described in chapter 3, the media prefer to focus on
superficial detail about the participants and opinions within a narrow
range of establishment views (plus bluff denials by Bulgarian and Soviet
officials), along with each development supporting the accepted case (a
defector's accusations, a further Agca confession, an investigator's or
prosecutor's report, and leaks of alleged claims or expected new devel-
opments), whatever its credibility_

"Off the agenda" are arguments and facts that would call into ques-
tion the validity of the basic SHK model, and those relating to the
"alternative model" (which stam with the question of why Agca con-
fessed so late and the likelihood that he was encouraged and pressed
to talk). We wiU run through only a few of the important questions and
points of evidence that the mass media put off the agenda.

The basic SHK model rested its case on the Soviet motive, Agca's
stay in Sofia, and the high professionalism of the Soviet and Bulgarian
secret police, which made it hkely that they were manipulating Agca if
he stopped off in Bulgaria. Only the ABC "20/20" program of May 12,
1983, explored the Soviet motive in any depth, despite the constant
mass-media reiteration of the SHK line. ABC went to the trouble of
asking the Vatican about the validity of Marvin Kalb's claim that the
pope had written a note threatening to resign and to return to Poland
to lead the resistance to any Soviet invasion. Cardinal John Krol,
speaking for the Vatican, said that "Not only was there not such a letter,
but such a letter directly from the Pope to Brezhnev would have been
a total departure from all normal procedures. In no way could you
conceive of the Holy Father saying, 'I would resign.'" ABC's informa-
tion from the Vatican too was that the pope's spoken message to Brezh-
nev was conciliatory. This spectacular repudiation of an important
element in the SHK case was unreported in the rest of the media, and
simply died with the ABC broadcast. And any balancing of supposed
gains against the costs and risks to the Soviet Union in sponsoring Agca
was simply not undertaken in the mass media.

None of them stopped to evaluate Agca's 1979 letter threatening to
kill the pope on his earlier visit to Turkey. Sterling's ludicrous claim
that the KGB hired a Turk to kill the pope in order to damage Turkey's

THE KGB-BULGARIAN PLOT TO Kill THE POPE r63

relation to NATO was never discussed. The question of the authentic-
ity of Agca's letter to Turkes, which bears on Agca's political commit-
ments (and thus another SHK premise), was never discussed in the U.S.
mass media. During the trial, Abdullah Catli's statement that Bulgaria
was a preferred Gray Wolves route to Europe because of the relative
ease of hiding in the heavy Turkish traffic-which directly contradicts
the SHK claim that the Bulgarian secret pohce know everything, and
that Agca's stay in Sofia must therefore have been by Bulgarian official
pi an- was never picked up in the U.S. mass media's coverage of the
Rome trial.

The most striking deficiencies of the mass media's handling of the
basic SHK claims, however, was their remarkable naivct6 in the face
of the pseudoscientific speculations of SHK and the accumulating vio-
lations of elementary principles of plausible deniability. The preposter-
ous SHK claims-without a vestige of evidence-that Agca had been
recruited by the KGB in Turkey for future work, and that he took on
the appearance of a right-winger as a "cover," were not ridiculed, and
were not evaluated when presented as purported truth, There was
never any discussion in the mass media of the fact that the thesis of
prior recruitment and careful cultivation of Agca's cover in Turkey was
flatly inconsistent with the claim that he was brought to Sofia for a
lengthy stay for instructions. With regard to Agca's alleged open deal-
ings with Bulgarians in Rome, the mass media simply refused to discuss
the fact that the alleged professionalism and use of the right-wing Turk
as a "cover" had disappeared.

As regards the alternative model, and the likelihood that Agca had
been encouraged and coached, here also the mass media refused to
explore these dissonant possibilities. They simply would not examine
and discuss the convenience of the newly discovered plot for so many
Western in(erests; the huge time /agin the nam/ng of Bulgarians; Agca's
prison conditions and prison contacts; reports of meetings, offers, and
threats to Agca to induce him to talk; and the compromised character
of the Italian police and intelligence agencies. This involved the media
in the suppression of important documents.

As one important instance, the July 12, 1984, Italian Report of the
Parliamentary Commission on the Masonic Lodge P-2 describes in great
detail the penetration of this massive neo-Fascist conspiracy into the
military establishment, secret services, press, and judiciary, among oth-
ers. This report was newsworthy in its own right, but it also had a
bearing on the Bulgarian Connection case, as it addressed characteris-
tics of Italian institutions that were directly involved in making and

164 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

prosecuting the case against the Bulgarians. The New York TimeSt Timet
Newsweek, and CBS Evening News never mentioned the publication of
this report.

As a second major illustration, one year later, in July 1985, the Crimi-
nal Court of Rome handed down iyudgmeni in the Maner of Francesco

Pazienza et al„ which described repeated corrupt behavior by officials
of the Italian secret-service agency SISMI, including the forgery and
planting of documents. These officials were also charged with involve-
ment in a cover-up ofthe agents carrying out the 1980 Bologna railway-
station massacre, the kind of terrorist connection that attracts frenetic
mass-media attention when attributable to suitable villains. As we noted
earlier, SISMI officials had visited Agca in prison and SISMI had
issued a forged document implicating the Soviet Union in the shooting
of the pope on May 19, 1981, only six days after the assassination
attempt. This forgery was never mentioned in the Times, Time, and
Newsweek, or on CBS News, and the July 1985 court decision was barely
mentioned in a back-page article of the Times.

These blackouts are of materials that suggest a corrupt Italian pro-
cess and the possibility that Agca was persuaded and coached to pin the
plot on the East. A propaganda system exploiting the alleged Bulgarian
Connection will naturally avoid such documents.

Agca's extremely loose prison conditions and the numerous claims
in the Italian and dissident U.S. press of visits by Italian intelligence
personnel were also virtually unmentioned by the U.S. mass media
throughout 1982 and 1983. In June 1983, Diana Johnstone, the foreign
editor of the newspaper In These Times submitted on Op-Ed column
to the New York Times and the Philadelphia Inquirer that summarized
the evidence and claims of intelligence-agency visits, the reported
threats to Agca that his open and pleasant prison conditions might be
terminated if he remained uncooperative, and Martella's proposed deal
with Agca. This Op-Ed offering was rejected, and no commentary or
news along these lines was permitted to surface in. the Times or the
Philadelphia Inquirer-or elsewhere, to our knowledge. Several years
later, in an article in the A^ew York Times of June 17,1985, referring to
Pandico's detailed description of how Agca was coached in prison, John
Tagliabue describes Agca's prison as "notoriously porous." But the
Tim£s had never mentioned this notorious fact before, or considered it
in any way relevant to the case.

When Agca identified the Bulgarians in November 1982, the integrity
of the Italian investigative-judicial process in pursuing the case was
already badly compromised for a wide variety of reasons,46 but the U.S.
mass media weren't interested. Nor were they interested in the strange

THE KGB-BULGARIAN PLOT TO KILL THE POPE 165

circumstances of the famous Antonov photo, widely circulated in the
Western press, which shows Antonov very clearly and in a remarkable
likeness watching the scene at St. Peter's Square on May 13, 1981. This
photo, Martella eventually claimed, was not of Antonov but an Ameri-
can tourist. But this tourist, who apparently looked exactly like An-
tonov, has never been located, and the film from which this shot was
taken has unaccountably disappeared."*^ Agca's alterations in his claims
about the Bulgarians, with Martella generously allowing him to change
his recollections about the timing of events on May 13 whenever Bul-
garian counter-evidence was too strong, failed to attract the media's
attention. Agca's June 28, 1983, retraction of his claim that he had
visited Antonov's apartment and met his family was not mentioned in
the mass media until a full year after the event, and even then suggested
to the press no very serious problems with the case or with Martella' s
investigative work.'*^ hq^v could Agca know details about Antonov's
apartment if he had never been there? An honest press would have
pursued this relentlessly. The New York Times, with Sterling as its
reporter, suppressed the issue. ^ The rest of the press simply wasn't
interested.

The media also weren't interested in Orsen Oymen's finding that the
Vatican had gone to some pains to try to implicate the Bulgarians, or
the trial disclosure that the West German authorities had tried to bribe
Gray Wolves member Oral Celik to come to West Germany and con-
firm Agca's claims. Pandico's and Pazienza's insider claims of Mafia and
8I8MI involvement in getting Agca to talk were also given only the
slightest attention, and this accumulating mass of materials on the
Italian process was never brought together for a reassessment.

Perhaps the most blatant case of willful ignorance concerned the
Italian fixer and former member of SI8MI, Francesco Pazienza.
Wanted for several crimes, Pazienza had fled Italy, and in 1985 he
resided in exile in New York City. Eventually he was seized and held
there by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Pazienza had
been a partner of Michael Ledeen in the "Billygate" affair in Italy, and
retained his connection after Ledeen became General Haig's right-
hand man in Italy in the early days of the Reagan presidency. Pazienza
had also been a close associate of SISMI head Giuseppe 8antovito.
From 1983 onward it was alleged in the Italian press that Pazienza had
been involved in getting Agca to talk, and he himself eventually made
detailed accusations of coaching by elements of SISMI. Although Pa-
zienza was readily available for interviews in a New York City jail, the
New York Times ignored him. Our hypothesis is that they did this
because if they had talked to him it would have been difficult to avoid

166 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

discussing his connections with Ledeen and Sterling (both Times
sources and under Times protection). This would not have reflected
well on the quality of the paper's sourcing. Pazienza's story would also
have highlighted the Times 's suppression of facts concerning the cor-
ruption of SISMI and raised questions about coaching. This would
have disturbed the propaganda line.

The trial in Rome was awkward for the Western media, as Agea
quickly declared himself to be Jesus and, more important, failed to
produce any supportive evidence backing up his claims of Bulgarian
involvement. The diligent and extensive court investigation found nu-
merous Gray Wolves links to Agea in the period just up to his assassina-
tion attempt, but no witness to his (allegedly) numerous meetings with
Bulgarians in Rome, no money, no car, and, in the end, no conviction.
As we have pointed out, in addition to the already available evidence
of atrocious prison practice in dealing with Agea, and the 1981 meetings
with intelligence officials and Martella's offer, there was a steady ac-
cumulation of claims and evidence of pressures on Agea to implicate
the Bulgarians. But, despite this evidence and the failure to convict the
Bulgarians after a lengthy investigation and trial, the mass media of the
West never provided any serious reevaluations of the case. Ahnost
uniformly they hid behind the fact that an Italian court dismissed the
case for lack of evidence rather than demonstrated innocence. They
never hinted at the possibility that an Italian court and jury might still
be biased against the Eastern bloc and protective of the powerful
Western interests that had supported the Bulgarian Connection so
energetically.

The mass media also never looked back at their own earlier claims
and those of the disinformationists to see how they had stood up to the
test of accumulated evidence. On January 3, 1983, Newsweek had quoted
an Italian official who said that "we have substantial evidence . . . [that}
Agea operated in close contact with the Bulgarians," and the New York
Times editorialized on October 20, 1984, that "Agea's accounts of meet-
ings with Bulgarian officials are verifiable in important details." If there
was "substantial evidence" and "verifiable" details long before the trial,
why was this evidence not produced in the courtroom? Why, after an
enormous further investigative effort was there still not enough evi-
dence to sustain a conviction? The U.S. mass media didn't even try to
answer these questions. This would mean asking serious questions
about the validity of the SHK model and considering alternatives,
which the media have never been prepared to do. For them, the alterna-
tive model, plausible from the beginning and, by March 1986, based on
a great deal of evidence, was still the "Bulgarian view." The questions

THE KGB-BULGARIAN PLOT TO KILL THE POPE r67

raised by the "Bulgarian view>" we believe, would have been applied
by the U.S. mass media to analogous facts in a Moscow setting. This
means that the view actually employed by the media from beginning to
end was a "U.S. government view," as suggested by a propaganda
model. That this was true even after the trial ended we show in a
detailed analysis in appendix 3j "Tagliabue's Finale on the Bulgarian
Connection: A Case Study in Bias."

The Indochina Wars (I):

Vietnam

MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE U.S. WARS TN INDOCHINA HAS EN-
gendered a good deal of bitter controversy, some close analysis of
several specific incidents, and a few general studies.' It is widely held
that the media "lost the war" by exposing the general population to its
horrors and by unfair, incompetent, and biased coverage reflecting the
"adversary culture" of the sixties. The media's reporting of the Tet
offensive has served as the prime example of this hostility to established
power, which, it has been argued, undermines democratic instirutions
and should be curbed, either by the media themselves or by the state.

A propaganda model leads to different expectations. On its assump-
tions, we would expect media coverage and interpretation of the war
to take for granted that the United States intervened in the service of
generous ideals, with the goal of defending South Vietnam from aggres-
sion and terrorism and in the interest of democracy and self-determina-
tion. With regard to the second-level debate on the performance of the
media, a propaganda model leads us to expect that there would be no
condemnation of the media for uncritical acceptance of the doctrine of

170 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

U.S. benevolence and for adherence to the official line on all central
issues, or even awareness of these characteristics of media performance.
Rather, given that the U.S. government did not attain all of its objec-
tives in Indochina, the issue would be whether the media are to be
faulted for undermining the noble cause by adopting too "adversarial"
a stance and departing thereby from fairness and objectivity.
We shall see that aU of these expectations are amply fulfilled.

5.1. THE BOUNDS OF
CONTROVERSY

"For the first time in history," Robert Elegant writes, "the outcome of
a war was determined not in the battlefield, but on the printed page,
and above all, on the television screen," leading to the defeat of the
United States in Vietnam. The belief that the media, particularly televi-
sion, were responsible for U.S. government failures is widely expressed.
It was endorsed by the right-wing media- monitoring organization Ac-
curacy in Media in its hour-long "Vietnam Op/Ed" aired by public
television in response to its own thirteen-part series on the war.^ Ac-
cording to a more "moderate" expression of this view, the media had
become a "notable new source of national power" by 1970 as part of
a general "excess of democracy," contributing to "the reduction of
governmental authority" at home and a resulting "decline in the influ-
ence of democracy abroad." "Broader interests of society and govern-
ment" require that if journalists do not impose "standards of
professionalism," "the alternative could well be regulation by the gov-
ernment" to the end of "restoring a balance between government and
media."3 Freedom House Executive-Director Leonard Sussman, com-
menting on Big Story, the study of media coverage of the Tet offensive
sponsored by Freedom House, describes the "adversarial aspect" of the
press-government relation as "normal," presupposing without argu-
ment that it has been demonstrated, but asks: "Must free institutions
be overthrown because of the very freedom they sustain?"4 John Roche
proceeds further still, calling for congressional investigation of "the
workings of these private governments" who distorted the record in
pursuit of their "anti- Johnson mission," although he fears Congress is
too "terrified of the media" and their awesome power to take on this
necessary task. ^

Neu> York Times television critic John Corry defends the media as

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 171

merely "unmindful," not "unpatriotic" as the harsher cntics claim.
They are not "anti- American," despite their adversarial stance; rather,
"they reflect a powerful element of the journalistic-literary-political
culture," where "the left wins battles ... by default" because "its ideas
make up the moral and intellectual framework for a large part of the
culture," and "television becomes an accomplice of the left when it
allows the culture to influence its news judgments," as in his view it
regularly does.*

Media spokespersons, meanwhile, defend their commitment to inde-
pendence while conceding that they may err through excessive zeal in
calling the government to account in vigorous pursuit of their role as
watchdog.

Within the mainstream, the debate is largely framed within the
bounds illustrated by the PBS -AIM interchange broadcast on the pub-
lic television network. AIM's "Vietnam Op/Ed" accused PBS of "de-
liberate misrepresentation" and other sins, while the producers of the
documentary defended its accuracy. A dozen commentators, ranging
from extreme hawks to mild critics of the war such as General Douglas
Kinnard, added their thoughts.^ The program concluded with a studio
wrap-up featuring three "intelligent citizens"; Colonel Harry Summers
of the Army War College, a hawkish critic of the tactics of the war;
Peter Braestrup, one of the harshest critics of media war coverage; and
Huynh Sanh Thong, speaking for what the moderator called "the South
Vietnamese community," meaning the exile community.

The hypothesis advanced by the propaganda model, excluded from
debate as unthinkable, is that in dealing with the American wars in
Indochina, the media were indeed "unmindful," but highly "patriotic"
in the special and misleading sense that they kept-and keep--dosely
to the perspective of official Washington and the closely related corpo-
rate elite, in conformity to the general "journalistic-literary-political
culture" from which "the left" (meaning dissident opinion that ques-
tions jingoist assumptions) is virtually excluded. The propaganda
model predicts that this should be generally true not only of the choice
of topics covered and the way they are covered, but also, and far more
crucially, of the general background of presuppositions within which
the issues are framed and the news presented. Insofar as there is debate
among dominant elites, it will be reflected within the media, which in
this narrow sense may adopt an "adversarial stance" with regard to
those holding office, r.eflecting elite dissatisfaction with current policy.
Otherwise the media will depart from the elite consensus only rarely
and in limited ways. Even when large parts of the general public break
free of the premises of the doctrinal system, as finally happened during

172 MASUFACTURING CONSBNT

the Indochina wars, real understanding based upon an alternative con-
ception of the evolving history can be developed only with considerable
effort by the most diligent and skeptical. And such understanding as can
be reached through serious and often individual effort will be difficult
to sustain or apply elsewhere, an extremely important matter for those
who are truly concerned with democracy at home and "the influence
of democracy abroad," in the real sense of these words.

These conclusions concerning media conformism are accepted in
part by mainstream critics of the media. Thus Leonard Sussman, of
Freedom House, observes that "U.S. intervention in 1965 enjoyed near-
total editorial support, "s The "intervention" in 1965 included the

deployment of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam, the regular bombing of
North Vietnam, and the bombing of South Vietnam at triple the scale
in a program of "unlimited aerial warfare inside the country at the price
of literally pounding the place to bits. "9 It is a highly significant fact
that neither then, nor before, was there any detectable questioning of
the righteousness of the American cause in Vietnam, or of the necessity
to proceed to full-scale "intervention." By that time, of course, only
questions of tactics and costs remained open, and further discussion in
the mainstream media was largely limited to these narrow issues. While
dissent and domestic controversy became a focus of media coverage
from 1965, the actual views of dissidents and resisters were virtually
excluded. These individuals were presented primarily as a threat to
order, and while their tactics might be discussed, their views were not:
"The antiwar movement stood at the bottom of the media's hierarchy
of legitimate political actors," Daniel Hallin concludes from his survey
of television coverage (the print media were hardly different), "and its
access to the news and influence over it were still more .Limited. "lo All
exactly as the propaganda model predicts.

As the war progressed, elite opinion gradually shifted to the belief
that the U.S. intervention was a "tragic mistake" that was proving too
costly, thus enlarging the domain of debate to include a range of tactical
questions hitherto excluded. Expressible opinion in the media broad-
ened to accommodate these judgments, but the righteousness of the
cause and nobility of intent were rarely subject to question. Rather,
editorials explained that the "idealistic motives" of "the political and
military commands" who "conceive[d] their role quite honestly as that
of liberators and alhes in the cause of freedom . . . had little chance to
prevail against local leaders skilled in the art of manipulating their
foreign protectors. "11 "Our Vietnamese" were too corrupt and we were
too weak and too naive to resist their manipulations, while "their Viet-
namese" were too wily and vicious. How could American idealism cope

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM I73

with such unfavorable conditions? At the war's end, the liberal media
could voice the lament that "the high hopes and wishful idealism with
which the American nation had been born . . . had been chastened by
the failure of America to work its will in Indochina." 12 But no conflict
can be perceived between "wishful idealism" and the commitment to
"work our will" in foreign lands, a comment that holds of "the culture"
more broadly.

As for direct reporting, the major charge of the influential Freedom
House study of the Tet offensive, echoed by others who condemn the
media for their overly "adversarial" stance, is that reporting was too
"pessimistic." We return to the facts, but consideration of the logic of
the charge shows that even if accurate, it would be quite consistent with
a propaganda model. There was, no doubt, increased pessimism within
the German general staff after Stalingrad. Similarly, Soviet elites
openly expressed concern over the wisdom of "the defense of Afghanis-
tan" and its costs, and some might have been "overly pessimistic" about
the likelihood of success in this endeavor. But in neither case do we
interpret these reactions as a departure from service to the national
cause as defined by the state authorities. The Freedom House charge
tacitly but clearly presupposes that the media must not only accept the
framework of government propaganda, but must be upbeat and enthu-
siastic about the prospects for success in a cause that is assumed with-
out discussion to be honorable and just.

This basic assumption endures throughout, and provides the basic
framework for discussion and news reports. The harshest critics within
the mainstream media, as well as what Corry calls "the culture," held
that the war began with "blundering efforts to do good," although "by
1969" (that is, a year after corporate America had largely concluded that
this enterprise should be liquidated) it had become "clear to most of
the world-and most Americans-that the intervention had been a
disastrous mistake," and that it was a "delusion" to attempt to build "a
nation on the American model in South Vietnam"; the argument against
the war "was that the United States had misunderstood the cultural and
political forces at work in Indochina-that it was in a position where
it could not impose a solution except at a price too costly to itself
(Anthony Lewis).'* Stanley Karnow's highly praised companion vol-
ume to the PBS television series describes the American war as "a failed
crusade" undertaken for aims that were "noble" although "illusory"
and "motivated by the loftiest intentions": specifically, the commitment
"to defend South Vietnam's independence." 14

Within "the culture," it would be difficult to find harsher critics of
U.S. Asia policy than John King Fairbank, the dean of American China

174 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

scholarship, or Harvard government professor Stanley Hoffmann, or
Dissent editor Irving Howe. In his presidential address to the American
Historical Association in December 1968, Fairbank characterized the
U.S. involvement, which he termed a "disaster," as the result of "an
excess of righteousness and disinterested benevolence," an "error"
based on misunderstanding. Howe explained that "we opposed the war
because we believed, as Stanley Hoffman [sic] has written, that 'Wash-
ington could "save" the people of South Vietnam and Cambodia from
Communism only at a cost that made a mockery of the word "save." , "
Hoffmann explains later that our efforts in "supporting the South Viet-
namese" were "undermined" by the way the war was fought, while the
means adopted to "deter the North Vietnamese from further infiltra-
tion" were "never sufficient"; and sufficient means, "had the United
States been willing to commit them, would have created for the United
States real external dangers with potential adversaries and in relations
with allies." Again, we find not the slightest recognition that the familiar
pieties of state propaganda might be subject to some question.

In its 1985 tenth-anniversary retrospective on the Vietnam war. For-
eign Affairs presents both the hawk and the dove positions. Represent-
ing the more dovish view, David Fromkin and James Chace assert
without argument that "the American decision to intervene in Indo-
china was predicated on the view that the United States has a duty to
look beyond its purely national interests." and that, pursuant to its
"global responsibilities," the United States must "serve the interests of
mankind." "As a moral matter we were right to choose the lesser of two
evils" and to oppose "communist aggression" by the Vietnamese in
Vietnam, but on the "practical side" it was "wrong" because "our side
was likely to lose." The moral imperatives of our service "to the inter-
ests of mankind" do not. however, require that we intervene to over-
throw governments that are slaughtering their own populations, such
as the Indonesian government we supported in 1965, or our Guatemalan
and Salvadoran clients of the 1980s. On the contrary, they observe, the
success of our Indonesian alMes in destroying the domestic political
opposition by violence in 1965 was a respectable achievement that
should have led us to reconsider our Vietnam policy. They cite Lyndon
Johnson's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, who feels in
retrospect that "our effort" in Vietnam was "excessive" after 1965,
when "a new anti-communist government took power in Indonesia and
destroyed the communist party [the only mass-based political party] in
that country . . . •" incidentally slaughtering several hundred thousand
people, mostly landless peasants, and thus "securing" Indonesia in

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): ViBTNAM 175

accord with our "global responsibilities" and "serving the interests of
mankind." 16

Fromkin and Chace define "opponents of the war"-meaning. pre-
sumably, critics whose views merit serious consideration-as those who
"did not believe that 'whipping' the enemy [North Vietnam] was
enough, so long as the enemy refused to submit or surrender." The
media, they say, "brought home to the American people how little
effective control over the population had been purchased by all of
General Westmoreland's victories," thus strengthening the "opponents
of the war," dissatisfied by our inability to gain "effective control over
the population." "The media cannot be blamed for pointing out the
problem, and if General Westmoreland knew the answer to it. perhaps
he should have revealed it to the public."

Outside of those committed to "the cause," although possibly skepti-
cal about its feasibility or the means employed, there are only those
whom McGeorge Bundy once described as "wild men in the wings,"
referring to people who dared to question the decisions of the "first
team" that was determining U.S. policy in Vietnam."

Quite generally, insofar as the debate over the war could reach the
mainstream during the war or since, it was bounded on the one side by
the "hawks," who felt that with sufficient dedication the United States
could succeed in "defending South Vietnam," "controlling the popula-
tion," and thus establishing "American-style democracy" there,18 and
on the other side by the "doves," who doubted that success could be
achieved in these noble aims at reasonable costi'- later, there arrived
the "owls." who observed the proceedings judiciously without suc-
cumbing to the illusions of either extreme of this wrenching contro-
versy. Reporting and interpretation of the facts were framed in
accordance with these principles.

5.2. "THE WILD MEN IN THE
WINGS"

As the elite consensus eroded in the late 1960s, criticism of the "noble
cause" on grounds of its lack of success became more acceptable, and
the category of "wild men in the wings" narrowed to those who opposed
the war on grounds of principle-the same grounds on which they
opposed the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, later,
Afghanistan. Let us consider how superpower intervention would be

176 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

presented from a point ofview that permits aggression to be understood
as aggression.

In the case of Soviet intervention, there is no serious controversy.
True, the Soviet Union has security concerns in Eastern Europe, in-
cluding states that collaborated with the Nazis in an attack on the
Soviet Union that practically destroyed it a generation ago and now
serve as a buffer to a rearmed West Germany that is part of a hostile
and threatening military aUiance. True, Afghanistan borders areas of
the Soviet Union where the population could be inflamed by a radical
Islamic fundamentalist revival, and the rebels, openly supported by
bitter enemies of the Soviet Union, are undoubtedly terrorists commit-
ted to harsh oppression and religious fanaticism who carry out violent
acts inside the Soviet Union itself and have been attacking Afghanistan
from Pakistani bases since 1973, six years before the Soviet invasion.^O
But none of these complexities bear on the fact that the Soviet Union
invaded Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan, holds Poland in a
firm grip, etc. True, the Russians were invited into Afghanistan in 1979,
but as the London Economist accurately observed, "an invader is an
invader unless invited in by a government with some claim to legiti-
macy,"21 and the government that the Soviet Union installed to invite
it in plainly lacked any such claim.

None of these matters elicit serious controversy, nor should they.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, like earlier cases of Soviet inter-
vention in the region occupied by the Red Army as it drove out the
Nazis during World War II, are described as aggression, and the facts
are reported in these terms. The United Nations has repeatedly con-
demned the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and regularly investigates
and denounces the crimes they have committed. Western reporters
cover the war from the standpoint of (he rebels defending their country
from foreign attack, entering Afghanistan with them from their Pakis-
tani sanctuaries. Official Soviet pronouncements are treated not merely
with skepticism but with disdain.

In the case ofthe U.S. intervention in Indochina, no such interpreta-
tion has ever been conceivable, apart from "the wild men in the wings,"
although it is at least as well grounded as the standard, and obviously
correct, interpretation ofthe Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Further-
more, the reporting practice of journalists and commentators is also
radically different in the two cases. We put off for a moment the more
significant issue of how the war is understood, focusing first on the
narrower question of journalistic practice.

In sharp contrast to the Soviet aggression, it was standard practice
throughout the Indochina war for journalists to report Washington

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 177

pronouncements as fact, even in the extreme case when official state-
ments were knOwn to be false. Furthermore, this practice persisted
through the period when the media had allegedly had become "a nota-
ble new source of national power" threatening government authority.
To mention only one typical case from the year in which, we are to
understand, this status had been definitively attained (see p. 170), in
March 1970 the media reported a North Vietnamese invasion of Laos
on the basis of a speech by President Nixon announcing that North
Vietnamese forces in Laos had suddenly risen from 50,000 to 67,000.
Nixon's comment came immediately after the U.S. military attache in
Vientiane had presented his standard briefing citing the lower figure- a
source of much private amusement among the press corps in Vientiane,
as one of us witnessed at first hand-but the presidential fabrication
was reported as fact. The lower figure was also fraudulent, although this
fact was never reported. 22 Throughout the Indochina wars, when offi-
cial statements were questioned, it was generally on the basis of U.S.
military sources in the field, so that reporting and analysis remained
well within the bounds set by U.S. power.23

Only very rarely did U.S. reporters make any effort to see the war
from the point of view of "the enemy"-the peasants of South Vietnam,
Laos, or later Cambodia--or to accompany the military forces of "the
enemy" resisting the U.S. assault. Such evidence as was available was
ignored or dismissed. In reporting the war in Afghanistan, it is consid-
ered essential and proper to observe it from the standpoint of the
victims. In the case of Indochina, it was the American invaders who
were regarded as the victims of the "aggression" of the Vietnamese, and
the war was reported from their point of view, just as subsequent
commentary, including cinema, views the war from this perspective.

Refugee testimony, which could have provided much insight into the
nature of the war, was also regularly ignored. The enemy of the U.S.
government was the enemy of the press, which could not even refer to
them by their own name: they were the "Viet Cong," a derogatory term
of U.S. -Saigon propaganda, not the National Liberation Front, a
phrase "never used without quotation marks" by American reporters,^*
who regularly referred to "Communist aggression" (E. W. Kenworthy)
by the South Vietnamese in South Vietnam and Communist efforts "to
subvert this country" (David Halberstam)2S-their country, then under
the rule of a U.S. -imposed client regime.

To a substantial extent, the war was reported from Washington. In
late 1970, when the process of elite defection was well under way, Los
A ngeles Times Washington correspondent Jules Witcover described the
Washington scene during the earlier years:

178 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

While the press corps in those years diligently reported what the
government said about Vietnam, and questioned the inconsisten-
cies as they arose, too few sought out opposing viewpoints and
expertise until too late, when events and the prominence of the
Vietnam dissent could no longer be ignored. In coverage of the
war, the press corps' job narrowed down to three basic tasks-
reporting what the government said, finding out whether it was
true, and assessing whether the policy enunciated worked. The
group did a highly professional job on the first task. But it fell
down on the second and third, and there is strong evidence the
reason is too many reporters sought the answers in all three cate-
gories from the same basic source-the government.26

The search for "opposing viewpoints" as things went wrong was also
extremely narrow, limited to the domain of tactics -that is, limited to
the question of "whether the policy enunciated worked," viewed en-
tirely from the standpoint of U.S. interests, and with official premises
taken as given.

Furthermore, the U.S. war was openly supported by U.S. allies, some
of whom sent combat forces (Austraha, Thailand, South Korea), while
others enriched themselves through their participation in the destruc-
tion of Indochina. For Japan and South Korea, this participation con-
tributed significantly to their "take-off" to the status of major economic
powers, while Canada and Western Europe also profited from their
support for the U.S. operations. In contrast to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the United Nations never condemned the U.S. "interven-
tion," nor did it investigate or denounce the crimes committed in the
course of U.S. military operations, a reflection of U.S. world power and
influence. These facts notwithstanding, it is common practice to de-
nounce the UN and world opinion for its "double standard" in con-
demning the U.S. "intervention" in defense of South Vietnam while
ignoring the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, regularly described as
"genocidal," a term never used in the mainstream media with regard
to the United States in Indochina.

At the time of the full-scale U.S. invasion of Vietnam, in 1965, when
there was as yer no debate over the righteousness of the already massive
"intervention," the United States had not yet succeeded in establishing
a government able or willing to "invite it in." It appears that the United
States simply moved in without even the formalities of request or
acquiescence by a supposedly sovereign government. Nevertheless, at
the dovish extreme of U.S. journalism, Tom Wicker, explaining his
view that "the United States has no historic or God-given mission to

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 179

bring democracy to other nations," observes that the matter is different
in the case of the "maintenance of freedom" where it already exists:

U.S. support for a democratic regime that is being attacked or
subverted by repressive forces of the left or right might well be
justified if invited—althoughj zn Vietnam, the "freedom" being
defended may be minimal and the cost may be astronomical.

As a dissident commentator, Wicker recognizes that the "freedom" we
were defending in Vietnam was minimal and that the cost proved too
high. But the doctrine that we were "invited in" remains sacrosanct,
and the idea that we were "defending" nothing beyond our right to
impose our will by violence is completely beyond the range of the
thinkable. We might ask how we would characterize the Soviet media
if the harshest condemnation of the war in Afghanistan that could be
expressed in the year 2000 is that Soviet support for the democratic
regime in Afghanistan that invited the Russians in might be justified,
although the "freedom" that the Soviets were defending was perhaps
minimal and the cost was far too high.

Let us now turn to "the wild men in the wings" who adopt the
principles universally accepted in the case of Soviet aggression when
they approach the V.S. wars in Indochina. The basic facts are not in
doubt. By the late 1940s, V.S. authorities took for granted that in
backing France's effort to reconquer its Indochina colonies after World
War II, they were opposing the forces of Vietnamese nationalism repre-
sented by the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh. In 1947, the State
Department noted that Ho had established himself as "the symbol of
nationalism and the struggle for freedom to the overwhelming majority
ofthe population. "2s By September 1948, the department deplored "our
inability to suggest any practicable solution of the Indochina problem"
in the light of "the unpleasant fact that Communist Ho Chi Minh is
the strongest and perhaps the ablest figure in Indochina and that any
suggested solution which excludes him is an expedient of uncertain
outcome," the Communists under Ho having "capture[d] control ofthe
nationalist movement," while the U.S. "long-term objective" was "to
eliminate so far as possible Communist influence in Indochina. "29
Nonetheless, the United States supported the cause of France against
Vietnam, covering some 80 percent of the cost of the war at the end
and contemplating a direct U.S. attack, had France agreed.

When the French withdrew, in 1954, the United States at once turned
to the task of subverting the Geneva agreements that laid the ground-
work for unification of Vietnam with countrywide elections by 1956,

ISO MANUFACTURING CONSENT

establishing a client state in South Vietnam (the GVN) that controlled
its population with substantial violence and rejected the terms of the
Geneva political settlement, with U.S. support. State terrorism evoked
renewed resistance, and by 1959, Viet Minh cadres in the South, who
were being decimated by U.S. -organized state terror, received authori-
zation to use violence in self-defense, threatening the quick collapse of
the U.S. -imposed regime, which by then had killed tens of thousands
of people and alienated much of the peasantry as well as urban ehtes.
The Vietnam correspondent for the London Times and the Economist,
David Hotham, wrote in 1959 that the Diem regime imposed by the
United States

has crushed all opposition of every kind) however anti-Commu-
nist it might be. He has been able to do this, simply and solely
because of the massive dollar aid he has had from across the
Pacific, which kept in power a man who, by all the laws of
human and political affairs, would long ago have fallen. Diem's
main supporters are to be found in North America, not in Free
Vietnam .... 30

The leading U.S. government speciahst on Vietnamese Communism,
Douglas Pike, whose denunciations of the "Viet Cong" often reached
the level of hysteria, conceded that the NLF "maintained that its
contest with the GVN and the United States should be fought out at
the political level and that the use of massed military might was in itself
illegitimate," until forced by the United States and its clients "to use
counterforce to survive. -31

The Kennedy administration escalated the war in South Vietnam,
engaging U.S. military forces directly in bombing, defoliation, and
"advising" combat troops from 1961 to 1962 as part of an effort to drive
several milhon people into concentration camps ("strategic hamlets")
in which they could be "protected" behind barbed wire and armed
guard from the guerrillas whom, the United States conceded, they were
willingly supporting. Douglas Pike assessed indigenous support for the
NLF at about 50 percent of the population at the time-which is more
than George Washington could have claimed-while the United States
could rally virtually no indigenous support. He explained that political
options were hopeless) since the NLF was the only "truly mass-based
political party in South Vietnam," and no one, "with the possible
exception ofthe Buddhists, thought themselves equal in size and power
to risk entering a coalition, fearing that if they did the whale [the NLF]
would swallow the minnow." As for the Buddhists, the United States

THE INDOCHINA WARS ^l): VIETNAM 181

regarded them "as eq-jivalent to card-carrying Communists" (Ambas-
sador Henry Cabot Lodge), and later backed the use of force to destroy
their pOhtical movement, to ensure that no independent political force
would remain, since no such force could be controlled. In a highly
regarded military history and moral tract in justification of the Ameri-
can war, Guenter Lewy describes the purpose of the U.S. air operations
of the early 1960s, which involved "indiscriminate killing" and "took
a heavy toll of essentially innocent men, women and children," in a
manner that Orwell would have appreciated: villages in "open zones"
were "subjected to random bombardment by artillery and aircraft so as
to drive the inhabitants into the safety of the strategic hamlets."33

It was conceded on all sides that the government imposed by the
United States lacked any significant popular support. The experienced
U.S. pacification chief John Paul Vann, widely regarded as the U.S.
official most knowledgeable about the situation in South Vietnam,
wrote in 1965 that

A popular pohtical base for the Government of South Vietnam
does not now exist. . . . The existing government is oriented
toward the exploitation of the rural and lower class urban popula-
tions. It is, in fact, a continuation of the French colonial system
of government with upper class Vietnamese replacing the French.
. . . The dissatisfaction of the agrarian population ... is expressed
largely through alliance with the NLF.34

Virtually aE parties concerned, apart from the United States, were
making serious efforts in the early 1960s to avoid an impending war by
neutralizing South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia-the official stand of
the National Liberation Front, the "Viet Cong" of U.S. propaganda,
essentially the southern branch of the Viet Minh. But the United States
was committed to preventing any political settlement.

Unable to develop any political base in the south, the U.S. govern-
ment proceeded to expand the war. It was able to do this by continually
manipulating the political scene in South Vietnam to assure the attain-
ment of its objective: continued fighting until an anti-Communist re-
gime, susceptible to American will, was established in the South.
Ambassador Lodge observed in January 1964 that "It is obvious that the
generals are all we have got."^"' And we would keep replacing them until
we got the right ones, "right" meaning that they were willing to follow
orders and fight, not negotiate. One of Diem's early replacements told
newsmen that he found out that he was going to be the next head of
state only when his U.S. adviser "told me that a coup d'dtat was planned

182 MAKUFACTURING CONSENT

in Saigon and that I was to become President. ..." General Maxwell
Taylor spoke quite frankly about the need of "establishing some rea-
sonably satisfactory government," replacing it if we are not satisfied,
either with civilians, or with "a military dictatorship. -36

It should be noted in this connection that after the long-standing
U.S. manipulation of governments in its client state had finally suc-
ceeded in its aim, and the United States had placed in power two former
French collaborators, Ky and Thieu, whose sole qualification for rule
was that they met the U.S. condition ofwilhngness to fight and evade
political settlement, the U.S. media continued to pretend that the gov-
ernment of South Vietnam was a free choice of the South Vietnamese
people.^' Thus the New York Times commented editorially on June 4,
1966, that "Washington cannot shape the political future in Saigon, but
it can continue to urge a search for unity among all the South Viet-
namese political factions pending the September elections." In fact, the
rulers at the moment had been imposed by the United States, the
election was a U.S. idea, and-needless to say-the South Vietnamese
who constituted the only "truly mass-based political party in South
Vietnam" (Pike, referring to the NLF) were not considered one of the
"South Vietnamese political factions." As for the "unity" sought by the
United States, it was intended solely to provide a base for prosecution
ofthe U.S. war. As that goal could be accomplished only by suppression
of all popular movements, later in 1966 the military junta, with U.S.
approval and direct assistance, crushed by force the largest non-Com-
munist group, the organized Buddhists, thereby clearing the ground for
durable rule by Thieu and Ky. Despite all of this, the U.S. media did
not point out that any basis for a free election had been destroyed, and
that the unelected government was maintained in power solely because
its aims were identical to those ofthe U.S. administration-that is, that
it was a classic example of a puppet govemment.^** On the contrary, the
junta never ceased to be the leaders of free and independent South
Vietnam, the word "puppet" being reserved for agents of enemy states.

Returning to the expanding U.S. war, efforts to obtain congressional
support succeeded with the August 7, 1964 resolution, after the Tonkin
Gulf incident, authorizing the president "to take all necessary measures
to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and
to prevent further aggression" by the Vietnamese in Vietnam, "a virtual
blank check in waging the war for the Administration."39

The United States invaded outright in early 1965, also initiating the
regular bombing of North Vietnam in the hope that Hanoi would use
its influence to call off the southern resistance, and to justify the escala-
tion of the attack against the South, which required something beyond

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 183

the "internal aggression" by the NLF within South Vietnam that UN
Ambassador Adiai Stevenson identified as the problem we faced.** By
the time of the U.S. land invasion in 1965, over ISO, 000 people had been
killed in South Vietnam, according to figures cited by Bernard Fall,
most of them "under the crushing weight of American armor, napalm,
jet bombers and finally vomiting gases," or victims of the state terrorism
of the U.S. -installed regimes. ^1 From January 1965, the United States
also employed Korean mercenaries, some 300,ooo in all, who carried
out brutal atrocities in the South. The first regular North Vietnamese
unit, a four-hundred-man battalion, was thought to have been detected
in border areas of the south in late April 1965J until the Tet offensive
in January 1968, according to Pentagon sources. North Vietnamese
units, mainly drawing U.S. forces away from populated centers, were
at about the level of Korean and Thai mercenaries who were terrorizing
South Vietnam, all vastly outnumbered by the U.S. forces.

By 1967, the war had reached such a level of devastation that, in
Fall's words, "Vietnam as a cultural and historic entity ... is threatened
with extinction . . . [as] . . . the countryside literally dies under the blows
of the largest military machine ever unleashed on an area of this size."42
The strategy of destroying South Vietnam was generally considered a
success. Harvard professor and government adviser Samuel Hunting-
ton concluded that "In an absent-minded way the United States in
Vietnam may well have stumbled upon the answer to 'wars of national
liberation,' " namely, "forced-draft urbanization and mobilization" by
violence so extreme as "to produce a massive migration from country-
side to city," thus "undercutting" the Maoist strategy of organizing the
peasant population (over so percent of the population when these
techniques were initiated) and undermining the Viet Cong, "a powerful
force which cannot be dislodged from its constituency so long as the
constituency continues to exist. "43

The Tet offensive of January 1968, conducted almost entirely by
South Vietnamese NLF forces in cities and towns throughout the
country, convinced U.S. elites that the war was proving roo costly to
the United States, and that strategy should shift toward a more "capi-
tal-intensive" operation with reliance on an indigenous mercenary
army (in the technical sense of the phrase) and gradual withdrawal of
the U.S. forces, which were by then suffering a severe loss of morale,
a maner of growing concern to military authorities. U.S. forces under-
took a post-Tet "accelerated pacification campaign," in actuality a
mass-murder operation that demolished the NLF and much of what
was left of the peasant society while killing tens of thousands and
extending the destruction of the country. Much of North Vietnam,

,84 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

particularly the southern region, was turned into a moonscape, and
Laos was battered under the heaviest bombing in history, including the
peasant society of northern Laos where, the U.S. government
conceded, the bombing had no relation to its war in South Vietnam.
The United States bombed and invaded Cambodia, destroying much of
the countryside and mobilizing embittered peasants to the cause of the
Khmer Rouge, previously a marginal force. By the war's end, the death
toll in Indochina may have reached four milMon or more,** and the land
and societies were utterly devastated. Subsequent U.S. policy has
sought to prevent any recovery from this cataclysm by refusing repara-
tions, aid, and trade, and blocking assistance from other sources -
although not all aid: U.S. aid to the Khmer Rouge in the 1980s appears
to have run to many millions.

Applying the principles that we rightly adopt in the case of Soviet
aggression, the conclusion seems obvious. The United States attacked
South Vietnam, arguably by 1962 and unquestionably by 1965, expand-
ing its aggression to all of Indochina with lethal and long-term effects.
Media coverage or other commentary on these events that does not
begin by recognizing these essential facts is mere apologetics for terror-
ism and murderous aggression. The United States was "defending
South Vietnam" in the same sense in which the Soviet Union is "de-
fending Afghanistan."

But from the point of view of the media, or "the culture," there is
no such event in history as the U.S. attack against South Vietnam and
the rest of Indochina. One would be hard put to find even an single
reference within the mainstream to any such event, or any recognition
that history could possibly be viewed from this perspective-just as
Pravda, presumably, records no such event as the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, only the defense of Afghanistan against "bandits" sup-
ported by the CIA. Even at the peak period of peace-movement activ-
ism there was virtually no opposition to the war within the intellectual
culture on the grounds that aggression is wrong** — the. grounds univer-
sally adopted in the case of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968 -for a very simple reason: the fact of U.S. aggression was unrecog-
nized. There was much debate during the war over whether the North
Vietnamese were guilty of aggression in Vietnam, and as we have seen,
even the South Vietnamese were condemned for "internal aggression"
(Adlai Stevenson); but there was no discussion of whether the United
States was guilty of aggression in its direct attack against South Viet-
nam, then aU of Indochina. These intriguing facts reflect the over-
whelming dominance of the state propaganda system and its ability to
set the terms of thought and discussion, even for those who believe

THE INDOCHINA WARS CI): VIETNAM I8S

themselves to be taking an "adversarial stance." As for the media,

departures from these doctrinal principles were negligible; indeed, they
may well have been literally zero in the vast coverage and commentary
on the war, while it was in progress or since.

In a revealing article entitled "Lessons of Running Viets' War,"
published in August 1987, Stanley Karnow, a veteran Asia correspond-
ent and author of a highly regarded liberal history of the Vietnam War,
argues that the United States erred in Viemam because it allowed the
Vietnamese people to depend too heavily on us.'^^ Reciprocally, the
South Vietnamese people also "allowed themselves to be lulled into a
complacent sense of dependency on the United States," thinking we
wouldn't back down, not realizing that small clients are expendable.
The South Viernamese people who fought the U.S. invasion are never
mentioned, or considered to be "South Vietnamese" within Karnow's
patriotic frame, although they constituted the majority of the popula-
tion and the only serious political force, according to U.S. specialists
and officials on the scene, and despite the fact that the U.S. -selected
faction repeatedly stressed that "Frankly, we are not strong enough
now to compete with the communists on a purely political basis."48 A
Soviet Karnow would no doubt express similar concern in retrospect
that the Soviet Union allowed the "Afghans" to rely too heavily on
Soviet power.

By the standards we rightly apply to the actions of the Soviet Union
or other official enemies, there is nothing further that need be said
about the media and Indochina. Any further discussion is on a par with
the minor question of whether Pravda reports facts accurately about
"the Soviet defense of Afghanistan." Adopting the Freedom House-
Trilateral Commission perspective, a Communist party functionary
might criticize Pravda for excessive pessimism or for too adversarial a
stance, contributing to the eventual loss of the war and the takeover of
Afghanistan by feudalist elements committed to terrorism, horrifying
repression of women, religious fanaticism, plans to "march on Jerusa-
lem," etc. Or if he found that the reporting was suffickntly upbeat and
not too distorted, he might laud Pravda for its accuracy and objectivity.
But all of this would be nonsense, whatever is discovered; serious
evaluation of the media is effectively over when we discover that the
basic principle of state propaganda-the principle that the USSR is
defending Afghanistan from terrorist attack-is adopted as the unques-
tioned framework for further reporting and discussion. The same is true
in the case of U.S. aggression in Indochina.

We cannot quite say that the propaganda model is verified in the case
of the Indochina wars, since it fails to predict such extraordinary.

186 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

far-reaching, and exceptionless subservience to the state propaganda
system. The fact that this judgment is correct-as it plainly is-is
startling enough. Even more revealing with regard to Western intellec-
tual culture is that the simple facts cannot be perceived, and their
import lies far beyond the bounds of the thinkable.

Nevertheless, let us pursue the narrow question of media coverage
of Indochina, bearing in mind that we are now turning to relatively
minor matters, having taken note of a central and quite devastating
criticism: the media's pervasive, docile, and unthinking acceptance of
a set of patriotic assumptions at such a level as to make further com-
mentary of secondary significance, at best.

5.3. THE EARLY STAGES: A
CLOSER LOOK

The "first Indochina war," fought by the French and their client forces
and largely supplied by the United States, came to an end with the
Geneva Accords of 1954, which established a partition at the 17th
parallel pending reunification through elections within two years. The
United States pledged not to obstruct these arrangements.

The Geneva settlement was quickly undermined by the United
States and its client regime because it was taken for granted on all sides
that elections would lead to a xmified Vietnam under Viet Minh rule.
"American intelligence sources were unanimous that Diem [the U.S.-
imposed client] would lose any national election," George Kahin con-
cludes from a close inspection of the available record. The Viet Minh
had agreed to the Geneva decision for regroupment of its forces well
to the north of territories it controlled on the basis of "the assurance
that the struggle for the control of Vietnam would be transferred from
the military to the political level, a realm in which the Vietminh leaders
knew their superiority over the French and their Vietnamese collabora-
tors was even greater than it was militarily For the Vietminh, this

was the heart of the Geneva Agreements. "49

The secret U.S. response to the perceived disaster of Geneva was a
plan to resort to military action (including attacks on China if deemed
necessary) in the event of "local Communist subversion or rebellion not
constituting armed attack," in explicit violation of the UN Charter,
which limits the use of force to self-defense in the event of "armed
attack" until the UN Security Council is able to respond. This crucial

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 187

decision, misrepresented beyond recogmtlOn in the Pentagon Papers
history and generally ignored, also recommended operations against
China, "covert operations on a large and effective scale" throughout
Indochina (including North Vietnam), remilitarization of Japan, devel-
opment of Thailand "as the focal point for U.S. covert and psychologi-
cal operations in Southeast Asia," etc.^o Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara observed in a memorandum for President Johnson that

"Only the U.S. presence after 1954 held the south together and

enabled Diem to refuse to go through with the 1954 provision calling
for nationwide free elections in 1956."51

Surveying the media during this period, Howard Elterman observes
that "during a six-month period m 1955 and 1956, there was virtually
no news coverage" about the U.S. policy of undermining the Geneva
Accords in the New York Times and the three newsweeklies. Commu-
nist charges to this effect were occasionally mentioned on back pages
but dismissed as propaganda-accurate propaganda, in fact. When the
evasion of elections was conceded, it was justified on the basis of
Communist terror and regimentation. The Times (June 2, 1956) de-
scribed Vietnam as a country "divided into the Communist regime in
the north and a democratic government in the south" -namely, the
murderous and corrupt Diem dictatorship. Newsweek denounced the
"wide infiltration in South Vietnam" in support of the "implacable
purpose" of the Viet Minh, while U.S. News & World Report con-
demned Ho Chi Minh for "plouing new Red aggression in Southeast
Asia."52

More generally, through 1956 "the press insured that the reading
public: would view the war as a struggle between Communism and the
Free World," Susan Welch observes on the basis of her survey of
several leading journals. Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh were pre-
sented as "merely agents of Moscow and Peking whose primary means
of gaining support was through terror and force (although occasional
mention was made of their nationalist appeal)," while France was "a
gallant ally . . . fighting alongside the United States to preserve liberty
and justice in Asia," a cause carried on by the United States alone after
Geneva. State doctrine was "never challenged" by editors or colum-
nists. The liberal press showed particular enthusiasm for the cause, and
"News stories also reinforced the preconceptions of the Administra-
tion," because "the press relied almost completely on Administration
sources for information which was reported." Although coverage of
Indochina was limited, apart from a peak in 1954, and faded still further
afterwards, "the terms of the future debate over U.S. policy were being
hardened into usage by the press. "53

188

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

With peaceful settlement successfully deterred, the United States
and its client regime turned to the task of internal repression, killing
tens of thousands and imprisoning tens of thousands more.^"* Diem
supporter and adviser Joseph Buttinger describes "massive expedi-
tions" in 1956 that destroyed villages, with hundreds or thousands of
peasants killed and tens of thousands arrested by soldiers in regions
"controlled by the Communists without the slightest use offorce," facts
that "were kept secret from the American people"-and still are. 55

The main target of the repression was the anti-French resistance, the
Viet Minh, which was virtually decimated by the late 1950s. The rea-
sons for the resort to violence were simple and have been amply docu-
mented. Recourse to violence was the only feasible response to the
successes of the Viet Minh, reconstituted as the National Liberation
Front (NLF), in organizing the peasantry, which left the United States
only one option: to shift the struggle away from the political arena,
where it was weak, to the arena of violence, where it was strong. Despite
the U.S. -organized terror, the Communist party continued to advocate
political action. The outline of strategy for the coming year sent to the
South in late 1958 still called for political struggle without the use of
arms.^'' As Jeffrey Race documents, when the Communist parry finally
authorized the use of violence in self-defense in 1959 in response to
pleas from the southern Viet Minh, the slaughter could no longer
proceed unimpeded, and government authority quickly collapsed.
Nevertheless, "... the government terrorized far more than did the
revolutionary movement-for example, by liquidations of former Viet-
minh by artillery and ground attacks on 'communist villages,' and by
roundups of 'communist sympathizers.' "

The fundamental source of strength for the revolutionary move-
ment. Race continues, was the appeal of its constructive programs-for
example, the land-reform program, which "achieved a far broader
distribution of land than did the government program, and without the
killing and terror which is associated in the minds of Western readers
with communist practices in land reform." On the contrary, "the princi-
pal violence was brought about not by the Party but by the government,
in its attempts to reinstall the landlords "-the usual pattern, in fact,
although not "in the minds of Western readers." The lowest economic
strata benefited the most from the redistributive policies implemented.
Authority was decentralized and placed in the hands of local people,
in contrast to the rule of the U.S. client regime, perceived as "outside
forces" by major segments of the local population: "what attracted
people to the revolutionary movement was that it represented a new
society in which there would be an individual redistribution of values.

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I); VIETNAM 189

including power and status as well as material possessions." In Long
An province, near Saigon, which Race studied intensively, the NLF had
become dominant in the early 1960s, while the government apparatus
and its armed forces dissolved without violent conflict, undermined by
NLF organizing and propaganda. By late 1964, parts of the province
were declared a free-strike zone, and by early 1965, "revolutionary
forces had gained victory in nearly aU the rural areas of Long An. "58
The first units of the "North Vietnamese aggressors" entered the
province at the time of the 1968 Tet offensive. In fact, up to summer
1969, when the post-Tet accelerated pacification campaign had suc-
ceeded in decimating the indigenous resistance, U.S. sources reported
about eight hundred North Vietnamese "against an estimated total of
49,000 Vietcong soldiers and support troops" in the entire Mekong
Delta. 59

This picture and what it entails was essentially .invisible to the
American public, and it is so remote from news coverage that sampling
of the record is beside the point. The same remains true today outside
of the specialist and dissident literature.

The context of McNamara's observation cited earlier on the crucial
U.S. role in blocking the election and unification provisions after Ge-
neva was the "growth of antiwar and neutralist sentiment in the Saigon-
controlled areas" in 1964. This came at a time when virtually all
Vietnamese factions, along with international opinion generally, were
seeking a political solution among Vietnamese that would head off the
impending war to which the United States was committed because of
its recognition that it had no political base in South Vietnam.

The United States overturned the Diem regime in 1963 because of
its ineptitude in conducting the war, as well as because of fears that it
was moving toward a negotiated settlement with the NLF. There were
few illusions about popular support for the U.S. efforts to maintain and
extend the mihtary struggle. As for the generals, who are "all we have
got," as Ambassador Lodge recognized in January 1964, U.S. policy-
makers knew little about them. William Bundy, soon to become assist-
ant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, later commented that
"Actually no one on our side knew what the new people were thinking

at aU Our requirements were really very simple- we wanted any

government which would continue to fight." The generals, however,
did not want to continue to fight. Rather, along with the prime minister
installed as a civilian cover for the military regime, they "wanted to
move as rapidly as possible towards transferring the struggle for power
in the South from the military to the political level," leading to "a
negotiated agreement among the Vietnamese parties themselves, with-

190

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

out American intervention." They saw the NLF "as preponderantly
noncommunist in membership" and largely independent of Hanoi's
control, and regarded a political settlement among South Vietnamese
as feasible in essential agreement with the official NLF program. 6i

But none of this was acceptable to the United States. President
Johnson explained to Ambassador Lodge that his mission was "knock-
ing down the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head,"
because neutralism, as Ambassador Maxwell Taylor observed, "ap-
peared to mean throwing the internal political situation open and thus
inviting Communist participation" in a democratic process, here-as
always-intolerable to the United States unless the right outcome is
first determined by establishing a proper distribution offorce. 62 Ambas-
sador Taylor feared as the worst outcome a government that would
"continue to seek a broadened consensus" and would thus "become
susceptible to an accommodation with the liberation front." After the
war ended, senior Pentagon legal adviser Paul Warnke observed criti-
cally in retrospect that "For the United States to 'compromise' and
permit the indigenous forces of Vietnam to work their own way would
be to condone the demise of the anti-Communist regime we had sup-
ported in Saigon for twenty years."

UN Secretary-General U Thant initiated a negotiation effort in the
fall of 1964, with the support of Moscow and Hanoi and in accord with
the consensus of Vietnamese as well as others, but it was rebuffed by
Washington. As for the media, "It was not until after the die had been
cast-not until March 9, 1965, after the United States had mounted its
sustained air war against the North and landed the first U.S. ground
forces in Vietnam-that The NfW York Times reported U Thant's 1964
efforts."63

The U.S. position throughout was that "after, but only after, we have
established a clear pattern of pressure," could peaceful means be con-
sidered (William Bundy, Aug. 11, 1964; his emphasis). First violence,
then-perhaps-recourse to the peaceful means required by interna-
tionallaw and the supreme law of the land. The elections provision of
the Geneva Accords had been officially described in a 1961 State De-
partment white paper as "a well-laid trap" that the United States had
skillfully evaded, and planners were in no mood to fall into such a
"trap" in 1964, until the use of violence had secured their objectives.**
Increasingly, U.S. planners turned to the policy of expanding the war
to the North in the hope that this would compensate for their political
weakness.

No such conception of the evolving events, and their meaning, was
ever made accessible through the mainstream media, which kept to the

THE 1NI>0CH1NA WARS (I): VIETNAM I9I

official line that the United States was pursuing limited measures "to
strengthen South Vietnam against attack by the Communists," support-
ing South Vietnam "against Communist aggression. "^^

In the New York Times version, the United States was leading "the
free world's fight to contain aggressive Communism" (Robert Trum-
bull), defending South Vietnam "against the proxy armies of Soviet
Russia-North and South Vietnamese guerrillas" (Hanson Baldwin),
just as the French had fought "a seven-and-a-half-year struggle"
against "foreign-inspired and supplied Communists." In early 1965,
President Johnson decided "to step up resistance to Vietcong infiltra-
tion in South Vietnam" (Tom Wicker); the Vietcong "infiltrate" in their
own country, while we "resist" this aggression. Since the South Viet-
namese guerrillas were "trying to subvert this country" (David Halber-
stam), it was natural that the Times supported the strategic-hamlet
program as necessary despite the coercion and brutaiity; it was "con-
ducted as humanely as possible" to offer the peasants "better protection
against the Communists" (Halberstam, Homer Bigan). The peasant
support for the South Vietnamese "aggressors" and the reasons for it
were ignored. Hallin comments that in the entire Nev> York Times
coverage from 1961 through September 1963, he found two "extremely
brief references to land tenure.'^

While the print media did on occasion reflect the perceptions and
opinions of American military officers in the field, arousing much irate
condemnation thereby for their anti-Americanism and "negative re-
poning," television was more obedient. Thus "the head of the Penta-
gon's public-affairs office was able to assure Kennedy that the [NBC]
network had been persuaded that it would be 'against the interest of the
United States' to show its coverage of 'rough treatment by South
Vietnamese soldiers to Viet-Cong prisoners, with a U.S. Army captain
appearing in this sequence/ NBC's news director undertook to with-
hold this film's scheduled appearance on the Huntley-Brinkley show,
and to keep it on the shelf so far as any other programs were con-
cerned. "61

Until the expansion of the war in 1965 began to provoke some con-
cern, the NLF and DRV were "treated almost exclusively as an arm
of international Communism," Hallin found in his analysisi of the
Times' s coverage. "The term civil war began to be used in 1965" and
"the term aggression began to appear sometimes in quotation marks "-
referring, of course, to Vietnamese aggression in Vietnam, the concept
of American aggression being unimaginable, then or since. But concern
over Vietnamese "aggression" never abated, as when James Reston
discussed "the main point": "How, then, is this aggression by subver-

192 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

sion to be stopped?" -referring to aggression by Vietnamese against the
American invaders and their clients. Similarly, on television, even more
conformist than the print media, Peter Jennings, showing Pentagon
films on U.S. air attacks, commented that "This is the shape of things
to come for Communist aggression in Vietnam," while NBC's Jack
Perkins, reporting an air-force attack that wiped out a "village una-
bashedly advertising itself with signs and flags as a Vietcong village,"
justified the attack as necessary: "The whole village had turned on the
Americans, so the whole village was being destroyed." It is taken for
granted that the Americans had every right to be marauding in a region
of Vietnam where "Everything in this area for years was Vietcong." A
television report on Operation Attleboro described the fighting as rag-
ing "once again to preserve democracy."68

Summarizing, from the late 1940s, the United States supported the
French war of conquest; overturned the political settlement arranged
at Geneva in 1954; established a terrorist client regime in the southern
section of the country divided by foreign (i.e., U.S.) force; moved on
to open aggression against South Vietnam by 1962 and worked desper-
ately to prevent the political settlement sought by Vietnamese on all
sides; and then invaded outright in 1965, initiating an air and ground
war that devastated Indochina. Throughout this period, the media
presented the U.S. intervention entirely within the framework pre-
dicted by a propaganda model.

There are, of course, those who demand still higher standards of
loyalty to the state, and for them, the fact that critical perceptions of
American military officers in the field sometimes reached public atten-
tion is an intolerable "adversarial stance" reflecting the left-wing pro-
clivities of "the culture." Putting this interesting perspective to the side,
as far as this period is concerned we may dismiss the conception that
the media "lost the war," although it would be quite accurate to con-
clude that they encouraged the United States to enter and pursue a war
of aggression, which they later were to regard as "a tragedy," or "a
blunder," while never acknowledging their fundamental contribution to
rallying public support for the policies that they were ultimately to
deplore. Given the conformism and obedience of the media during this
crucial period, when the basis for U.S. aggression was firmly and irrevo-
cably laid, it is small wonder that public concern was so slight, and that
opposition was so negligible as to be entirely without significance. Only
the most ardent researcher could have developed a moderately clear
understanding of what was taking place in Indochina.

Public attitudes after the bombing of Norch Vietnam in February

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 193

1965, in "reprisal" for an attack on U.S. military installations by the
"Viet Cong," are therefore hardly surprising. Asked "Who do you think
is behind the attacks by the Viet Cong?" 53 percent blamed the Chinese
Communists and 26 percent blamed North Vietnam, while 7 percent
said, "Civil war."69 In no identifiable sector of American opinion would
it have been possible even to ask the obvious question that would
receive an easy and accurate answer in the case of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan: "Why do you think the southern resistance is attacking
U.S. military installations in South Vietnam?" In fact, even at the peak
of peace-movement activities -or today, many years later, when it
should be possible to observe the plain facts with some detachment-it
would be quite impossible to raise this simple and obvious question, or
to answer it, within the mainstream media and most of "the culture."

In this dismal record we see very clearly the consequences of mind-
less media obedience in a state with enormous resources of violence.

5.4. REPORTING ON THE WAR

As the U.S. invasion mounted in scale and intensity, Indochina was
flooded with war correspondents, many of whom reported what they
saw and heard with honesty and courage. With rare exceptions, how-
ever, they gave an account of the war as perceived by the U.S. military
on the ground or as offered in press briefings. In the home offices,
Washington's version preva.iled until elite divisions within the United
States expanded the range of tactical debate.

Reporters often did not conceal atrocities committed by the U.S.
military forces, although they did not appear to perceive them as atroci-
ties and surely did not express the horror and outrage that would have
been manifest if others were the perpetrators, and the United States or
its clients the victims.'"' Malcolm Browne quotes a U.S. official who
describes B-52 strikes .in the South as "the most lucrative raids made
at any time during the war";

Every single bomb crater is surrounded with bodies, wrecked
equipment and dazed and bleeding people. At one such hole there
were 40 or 50 men, all in green North Vietnamese uniforms but
without their weapons, lying around in an obvious state of shock.
We sent in helicopter gunships, which quickly put them out of
their misery.VI

194 M ANUFACTURINC CONSENT

The Geneva conventions require that "members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely"; and there are no limits to the horror expressed,
until today, over Communist treatment of U.S. pilots captured during
the air operations that leveled much of North Vietnam. But the victims
that the Nev? York Times is describing are Vietnamese carrying out
aggression against Americans in Vietnam, so no such scruples are in
order, and none were expressed.

Similarly, there was little reaction when B-52 raids in "the populous
[Mekong] delta" were reported in 1965, with unknown numbers of
civilian casualties and hordes of refugees fleeing to government-con-
trolled areas "because they could no longer bear the continuous bomb-
ings."72 The victims fell under the category of "the unfortunate
accidental loss of life incurred by the efforts of American military forces
to help the South Vietnamese repel the incursion of North Vietnam and
its partisans," as explained by Sidney Hook while condemning Bertrand
Russell because he "plays up" these meritorious actions "as deliberate
American atrocities."73 No doubt one can find similar remarks today in
Pravda in commentary on Afghanistan by other commissars who are
much admired as leading humanitarians because they courageously
condemn the crimes of the United States and its alhes in Soviet
journals.

Not only was there no reaction to these and subsequent atrocities,
but there was also no attempt to place them in the context of what had
immediately preceded-that is, to make them intelhgible. Indeed, there
was little awareness of the background, because the media were so
closely wedded to U.S. government goals and perceptions that they
never sought to learn the facts. As the war progressed, ample evidence
became available from U.S. government sources to explain why the
United States had been forced to resort to violence in "the populous
delta," as elsewhere, as we described in the preceding section. But such
materials, inconsistent with the preferred image of the United States
defending South Vietnam from Communist terror and aggression, had
little impact on news reporting or commentary, except for occasional
illustration of the difficulties faced by the United States in pursuing its
noble cause.

The reason for the U.S. resort to violence was overwhelmingly clear
by the time of the outright U.S. invasion in 1965, and would have been
no less clear before had any serious effort been made to determine the
facts. As noted above, the United States was compelled by the political
and social successes of the southern Viet Minh (NLF, "Viet Cong") to

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 195

shift the struggle away from the political arena, where it was weak, to
the arena of violence, where it was strong, a typical response to a classic
dilemma.

It is in this context that we can understand the resort to B-S2 raids
in "the populous delta" and elsewhere to destroy the civilian base of
the indigenous enemy, expanding the failed efforts of the strategic-
hamlet program and earlier terror. The U.S. media continued to report
the subsequent atrocities, but from the standpoint of the aggressors.
One had to turn to the foreign press to find reports from zones held by
the South Vietnamese enemy-for example, those of the pro-Western
correspondent Katsuichi Honda, who reported in the Japanese press in
the fall of 1967 from the Mekong Delta, describing attacks against
undefended villages by gunboats in the Mekong River and helicopter
gunships "firing away at random at farmhouses," "using the farmers for

targets as if in a hunting mood": "They are hunting Asians . This

whimsical firing would explain the reason why the surgical wards in
every hospital in the towns of the Mekong delta were full of wounded."
His reports were available only to readers of antiwar literature, not the
"objective" media, which had no interest in how the war might appear
from the standpoint of the Vietnamese victims of the attack by the
United States and the local forces it established.'''*

The media continued to observe and discuss atrocities blandly, not
considering them as controversial or as raising any moral issue-in fact,
not regarding them as atrocities at all, although we detect no such
reserve with regard to the violence of official enemies. The respected
columnist Joseph Harsch describes the frustrations of an American
pilot dropping bombs "into a leafy jungle" with "no visible result" and
without "the satisfaction of knowing what he achieved":

A hit on a big hydroelectric dam is another matter. There is a huge
explosion visible from anywhere above. The dam can be seen to
fall. The water can be seen to pour through the breach and drown
out huge areas of farm land, and villages, in its path. The pilot who
takes out a hydroelectric dam gets back home with a feeling of
accomplishment. Novels are written and films are made of such
exploits. . . . The bombing which takes out the dam wiU flood
villages, drown people, destroy crops, and knock out some electric
power Bombing the dam would hurt people.

Nevertheless, it is better to bomb trucks, he concludes, although there
would plainly be no moral barrier to the much more satisfying alterna-
tive rejected on tactical grounds.

196 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

In the South, bombing of dikes and virtually limitless destruction
was an uncontroversial tactic, as in the Batangan Peninsula, where
12,000 peasants (including, it appears, the remnants of the My Lai
massacre) were forced from their homes in an American ground sweep
in January 1969 and shipped off to a waterless camp near Quang Ngai
over which floated a banner saying: "We thank you for liberating US
from Communist terror." The Times reported that the refugees had
lived "in caves and bunkers for many months" because "heavy Ameri-
can bombing and artillery and naval shelling" had destroyed their
homes, as well as a dike that was "blasted by American jets to deprive
the North Vietnamese [sic] of a food supply." It was left unrepaired,
so that two years later "the salt water of the South China Sea continues
to submerge the fields where rice once grew." The reason, according
to an American official, is that the people "were written off as commu-
nists," and for the same reason the region was left in ruins: "the hills
that overlook the flooded paddies, once scattered with huts, are . . .
filled with bomb fragments, mines and unexploded artillery shells," and
"B-52 craters nearly 20 feet deep pock the hills."76

Bombing of dikes in the North, occasionally reported," was contro-
versial, as was the bombing of North Vietnam generally. The reason is
that the cost to the United States might be high because of a potential
Chinese or Soviet response, regarded as a serious and dangerous possi-
bility, or because of the impact on international opinion. But these
questions did not arise in the case of U.S. terror against the South
Vietnamese, which therefore proceeded without notable concern or, it
seems, much in the way of planning. In the Pentagon Papers, we find
extensive discussion and debate over the escalation of the bombing
against the North, while there is virtually nothing about the far more
destructive bombing, defoliation, destruction of vast areas by Rome
plows, etc., in South Vietnam, where we were "saving" the population
from "aggression." With regard to South Vietnam, the planning record
is limited to the question of deployment of U.S. troops, which again
raised potential costs to the United States.^'

The most notable exception to the easy tolerance of atrocities perpe-
trated against South Vietnamese was the My Lai massacre, in March
1968, reported at once by the NLF among other massacres that are still
not acknowledged or discussed. Details were disclosed in Paris in June
1968, but neglected by the media until November 1969 despite extensive
efforts by helicopter gunner Ronald Ridenhour to publicize the story,
which finally broke through to the general public, thanks to the persist-
ence of Seymour Hersh, at the time of a massive demonstration in-
Washington, when media attention was focused cn antiwar protest. The

THE INDOCHINA WARS (l): VIETNAM 197

massacre was a footnote to the post-Tet accelerated pacification cam-
paign, and minor in context. More revealing was the massacre at nearby
My Khe, with ninety civiUans reported dead, discovered by the Peers
Panel inquiry into the My Lai massacre; proceedings against the officer
in charge were dismissed on the grounds that this was merely a normal
operation in which a village was destroyed and its population murdered
or forcibly relocated, a decision that tells us all we need to know about
the American war in South Vietnam, but that passed without com-
ment.

While the nation agonized about the sentencing of Lieutenant Wil-
liam Calley for his part in the My Lai massacre, a new ground sweep
in the same area drove some 16,000 peasants from their homes, and a
year later the camp where the My Lai remnants were relocated in this
operation was largely destroyed by air and artillery bombardment, the
destruction attributed to the Viet Cong. 8' These events too passed with
little notice, and no calls for an inquiry-reasonably enough, since
these too were normal and routine operations.

Medical workers at the nearby Canadian-run hospital reported that
they knew of the My Lai massacre at once but gave it little attention
because it was not out of the ordinary in a province (Quang Ngai) that
had been virtually destroyed by U.S. military operations. The highest-
ranking officer to have faced court-martial charges for the massacre,
Colonel Oran Henderson, stated that "every unit of brigade size has its
Mylai hidden some place," although "every unit doesn't have a Riden-
hour" to expose what had happened. **2 Knowledgeable elements of the
peace movement also gave the My Lai massacre no special notice, for
the same reasons.

The reasons why this particular massacre became a cause cfilibre
were explained by Newsweek's Saigon bureau chief Kevin Buckley,
referring to Operation Wheeler Wallawa, with 10,000 enemy reported
killed, including the victims of My Lai, who were listed in the official
body count:

An examination of that whole operation would have revealed the
incident at My Lai to be a particularly gruesome application of a
wider poMcy which had the same effect in many places at many
times. Of course, the blame for that could not have been dumped
on a stumblebum lieutenant. Calley was an aberration, but
"Wheeler Wallawa" was not.

The real issue concerning this operation, Buckley cabled to the U.S.
office of Newsweek, was not the "indiscriminate use of firepower," as

198 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

is often alleged. Rather, "it is charges of quite discriminating use-as
a matter of policy, in populated areas," as in this operation or many
others, among them Operation Speedy Express, with thousands of
civilians murdered and many others driven to refugee and prison camps
by such devices as B-52 raids targeted specifically on villages.

An experienced U.S. official, cited by Buckley, compared My Lai to
the exploits of the U.S. Ninth Infantry Division in a range of similar
operations:

The actions ofthe 9th Division in inflicting civilian casualties were
worse. The sum total of what the 9th did was overwhelming. In
sum, the horror was worse than My Lai. But with the 9th, the
civilian casualties came in dribbles and were pieced out over a long
time. And most of them were inflicted from the air and at night.
Also, they were sanctioned by the command's insistence on high

body counts The result was an inevitable outcome ofthe unit's

command policy.53

In short, the My Lai massacre was ignored when it occurred, and the
substantial attention given to it later is a more subtle form of cover-up
of atrocities. An honest accounting, inconceivable in the media or "the
culture" generally, would have placed the responsibility far higher than
Lieutenant Calley, but it was more convenient to focus attention on the
actions of semi-crazed GI's in a gruesome combat situation with every
Vietnamese civilian a threatening enemy. My Lai did not prompt the
media generally-there were some individual exceptions-to take a
deeper look at the nature ofthe war, or to display an interest in reports
of similar events in nearby areas that suggested its unexceptional char-
acter. This particular massacre was made exceptional by an arbitrary
cutoff of attention and refusal to investigate beyond narrowly circum-
scribed limits. The limited but dramatized attention to My Lai was even
used to demonstrate the conscience of America, in the face of enemy
provocations. Thus a 1973 New York Times report from My Lai de-
scribes the "battered Batangan peninsula," an area where the inhabi-
tants were "generally supporters ofthe Vietcong," now demolished by
U.S. bombardment and ground operations: "big guns fire into the pe-
ninsula as they have again and again over the eight years that American,
South Korean and South Vietnamese forces have been trying to make
it safe." The report quotes villagers who accuse the Americans of
having killed many people here: "They are in no position to appreciate
what the name My Lai means to Americans, " the reporter adds thought-
fuUy.84

THE INDOCHINA WARS (l)' VIETNAM 199

The Standard critique of the media for having "lost the war" identi-
fies television as the major culprit. Television analyst Edward Jay
Epstein formulates the standard view as follows:

Over the past 10 years, almost nightly, Americans have witnessed
the war in Vietnam, on television. Never before in history has a
nation allowed its citizens to view uncensored scenes of combat,
destruction and atrocities in their living rooms, in living color.
Since television has become the principal-and most believed-
source of news for most Americans, it is generally assumed that
the constant exposure of this war on television was instrumental
in shaping public opinion. 1 1 has become almost a truism, and the
standard rhetoric oftelevision executives, to say that television, by
showing the terrible truth of the war, caused the disillusionment

of Americans with the war . This has also been the dominant

view of those governing the Nation during the war years. . . .
Depending on whether the appraisal has come from hawk or dove,
television has thus been either blamed or applauded for the disil-
lusionment of the American public with the war.^^

There have been several studies of the matter, suggesting a rather
different picture. We will return to some of these issues in discussing
the coverage of the Tet offensive, but we should observe that there are
some rather serious questions about the standard formulations. Sup-
pose that some Soviet investigators were to conduct an inquiry into
coverage of the war in Afghanistan to determine whether Pravda
should be blamed or applauded for the disillusionment of the Soviet
public with the war? Would we consider such an inquiry to be mean-
ingful without consideration of both the costs and the justice of the
venture?

Epstein notes an obvious "logical problem" with the standard view:
for the first six years oftelevision coverage, from 1962 and increasingly
through 1967, "the American public did approve of the war in Vietnam"
according to polls. Furthermore, in a 1967 Harris poll for Newsvwek, "64
per cent of the nation wide sample said that television's coverage made
them more supportive of the American effort, and only 26 per cent said
that it had intensified their opposition," leading the journal to conclude
that "TV has encouraged a decisive majority of viewers to support the
war."

Epstein's review ofhis and other surveys oftelevision newscasts and
commentary during this period explains why this should have been the
case. "Up until 1965," he writes, "the network anchor men seemed

200

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

unanimous in support of American objectives in Vietnam," and most
described themselves as "hawks" until the end, while the most notable
"dove," Walter Cronkite, applauded "the courageous decision that
Communism's advance must be stopped in Asia" in 1965 and later
endorsed the initial U.S. commitment "to stop Communist aggression
wherever it raises its head." In fact, at no time during the war or since
has there been any detectable departure from unqualified acceptance
of the U.S. government propaganda framework; as in the print media,
controversy was limited to tactical questions and the problem of costs,
almost exclusively the cost to the United States.

The network anchormen not only accepted the framework of inter-
pretation formulated by the state authorities, but also were optimistic
about the successes achieved in the U.S. war of defense against Viet-
namese aggression in Vietnam. Epstein cites work by George Baily, who
concludes: "The results in this study demonstrate the combat reports
and the government statements generally gave the impression that the
Americans were in control, on the offense and holding the initiative, at
least until Tet of 1968," a picture accepted by the network anchormen.
Television "focused on [the] progress" of the American ground forces,
supporting this picture with "film, supplied by the Pentagon, that
showed the bombing of the North" and "suggesting that the Americans
were also rebuilding South Vietnam" -while they were systematically
destroying it, as could be deduced inferentially from scattered evidence
for which no context or interpretation was provided. NBC's "Huntley-
Brinkley Report" described "the American forces in Vietnam as
'builders' rather than destroyers," a "central truth" that "needs under-
scoring."

What made this especially deceptive and hypocritical was the fact,
noted earlier, that the most advanced and cruel forms of devastation
and killing-such as the free use of napalm, defoliants, and Rome
plows-were used with few constraints in the South, because its popu-
lation was voiceless, in contrast with the North, where international
publicity and political complications threatened, so that at least visible
areas around the major urban centers were spared.

As for news coverage, "all three networks had definite policies about
showing graphic film of wounded American soldiers or suffering Viet-
namese civilians," Epstein observes. "Producers of the NBC and ABC
evening-news programs said that they ordered editors to delete exces-
sively grisly or detailed shots," and CBS had similar policies, which,
according to former CBS News president Fred W. Friendly, "helped
shield the audience from the true horror of the war." "The relative
bloodlessness of the war depicted on television helps to explain why

THE INDOCHINA WARS (l): VIETNAM 201

only a minority in the Lou Harris-Newsweek poll said that television
increased their dissatisfaction with the war"; such coverage yielded an
impression, Epstein adds, of "a clean, effective technological war,"
which was "rudely shaken at Tet in 1968." As noted earlier, NBC
withdrew television clips showing harsh treatment of Viet Cong prison-
ers at the request of the Kennedy administration.

Throughout this period, furthermore, "television coverage focused
almost exclusively on the American effort." There were few interviews
with GVN military or civiUan leaders, "and the Vietcong and North
Vietnamese were almost nonexistent on American television news-
casts."

There was one famous exception to the sanitizing of the war, an
August 5, 1965, CBS report by Morley Safer showing U.S. Marines
burning huts in the village of Cam Ne with cigarette lighters, which
elicited "a semiofficial campaign" by the Pentagon "to discredit the
television story and vilify the correspondent as 'unpatriotic.'" But
surveys of television newscasts by Epstein and Wisconsin Professor
Lawrence Lichty show that "instances shown on TV of American
brutality toward the South Vietnamese, such as Cam Ne, 'could be
counted on one hand' [Lichty]," "even though hundreds of South
Vietnamese villages were destroyed during this period." "The Cam Ne
story is famous for being the exception to the rule."

Returning soldiers told a different story, and it became increasingly
clear, although not through the medium of television, that the war was
bloody and brutal, leading to "disillusionment"-and among a large
sector of the general population, increasingly "out of control," a much
stronger and more appropriate reaction.

But, Epstein continues, "the televised picture of gradual progress in
the war was abruptly shattered by the Communist [Tet] offensive" in
January-February 1968, when the military lost its "control over the
movements of the press," who could step outside their hotels and find
"themselves willy-nilly in the midst of bloody fighting." For this brief
moment, correspondents sent on-the-spot reports that were aired in
place of "the usual carefully edited view of an orderly, controlled war,"
and the policy of "shield[ing] American viewers from the grisly close-
ups of wounded Americans, body bags and death" briefly collapsed,
though newscasts continued to be edited in home offices as "too
strong," in the words of NBC producer Robert Northshield. This cov-
erage convinced Walter Cronkite that the war had become "a bloody
stalemate," in a controversial report to which we will return.

The Tet offensive convinced U.S. elites that the war was becoming
too costly to the United States, and the government shifted toward the

102 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

policy of "Vietnamization," large-scale massacre operations to destroy
the indigenous resistance and its civilian base, expansion of the war in
Laos and Cambodia, and the commencement of negotiations with
North Vietnam. "Accordingly, the networks again changed the focus of
their coverage, this time from the battlefields in Vietnam to the negotia-
tion tables in Paris The 'story' was now the negotiations, not the

fighting," Northshield explained, adding that "combat stories seemed
like a contradiction and would confuse the audience." "Similar deci-
sions were made at the other networks," Epstein adds, as all "altered
their coverage in late 1969 from combat pieces to stories about the
'Vietnamization' of the war" and the negotiations in Paris. The post-
Tet accelerated pacification campaign.^ one of the most crucial and
murderous operations in the U.S. war against South Vietnam, received
little attention.

Epstein believes that "there is a marked difference between the
coverage of the formative years of the war (1962-1967) and the later
years (when the antiwar movement was at its height)." "Up until 1968,
television coverage was controlled to a large extent by the American
military, and generally it reflected a controlled American initiative
which seemed to be winning the countryside and decimating the Viet-
cong. The searchlight rarely focused on related questions, such as the
sufferings of Vietnamese civilians." During the Tet offensive, the focus
changed to Americans "shown on the defensive, endangered and help-
lessly frustrated," then to "the story of the American withdrawal" as
"negotiations began at the end of 1968." The differences, however, are
misleading. Apart from the hve coverage during the Tet offensive, there
is very little departure from the principle that the war must be viewed
from the standpoint determined by official Washington doctrine- a
standpoint that broadened in scope after Tet, as tactical disagreements
arose within elite circles.

In his survey of network newscasts from 1965 through the January
1973 peace treaty, Daniel Hallin reaches similar conclusions. Until the
Tet offensive, television coverage was "lopsidedly favorable to Ameri-
can policy in Vietnam," well beyond even the "remarkably docile" print
media. Like Epstein, he notes the "dramatic" change after Tet, "part
of a larger change, a response to as well as a cause of the unhappiness
with the war that was developing at many levels, from the halls of the
Pentagon, to Main Street, U.S.A. and the fire bases of Quang Tri
province"-and, much more crucially, the unhappiness that had be-
come quite significant by 1968 among business elites, leading to the
changes in U.S. government policy already discussed. "Before Tet,
editorial comments by television journalists .jran nearly four to one in

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 203

favor of administration policy; after Tet, two to one against," reflecting
divisions in the "establishment itself." He quotes New York Times
editor Max Frankel, who said in an interview that "we're an establish-
ment institution, and whenever your natural constituency changes, then
naturally you will too." The same was true of television, and it is hardly
surprising-and quite in accord with the propaganda model-that its
fervent loyalty to the administration changed when "the establishment
bastards have bailed out," as Lyndon Johnson put it bitterly after the
"Wise Men" advised him in March 1968 to abandon hope of military
victory and to de-escalate the conflict, in the wake of the Tet offen-
sive, s?

Television typically presented events in terms of "a kind of morality
play, ... a dramatic contrast between good, represented by the Ameri-
can peace offensive [in 1966], and evil, represented by Hanoi." Report-
ing was relatively bloodless, focusing on the successes of "the 'good
guys': American boys in action," regularly depicted as "brave men,"
"the greatest men in the worldj'* "heroes," exuding competence, hu-
manity, and high morale as they fight against "Communist aggression"
in the "battle for democracy," and "win hearts and minds" by caring
for sick and injured civilians after a village "was burned and blasted to
death"-properly, because ammunition had been found there, which
"was enough proof of its being used by the Vietcong" (Greg Harris,
NBC-TV, Oct. 27, 1967). The issue of racism "was apparently too
sensitive to touch," Hallin adds, noting that he found no "comment on
the hostility that many American soldiers felt towards all Vietnamese,
a prominent theme in veterans' recollections of the war."

The focus of coverage was the Americans: soldiers bravely defending
Vietnam, medics caring for the wounded, pacification officials rebuild-
ing after the damage for which Communist terror bore responsibility.
"Our South Vietnamese" were virtually ignored, with virtually nothing
on political, economic, or social affairs, and "the peasant figured in the
news mainly as a victim and prize of the conflict." The political opposi-
t.ion in Vietnam was portrayed with considerable hostility, "like the
antiwar movement at home." They were "forces of anarchy ... on the
march" (Walter Cronkite, CBS-TV, Mar. 31, 1966). The utterly fraudu-
lent elections were portrayed as a triumph as democracy, courageously
carried out in defiance of the disruptive attacks of "Vietcong terror-
ists."88

Civilian casualties were downplayed, or regarded as unavoidable side
consequences of "a job that had to be done," raising no moral question.
Observing an air strike on a village of "unabashed" Viet Cong support-
ers after a column of American soldiers had drawn fire, NBC's Jack

204

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Perkins commented: "There was no discriminating one house from
another. There couldn't be, and there did not need to be. The whole
village had turned on the Americans, so the whole village was being
destroyed," as is only right and just. In a follow-up on the Cam Ne
incident, Dan Rather offers a comment that Hallin cites as an example
of "a muckraking tone," the harshest he presents: the marines are
holding Cam Ne

by force, not through the pacification program . . . [which] hasn't
taken hold in Cam Ne. And until it does take hold here and a lot
of other places in South Vietnam, nobody can feel very good about
this dirty little war.

In short, as long as there is still resistance to American violence, we
cannot feel good about proceeding with our necessary chores; such
comments as these presumably account for Rather's reputation among
the "doves" as a courageous opponent of the war, and among the
"hawks" as a dangerous leftist. Walter Cronkite reported "an urgent
plea from the Vietcong for medical and surgical supplies" to the Inter-
national Red Cross, "an indication that our bombing raids and infantry
sweeps are taking a heavy toll of all kinds of Red equipment.

Reporting of civilian casualties rose from 1966 to a peak in early 1968,
then declined sharply as the United States turned to the murderous
accelerated pacification campaign, which Hallin does not discuss, pre-
sumably because it was largely ignored by television, which had shifted
attention to the negotiating tables in Paris in accordance with Washing-
ton priorities. The coverage rose again in 1972, when casualties could
be attributed to a North Vietnamese offensive and the U.S. "response."
In a 1971 CBS documentary entitled "The Changing War in Indo-
china," Charles Collingwood reported the progress of the pacification
campaign in Kien Hoa Province in the Mekong Delta- "once an NLF
stronghold," Hallin observes. This province had been the target of
Operation Speedy Express in early I969j one of the most brutal Ameri-
can operations of the war in an area that had been organized under
NLF control with no known North Vietnamese presence, conquered
through the "awesome firepower" ofthe Ninth Division. This included
air strikes using napalm, high explosives, and anti-personnel bombs,
B-52 bombing, and artillery shelling "around the clock" at a level that
"it is impossible to reckon," with armed helicopters "scouring the
landscape from the air night and day" and accounting for "many and
perhaps most of the enemy kills"-about 11,000 according to the U.S.
command, with 748 weapons captured, a fair indication of who was

THB INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 205

killed.''* Collingwood was pleased to observe progress in pacification,
although there was still "Indian country" beyond. "This is almost like
St. Louis on the move into the frontier," his companion, a U.S. govern-
ment adviser replied, in a reference that is more accurate than he
probably knew.*"

In contrast to the heroic and humane image of the American soldiers
defending democracy, the NLF and North Vietnamese were portrayed
in "an almost perfectly one-dimensional image ... as cruel, ruthless and
fanatical." Of twelve positive comments by journalists that he found
throughout the war, Hallin remarks, "10 concerned the effectiveness of
enemy forces: this was the only element of television's image of the
enemy that changed substantially" in the course of the pOSt-Tet shift,
mirroring establishment qualms about the prospects for the success of
American arms. "What did not change was the dark picture of evil."
When U.S. forces burned villages, this was a necessity because they
provided cover and support for the Viet Congo The results of B-52
saturation bombing were a "tragedy of war." But when a North Viet-
namese artillery shell hit an orphanage in An Hoa in October 1970,
ABC's George Watson commented with horror: "No one was prepared
for the massacre, the irrational murder that the North Vietnamese
inflicted on An Hoa." Although civilian casualties were overwhelmingly
the result of U.S. firepower, attribution of responsibility by television
was weighted by a 10 to 7 ratio to the account of the enemy; its
"calculatedpo/j'cy of terror" contrasted with the unfortunate but legiti-
mate side-effects of U.S. operations. Even military operations of the
enemy were "terrorism." Reporting on a Viet Cong ambush of an
American patrol, ABC's Peter Jennings recounted "another of those
small but {and here he paused a moment for dramatic effect] harrowing
VC butcheries" (October, 1965). The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
were portrayed as "savage," "brutal," "murderous," "fanatical," "sui-
cidal," "halfcrazed," mere vermin in areas that were "Communist in-
fested" or "Vietcong infested," and thus had to be cleansed by the
American liberators.

The style and technique are familiar in state propaganda of aU
varieties.

Overall, Hallin concludes from his survey, television never veered
from the official interpretation of the war as "a struggle to defend
democracy against aggression." In the early years, it was taken for
granted that

we would surely win, not only because we were more powerful but
because the right was clearly on our side. Television held this view

206

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Strongly, perhaps more strongly than the public itself. It didn't
work out that way, and eventually television brought the bad
news. But it never explained why: it never reexamined the as-
sumptions about the nature of the war it had helped to propagate
in the early years. So to the public, the bad news must have
seemed nearly as incomprehensible as an earlier "American de-
feat" in Asia: the "loss" of China.

Attribution of the American failure by the public to "treason" or "lack
of American will" caused by the failure ofthe media to support our just
cause with sufficient fervor is, therefore, "hardly surprising. "93

This may well explain why the public has apparently been willing to
accept the tales about media treachery. But among the educated elites,
the explanation may lie elsewhere: in a totalitarian cast of mind that
regards even the actual level of media subservience to the state as
inadequate and a threat to order and privilege by the "forces of anarchy
on the march."

5.5. SOME CRUCIAL EVENTS OF
THE WAR

5.5.1. The Tonkin Gulf incident

By mid-1964, there was a growing consensus among Vietnamese in
favor of a negotiated political settlement, while the United States was
maneuvering with increasing desperation to evade what internal docu-
ments describe as "premature negotiations." The reason, as frankly
explained, was that the United States was politically isolated, in opposi-
tion to the NLF, the non-Communist opposition, and even the gener-
als. It was therefore regarded as necessary to expand the war to the
North to "obtain [the DRV'sJ cooperation in bringing an end to the
Viet Cong insurgency" and to "persuade or force the DRV to stop its
aid to the Viet Cong and use its directive powers to make the Viet Cong
desist" (Ambassador Maxwell Taylor). Intelligence, meanwhile, con-
cluded that "the basic elements of Communist strength in South Viet-
nam remain indigenous."'*

U.S. -run military operations against North Vietnam began on Feb-

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 10?

ruary I, 1964 (OPLAN-34A), using South Vietnamese and "third-coun-
try" mercenaries, "presumably mostly Nationalist Chinese," according
to Kahin. These operations were officially "designed to result in sub-
stantial destruction, economic loss, and harassment. "95 On July 30-31,
Saigon Navy vessels attacked North Vietnamese islands, eliciting an
official DRV protest to the International Control Commission on July
31. The U.S. destroyer Maddox^ conducting an electronic espionage
operation in that general area, entered the twelve-mile zone regarded
by North Vietnam as its territorial waters on August 2. The Maddox
was challenged by North Vietnamese patrol boats, fired "warning
shots," and was hit by a single bullet in the ensuing battle, in which the
patrol boats were damaged or destroyed by the destroyer and U.S.
aircraft. On August 3, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a (secret) cable
to Ambassador Taylor, stating that "We believe that present Op Plan
34 A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi, and Maddox incident is
directly related to their efforts to resist these activities." The Maddox
was returned to the area along with the destroyer Turner Joy on August
3, and on August 3 and 4 Saigon naval vessels bombarded North Viet-
namese coastal facilities, "quite possibly one that the destroyer's elec-
tronic surveillance had activated and located," Kahin observes. There
was some indication that the U.S. destroyers might have come under
attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats on August 4, although Captain
John Herrick of the Maddox was unsure, and radioed that reports
"appear very doubtful" and that there were "No actual sightings by
Maddox," recommending "complete evaluation before any further ac-
tion." Subsequent evidence indicates that almost certainly no attack
took place. 96

On August 5, President Johnson publicly denounced the "open ag-
gression on the high seas against the United States of America" by the
North Vietnamese, while the DRV and China stated that "the so-called
second Tonkin Gulf incident of 4 August never occurred" (Chinese
government statement). On August 5, U.S. planes bombed North Viet-
namese instalJations and destroyed North Vietnamese patrol boats.
After testimony by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in which he
falsely claimed that the Maddox "was operating in international waters,
was carrying out a routine patrol of the type we carry out all over the
world at all times," Congress passed a resolution authorizing the presi-
dent to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against
the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression" (416
to a in the House, Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening alone in opposi-
tion in the Senate). This August 7 resolution was subsequently ex-

208 MAKUF&CTUKINQ CONSENT

ploited as the basis for the escalation of the U.S. attack against Viet-
nam.5''

"The Gulf of Tonkin incident," Hallin observes, "was a classic of
Cold War news management .... On virtually every important point,

the reporting of the two Gulf of Tonkin incidents was either

misleading or simply false"-and in accordance with the needs of the
U.S. executive at that crucial moment. The Nets York Times had re-
ported sabotage missions against the North as recently as July 23, and
reported Hanoi's August 2 protest of an attack on North Vietnamese
villages by Laotian Air Force planes, but neither the Times nor the
Washington Post mentioned these facts "either at the time of the inci-
dents or in the weeks that followed, aside from inconspicuous sidebars
on Hanoi's 'allegations' [which were accurate, but dismissed] and a
passing reference" in a column by James Reston. The reporting was
"objective" in that it correctly reported U.S. government statements,
raising no question about them, presenting no relevant background, and
marginally citing Communist denials while proceeding to report the
events as Washington wished them to be perceived.^^

In subsequent weeks, the Times published a number of brief refer-
ences to what was "charged" or "asserted" in the generally accurate
reports from North Vietnam, which were rejected and dismissed by
reporters while front-page stories and headlines presented the false
Washington version as fact, with much speculation about Hanoi's mo-
tives in sending a few patrol boats to attack the mighty U.S. Seventh
Fleet. The relevant background continued to be ignored or buried with
marginal references in back pages. The criticism by Senator Morse was
barely mentioned, and dismissed. There was no hint of administration
doubts that the August 4 incident had even taken place.

The newsweeklies adhered still more rigidly to the government prop-
aganda line, even providing vivid and dramatic accounts of the August
4 incident, which apparently never took place. The accurate criticism
by Senators Gruening and Morse received a few Mnes, dismissed as
"predictable" responses by the "irascible" Morse. There was no inter-
est in their charge that the Tonkin Gulf resolution had been predated,
also dismissed by the Times without inquiry. North Vietnamese and
Chinese reactions were dismissed as "bluster" by Communists who
"boiled with hatred and hostility toward the U.S." (Newsweek) and
"propaganda blasts" f?7.5. A^evr.? & World Report). None of the weeklies
considered the possibility that U.S. actions might have provoked the
August 2 incident, or that there were doubts in Washington about the
August 4 attack, although some of the relevant facts had been briefly

THE INDOCHINA WARS (l): VIETNAM 209

noted (e.g., Tim^ July 31, noting missions inside North Vietnam by
paractiuted sabotage teams). The U.S. government version was simply
adopted as unquestioned truth, with no further discussion or inquiry
necessary .100

There were ample grounds at the time for suspicion about the U.S.
government version. The foreign press was able to see that serious
questions arose. Le Monde presented public statements on all sides
and an analysis of what the public record indicated. "Neither the
Times nor the Post made any such analysis of the record," simply
taking the false Washington version to be correct and dismissing the
accurate Communist "allegations" with a bare mention. In London,
the New Statesman covered the U.S. and Chinese versions, including
the (accurate) Chinese account of the U.S. -Saigon actions that
preceded the incidents and the charge that the first was provoked by
Washington while the second never occurred, and concluding that
"the incidents in Vietnam do not seem quite as simple as the initial
headlines indicated" (a substantial understatement). In the United
States, the left-wing National Guardian, with five major articles, and
I.F. Slone's Weekly provided the most extensive, careful, and accurate
account of the events. In contrast to the fevered rhetoric of the main-
stream newsweeklies, the National Guardian simply described the
facts that were available, asking whether the August 2 "skirmish" had
been provoked and whether the "alleged" August 4 incident had
taken place. The relevant background and Communist versions were
accurately presented, with appropriate questions raised. Wayne
Morse's commentary was given ample coverage, as were South Viet-
namese General Ky's statements on sabotage missions in North Viet-
nam. I.F. Stone's Weekly also reported the facts accurately, adding
relevant background ignored by the major media.

In summary, the national media, overcome by jingoist passion, failed
to provide even minimally adequate coverage of this crucial event,
although appropriate skepticism would have been aroused in the mind
of the reader of the foreign or "alternative" media, or the reader with
the sophistication to treat the media as a disinfonnation system disguis-
ing a reality that can perhaps be ascertained with sufficient energy and
dedication. The Pentagon Papers analyst describes these events as "an
important firebrea.k," noting that "the Tonkin Gulf Resolution set U.S.
public support for virtually any action." 103

The willingness of the media to serve as a vehicle for government
propaganda helped impel the country toward what they were later to
regard as "the tragedy" of Vietnam. The reaction of Congress and the

210 MANUPACTUKING CONSENT

public laid the basis for the outright invasion of eariy 1965J providing
suppon for the planners who were secretly concerned that the NLF was
continuing "to seek a political settlement favorable to the communists"
through the device of "neutralism" and "a coalition government"
(Maxwell Taylor, Aug. ro, 1964), and who warned about "Saigon and
Vientiane hanky panky with Reds" (John McNaughton, October
1964)-that is, moves toward a political settlement-in accordance with
the NLF program as described by intelligence: "to seek victory through
a 'neutralist coalition' rather than by force of arms. "104 When the
United States extended the war in early 1965 to try to salvage its
position in the South, the media continued to offer total support, in
accordance with "the guiding principle of American foreign policy
since 1945" as outlined by the distinguished liberal commentator of the
New York Times James Reston,

that no state shall use military force or the threat of military force
to achieve its political objectives. And the companion of this
principle has been that the United States would use its influence
and its power, when necessary and where it could be effective,
against any state that defied this principle,

which was "at stake in Vietnam," where "the United States is now
challenging the Communist effort to seek power by the more cunning
technique of military subversion. "lo5

In the Orwellian world of American journalism, the attempt to seek
a political settlement by peaceful means is the use of "military force,"
and the use of military force by the United States to block a political
settlement is a noble action in defense of the "guiding principle" that
the use of military force is illegitimate.

The United States then proceeded to fight a long and brutal war to
try to achieve its objectives in Vietnam, demolishing much of Indo-
china in the process and leaving a legacy that may never be overcome.
Finally, in January 1973, the United States formally accepted a peace
treaty that was virtually identical with the Vietnamese consensus it
overturned by violence in 1964, except that by that time, the indige-
nous NLF had been effectively demolished and little remained in In-
dochina outside of North Vietnam, laying the basis for North
Vietnamese domination of Indochina, exactly as had been predicted,
long before, by "the wild men in the wings." The media bear a major
responsibiJity for these tragic events, coverage of the Tonkin Gulf
incident with its congressional "blank check" for further aggression
serving as a notable example. ^

THE INDOCHINA WARS (i): VIETNAM JII

5.5.2. The Tet offensive

Media coverage of the Tet offensive has been the centerpiece of the
critique of the media for "losing the war" by their incompetent report-
ing and their anti-government bias reflecting their passion for confront-
ing authority. The authoritative "proof of this contention was
provided in the two-volume Freedom House study by Peter Braestrup.
Conducted over a six-year period with a wide range of distinguished
participants and consultants, and support acknowledged from some two
dozen corporations and labor unions, this study was hailed as a "monu-
mental" work by Don Oberdorfer in a Washington Post magazine cover
story on the tenth anniversary of the offensive, with the title: "Tet: The
Turning Point: How a 'Big Event' on Television Can Change Our
Minds." Professor John P. Roche, of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy of Tufts University, "intellectual-in-residence" for the
Johnson administration, described the Freedom House study as "one
of the major pieces of investigative reporting and first-rate scholarship
of the past quarter century," a "meticulous case-study of media incom-
petence, if not malevolence." In a relatively critical discussion in the
Times' s Sunday book review, Edwin Diamond praises this "painstak-
ingly thorough study of how the Vietnam war was presented to the
American public by its leading image makers," a "highfalutin' epis-
temological quest" by a "conscientious ... reporter-analyst" that raises
profound questions about "how do we know what we know," revealing
"the biases introduced by standard journalistic assumptions and organi-
zational practices" that contributed to undermining the U.S. position
in Vietnam among the general public and Congress. Similarly, Charles
Mohr reports that in a conference of "aging hawks and doves" on the
tenth anniversary of the Tet offensive at the University of North Caro-
lina, "Journalism came in for some strong criticism and only a rather
muted defense." The criticism was by Braestrup, who "expounded
gently the theme of his recent book," Big Siory, and the hawks in
attendance, "while some of the reporters there demurred only softly."
The study is regularly cited by historians, without qualification, as the
standard work on media reporting of the Tet offensive, "in some re-
spects as important as the battle itself," here "analysed in depth"
(R. B. Smith). 106

Oberdorfer too accepts the conclusions of the study as proven: it was
the" 'Big Event' on television" that changed our minds about the war.
The only commentary he cites, even obliquely, accepts this judgment
(Roche and others unnamed). Within the mainstream more generally,
it is assumed with little question that this remarkable scholarly contri-

2J2 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

bution made its case, though one may debate whether it revealed "ma-
levolence" or deeper problems of "standard journalistic assumptions
and organizational practices," reflecting perhaps the "adversarial
stance" of the media with regard to established power.

Braestrup claims to have shown that the reporting of the Tet offen-
sive is "in extreme case" of the "unsatisfactory" performance of the
media: "Rarely has contemporary crisis-journalism turned out, in retro-
spect, to have veered so widely from reality" by presenting "a portrait
of defeat for the allies"-"allies" being the term regularly used to refer
to the U.S. invaders, the local forces they organized, and the largely
mercenary forces they introduced to support U.S. military operations
in Indochina, and a term chosen to exploit the favorable connotations
provided by World War II, when "the allies" fought "the Axis." "To
have portrayed such a setback for one side [them] as a defeat for the
other {us] -in a major crisis abroad — cannot be counted as a triumph
for American journalism," which "shouted that the patient was dying,
then weeks later began to whisper that he somehow seemed to be
recovering- whispers apparently not heard amid the clamorous domes-
tic reaction to the initial shouts," with television the worst offender.
The whispers began "about late February," he asserts. These journalis-
tic failures, Braestrup concludes, reflect "the more volatile journalistic
style-spurred by managerial exhortation or complaisance-that has
become so popular since the late 196050," accompanied with "an often
mindless readiness to seek out conRict, to believe the worst of the
government or of authority in general, and on that basis to divide up
the actors on any issue into the 'good' and the 'bad.' "The "bad actors"
include the U.S. forces in Vietnam, the "military-industrial complex,"
and the CIA, among others, while "the good'^ in the eyes of the media
are presumably the Communists, who, Braestrup argues sardonically
throughout, were consistently overpraised and protected. The prospect,
he foresees, "is for a continuation of the current volatile styles, always
with the dark possibility that, if the managers do not themselves take
action, then outsiders-the courts, the Federal Communications Com-
mission, or Congress-will seek to apply remedies of their own," a
proposal taken up in Roche's call fOT a congressional inquiry and the
subsequent warnings of the Trilateral Commission, cited earlier (Big
Story, I, 705ft".)

The Braestrup-Freedom House thesis has two essential components:
(I) coverage of the Tet offensive illustrates media incompetence and
their "adversarial stance"j (2) by their portrayal of an American victory
as a defeat, the media bear responsibility for the loss of American
resolve and the subsequent American defeat in Vietnam. It is the sec-

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 213

ond component of the thesis that carries the dramatic impact, and that
has permitted it to set much of the agenda for subsequent discussion
of the fourth estate and the dangers that its new-found power and
"sixties' style" of "mindless" hatred of authority pose for the very
survival of free institutions and democracy.

The first component of the thesis is commonly accepted even by
those who deny the second. Thus, rejecting "the stab-in-the-back the-
sis," George Herring nevertheless observes: "That the media was hos-
tile to the war and to Johnson seems clear, and much of the reporting
of Tet was misleading"; these "distortions of the media" may have
contributed to "growing popular discontent" with the war and "public
anxiety," Herring adds, but these were not the operative factors in
Johnson's decision to de-escalate and seek negotiations after Tet.'O?

An analysis of the facts and the argument demonstrates that neither
component of the Freedom House thesis is tenable. The second, as we
shall see, is conceded in the Freedom House study to be false with
regard to public opinion, and the straw at which they then grasp wiU
plainly not bear the weight. As for the &st component, on the narrow
question of professional competence in reporting the facts available
under trying and confused circumstances, the performance of the
media was acceptable if not outstanding, and compares quite favorably
to the internal reporting of the American military authorities and U.S.
intelligence, insofar as these are available. But when we turn to broader
questions of the sort discussed earlier-that is, if we evaluate the media
by the standards that we would properly apply to reporting, say, on the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan-we see that indeed they can be faulted
in precisely the terms anticipated by the propaganda model. The very
example selected as providing the strongest grounds for their accusa-
tions by Freedom House and other critics from the jingoist right wing
of the political spectrum actually happens to demonstrate the precise
opposite of what is alleged-namely, it provides yet another striking
illustration of the subservience of the media to the state propaganda
system, los

The Freedom House study itself provides ample documentation to
establish these conclusions, and to refute its own specific allegations
point by point. Given the major role that this study and the thesis it
allegedly established has played in recent ideology, we will give some
attention to the chasm that lies between its interpretation and summar-
ies, on the one hand, and the documentary record that it (in part)
presents, on the other. The comments and summaries often seriously
misrepresent the contents of the documents described or are outright
falsifications. The analysis, laced with bitter sarcasm throughout, is

214 MANU;/^CTUKlS<i COKS&NT

thoroughly undermined when compared with the actual documents.
When the countless errors and careless and inaccurate comments art
corrected, nothing remains of the Freedom House case. The sardonic
reference to "straw man journalism," "CBS exclusives" and the like,
referring to alleged misdeeds of the media, is misplaced; case by case,
we find, instead, "Freedom House exclusives."

Before proceeding to details, we should take careful note of the
background assumptions that guide this inquiry. As we noted, for Bra-
estnsp and Freedom House, the "allies" are the United States, the
South Vietnamese client government, and the various South Korean,
Thai, Australian, Chinese Nationalist, and other forces (largely merce-
nary) mobilized by the United States. The "South Vietnamese" include
our client government and the armed forces organized, supplied,
trained, and directed by the United States, but exclude the indigenous
NLF and its supporters, although the U.S. government never had the
slightest doubt, and its specialists do not hesitate to concede, that the
client regime had Hftle support while its opponents in South Vietnam
constituted so powerful a political force that any peaceful settlement
was unthinkable. That the United States has a right to conduct military
operations in South Vietnam to uproot the NLF and destroy the peas-
ant society in which it was based, that its goals are democracy and
self-determination, and that its forces "protect" and "bring security"
to South Vietnamese peasants are principles taken for granted in the
Braestnip-Freedom House version, where no patriotic assumption or
cliche is ever challenged--or even noticed, so deeply rooted are these
doctrines. Correspondingly, the fact that the media coverage surveyed
is framed entirely within these patriotic premises passes unnoticed. The
Freedom House inquiry cannot perceive fundamental bias favorable to
the state because all of the premises of state doctrine are taken as given.
There is "mindlessness" herCj as Braestrup observes, although it is not
quite what he perceives; rather, we find that Braestrup "mindlessly"
adopts what we referred to in chapter 3 as a patriotic agenda, even more
so than the media he condemns. And as we described in chapter i, the
function of such "flak machines" as Freedom House is to ensure that
the press stays within the bounds of this patriotic agenda.

The Tet offensive of January 1968 began on January 21 with a siege
by North Vietnamese (NVA) regulars of a U.S. military base at Khe
Sanh. near the 17th parallel. It was soon apparent that the purpose was
to draw U.S. forces away from populated centers, and the siege suc-
ceeded in this aim, as General Westmoreland rushed combat forces to
the northern areas. On January 31, all major cities and thirty-six of
forty-four provincial capitals, along with numerous other towns, came

THE INDOCHINA WAUS (I): VIETNAM JI5

under simultaneous attack by southern NLF resistance forces ("Viet
Cong"), along with some NVA elements. The effects are succinctly
summarized by Wallace Thies in his scholarly study ofthe U.S. strategy
of "coercing Hanoi":

" . although U.S. military commanders would later claim that the
offensive had been anticipated and that the heavy casualties suf-
fered by the attackers had resulted in a great victory for the Allies,
the offensive was in fact a military setback for the American side.
To meet the threat in the northern provinces and forestall a Dien
Bien Phu-type defeat at Khe Sanh, half of aU U.S. maneuver
battalions in South Vietnam were deployed in I Corps (in the
north]; the rest, along with the bulk of the combat-ready ARVN
[GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam] units, were tied down
defending the cities against the possibility of a second wave of
attacks. As a result, the countryside went by default to the NLF,
the pacification program was left in a shambles, and whatever
losses the DRV / VC (North Vietnamese / Viet Cong] forces did
suffer in the initial assaults were largely offset by the unimpeded
recruiting that they conducted in the rural areas in the weeks that
followed.

International Voluntary Services (IVS), which had a close familiarity

with the situation in rural areas, withdrew most of its field workers in
early 1968 because of "security conditions." A volunteer reported in
February: "The number of locations at which we can safely place a
volunteer have significantly decreased in recent months"; another
added that "we all knew that security in the countryside was getting
worse and worse," contrary to the optimistic evaluations of the U.S.
high command and Washington, which were relayed with little skepti-
cism by the media in the pre-Tet period. A South Vietnamese senator
estimated that after Tet, the government controlled "only one third of
the country/' the remaining two-thirds being in the hands ofthe NLF,
an estimate consistent with U.S. intelligence reports. 1 1 1

The Tet offensive left Washington in a state of "troubled confusion
and uncertainty," Undersecretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes
observed, and "performed the curious service of fully revealing the
doubters and dissenters to each other, in a lightning flash," within the
Pentagon. While General Westmoreland persisted with the optimistic
assessments that had been undermined by this dramatic demonstration
that the NLF remained firmly rooted in the South despite the devastat-
ing American attack on the rural society, the reaction in official Wash-

216 MAKUFACTDRING CONSENT

ington circles was quite different. Summarizing the impact in Washing-
ton, George Herring observes that in private,

Johnson and his advisers were shocked by the suddenness and

magnitude of the offensive and intelligence estimates were

much more pessimistic than Westmoreland An "air of gloom"

hung over White House discussions, [General Maxwell] Taylor
later observed, and [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Gen-
eral [Earle] Wheeler likened the mood to that following the first
Battle of Bull Run.n^

General Wheeler reported that "to a large extent the VC now control
the countryside," the situaiion being particularly bad in the Mekong
Delta, and the Pentagon systems-analysis group concluded that "our
control of the countryside and the defense of the urban areas is now
essentially at pre- August 3965 levels," when the U.S. war was being lost,
according to General Westmoreland. A U.S. government military-his-
torical summary of the offensive in the Mekong DeUa, completed in
April 1968, concluded that "The Tet offensive in IV Corps had a
devastating effect on the Revolutionary Development [pacification]
Program." As we shall see, these internal assessments are considerably
more "pessimistic" than those of the media that are denounced for the
crime of excessive pessimism by Freedom House standards.

We might incidentally note that in IV Corps (including the Mekong
Delta), there were "no regular North Vietnam units" according to
Defense Secretary McNamara; the Freedom House study states that
"In the southernmost Delta, it was an ARVN-Vietcong [actually, U.S.-
Vietcong] guerrilla struggle," and more generally, Hanoi "had yet to
commit sizable (multi-division) forces in sustained, concerted attacks"
anywhere in South Vietnam (I, 24).113 These assessments are what
motivated the mass-slaughter campaign carried out in the rural areas
of the delta and elsewhere in the post-Tet accelerated pacification
campaign, discussed earlier.

Even before the Tet offensive. Defense Secretary McNamara had
privately concluded that military victory was an unreasonable objective
and that the course of the war should be changed. Clark Clifford, who
was brought in to replace him after Tet, had long shared such doubts,
and they were reinforced by the evidence available to him and by the
conclusions of th< "Wise Meii" whom Johnson called in to assess the
situation. h4 Dean Acheson, who headed this group of longtime hawks
drawn from business and political elites, agreed with Clifford's pessi-
mism and "advised Johnson to scale down ground operations, reduce

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 217

the bombing, and seek every means of terminating hostilities without
abandoning South Vietnam." The "Wise Men," "after full briefings
from diplomatic and military officials, confirmed Acheson's findings
. . . the consensus, as summed up by one of the participants) was that
'rhere are no military concJusjons in this war—or any military end in
the future,' " so that "Johnson should therefore de-escalate the con-
flict." 115

Notice that at this point some rather serious problems arise concern-
ing the second component of the Freedom House thesis: that the mis-
deeds of the media caused the public to oppose the war, undermining
government resolve and leading to U.S. failure in its (by definition,
benevolent) aims. To establish the "stab-in-the-back" component of
the Freedom House thesis, it is necessary to show that public opinion
was swayed toward opposition to the war by media coverage, and that
the media and public opinion were a significant factor in the shift of
government policy. Neither claim can be sustained.

With regard to the course of public opinion, the Freedom House
study decisively refutes its own thesis. It includes a chapter on public
opinion polls by Bums Roper, which demonstrates, as Braestrup con-
cedes, that "there is no available evidence of a direct relationship
between the dominant media themes in early 1968 and changes in
American mass public opinion vi8-4-vis the Vietnam war itself)" but
rather a continuing "slow drift toward the dove side" after an initial
wave of support for the president and "frustration and anger at the foe"
during the Tet offensive. A closer examination of their own data under-
mines the Freedom House thesis even more thoroughly. The early
response to the Tet offensive, during the period when media incompe-
tence and unwarranted pessimism were allegedly at their height, was
"an increase in the belligerency of the American public"; "the immedi-
ate reaction of the U.S. public was to favor stiffened resistance [that
is, U.S. resistance to an attack by South Vietnamese in South Vietnam]
and intensified U.S. effort." The major sentiment aroused was "Bomb
the hell out of them." In later February and March) when the media,
in the Freedom House version, were beginning to "whisper" the true
story of American victory) "there developed a decided negative reaction
to the President's handling of the war and the war itself) and a distinct
opposition to more aggressive U.S. military action." In early February
1968, when the impact of the alleged media "distortions" and "pessi-
mism" reached its peak, public opinion shifted toward the "hawks."
Public opinion returned to the pre-Tet figures by late February, when
the media were allegedly correcting their earlier errors. By April, after
the offensive had ended and the "errors" had been overcome (albeit in

2l8 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

a "whisper"), there was a sharp shift toward the "doves." By April-
May-June, measurements had returned to pre-Tet levels. "When
looked at on this broader time scale, the Tet offensive appears merely
to have caused a minor ripple in a steadily changing attitude toward our
involvement in the war," a shift toward the position of the doves after
an initial shift toward the hawks during the period of media "pessi-
mism." Tet was just "one more incident" that "reminded the public
that the war was not going well-that the confident predictions out of
Washington had to be taken with a grain of salt-and that helped move
public opinion in the antiwar direction in which it had been moving for
nearly three years

Faced with this thorough refutation of one essential component of
their thesis, without which the thesis loses aU significance even if the
residue were tenable, the Freedom House analysts retreat to the posi-
tion that although the public was imaffected by the perverse behavior
of the media, there was an effect "on the nation's 'leadership segment'"
(Burns)-a safer claim, since, as they concede, no data are available.
The director of the Freedom House study, Leonard Sussman, con-
cludes that "the Tet offensive, as portrayed in the media, appeared to
have had a far greater effect on political Washington and the Adminis-
tration itself than on the U.S. population's sentiment on the war" (1,
xxxiv). The media failures, in short, left the public unaffected or even
more supportive of the war while they misled the government- along
with presidential adviser Clark Chfford, the "Wise Men" from the
corporate, political, and military elites including fotmer top-level mili-
tary commanders, and such media addicts as Dean Acheson, Henry
Cabot Lodge, McGeorge Bundy, Douglas Dillon, Robert Murphy, etc.
We are asked to believe that their decision to move toward disengage-
ment in a situation that they perceived as one of stalemate was based
not on military briefings, intelligence reports, and all the information
available at the highest level to official Washington, but on watching the
evening news with Walter Cionkite."'

In short, we can dismiss out of hand the second component of the
Freedom House thesis, the component that had dramatic impact and
continuing influence within the post- Vietnam "right turn" among elites
and that has set the agenda for subsequent discussion about the "advet-
sarial stance" of the media and its grim consequences. We are left with
the conclusion that the media were either irrelevant, or that they con-
tinued to operate within the general confines of the approved ideologi-
cal &ysum> thus refuting the first componcm of the thesis as well. All
that remains of the Freedom House story is the possibility that the
media were incompetent (even malevolent), but ineffectual. Notice that

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 219

the Freedom House thesis here faces the same "logical problem" noted
earlier with regard to the charges concerning television: if television i$
as influential as claimed) then the evidence shows that through 1967 it
"encouraged a decisive majority of viewers to support the war."

To evaluate the remaining shreds of the Freedom House thesis) let
us continue with the record of the Tet offensive, now asking whether
the media did in fact distort it in their zealous-although utterly inef-
fectual — efforts to undermine authority.

With lavish use of firepower, U.S. forces succeeded in regaining
control of the towns and cities. The city of Hue, which had been
conquered from its own population by GVN troops with American
assistance several months earlier in a desperate U.S. effort to prevent
the growth of popular movements calling for democracy and a nego-
tiated pohtical settlement, lis was 80 percent destroyed by bombing and
shelling, which left 2,000 civilians buried in the "smashed ruins," ac-
cording to U.S. Air Force Undersecretary Townsend Hoopes; the ma-
rines listed "Communist losses" at over 5,000, while Hoopes states that
a "sizable part" of the Communist force of 1)000 men who captured the
city escaped) allowing a determination of who constituted the "Com-
munist losses." U.S. AID in May estimated that some 4,000 civilians
were left dead in the ruins of the city, most of them victims of U.S.
firepower.

In the Mekong Delta, "Artillery and air strikes leveled half of My

Tho) a city of 80,000, and the provincial capital of Ben Tre {Kien Hoa
Province, later devastated in the post-Tet terror campaign; see p. 204],
with 140,000 inhabitants, was decimated with the justification, as an
American colonel put it in one of the most wideJy quoted statements
of the war, 'We had to destroy the town to save it.' "120 The U.S.
command conceded that "the enemy" were overwhelmingly NLF, not
North Vietnamese; killed and captured outnumbered captured weap-
ons by a factor of five, an indication of who "the enemy" really were.
Secretary of Defense MeNamara estimated NVA forces at 50,000 to
55,000 at the end 0£1967, mostly in northern regions, with some 10,000
troops placed in Viet Cong combat units; the total roughly matches
third-country forces, mostly Korean mercenaries, mobilized by the
United States as part of its invasion of South Vietnam, and barely 10
percent of the U.S. forces of over half a million men, even excluding
the massive forces engaged in the attack against Vietnam and Laos from
the sea and from U.S. sanctuaries from Thailand to the Philippines and
Guam, employing means of destruction that dwarfed all else in Indo-
china.

As noted earlier, the Tet offensive not only reduced Washington to

220 MANUfACTUKING CONSENT

gloomy despair and convinced U.S. elites that there was no realistic
hope of a military victory in Vietnam at a cost acceptable to the United
States, but also changed the character of media reporting and commen-
tary, which mirrored the changes in elite opinion. On the ground,
American correspondents were able to witness the war at first hand,
gaining a view rather different from the sanitized and edited version
presented under the control of the American military command. Media
commentary at home reflected elite opinion in recognizing that the
optimistic forecasts that had been relayed from Washington with little
skepticism were inaccurate, and that a long and bitter war lay ahead.

But on-the-scene reporting and domestic commentary never veered
from the framework of the state propaganda system. In reporting the
fighting in Ben Tre and My Tho in the Delta, for example, the press
observed that American infantry participated while the towns were
blasted by American bombers, helicopter gunships, navy patrol boats,
and artillery to root out the Viet Cong-that is, the South Vietnamese
guerrillas who "were probably living with the people," according to an
American officer quoted by Bernard Weinraub. Nonetheless, the news
reports speak of the perceived need to "blast the city" with jets and
helicopter gunships, particularly the poorer and most crowded sections,
«to save other sections of the city and the lives of thousands of peo-
ple ..." (Lee Lescaze)-people whose lives were threatened not by the
southern NLF guerrillas living among them but by the U.S. forces
"defending" them from the NLF. Because of Tet, Weinraub explains,
"the protection of Ben Tre waS limited," and it was necessary to bring
in troops from the U.S. Ninth Infantry Division by helicopter, and to
carry out "bombing raids and fire by helicopter gunships and artillerj'^'
to "protect" Ben Tre, which "has long been a stronghold of the Viet-
cong" and is "sometimes considered a Vietcong rest and recreation
area," while surrounding hamlets "thought to be controlled by the
Vietcong have been razed by alhed bombing and artillery attacks and
fire from armed helicopters." In Ben Tre itself, "the market place is
rubble and near the gutted homes nearby women in shawls sit in the
noon heat and mourn with loud groans," while "My Tho still smells of
death," with halfthe homes destroyed-thanks to the effective "protec-
tion" the population received from their American defenders.'*'

Throughout, it is taken for granted that the forces armed, trained,
and supplied by the only foreign element in the delta are "the South
Vietnamese," not the South Vietnamese guerrillas living among the
population in their "Vietcong strongholds," from whom the United
States is "protecting" the population by ferocious bombardment of
civihan areas.

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I); VIETNAM 221

Recall that we are now evaluating the remaining component of the
Freedom House thesis: that the media were suppressing the American
victory in their antiestablishment zeal. In fact, they were reporting the
story accurately in a narrow sense, but completely within the frame-
work of the government propaganda system-never questioned, in a
shameful display of media servility. We may imagine what the reaction
would be to a comparable performance on the part of the Nazi or Soviet
press. Braestrup's final comment that "a free society deserves better"
of its media (1, 728) is aCCurate enough, although not quite in the sense
intended in the Freedom House study.

As throughout the war, the standpoint of the media continued to
reflect the perceptions and attitudes of the American military; for ex-
ample, an American official who observed: "What the Vietcong did was
occupy the hamlets we pacified just for the purpose of having the allies
move in and bomb them. By their presence, the hamlets were de-
stroyed." 123 The same Ncio York Times report from Binh Dinh Prov-
ince-the "showcase" province for pacification-indicates this had
been going on, unreported, well before the Tet offensive: "The enemy
moves in December- which several military men called a 'softening up'
for the offensive-resulted in a wave of allied air strikes on villages.
Hundreds of homes were destroyed."

The U.S. military "resistance"-to borrow the Freedom House ter-
minology-took the same form elsewhere. Robert Shaplen reported
from the scene that in Saigon,

A dozen separate areas, comprising perhaps sixty or seventy
blocks, had been totally burned out. These were almost all resi-
dential areas Most of the damage was the result of rocket

attacks by American armed helicopters or other planes, though

some of it had been caused by artillery or ground fighting A

modern ten-million-dollar textile plant, containing forty thousand
spindles, was entirely destroyed by bombs because it was sus-
pected of being a Vietcong hideout.

Le Monde correspondent Jean-Claude Pomonti observed that

in the popular suburbs, the Front [NLF] has proven that the only
way to eliminate its control is through systematic destruction. To
dislodge it, the air force had to level many residential areas. Flee-
ing the bombardments, tens of thousands of refugees have poured
into the center of the city.^*'

222

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Charles Mohr, whom Freedom House singles out for "perhaps the
consistently best reporting from Vietnam," reported that "in towns
such as Hue, Vinhlong, Bentre and Mytho appalling destruction was
wrought when encircled alMed forces took the decision to destroy the
attacking Vietcong forces by destroying the places they had occupied."
He quotes an American official in Saigon as stating: "The Government
won the recent battles, but it is important to consider how they won.
At first the Vietcong had won and held everything in some towns except
the American military compound and a South Vietnamese position." 126
By "the Government," he means the reader to understand the GVN,
who "won" thanks to U.S. firepower and troops.

As in this example, the U.S. govexnmeM claim that \ht Tet offensive
was a military defeat for the Communists was widely reported, although
the U.S. government official's perception of an initial Viet Cong victory
goes well beyond the typical media accounts in the crime of "pessi-
mism." "Journalists generally accepted the official claim that Tet was
a military defeat for the North Vietnamese and NLF," Daniel Hallin
concludes in his review of the press and television; for example, Walter
Cronkite, who said at once over CBS — on February 14-that "first) and
simplest, the Vietcong suffered a military defeat." 127 Clear and forth-
right.

These facts do not comport well with what remains of the Freedom
House thesis: the charge that until late February, the media portrayed
the enemy's defeat as "a defeat for the allies" in "clamourous shouts,"
only conceding from late February in a "whisper" that this was not
quite accmate, television being the worst offender, with Walter Cron-
kite the arch-criminal. It was this gross incompetence or malevolence
that illustrates most dramatically the "mindless readiness ... to believe
the worst of the government or of authority in general." In the real
world, the facts were quite the opposite, and the last remnants of
the Freedom House thesis thus disappear, apart from the charge,
to be evaluated in the appendix, that the reporting was technically in-
competent.

Some would contend that the issue of "how they won," which con-
cerned the American official cited earlier, is as important as "who
won" in evaluating the significance of the Tet offensive. This idea
never penetrated the minds of Braestrup or his Freedom House as-
sociates, however, at the time or in their study. Consider political
scientist Milton Sacks, a specialist on Vietnam and a GVN adviser,
thanked for "providing historical perspective" for the Freedom
House Study (I, sudii). In February 1968, he wrote, with no further
comment: V

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 223

In conventional terms, it now seems clear that the Communists
have suffered a military defeat in their Tet offensive. They have
expended the hves of thousands of their soldiers without securing
a single province or district town of significance.

U.S. officials, in contrast, were impressed with the fact that the NLF
and NVA occupied vast areas previously thought to be "controlled,"
wreaked havoc with the pacification program, and were dislodged only
by a further and still more violent U.S. attack on the civil society of
South Vietnam. It was feared that it might not be an easy task to
convince the populace that the Communists were to blame for the
slaughter and destruction by U.S. forces. The problem, as reponed
from Hue by Marc Riboud of Le Monde in April, was that the popula-
tion appeared to compare ARVN behavior unfavorably with that of the
NVA or NLF, while the deepest bitterness and resentment was directed
against the Americans, whose "blind and systematic bombardment"
had turned Hue into "an assassinated city"; this reaction may have also
been in part a residue of the deep bitterness and resentment left by the
U.S. -backed ARVN conquest of Hue a few months earlier.'^*" An IVS
worker quoted in Newsweek said: "As difficult as this may be to believe,
not a single Vietnamese I have met in Saigon or in the Delta blames
the Viet Cong for the events of the past two weeks," and in its last issue
of the Tet period, Newsweek reported from Hu4j with the same surprise
at this inexplicable reaction, that

Curiously, moreover, few of [the population] point an accusing
finger at the North Vietnamese. "When the NVA were here," said
one student, "they were polite and well-disciplined, totally dif-
ferent from the government troops, the Americans, or even the
Vie.tcong."

"The hope is that the Vietnamese people wiU blame the communists
rarher than the Americans for whatever damage is being done," Don
Webster reported from Hue on February 12 in the midst of the recon-
quest of the city by the U.S. Marines. Two days earlier, John Lengel
of AP wrote rhat

It is still impossible to gauge the breadth of the damage . But

few seasoned observers see the devastation of Hue backfiring on
the communists. They see as the greatest hope a massive and
instant program of restoration underlined by a careful psychologi-
cal warfare program pinning the blame on the communists. '3i

224

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Braestrup places the word "devastation" in italics as an illustration of
the unfairness and anti-American bias of the media; comment seems
superfluous.

While the U.S. media rarely strayed from the framework of the state
propaganda system, others were unconstrained by these hmits: for ex-
ample, the Le Monde correspondents cited; or British photo-journalist
Philip Jones Griffiths, who concluded from his observations on the
scene that the thousands of civiHan victims of the reconquest of Hu^
"were killed by the most hysterical use of American firepower ever
seen," and then designated "as the victims of a Communist massa-
cre." 132

To comprehend fully the nature of the Freedom House charges, we
may imagine how the inquiry urged by John Roche might proceed. Who
else is implicated in the terrible misdeeds that Freedom House per-
ceives? General Westinorelaini and the U.S. command in Saigon must
surely be placed on the docket because of their estimates of early VC
successes (see appendix 3 for further examples), along with William
Bundy, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, given his
extreme pessimism. He thought that the Tet offensive was "shattering
to the South, especially in the area of pacification," concluding for a
time that "the South Vietnamese were through," "they've had it"-
where "South Vietnamese" excludes the South Vietnamese defending
their country from a U.S. invasion, as usuaL These conclusions, which
do conform to the Freedom House parody of the media, were based not
on the press but on "reports from people in the field out in Vietnam,"
so presumably they too are implicated (Ij 625)- Similarly, Lyndon John-
son was guilty, since he seemed "to some degree 'psychologically de-
feated' by the threat to Khe Sanh and the onslaught on the cities of
Vietnam," so Braestrup concludes (I, 626, 630). The same is true of
Johnson's civilian advisers, given the "air of gloom" among them and
the "Battle of Bull Run" mood, and the author of the official U.S.
government military-historical summary, cited earlier; and Dean Ache-
son and other "Wise Men" who urged a shift of course because of the
same "undue pessimism" for which the media are condemned by Free-
dom House. Also Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who reported that the
offensive had "disrupted the pacification effort for the time being," and
the pacification adviser who reported that in his "showcase" area,
"pacification does not exist" (11, 184-86).

Further candidates for investigation appear in the Pentagon Papers-
for example. General Wheeler, who summarized the situation in the
following terms to the president on February 27, just as Walter Cron-
kite was speculating about "stalemate," arousing Freedom House ire:

THE INDOCHINA WAilS (1): VIETNAM 225

The enemy is operating with relative freedom in the countryside,
probably recruiting heavily and no doubt infiltrating NVA units
and personnel. His recovery is likely to be rapid; his supplies are
adequate; and he is trying to maintain the momentum of his

winter-spring offensive ARVN is now in a defensive posture

around towns and cities and there is concern about how well they
will bear up under sustained pressure. The initial attack nearly
succeeded in a dozen places, and defeat in these places was only
averted by the timely reaction of US forces. In shott, it was a very
near thing. There is no doubt that the RD Program [pacification]

has suffered a severe set back To a large extent the VC now

control the countryside MACV estimates that US forces wiU

be required in a number of places to assist and encourage the
Vietnamese Army to leave the cities and towns and reenter the
country. This is especially true in the Delta.

The media reports that Braestrup derides were rarely as "pessimistic"
as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose summary of the
situation led the president to order "the initiation of a complete and
searching reassessment of the entire U.S. strategy and commitment in
South Vietnam," the Pentagon Papers analyst reports. 03

The CIA must also be investigated for contributing to the decline of
"free institutions" by its pessimism. A CIA paper of March I, presuma-
bly uninfluenced by Walter Cronldfe^ expressed grave doubts about the
GVN and ARVN and predicted that they might cease "effective func-
tioning in parts of the country," so that "virtually the entire burden of
the war would fall on US forces." Like Cronkite a few days earlier, they
expected "no better than a standoff in the coming ten months. Penta-
gon systems analysis concluded that the offensive "appears to have
killed the [pacification} program once and for all," drawing the conclu-
sion that Braestrup falsely attributes to the media (see appendix 3), and
estimated that "our control of the countryside and the defense of the
urban areas is now ar pre-August 1965 levels." Ir was because of rhis
serious situation-not perceived American successes, as Braestrup inti-
mates-thar they recommended what was later to be called "Vietnami-
zacion/'

The civilian analysrs in the Pentagon must be charged not only with
undue pessimism, but also wirh some of the other crimes of the press.
For example, they referred to the famous statement that we are de-
stroying Sourh Vietnam in order to save it; citation of this statement
is the target of much Braestrup scorn. We must also include Colonel
Herbert Schandler, on whom Braestrup relies for his account of the

226 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

Whetiw-WcstfflOTcland request for additional troops. He was, Braest-
rup says, the anonymous author of the Pentagon Papers section on this
material, and here he described as "a startlingly accurate account" a
New York Times article by Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith which,
Braestrup claims, was a major example of "distorted and incomplete"
reporting (1, 581, 613). The authors of the "Epilogue" to the Pentagon
Papers must also be included in the indictment, given their pessimistic
post-Tet assessment of "the price for military victory" and the "illu-
sory" nature of claimed progress_

The category of people who were not threatening "free institutions"
by the standards of Freedom House is small indeed, a fact that some
may find suggestive.

It is significant that the major criticism of the media in the Freedom
House study is that they were too "pessimistic." Strikingly absent is the
obvious standard of comparison: the internal reports from the field and
analysis by intelligence and official Washington-which were, if any-
thing, even more pessimistic. The logic of the Freedom House brief
against the media is highly revealing. In their view, the media in a free
society must not only accept without question the principles ofthe state
doctrinal system, as the media did throughout (a fact that Freedom
House never addresses, and apparently cannot perceive), but must do
so with a degree of enthusiasm and optimism that exceeds that of U.S.
intelligence, the military command. Johnson's "Wise Men," and other
leading figures in the military, political, and corporate world who draw
their information from a full range of government sources. It is an
interesting conception of a "free society."

We might ask how the Freedom House conception of a free press in
a free society would be applied by Soviet commissars, let us say, to the
case of the mass circulation weekly Ogonyok^ which published a series
of long articles that presented a "bleak picture" ofthe war in Afghanis-
tan, depicting it "in stark terms," speaking of "poor morale and deser-
tion" among Afghan units and "tough fighting between elite Soviet
troops and Afghan guerrillas," and implying that "large areas of Afg-
hanistan are under guerrilla control." The articles also give "a broad
hint that drug use is common among Russian troops in Afghanistan,"
and they include extracts from a helicopter pilot's journal describing
"the sight and smell of colleagues' charred bodies" and implying that
"helicopter losses are high" after the receipt of sophisticated Western
weaponry by the guerrillas, terrorists who finance themselves by pro-
ducing drugs for the international market (charges verified by Western
observers, incidentally). But it would be inhumane for the USSR simply
to withdraw without guarantees for the population, because "a Soviet

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 227

withdrawal would lead to nationwide internecine warfare," as Afghans
who are quoted anticipate. The article does not simply mimic standard
U.S. media fare, as these excerpts indicate. Thus it describes an attack
on Soviet villages by Afghan guerrillas; one can imagine the U.S. reac-
tion had there been a Viet Cong attack on villages in Texas. But by
Freedom House standards, it is plain that the editors merit severe
censure for their "adversarial stance," "pessimism," and "volatile
styles," "always with the dark possibility that, if the managers do not
themselves take action, then outsiders [in the government] will seek to
apply remedies of their own. "U4 And, in fact, injanuary 1988, General
Dimitri T. Yakov, the Soviet defense minister, applied Freedom House
and Braestrup principles to the "adversarial" Soviet press, sharply
criticizing articles in Ogonyok and Literaturnaya Gazeta for reporting
on the Afghan war in ways that undermined public confidence in the
Soviet army and played into the hands of the West.

In the light of the evidence presented in the Freedom House study,
and of much that is ignored, the following conclusions seem reasonable.
During the Tet offensive and its aftermath, media performance was
creditable, sometimes very highly so, in a narrow sense. More broadly,
this reporting was highly deceptive in that it was framed within the
unchallenged and unrecognized doctrines of the state propaganda sys-
tem, which impose a severe distortion. Media reports compare favora-
bly in accuracy with those available to official Washington at the highest
level from internal sources, although they were regularly less alarmist,
perhaps because the media tended to give credence to official state-
ments and were unaware of the internal assessments. The reports from
the scene led media commentators to draw approximately the same
conclusions as Johnson's high-level advisers. The manner in which the
media covered the events had little effect on public opinion, except
perhaps to enhance its aggressiveness and, of course, to instill ever more
deeply the basic and unexamined tenets of the propaganda system.

As we shall see in appendix 3, a closer examination estabhshes these
conclusions still more iirmly, while demonstrating further the utter
incompetence-to use the kindest term-of the Freedom House study
that has been so influential in the subsequent period.

We have now addressed the argument presented by critics of the
media for its alleged "adversarial stance" on their own chosen grounds,
the grounds that they select as the strongest for their case. The propa-
ganda model is once again confirmed, thus meeting the most severe test
that can be posed. The model is also vindicated by the manner in which
Freedom House fulfills its function as a flak machine, attempting to
bully the media into a still more thoroughgoing conformity with the

228 MANUFACTUIINO CONSENT

propaganda requirements of state policy by methods that are a travesty
of honest journalism (let alone scholarship^allj of course, in the
interest of "freedom."

5.5.3. The Paris Peace Agreements

The Tet offensive convinced large sectors of elite opinion that the costs
of the U.S. effort were too high. Lyndon Johnson stepped down. In
what was termed by the government a "bombing halt," and reported
as such, the bombers were shifted from Nonh Vietnamese targets to
Laos, where the defenseless rural society of scattered villages in the
North was demolished, and later Cambodia, where the same was true
on an even more horrendous scale. U.S. forces undertook the violent
and destructive post-Tet accelerated pacification campaign in the
South, and bombing was intensified to "step up refugee programs deliber-
ately aimed at depriving the VC of a recruiting base, " in accordance with
the advict ofpacifkation director Robert Komer in April 1967,'^* The
Phoenix program was established to destroy the "infrastructure" of the
NLF by terror. The burden of ground fighting was shifted to Viet-
namese forces supplied and directed by the United States, and U.S.
conscripts were withdrawn, a more typical pattern for colonial wars that
essentially duplicated the earlier French effort to reconquer Indochina.
And the United States finally agreed to pursue the path of a negotiated
settlement, although still not relinquishing the aim of preventing the
unification o [Vietnam and retaining Indochina, apart from North Viet-
nam, within the U.S. global system.

This was not the maximal goal the United States had pursued; thus
in the late 1950S the U.S. government still hoped for unification
of Vietnam under anti-Communist leadership, and the U.S. client
regime always regarded itself as the government of all of Vietnam
(GVN = Government of Vietnam), and so declared in the first and
unamendable article of its constitution. But by the late 1960s, if not
before, control over all Indochina apart from North Vietnam was re-
garded as the maximum goal attainable. As we have seen, opportunities
for a peaceful diplomatic settlement had long existed, but they had
never been pursued because they were regarded as inconsistent with the
essential goal: preservation of an "independent" South Vietnam that
would be a U.S. client state.

By October 1972, the negotiators in Paris had reached the essential
terms of an agreement: the 9-Point Plan. President Nixon, however,
objected to the terms of the agreement, and the Thieu government in

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 229

Saigon was completely opposed to them. Nixon's hope was to delay
further negotiations until after the November presidential elections,
when he would have more leveraged 3? xj^g delay would also permit a
vast shipment of arms to the GVNj something that would surely be
prohibited by the agreements.

In an effort to pressure Nixon to sign the agreements, the DRV made
the terms public on October 26 in a radio broadcast. In a Washington
press conference, Kissinger stated that the Radio Hanoi broadcast gave
"on the whole a very fair account," then offering the following para-
phrase: "As was pointed out by Radio Hanoi, the existing authorities
with respect to both internal and external politics would remain in
office" in the South. Thus Kissinger sought to insinuate that according
to the accurate account on Radio Hanoi, the GVN ("the existing au-
thorities") would remain "in office" as the government of the South,
and would somehow deal with the other "party," whose status remained
mysterious. But "what was pointed out by Radio Hanoi"— correctly, as
Kissinger conceded-was something quite different, namely, that "the
two present administrations in South Vietnam will remain in existence
with their respective domestic and external functions," these being the
GVN and the PRO (based upon the NLF). Having reached agreement,
these two parties were then to move toward reunification, to be "carried
out step by step through peaceful means," with no external-meaning
U.S. -interference.

The differences are crucial. From its earliest days, the war was
fought over the question of whether "the South Vietnamese people
shall decide themselves the politico) future o/South Vietnam," as the
October 9-Point Plan explicitly stipulated must be the case, or whether
the United States would enforce the rule of its client regime, the GVN,
as the sole legitimate government in the South, in accordance with
Kissinger's version of the terms to which he had theoretically agreed,
a version that plainly departed radically from the text, us

Kissinger's announcement that "peace is at hand." designed with the
upcoming U.S. presidential elections in mind, was also blatant decep-
tion. As his distortion of the essential terms of the agreement clearly
revealed, the United States was backing away from the settlement and
refusing to implement it. Nixon later explained that "We had to use
[Kissinger's press conference} to undercut the North Vietnamese prop-
aganda maneuver [namely, making public the terms of the agreement]
and to make sure that our version of the agreement was the one that
had great public impact, "i** This result was substantially achieved; the
media characteristically accepted Kissinger's version with no recogni-
tion that it was diametrically opposed to the terms of the 9-Point Plan,

ago MANUFACTURING COKSEHT

though the facts were plain to anyone who troubled to look at the
readily available public record.

The United States then proceeded with a vast shipment of arms to
the GVN while demanding substantial changes in the October agree-
ments. Hanoi, in contrast, pUblicly insisted that the October agreements
be signed. The media adopted the version of events relayed regularly
by Kissinger, depicting him as caught between two irrational adversar-
ies, Hanoi and Saigon. The Christmas bombings of Hanoi and Hai-
phong followed, causing great damage and also the loss of several dozen
B-52S (the exact numbers are contested, but the losses clearly shocked
the Pentagon), as well as a highly adverse world reaction, although the
media continued to relay the Washington interpretation of what had
happened. Thus Stanley Karnow wrote that "evidently" the primary
aim of "Nixon's bombings of Hanoi" was "to compel the Nonh Viet-
namese to return to negotiations," a curious version of the readily
available facts, After the military and political failures of the Christ-
mas bombings, the U.S. government then signed the January peace
agreements, which were virtually identical to the terms it had rejected
the preceding October- and, still more significant, were hardly differ-
ent in essentials from the NLF proposals of the early 1960s, which
caused such dismay in Washington and compelled the U.S. government
to escalate the war so as to prevent a political settlement, thus virtually
destroying Indochina, with millions of casualties and three countries
utterly devastated-a fact considered of little moment in the West.

The charade that took place in October was reenacted in January.
As the agreements were announced on January 24, the White House
made an official statement, and Kissinger had a lengthy press confer-
ence in which he explained clearly that the United States was planning
to reject every essential provision of the accords the administration had
been compelled to sign, presenting a version that explicitly violated
them at every clUcial point. In yet another astonishing demonstration
of servility, the media accepted the Kissinger- White House version
unquestioningly, thus guaranteeing that the Vietnamese enemy would
appear to be violating the agreements if it adhered to them.

Recall that all of this took place during the period when the media
had allegedly reached their peak level of militant opposition to state
authority. Let us now briefly inspect this remarkable record.

The Paris Agreements committed "the United States and all other
countries [to] respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territo-
rial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements
on Vietnam" (article I). Pending reunification of Vietnam, which is to
"be carried out step by step through peaceful means . . . and without

THI! INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 231

foreign interference," the "military demarcation line" at the 17th paral-
lel is to be regarded as "only provisional and not a political or territorial
boundary" (article IS). In the South, there are two parallel and equiva-
lent "South Vietnamese parties," the GVN and the PRC This is the
central element of the agreements, which proceed to specify in detail
the responsibilities and commitments of the two "South Vietnamese
parties." These are to achieve national reconciliation through peaceful
means, under conditions of full democratic freedoms, while "Foreign
countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the
South Vietnamese people" and "the United States will not continue its
military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Viet-
nam" (articles 9C, 4). "The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to
respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all
matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid all armed con-
flict" (article 10). Furthermore, "the two South Vietnamese parties"
will proceed to "Achieve national reconciliation and concord, end ha-
tred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against
individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the
other," and, in general, "ensure the democratic liberties ofthe people,"
which are outlined, along with procedures to ensure the reconcilation
undertaken by "the two South Vietnamese parties" (articles II, 12). The
agreements committed "the two South Vietnamese parties" not to "ac-
cept the introduction of troops, mihtary advisers, and military person-
nel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and
war material into South Vietnam" and called for a "total withdrawal"
of an such personnel within sixty days, while "the two South Viet-
namese parties" will settle "The question of Vietnamese armed forces
in South Vietnam . . . without foreign interference" (articles 5, 7, 13).

In his January 24 press conference, Kissinger made it dear that the
United States maintained the right to provide "civilian technicians
serving in certain of the military branches," and as its forces were
withdrawn after the signing of the agreements, the United States pro-
ceeded to keep or introduce 7,200 "contract civilians" to "handle main>
tenance, logistics, and training jobs formerly performed by the U.S.
military," many of them "retired military men," under the supervision
of a U.S. major-general."*' The provisions concerning technical per-
sonnel were thus at once nullified, along with the U.S. pledge co refrain
from any intervention "in the internal affairs of South Vietnam."

In a speech of January 23, Nixon announced that the GVN would
bt recognized as the "sole legitimate government in South Vietnam,"
nullifying articles 9c and 4 as well as the basic principle of the agree-
ments: that the two parallel and equivalent "South Vietnamese parties"

Z3Z M^NUFACTUKIHG COMSENT

are to proceed toward a settlement with no U.S. interference or effort
to impose any "pobtica] tendency" on the people of South Vietnam. In
its "summary of basic elements of the Vietnam agreements" on January
24, the White House announced that "the government of the Republic
of (South) Vietnam continues in existence, recognized by the United
States, its constitutional structure and leadership intact and un-
changed" -the reason for the parentheses being that this "constitu-
tional structure" identifies the GVN as the government of all Vietnam.
This "constitutional structure" also outlawed the second of the twO
parallel and equivalent parties, along with "pro-communist neutralism"
and any form of expression "aimed at spreading Communist policies,
slogans and instructions"; and the GVN announced at once that such
"illegal" actions would be suppressed by force, while President Tilleu
stated that "this is solely a ceasefire agreement, no more no less."14z
With these declarations, the United States and its client regime thus
nullified the central principle of the Paris Agreements, and flatly re-
jected the provisions for "the two South Vietnamese parties" to achieve
"national reconciliation and concord" by peaceful means without
forceful measures or repression.

In short, the United States announced at once, clearly and without
equivocation, that it intended to disregard every essential provision of
the scrap of paper it was compelled to sign in Paris_

Kissinger attempted to obfuscate the matter in his January 24 press
conference, reprinted in full in the New York Times. He claimed,
falsely, that "we have achieved substantial changes" from the October
9-Point Plan, thus implicitly offering a justification for the Christmas
bombings. He stated that "what the civil war has been aU about" is
"who is the legitimate ruler of South Vietnam" and "is there such a
thing as a South Vietnam even temporarily until unification," claiming
that the United States had achieved its objectives on these points by
virtue of the "specific references to the sovereignty of South Vietnam"
and "the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination";
and he claimed that the United States had also achieved its goal with
regard to the status of the demarcation Mne.

All of this was blatant deception. The wording of the agreements
reflected the DRV-PRG position in all the respects Kissinger men-
tioned, while Kissinger's insinuation that the agreements permitted the
United States to recognize the GVN as "the legitimate ruler of South
Vietnam" is in explicit contradiction to the agreements he had just
signed, as is his attempt to create the impression that the "civil war"
is "between North and South Vietnam." The core provision of the Paris
Agreements establishes the GVN and the PRG as "the two South

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 233

Vietnamese parties," parallel and equivalent, to move toward unifica-
tion with the North, abrogating the provisional demarcation line, which
has no political status. Kissinger was attempting to confuse "sove-
reignty o/ South Vietnam" with "sovereignty within South Vietnam";
the latter is what the war "was aU about" from the outset, and the
agreements simply reiterated the position of "the enemy" that this was
a matter to be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties without
extemal interference, as in the October 9- Point Plan.'**

Just as in October, the purpose of this obfuscation was, in Nixon's
words, "to make sure that our version of the agreement was the one that
had great public impact." And again it succeeded. The media- without
exception, to our knowledge-accepted the Kissinger- White House
version as expressing the contents of the agreements, enabling them to
interpret the PRG-DRV insistence on the actual terms of the Paris
Agreements as an effort to disrupt them. Thus Joseph Kraft, a liberal
dove on these issues, wrote that "Much of the blame goes to the
Communists" for the subsequent breakdown of the cease-fire, because
"Hanoi has never abandoned the objective of unifying aU of Vietnam";
that is, Hanoi has never abandoned its objective of living up to the
terms of the Geneva Accords of 1954, now cxplidtly reiterated in the
Paris Agreements of January 1973.^^^ As a dove, he also added that "just
as much of the blame goes to President Thieu"-but none, of course,
can be assigned to Washingron. He cites Communist military actions
in the South and dispatch of equipment as the major reason for the
breakdown of the cease-fire, citing no evidence; as we shall see, the
facts reveal quite a different reason.

At the liberal extreme of U.S. opinion, Tom Wicker wrote that

American pohcy, which never accepted the Geneva agreement,
came to insist, instead, that South Vietnam was a legally con-
stituted nation being subverted and invaded by another power;
and that view is implied even in the documents that finally pro-
duced the cease-fire.^**

Wicker adopts Kissinger's version, which is in explicit contradiction to
the actual documents; these simply reiterate the long-held position of
the NLF and Hanoi with regard to the status of South Vietnam.

In the New Republic, Stanley Karnow wrote that "the Vietcong
considers [the PRG] to be a parallel administration, " faihng to observe
that it is not only "the Vietcong," but also the Paris Agreements just
signed by the United States government that assign to the PRG a Status
exactly parallel to that of the GVN.^*^ In Newsweek, Stewart Alsop

234 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

proclaimed that if the "marvelously elaborate" Nixon- Kissinger settle-
ment "survives more or less intact, we wiH have won the war"-which
would be true, under the Nixon-Kissinger interpretation, although
under the evidently irrelevant terms of the Paris Agreements, the
United States had abandoned its war aims and accepted the basic
proposals of the Vietnamese enemy. Newsweek went on to explain in the
same issue that Hanoi has now

accepted the provision that north and south are divided by a
sacrosanct demarcation line, thus tacitly acknowledging the legiti-
macy of the Saigon regime. . . . Equally vital to the Nixon Ad-
ministration was specific mention of the "sovereignty" of the
Saigon government, and on this point, too, the U.S. had its way.
Hanoi finally conceded that, in Kissinger's words, "there is an
entity called South Vietnam." In one important sense, the dispute
over that question was what the war in Vietnam was all about. '"^^

Again, utterly and transparently false in every respect, as a comparison
with the text just quoted immediately demonstrates, although in accord
with Kissinger's deceptive version of the agreements, taken as sac-
rosanct by the loyal media.

An honest and independent press would have announced the January
agreements with headlines reading: "u.S. Announces Intention to Vio-
late the Agreements Signed in Paris." An informed press would have
observed further that the Paris Agreements incorporate the principles
rejected by the United States at Geneva twenty years earlier, as well
as the essential principles of the NLF program of the early 1960s, which
were similar to those advocated by Vietnamese quite generally and
constituted the crucial fact that impelled the United States to escalate
the war so as to block a political settlement among Vietnamese. The
actual press simply adopted Washington's version of the agreements,
never mentioning that this version contradicted them in every essential
respect and thus guaranteed that the war would go on-as it did. Once
again, the contribution of the media was to help implement further
violence and suffering by adopting Washington's version ofevents-in
this case, in the face of the fact that ihii version was, transparently, in
flat contradiction to the documents readily at hand. One would have
to search assiduously to discover a more blatant example of media
subservience to state power.

The aftermath was predictable, predicted in the "alternative press,"
and similar to earlier occasions when the same factors were operative.
As after Geneva 1954, the Communists, who had won a political victory

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 235

(on paper), attempted to pursue "political struggle," while the United
States and its GVN client at once turned to military force to overturn
the terms of the Paris Agreements. These facts were reported by the
more serious journalists on the scene in Vietnam, notably Daniel South-
erland, who observed from his extensive investigations that "the Saigon
government has been guilty in by far the greatest number of cases of
launching offensive operations into territory held by the other side,"
assuming "that it has the right, despite the cease-fire," to take back
territory which it lost in t972," and giving many examples, as did
others. i"*^ The U.S. government informed Congress cheerily that "the
GVA/has fared weB during the post-cease-fire maneuvering," adding
"770 hamlets to the hst of those over which it has dominant control"
after the agreements-and in violation of them, a fact that passed
without notice. The GVN thus added one rmlliOn people to the areas
of its control, while expending sixteen times as much ammunition as
the enemy and using the newly provided U.S. equipment, as intended,
for massive military operations, including extensive bombardment of
PRO areas to prevent refugees from returning to them as provided by
the agreements. 150 The media either blamed the Communists, or some-
times the GVN as well, but not the United States, which had an-
nounced at once its intention to disrupt the agreements and now
publicly expressed its pleasure in the military actions that successfully
achieved this objective.

When the North Vietnamese finally responded to U.S. -GVN vio-
lence, the GVN quickly collapsed, leading to outrage in the U.S.
government and media-which still persists-over this dramatic dem-
onstration of Communist iniquity, which proves that their intentions all
along were to destroy the free and independent government of South
Vietnam and to reduce its people to Communist tyranny, thus further
entrenching the principle that "Communists cannot be trusted."

This useful lesson, firmly established by media complicity in trans-
parent government deceit, has, not surprisingly, been applied in subse-
quent efforts by the U.S. government to gain its ends by violence. One
dramatic example was featured in the media in August 1987, when the
Central American presidents confounded Washington strategy by
adopting a political settlement that undermined the familiar U.S. reli-
ance on force to compensate for its political weakness. As part of its
immediate efforts to sabotage this agreement, the State Department
called the Latin American ambassadors to Washington, where they
were presented with "a copy of the 1973 Paris peace agreement that was
negotiated to end the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War," the Wall
Street Journal reported, adding that "the agreement was subsequently

236 MANUFACTURING CONSSNT

ignored by North Vietnam." Thejourna/ explained that this unfortu-
nate "Vietnam experience," which proved that agreements with Com-
munists are not worth the paper they are printed on, is one factor in
administration "skepticism" about the Central American agreement.
Copies of the 1973 Paris Agreements were distributed to the envoys "as
a case study of how an agreement with ambiguous provisions could be
exploited and even ignored by a Communist government," Neil Lewis
reported in the lead story in the New York Times, adding: "In violation
of the 1973 accord, North Vietnam overran South Vietnam and united
the two parts of Vietnam under its banner in 1975."151 The utility of a
carefully crafted historical record, designed by the loyal media to serve
the needs of state power, is revealed here with much clarity.

Surveying these events, we reach essentially the same conclusions as
before, although once again the performance of the media-at the peak
period of their alleged "independence" and "adversarial stance"-goes
well beyond the predictions of the propaganda model, exceeding the
expected nann of obedience to the state authorities and reaching the
level that one finds in totalitarian states. As before, the servility of the
media made a significant contribution to ensuring that the slaughter in
Indochina would continue and that the U.S. government would be able
to exploit its "Vietnam experience," as filtered through the media, for
later exercises in international terrorism. The remarkable performance
of the media also laid the basis for the postwar interpretation of "what
the war was all about" and why the United States failed to auam its
ends, a matter to which we turn in the next section.

5.6. THE VIETNAM WAR IN
RETROSPECT

In April 1975, the war came to an end, and the thirty-year conflict
entered a new phase. Indochina faced the near-insoluble problems of
reconstruction in aland that had been reduced to ruin by foreign annies
after a century of colonial oppression. In the United States too, elite
groups faced a problem of reconstructioni but of a different kind. The
problem in the United States was the reconstruction of ideology, the
taming of the domestic population that had lost its faith in the nobility
of intent and the inspiring benevolence of the elites who determine U.S.
policy. It was necessary to overcome what Norman Podhoretz, echoing
Goebbels, calls "the sickly inhibitions against the use of military force,"

THE INOOCHINA WARS (r): VIETNAM 237

the dread "Vietnam syndrome," finally cured by the stirring triumph
of U.S. arms in Grenada, so Podhoretz hoped. i;2 This was part of a
larger problem, the "crisis of democracy" perceived by Western elites
as the normally passive general population threatened to participate in
the political system, challenging established privilege and power.'** A
further task was to prevent recovery in the societies ravaged by the
American assault, so that the partial victory already achieved by their
destruction could be sustained.

As we have seen, through the mid-sixties, the media loyally fulfilled
their function of service to state violence, and there was no significant
popular opposition to the U.S. attack on Indochina. True, in 1964, the
population voted 2 to 1 in favor of the "peace candidate," who was
assuring them that we want no wider war while laying the groundwork
for the rapid escalation planned for the postelection period, a note-
worthy illustration of the character of electoral politics in a society
lacking genuine opposition parties and a critical and independent press.
Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the ideological institutions for the
rapid escalation of U.S. efforts to "defend South Vietnam" from "inter-
nal aggression" helped keep the public in line as the U.S. invading army
rose to over half-a-miUion men on the ground and appeared to be
attaining some success in "grinding the enemy down by sheer weight
and mass," although at "horrendous cost," in the words of pacification
chief Robert ("Blowtorch") Komer, later to become a high-ranking
official of the Human Rights Administration.

By 1967, the popular mood was shifting, and the public was begin-
ning to defy the hawk-dove consensus of elites for whom the issues
were limited to tactics and expedience, a matter of much government
concern. Defense Secretary McNamara warned the president, in secret,
in May 1967 that expansion of the American war might "polarize opin-
ion to the extent that 'doves' in the US will get out of hand-massive
refusals to serve, or to fight, or to cooperate, or worse?"155 At the time
of the Tet offensive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned with "our
capacity to meet the possibility of widespread civil disorder in the
months ahead"; in considering further troop deployments, they took
care to ensure that "sufficient forces are stili available for civil disorder
control," including "National Guard forces deployed under State or
Federal control" and U.S. Army troops. The Pentagon warned further
that a request for more troops might lead to "increased defiance of the
draft and growing unrest in the cities," running the risk of "provoking
a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions." Earlier, the Pentagon
feared that escalation ofthe land war beyond South Vietnam might lead
to massive civil disobedience, particularly in view of opposition to the

ajS MANUFACTURING COMSBNT

war among young peoplcj the underprivileged, women, and segments
of the intelligentsia. "The sight of thousands of peaceful demonstrators
being confronted by troops in battle gear" during "the massive anti-war
demonstration" and "massive march on the Pentagon" in October 1967
was particularly disturbing, the Pentagon Papers analyst observed."'
The gradual withdrawal of the increasingly demoralized U.S. military
forces led to a diminution of visible protest by the early 19705, but the
"Vietnam syndrome" was never cured. As late as 1982, 72 percent of
the public (but far fewer "opinion makers" and, to judge by other
evidence cited earlier, virtually none of the "American intellectual
elite") regarded the Vietnam War as "more than a mistake; it was
fundamentally wrong and immoral," a disparity between the public and
its «leaders" that persists as of 1986.'"

The primary task facing the ideological institutions in the postwar
period was to convince the errant public that the war was "less a moral
crime than the thunderously stupid military blunder of throwing half
a milhon ground troops into an unwinnable war>" as the respected New
York Times war correspondent Homer Bigan explained, while chastis-
ing Gloria Emerson for her unwillingness to adopt this properly moder-
ate view, iss The "purpose of the war" must be perceived as "preventing
North Vietnam from subjugating South Vietnam" Oohn Midgley), "the
real enemy, of course, [beingj North Vietnam, supplied and sustained
by the Soviet Union and China" (Drew Middleton)159-all in defiance
of the plain facts. The primary issue was the cost to the United States
in its noble endeavor; thus Robert Nisbet describes the "intellectual
pleasure" he derived from "a truly distinguished work of history" with
a chapter covering the 1960s, "with emphasis on the Vietnam War and
its devastating impact upon Americans," obviously the only victims
worthy of concem.'^o To persuade elite opinion was never much of a
problem, since these were the reigning conceptions throughout, and
clearly privilege, along with media access, accrues to those who follow
this path. Bur the public has nevertheless remained corrupted.

An ancillary task has been to keep the devastation that the United
States left as its legacy in Indochina hidden from public view. Indeed,
one finds only scattered reference to this not entirely trivial matter in
the U.S. media-a remarkable achievement, given the agency of de-
struction and its scale. Keeping just to Vietnam, the death toll may have
passed three million. In an article entitled "Studies Show Vietnam
Raids Failed," Charles Mohr observes that the CIA estimated deaths
from bombing of the North at welt over 30,000 a year by 1967, "heavily
weighted with civilians." 161 Crop-destruction programs from 1961 had
a devastating impact, including aerial dcstrucuon by chemicals, ground

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 239

operations to destroy orchards and dikes, and land clearing by giant
tractors (Rome plows) that "obliterated agricultural lands, often in-
cluding extensive systems of paddy dikes, and entire rural residential
areas and farming hamlets," leaving the soil "bare, gray and lifeless,"
in the words of an official report cited by Arthur Westing, who com-
pares the operations to the "less efficient" destruction of Carthage
during the Punic Wars. "The combined ecological, economic, and so-
cial consequences of the wartime defoliation operations have been vast
and will take several generations to reverse"; in the "empty landscapes"
of South Vietnam, recovery will be long delayed, if possible at all, and
there is no way to estimate the human effects of the chemical poison
dioxin at levels "300 to 400% greater than the average levels obtaining
among exposed groups in North America." 162

In the South, 9,000 out of 15,000 hamlets were damaged or de-
stroyed, along with some twenty-five million acres of farmland and
twelve million acres offorest. One-and-a-half million cattle were killed,
and the war left a million widows and some 800,000 orphans. In the
North, aU six industrial cities were damaged (three razed to the ground)
along with twenty-eight of thirty provincial towns (twelve completely
destroyed), ninety-six of n6 district towns, and 4,000 of some 5,800
communes. Four hundred thousand cattle were killed and over a mil-
lion acres of farmland were damaged. Much ofthe land is a moonscape,
where people live on the edge of famine, with rice rations lower than
those in Bangladesh. Reviewing the environmental effects, the Swedish
peace-research institute SIPRI concludes that "the ecological debilita-
tion from such attack is likely to be of long duration." The respected
Swiss-based environmental group lUCN (International Union for
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources) concluded that the
ecology is not only refusing to heal but is worsening, so that a "catastro-
phe" may result unless billions of dollars are spent to "reconstruct'* the
land that has been destroyed, a "monumental" task that could be
addressed only if the United States were to offer substantial repara-
tions, a possibility that cannot be considered in a cultural climate of
abysmal ignorance, chauvinism, and the self-righteous pursuit of self-
interest. Destruction of forests has increased the frequency of floods
and droughts and aggravated the impact of typhoons, and war damage
to dikes (some of which, in the South, were completely destroyed by
U.S. bombardment) and other agricultural systems has yet to be re-
paired. The report notes that "humanitarian and conservationist
groups, particularly in the United States, have encountered official
resistance and red tape when requesting their governments' authoriza-
tion to send assistance to Vietnam" -naturally enough, since the

240 MANUmCTYIRING CONSSKT

United States remains committed to ersure that its achievements are
not threatened by recovery of the countries it destroyed. ^'^^

There is little hint of any of this, or of the similar Carthaginian
devastation in Laos and Cambodia, in mainstream U.S. media coverage.
Rather, with remarkable uniformity and self-righteousness, the prob-
lems of reconstruction, hampered further by the natural catastrophes
and continuing war to which the United States has made what contri-
bution it can, are attributed solely to Communist brutality and inepti-
tude. The sole remaining interest in postwar Vietnam in the U.S. media
has been the recovery of remains of U.S. personnel presumed to be
killed in action, the Vietnamese preoccupation with other matters serv-
ing as further proof of their moral insensitivity.

In one of his sermons on human rights, President Carter explained
that we owe Vietnam no debt and have no responsibility to render it
any assistance because "the destruction was mutual,"164 a statement
that elicited no comment, to our knowledge, apart from our own- a fact
that speaks volumes about the prevailing cultural climate. Some feel
that there may once have been a debt but that it has been amply repaid.
UndM the headline "The Debt to the Indochiftese Is Becoming a Fiscal
Drain," Bernard Gwertzman quotes a State Department official who
"said he believed the United States has now paid its moral debt for its
involvement on the losing side in Indochina." The remark, which also
passed without comment, is illuminating: we owe no debt for mass
slaughter and for leaving three countries in ruins, no debt to the mil-
lions of maimed and orphaned, to the peasants who still die today from
exploding ordnance left from the U.S. assaxih. Rather, our moral debt
results only from the fact that we did not win. By this logic, if the
Russians win in Afghanistan, they will have no moral debt at all. Pro-
ceeding further, how have we paid our moral debt for failing to win?
By resettling Vietnamese refugees fleeing the lands we ravaged, "one
of the large$tj most dramatic humanitarian efforts in history" according
to Roger Winter, director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees. But
"despite the pride," Gwertzman continues, "some voices in the Reagan
Administration and in Congress are once again asking whether the war
debt has now been paid. . . . "165

The media are not satisfied with "mutual destruction" that effaces
all responsibility for some of the major war crimes of the modern era.
Rather, the perpetrator of the crimes must be seen as the injured party.
We find headlines reading: "Vietnam, Trying to Be Nicer, Still Has a
Long Way to Go." "1 t'S about time the Vietnamese demonstrated some
good will," said Charles Printz, of Human Rights Advocates Intema-
tional, referring to negotiations about the Amerasian children who

THE INDOCHINA WARS (l): VIETNAM 241

constitute a tiny fraction of the victims of U.S. aggression in Indochina.

Barbara Crossette adds that the Vietnamese have also not been suffi-
ciently forthcoming on the matter of remains of American soldiers,
although their behavior may be improving: "There has been progress,
albeit slow, on the missing Americans." The unresolved problem of the
war is what they did to us. Since we were simply defending ourselves
from "internal aggression" in Vietnam, it surely makes sense to con-
sider ourselves the victims of the Vietnamese.

In a derisive account of Vietnamese "laments" over the failure of the
United States to improve relations with them, Barbara Crossette re-
ports their "continuing exaggeration of Vietnam's importance to
Americans" under the headline: "For Vietnamese, Realism Is in Short
Supply." The Vietnamese do not comprehend their "irrelevance," she
explains with proper imperial contempt. U.S. interest in Vietnam, she
continues, is limited to the natural American outrage over Hanoi's
invasion of Cambodia (to overthrow our current ally Pol Pot), and its
failure to be sufficiently forthcoming "on the issue of American service-
men missing since the end of the war." She cites a Pentagon statement
noting that Vietnam "has agreed to return the remains of 20 more
servicemen" and expressing the hope that the Communists will proceed
"to resolve this long-standing humanitarian issue." She quotes an
"Asian official" as saying that "We all know they have the bones some-
where If Hanoi's leaders are serious about building their country,

the Vietnamese will have to deal fairly with the United States." When
a Vietnamese official suggested that the U.S. send food aid to regions
where starving villagers are being asked to spend their time and energy
searching for the remains of American pilots killed while destroying
their country. State Department spokeswoman Phylhs Oakley reacted
with great anger: "Weare outraged at any suggestion of linking food
assistance with the return of remainSj" she declaimed. So profound is
the U.S. commitment to humanitarian imperatives and moral values
that it cannot permit these lofty ideals to be tainted by associating them
with such trivial concerns and indecent requests. It is difficult to
know how to react to a cultural climate in which such words can be
spoken, evoking no reaction.

According to standard state and media doctrine. South Vietnam (i.e.,
the client regime that we established) lost the war to North Yietnam-
the official enemy, since the U.S. attack against the South cannot be
conceded. "North Vietnam, not the Vietcong, was always the enemy,"
John Corry proclaims in reporting the basic message of an NBC white
paper on the war,I67 a stance that is conventional in the mainstream.
Corry is indignant that anyone should question this higher truth. As

242 MANUfACTURING CONSIINT

proof of the absurdity of such "liberal mythology," he cites the battle
of la Drang Valley in November 1965:

It was clear then that North Vietnam was in the war. Nonetheless,
liberal mythology insisted that the war was being waged only by
the Vietcong, mostly righteous peasants.

Corry presents no example of liberals who described the Viet Cong as
"righteous peasants," there being none, and no example of anyone who
denied that North Vietnamese troops had entered the South by No-
vember 1965, since, again, there were none. Furthermore, opponents of
the war at that time and for several years after included few representa-
tives of mainstream liberalism. Corry's argument for North Vietnamese
aggression, however, is as impressive as any that have been presented.

The NBC white paper was one of a rash of retrospectives on the
tenth anniversary of the war's end, devoted to "The War that Went
Wrong, The Lessons It Taught."I68 These retrospective assessments
provide considerable insight into the prevailing intellectual culture.
Their most striking feature is what is missing: the American wars in
Indochina. It is a classic example of Hamlet without the Prince of
Denmark. Apart from a few scattered sentences, the rare allusions to
the war in these lengthy presentations-as in postwar commentary
rather generally, including cinema and literature as well as the media-
are devoted to the suffering of the American invaders. The Wall Street
Journal^ for example, refers to "the $180 million in chemical companies'
compensation to Agent Orange victims "-U.S. soldiers, not the South
Vietnamese victims whose suffering was and remains vastly greater. i69
It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of these startling facts.

There is an occasional ghmpse of reality. Time opens its inquiry by
recalling the trauma of the American soldiers, facing an enemy that

dissolved by day into the villages, into the other Vietnamese. They
maddened the Americans with the mystery of who they were-the
unseen man who shot from the tree line, or laid a wire across the
trail with a Claymore mine at the other end, the mama-san who
did the wash, the child concealing a grenade.

No doubt one could iind similar complaints in the Nazi press about the
Balkans.

The meaning of these facts is almost never perceived. Time goes so
far as to claim that the "subversion" was "orchestrated" by Moscow,
so that the United States had to send troops to "defend" South Viet-

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 243

nam, echoing the fantasies concocted in scholarship-for example, by
Walt Rostow, who maintains that in his effort "to gain the balance of
power in Eurasia," Stalin turned "to the East, to back Mao and to
entlame the North Korean and Indochinese Communists. "170

Throughout the war, elite groups remained loyal to the cause, apart
from expressing qualms about the bombing of North Vietnam, which
was regarded as problematic since it might lead to a broader conflict,
drawing in China and the USSR, from which the United States might
not be immune. This was the "toughest" question, according to the
McNamara memo cited earlier, and the only serious question among
"respectable" critics ofthe war. The massacre of innocents is a problem
only among emotional or irresponsible types, or among the "aging
adolescents on college faculties who found it rejuvenating to play 'revo-
lution.' "171 Decent and respectable people remain silent and obedient,
devoting themselves to personal gain, concerned only that we too might
ultimately face unacceptable threat-a stance not without historical
precedent. In contrast to the war protestors, two commentators explain,
"decent, patriotic Americans demanded- and in the person of Ronald
Reagan have apparently achieved-a return to pride and patriotism, a
reaffirmation ofthe values and virtues that had been trampled upon by
the Vietnam-spawned counterculture"172-most crucially, the virtues
of marching in parades chanting praises for their leaders as they con-
duct their necessary chores, as in Indochina and El Salvador.

The extent of this servility is revealed throughout the tenth-anniver-
sary retrospectives, not only by the omission ofthe war itself but also
by the interpretation provided. The New York Times writes sardonically
of the "ignorance" of the American people) only 60 percent of whom
are aware that the United States "sided with South Vietnam"-as Nazi
Germany sided with France) as the USSR now sides with Afghanistan.
Given that we were engaged in "a defense of freedom" in South Viet-
nam (Charles Krauthammer), it must be that the critics of this noble
if flawed enterprise sided with Hanoi, and that is indeed what standard
doctrine maintains; the fact that opposition to American aggression in
South Vietnam, or even against the North, entails no such support, just
as opposition to Soviet aggression entails no support for either the
feudalist forces of the Afghan resistance or Pakistan or the United
States, is an elementary point that inevitably escapes the mind of the
well-indoctrinated intellectual. The Times retrospective alleges that
North Vietnam was "portrayed by some American intellectuals as the
repository of moral rectitude." No examples are given, nor is evidence
presented to support these charges, and the actual record is, as always,
scrupulously ignored. Critics of the peace movement are quoted ex-

Z44 MfmUFACTUKIKG CQMtVNT

pounding on its "moral failure of terrifying proportions," and several
"former peace activists who had leaped across the ideological divide"
and now "are taking their stand with conservative Christians" of the
Reaganite variety are quoted at length. But those who are allegedly
guilty of these "terrifying" crimes are given no opportunity to explain
the basis for their opposition to U.S. aggression and massacre. Nor are
they permitted to assign to their proper place in history those who
condemn the "moral failure" of opposing U.S. aggression or those who
praise themselves for their occasional twitters of protest when the cost
to us became too great. We read that the opponents of the war "bran-
dished moral principles and brushed aside complexity" but nothing of
what they had to say-as was the case throughout the war. A current
pretense is that principled critics of the war had access to the main-
stream media during these years. In fact, they were almost entirely
exdudedj and now we are regaled with accounts of their alleged crimes
but are almost never permitted to hear their actual words, exactly as
one would expect in a properly functioning system of indoctrination
with the task of preserving privilege and authority from critical analysis.

The Times informs us that Vietnam "now stands exposed as the
Prussia of Southeast Asia," because since 1975 they have "unleashed a
series of pitiless attacks against their neighbors," referring to the Viet-
namese invasion that overthrew the Pol Pot regime (after two years of
border attacks from Cambodia), the regime that we now support despite
pretenses to the contrary. Although the Times is outraged at the Prus-
sian-style aggression that overthrew our current Khmer Rouge ally, and
at the Vietnamese insistence that a political settlement must exclude
Pol Pot, the reader of its pages will find little factual material abou( any
of these matters. There are, incidentally, countries that have "un-
leashed a series of pitiless attacks against their neighbors" in these
years-for example, Israel, with its invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and
1982-bm as an American client state, Israel inherits the right of aggres-
sion, so it does not meri( the bitter criticism Vietnam deserves for
overthrowing Pol POt; and in any event, Israel's invasion of Lebanon
was a «liberation," as the Times explained at the time, always carefully
excluding Lebanese opinion on the matter as obviously irrelevant. ^^"^

The Times recognizes (ha( the United States did suffer "shame"
during its Indochina wars; "the shame of defeat." Victory, we are to
assume, would not have been shameful, and the record of aggression
and atrocities generally supported by the Times evokes no shame.
Ra(her, the United States (bought it was "resisting" Communis(s
"when it imervened in Indochina"; how we "resist" the natives defend-
ing their homes from our attack, the Times does not explain.

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 245

That the United States lost the war in Indochina is "an inescapable
fact" (Wall Slreet Journal), repeated without question throughout the
retrospectives and in American commentary generally. The truth is
more complex, although to see why, it is necessary to escape the con-
fines of the propaganda system and to investigate the rich documentary
record that lays out the planning and motives for the American wars
in Indochina over thirty years. This record shows that a rather different
conclusion is in order, an important fact to understand.

The United States did not achieve its maximal goals in Indochina,
but it did gain a partial victory. Despite talk by Eisenhower and others
about Vietnamese raw materials, the primary U.S. concern was not
Indochina but rather the "domino effect," the demonstration effect of
independent development that might cause "the rot to spread" to Thai-
land and beyond, perhaps ultimately drawing Japan into a "New
Order** from which the United States would be excluded. This threat
was averted as the United States proceeded to teach the lesson that a

" 'war of liberation' is costly, dangerous and doomed to failure"

(Kennedy adviser General Maxwell Taylor, testifying to Congress). 176
The countries of Indochina wiU be lucky to survive; they will not
endanger global order by social and economic success in a framework
that denies the West the freedom to exploit, infecting regions beyond,
as had been feared. It might parenthetically be noted that although this
interpretation of the American aggression is supported by substantial
evidence, 177 there is no hint of its existence in the popular histories or
the retrospectives, for such ideas do not conform to the required image
of aggrieved benevolence. Again, we see here the operation of the
Orwellian principle that ignorance is strength.

While proceeding to extirpate the "rot" of successful independent
development in Indochina, the United States moved forcefully to but-
tress the second hne of defense. In 1965, the United States backed a
military coup in Indonesia (the most important "domino," short of
Japan), while American liberals and Freedom House lauded the "dra-
matic changes" that took place there-the most dramatic being the
massacre of hundreds of thousands of landless peasants and the de-
struction of the only mass-based political party-as a proof that we
were right to defend South Vietnam by demolishing it, thus encourag-
ing the Indonesian generals to prevent any rot from spreading there. In
1972, the United States backed the overthrow of Philippine democracy,
thus averting the threat of national capitalism there with a terror-and-
torture state on the preferred Latin American model. A move toward
democracy in Thailand in 1973 evoked some concern, prompting a
reduction in economic aid and increase in military aid in preparation

246 MANUFACTUmNG CONSENT

for the military coup that took place with U.S. support in 1976. Thai-
land has had a particularly important rote in the U.S. regional system
since 1954, when the National Security Council laid out a plan for
subversion and eventual aggression throughout Southeast Asia, in re-
sponse to the Geneva Accords, with Thailand serving as its "focal
point" and, subsequently, as a CQajor base for the U.S. attacks on
Vietnam and Laos."* In his personal Times retrospective, Penzagon
Papers director Leslie Gelb observes that ten years after the war ended,
"the position of the United States in Asia is stronger" than at any time
since World War H, despite "the defeat of South Vietnam," quoting
"policy analysts" from government and scholarship who observe that
"Thailand and Indonesia , . . were able to get themselves together
politically, economically and militarily to beat down Communist insur-
gencies," in the manner just indicated, as were the Philippines and
South Korea, also graced with a U.S. -backed military coup in 1972."'
The business press had drawn the same conclusions years earlier, dur-
ing the latter stages of the war.'*"

In short, the United States won a regional victory, and even a sub-
stantiallocal victory in Indochina, left in ruins. The U.S. victory was
particularly significant within South Vietnam, where the peasant-based
revolutionary forces were decimated and the rural society was demol-
ished. "One hard-core revolutionary district just outside Saigon, CD
Chi," Paul Quinn-Judge observes, "sent 16,000 men and women to fight
for the National Liberation Front. Some 9,900 did not return." Much
the same was true throughout the South. "The deaths left a major
pOMtical gap for the new regime," he adds. "The south was stripped of
the trained, disciplined and presumably committed young cadres who
would have formed the backbone of the present administration. In

many areas the losses were near complete And the casualties put

further strains on the state's limited financial and organisation capaci-
ties."181 The U.S. victory over the overwhelmingly rural society of
South Vietnam, always the primary enemy, laid the basis for the take-
over by North Vietnam (as anticipated years earlier in the much-
derided peace-movement literature),! 82 allowing American hypocrites
to "prove" that this predictable consequence of the war they supported
shows that it was a just "defense of South Vietnam" against northern
aggressors. In the cities, swollen with millions of refugees, the lucky and
the more corrupt survived on an American dole at a level that had no
relation to the now-demolished productive capacity of the country,
leaving another near-insoluble problem that can conveniently be
blamed on the Communists. The revolutionary forces had gained vic-
tory in many rural areas by the time of the outright U.S. invasion.

THE INDOCHINA WAKS (I): VIETNAM 247

largely through their appeal to the peasantry, as documented in the
more serious scholarly work from sources in or close to the U.S. gov-
ernment ("The Early Stages," p. 186). But "many ofthe conclusions [of
this work] have been invalidated by the events after Tet," New York
Times Asia correspondent Fox Butterfield observes, a coy reference to
the fact that this political success was overturned by the U.S. outburst
of savagery in the post-Tet mass murder operations. '^^

That the United States suffered a "defeat" in Indochina is a natural
perception on the part of those of limitless ambition, who understand
"defeat" to mean the achievement only of major goals, while certain
minor ones remain beyond our grasp. The perception of an unqualified
U.S. "defeat" in the media retrospectives and similar commentary is
understandable in part in these terms, in part in terms of the alleged
goal of "defending freedom" developed in official propaganda and
relayed by the ideological institutions.

Postwar U.S. policy has been designed to ensure that the victory is
maintained by maximizing suffering and oppression in Indochina,
which then evokes further gloating here. Since "the destruction is
mutual," as is readily demonstrated by a stroll through New York,
Boston, Vinh, Quang Ngai Province, and the Plain of Jars, we are
entitled to deny reparations, aid, and trade, and to block development
funds. The extent of U.S. sadism is noteworthy, as is the (null) reaction
to it. In 1977, when India tried to send a hundred buffalo to Vietnam
to replenish the herds destroyed by U.S. violence, the United States
threatened to cancel "food-for-peace" aid, while the press featured
photographs of peasants in Cambodia pulling plows as proof of Com-
munist barbarity; the photographs in this case were probable fabrica-
tions of Thai intelligence, but authentic ones could, no doubt, have
been obtained throughout Indochina. The Carter administration even
denied rice to Laos (despite a cynical pretense to the contrary), where
the agricultural system was destroyed by U.S. terror bombing. Oxfam
America was not permitted to send ten solar pumps to Cambodia for
irrigation in 1983; in 1981, the U.S. government sought to block a ship-
ment of school supplies and educational kits to Cambodia by the Men-
nonite Church. ^^'^

A tiny report in the Christian Science Monitor observes that the
United States is blocking international shipments of food to Vietnam
during a postwar famine, using the food weapon "to punish Vietnam
for its occupation of Cambodia," according to diplomatic sources. Two
days later. Times correspondent Henry Kamm concluded his tour of
duty as chief Asian diplomatic correspondent with a long article in
which he comments "sadly" on the "considerably reduced quality of

248 MUNUFACTUKIMG CONSENT

life" in Indochina, where in Vietnam "even working animals 3re rare,"
for unexplained reasons, in contrast to "the continuing rise, however
uneven in many aspects, of the standard of living" elsewhere in the
region. In thirty-five paragraphs, he manages to produce not one word
on the effects of the U.S. war or the postwar policy of "bleeding
Vietnam," as the Far Eastern Economic Review accurately terms it.'^^
The major television retrospective on the war was the award-winning
thirteen-part PBS "Television History" of 1983, produced with the
cooperation of British and French television, followed by a "Vietnam
Op/Ed" in 1985 that included the Accuracy in Media critique and
discussion of the two documentaries by a group tilted heavily toward
the hawks. The controversy had well-defined bounds. At one ex-
treme, there were those who defended the PBS series as fair and accu-
rate; at the other, critics who claimed that it presented "a war of the
good nationalists, represented by Ho Chi Minh, versus the evil imperi-
alist Americans who are trying to quash, sit on, the legitimate aspira-
tions of the South Vietnamese people" (AIM chairman Reed Irvine).
The moderator, "the man in the middle," concluded the discussion by
stressing the importance of allowing "conflicting views about the Viet-
nam war to be presented at a time when the nation as a whole is finally
allowing itself a close look at the only war we have ever lost." We will
not review the AIM critique'^'' or the "debate," which reiterates many
of the charges we have already discussed (for example, Irvine's sole
example of how "the enemy was able to use our free, uncontrolled
media to achieve their own objectives," namely, via the media's por-
trayal of the Tet offensive "as a defeat for our side, even though it was
actually a very outstanding military victory"). More to the point here
are the contents of the PBS series itself, and the fact that it sets the
bounds on critical analysis of the "failed crusade" undertaken for mo-
tives that were "noble," although "illusory," as the PBS companion
volume describes the U.S. effort "to defend South Vietnam's indepen-
dence."Iss

With regard to the American war, the PBS series makes a conscious
effort to be balanced, to present all sides, to take no side. The French,
in contrast, are treated far more harshly, as brutal colonialists, with no
pretense of balance. Peter Biskind comments:

Whereas the narrator referred to Ho Chi Minh and his followers
as "rebels," "nationalists," or "the Vietnamese resistance," as long
as they were fighting the French, once the Americans arrive they
are invariably "Communists" or just "the enemy." Whereas Bao
Dai is the "playboy emperor picked by the French," Nguyen Cao

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 249

Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu are simply the "government."

Whereas French troops just released from Japanese prison camps
go "on a rampage, arresting and attacking Vietnamese," American
troops engage in the was-it-or-wasn't-it massacre at Thuy Bo.

The effort to maintain balance is illustrated, for example, in the narra-
tor's concluding words to episode 4, covering Johnson's escalation of
the war in 1964-65 and the first appearance of North Vietnamese units
in the South in mid-1965. After presenting Lyndon Johnson and other
U.S. government spokesmen, the narrator states:

Johnson called it invasion. Hanoi called it liberation. In the fall
of 1965, three North Vietnamese regiments massed in the Central
Highlands. Nearly two years had passed since Johnson renewed
the U.S. commitment to defend South Vietnam. Nearly two years
had passed since Ho Chi Minh renewed his commitment to liber-
ate the South. Now their two armies braced for battle For the

first time, in the Battle of the la Drang Valley, Americans fought
the North Vietnamese-face to face. For the first time, B-52s
supported troops in the field. And for the first time, to Americans,
Vietnam meant a major new war.

Here we have "balance," but of a special kind. One may believe, with
Johnson, that North Vietnam is invading the South, or, with Ho, that
North Vietnam is fighting to liberate the South. We may not beheve,
however, that the United States is invading South Vietnam, which, we
learn two episodes later, it had been bombing since 1961. Rather, we
must assume, as a given fact not subject to debate, that the U.S. com-
mitment was "to defend South Vietnam."

To evaluate this effort at "balance," we may observe that during the
preceding summer (1965), five months after the United States began the
regular bombing of North Vietnam, the Pentagon estimated that the
60,000 U.S. troops then deployed faced an enemy combat force of
48,500,97 percent of them South Vietnamese guerrillas ("Viet Cong").
A few months after the la Drang Valley battle, in March 1966, the
Pentagon reported 13,100 North Vietnamese forces in the South, along
with 225,000 Viet Cong, facing 2i6^00 U.S. troops and 23,000 third-
country troops (mostly South Korean), in addition to 690,000 ARVN
troops.189 Considering these facts, and the earlier history, it would seem
possible to imagine a point of view that departs from the framework
established here, one that is, furthermore, plainly accurate: the United
States was stepping up its attack against South Vietnam. But that goes

250 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

beyond "balance," which is construed similarly throughout, thus con-
signing the series to the familiar system of state propaganda on the most
crucial and essential point. A position critical of foreign aggression (that
is, the U.S. aggression that was plainly the central element of the war)
is excluded as unthinkable, although it may be conceded that "To the
Communists in Hanoi, America's presence in the South was yet another
act of foreign aggression" (episode 4). The NLF in the South is granted
no opinion on the matter, and the episode ends with a ringing declara-
tion by LBJ.i»®

It is not that the facts are entirely hidden. Thus episode 5 ("America
Takes Charge") opens with a description by a GI of how "the ARVN
and the VC are the same people, the same race, the same culture, and
yet one side seems to be chicken and the other side seems to fight in
the face of overwhelming disadvantages" in what is clearly "their coun-
try." A U.S. major discusses the problem in Binh Dinh Province, which
"had never been really in friendly hands" since 1946 but rather "under
VC control" throughout, compelling the United States to resort to
"awesome fire power" that turns heavy jungle into a "moonscape." But
the plain truth that such facts entail cannot be expressed, or perceived.

Balance is also preserved in an "account from both sides" of what
happened in the village of Thuy Bo, in January 1967, where British
producer Martin Smith had been shown the site of what villagers
claimed to be a My Lai-style massacre, one of many they alleged, with
a hundred women and children killed. Fox Butterfield reports that in
contrast to the "balanced" picture actually presented by PBS, the
British participants in the series argued that "the Marine attack on
[Thuy Bo] should be labeled a war crime." This failure to maintain
"balance" was in keeping with what a filmmaker involved in the project
termed their "more moralistic stance, anxious to accentuate the aspects
of the war that were immoral at the expense of looking at it afresh,"
which would apparently exclude the "more moralistic stance." 191 In
this episode, the marines tell their story of an assault on a VC-defended
village and then the villagers (given thirty-five lines of the transcript,
to ninety for the marines) tell their conflicting version of a marine
massacre of wounded and captured civilians. The sequence ends with
a marine describing what took place as a "normal procedure," with
"burning them hootches down and digging them Vietnamese people out
of holes [with grenades and rifle fire] and scattering animals, pigs and
chickens around like we normally do," especially after three days in the
field under brutal conditions.

The account continues in the same vein. We hear that "American

THE INDOCHINA WARS (I): VIETNAM 251

aircraft dropped six times more bombs on South Vietnam than on the
Communist North," and that "most of the enemy troops were native
southerners" (episode 8). But no conclusion is suggested, except that
the purpose of the U.S. bombing of Vietnam, distributed in this curious
manner and at "twice the tonnage dropped on Germany and Japan in
World War II," was to try "to stop North Vietnam from sending
soldiers and supplies to the South." Nevertheless, 140,000 made it
through 1967 according to the U.S. government (episode 7), about half
the number of South Korean mercenaries and a small fraction of the
Americans who were destroying South Vietnam.

The Phoenix program of political assassination is justified at length
by its director, William Colby, who denies that it was what it was, and,
for balance, some comments are added by critics in the military and by
a civihan aide worker, describing apparent random killing and torture.
The post-Tet military operations are passed over in total silence. After
Nixon's election in I968> when these wholesale U.S. massacres began
in full force, "the war continued," we learn: "The weapons were Viet-
cong rockets, the victims were Danang civilians" killed by the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese.

After the breakdown of negotiations in October 1972^ "The North
was again intransigent," we learn-namely, in demanding that the
agreements be signed, a fact ignored; and "In South Vietnam, too, the
agreement was still unacceptable," the familiar evasion of U.S. respon-
sibility (see "The Paris Peace Agreements, p. 228). The terms of the
January 1973 agreement are given, but with no indication that the U.S.
government announced at once its intent to disregard them, as it did.
Rather, we hear that "to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, the
struggle had not ended," because "Vietnam was still divided." The facts
are quite different, as we have seen. They are indeed more accurately
stated, although briefly, two episodes later (episode 12), although the
U.S. role is suppressed except by implication: "America was still com-
mitted to South Vietnam," the narrator says, without noting that this
commitment to the GVN, identified with South Vietnam by the U.S.
government and by PBS, is in explicit violation of the agreements
signed in Paris.

"Whatever their views of the war," the narrator adds, "most Ameri-
cans now believed that the cost had been too great," particularly the
cost of American lives; "They believed that no more Americans should
die for Vietnam. " The only other Americans are those who thought it
proper that "more Americans should die for Vietnam. " Americans were
dying for Vietnam in the same sense in which Russian boys are dying

252

MANUFACTURING CONSBKT

for Afghanistan, but those who could perceive this fact, and who op-
posed the war not merely because the cost was too great but because
aggression is wrong, are excluded from the category of Americans.

As in the media retrospectives, the antiwar movement is given short
shrift. A few activists are quoted, but permitted to discuss only ques-
tions of tactics. Even Eugene McCarthy, plainly the favored antiwar
figure in this presentation, says nothing except that "I think the case
is rather clear about what's wrong about our involvement"-which is
fair enough, since the media's favorite dove had never been a serious
critic of the war and was to disappear quickly from the scene after
failing to gain political power, thus demonstrating again where his
commitments lay. James Fallows is permitted to describe "the spirit of
the times": "to look for the painless way out, namely, a physical defer-
ment." In the real world, this was a position that hardly defined "the
spirit of the times," although it is a facet of this "spirit" that is far more
acceptable to main&trc&m opinion than the principled and courageous
resistance of many thousands of young people, an intolerable phenome-
non and therefore erased from the record. As Peter Biskind observes,
for all the attempt at "balance," and "despite the preference of (the
PBS series] for doves over hawks, it is the right, not the left, that has
set this film's political agenda," in conformity to elite opinion.

Biskind concludes his review of the PBS series by stating: "The truth
is that the war was a crime, not a tragedy. The tragedy is that this film
lacks the conviction to say so." The same may be said about the retro-
spective commentary generally. The war was a "tragic error," but not
"fundamentally wrong and immoral" (as the overwhelming majority of
the American people continue to believe), and surely not criminal
aggression-the judgment that would be reached at once on similar
evidence if the responsible agent were not the United States, or an ally
or client.

Our point is not that the retrospectives fail to draw what seem to us,
as to much of the population, the obvious conclusions; the more signif-
icant and instructive point is that principled objection to the war as
"fundamentally wrong and immoral," or as outright criminal aggres-
sion-a war crime-is inexpressible. It is not part of the spectrum of
discussion. The background for such a principled critique cannot be
developed in the media, and the conclusions cannot be drawn. It is not
present even to be refuted. Rather, the idea is unthinkable.

AU of this again reveals with great clarity how foreign to the mobil-
ized media is a conception of the media as a free system of information
and discussion, independent of state authority and elite interests.

The. Indochina Wars (II):

Laos and
Cambodia

GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954 PROVIDED FOR A POLITICAL SET-
tlement in Laos and Cambodia. Both countries, however, were drawn
into the U.S. attack on Indochina, with devastating consequences. In
both cases, the media made a noteworthy contribution to this outcome.

6.1. LAOS

In Laos, as in Vietnam, the United States undertook to prevent a
political settlement, as described frankly in congressional hearings by
Ambassador Graham Parsons, who stated that "I struggled for 16
months to prevent a coalition." A U.S. military mission was established
under civilian cover in violation of the Geneva Accords, headed by a
general in civilian guise, and U.S. aid flowed in an effort to establish
U.S. control. A measure of its scale and purposes is given by the fact

254 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

that Ljios was "the only country in the world where the United States
supports the military budget 100 percent."]

Nevertheless, a coalition government was established in 1958 after
the only elections worthy of the name in the history of Laos. Despite
extensive U.S. effonsj they were won handily by the left. Nine of the
thirteen candidates of the Pathet Lao guerrillas won seats in the na-
tional assembly, along with four candidates of the left-leaning neutral-
ists ("fellow travelers," as they were called by Ambassador Parsons).
Thus "Communists or fellow travelers" won thirteen of the twenty-one
seats contested. The largest vote went to the leader of the Pathet Lao,
Prince Souphanouvong, who was elected chairman of the national
assembly.

U.S. pressures-including, cruciany, the withdrawal of aid— quickly
led to the overthrow of the government in a coup by a "pro-Western
neutralist" who pledged his allegiance to "the free world" and declared
his intention to disband the political party of the Pathet Lao (Neo Lao
Hak Sat, or NLHS), scrapping the agreements that had successfully
established the coalition. He was overthrown in turn by the CIA favor-
ite, the ultra-right- wing General Phoumi Nosavan. After U.S. cliems
won the 1960 elections, rigged so crudely that even the most pro-U.S.
observers were appalled, civil war broke out, with the USSR and China
backing a coalition extending over virtually the entire political spec-
trum apart from the extreme right, which was backed by the United
States. The U.S. government assessment was that "By the spring of 1961
the NLHS appeared to be in a position to take over the entire country,"
primarily because of its control of the countryside, where it had "dili-
gently built up an organization covering most of the country's ten
thousand villages," as noted ruefully by the bitterly anti-Communist
Australian journalist Denis Warner.^ The problem was the familiar one:
the United States and its clients were militarily strong but politically
weak.

Recognizing that its policies were in a shamWes^ the United States
agreed to take part in a new Geneva conference, which proposed a new
settlement in 1962. This too quickly broke down, and the civil war
resumed with a different line-up and with increasing intervention by the
United States and its allies., and by North Vietnam, in the context of
the expanding war in Vietnam. U.S. clandestine military operations
began in 1961, and the regular U.S. bombing began in early 1964'.
Operation Barrel Roll, directed against northern Laos, was initiated in
December 1964, several months before the regular bombing of North
Vietnam. The bombing of northern Laos was intensified in 1966, reach-
ing extraordinary levels from 1968 with the "bombing halt" in North

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 255

Vietnam-in reality, a bombing redistribution, the planes being shifted
to the destruction of Laos. ^

Media coverage of Laos during the earlier period was sometimes
extensive — over three times as great as of Vietnam in the Netv York
Times in 1961, the Pentagon Papers analyst observes. But its contents
were often absurd. For example, the aid cut-off that was the essential
factor in the U.S. subversion of the elected government of Laos in 1958
"was never even reported in the national press," which barely men-
tioned the eVents, and then with misleading commentary reflecting
Washington deceit.'* Bernard Fall gave a detailed and derisive exposure
of some of the more ludicrous incidents^ including inflammatory fabri-
cations that helped create major crises and led to deeper U.S. involve-
ment in Thailand and Indochina. Joseph Alsop's fevered reports of
largely invented Communist military actions were parr.icularly note-
worthy, s

As the Vietnam War escalated, Laos became "only the wan on the
hog of Vietnam, " as Dean Rusk put it, a "sideshow war," in Walter
Haney's phrase, as Cambodia was to be later on. Media coverage de-
clined as the "sideshow war" escalated. There were, in fact, three
distinct U.S. wars: the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail in the South;
the bombing of the peasant society of northern Laos, which the U.S.
government conceded was unrelated to the war in South Vietnam; and
the "clandestine war" between a CIA-run mercenary force based on
mountain tribesmen and the Pathet Lao, backed by North Vietnam
apparently at about the level of the Thai and other mercenaries intro-
duced by the United States. The bombing of southern Laos was re-
ported; the clandestine war and the bombing of northern Laos were not,
apart from tales about North Vietnamese aggression, often fanciful and
subjected to no critical analysis.''

In July 1968, the Southeast Asia correspondent ofLe Monde, Jacques
Decornoy, published lengthy eyewitness reports of the bombing of
northern Laos, which had become". . . a world without noise, for the
surrounding villages have disappeared, the inhabitants themselves liv-
ing hidden in the mountains ... it is dangerous to lean out at any time
of the night or day" because of the ceaseless bombardment that leads
to "the scientific destruction of the areas held by the enemy." He
describes "the motionless ruins and deserted houses" of the capital of
Sam Neua district, iirst bombed by the U.S. Air Force in February 1965,
Much of this "population center" had been "razed to the ground" by
bombing, and as he arrived he observed the smoking ruins from recent
raids with phosphorus bombs, the "enormous craters" everywhere in
the town, the churches and houses "demolished," the remnants of U.S.

236 MAMUFACTOKING CONSBNT

fragmentation bombs dropped to maximize civilian casualties. From
this town to a distance of thirty kilometers, "no house in the villages
and hamlets had been spared. Bridges had been destroyed, fields up to
the rivers were holed with bomb craters."7 After Decornoy's reports,
there could be no doubt that the U.S. Air Force was directing murder-
ous attacks against the civilian society of northern Laos. These reports
of terrible destruction were repeatedly brought to the attention of the
media, but ignored or, more accurately, suppressed. Later described as
"secret bombings" in an "executive war," the U.S. attack was indeed
"secret," not simply because of government duplicity as charged but
because of press complicity.

Not omy did the media fail to publish the information about the
attack against a defenseless civilian society or seek to investigate further
for themselves, but they proceeded to provide exculpatory accounts
that they knew to be inaccurate, on the rare occasions when the bomb-
ing was mentioned at all. As the bombing of Laos began to be reported
in 1969, the claim was that it was targeted against North Vietnamese
infiltration routes to South Vietnam (the "Ho Chi Minh trail"), and,
later, that U.S. planes were providing tactical support to government
forces fighting North Vietnamese aggressors, a far cry from what
Decornoy had witnessed and reported, and a much more tolerable
version of the unacceptable facts, s

Keeping just to the New York Times, through 1968 there was no
mention of the bombing apart from tiny items reporting Pathet Lao
complaints (Dec. 22, 31, 1968). On May 18, 1969, the Times reported U.S.
bombing in Laos, alleging that it was "directed against routes, including
the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, over which the North Vietnamese
send men and supplies to infiltrate South Vietnam." A June 14 report
states that "American planes bomb targets aU over Laos, especially
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in an effort to harass the Pathet Lao, the
Communist-led rebel movement in Laos, and to stop the flow of enemy
supplies to South Vietnam." Charles Mohr reported on July 16 that
U.S. bombing "is directed against infiltration routes from North Viet-
nam that pass through Laos en route to the South." There is a July 28
reference to "200 American bombing sorties a day over northeastern
Laos," directed against North Vietnamese forces, and Hedrick Smith
adds from Washington on August 2 that the United States "has been
bombing North Vietnamese concentrations" in Laos. T. D. Allman
repOlled bombing sorties "in tactical support" of government forces
fighting the North Vietnamese and "harassing attacks against Commu-
nist positions all over northeast Laos" on August 25, the latter providing

4

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 257

the iirst glimpse of something beyond the approved version. Further
reports of U.S. air power in tactical support and "to cut North Viet-
namese supply routes" appear on September 7, followed by Allman's
report of successes of a government offensive with forces "stiffened by
Thai soldiers," supported by "the most intense American bombing ever
seen in Laos" (Sept. 18). Then followed reports from Washington and
Vientiane (Sept. 19, 20, 23, 24, 30) confirming that the U.S. Air Force
was providing tactical support for government combat missions in addi-
tion to bombing North Vietnamese infiltration routes, including a Sep-
tember 23 Agence-France-Presse dispatch reporting "bombing of
Pathet Lao areas by United States aircraft," thus implying that the
bombing went well beyond infiltration routes and combat operations,
common knowledge in Paris and Vientiane but yet to be reported here.

In short, the terror bombing of northern Laos, although known,
remained off the agenda, and reporting in general was slight and highly
misleading, to say the least. Elterman observes that the war in Laos and
Cambodia was virtually "invisible" in the media through 1969^ apart
from the leftist National Guardian, which gave substantial coverage to
what was in fact happening.'

On October I, 1969, the New York Tmes finally ran an account by
T. D. Allman, whose valuable reporting throughout the war appeared
primarily overseas, concluding that "the rebel economy and social fab-
ric" were "the main United States targets now," and that the American
bombardment had driven the population to caves and tunnels during
the daylight hours, making it difficult for the Pathet Lao "to fight a
'people's war' with fewer and fewer people." Control of territory was
now of lesser importance, he wrote, "with United States bombers able
to destroy, almost at will, any given town, bridge, road or concentration
of enemy soldiers or civilians. "lo

This confirmation of what had long been known in restricted peace-
movement circles, and consciously suppressed in the mainstream press,
passed without particular notice. The CIA clandestine army had swept
through the Plain of Jars in the preceding months, evacuating all re-
maining civilians to areas near Vientiane, where they and their harrow-
ing stories were largely ignored by the well-represented media,
although available elsewhere.

Walter Haney, a Lao-speaking American who compiled a detailed
collection of refugee interviews that was described as "serious and
carefully prepared" by U.S. Ambassador to Laos William Sullivan,
quotes remarks by a UN official in Laos as "the most concise account
of the bombing":

258 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

By 1968 the intensity of the bombings was such that no organized
hfe was possible in the villages. The villages moved to the outskirts
and then deeper and deeper into the forest as the bombing reached
its peak in 1969 when jet planes came daily and destroyed aU
statiOQary structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers
lived in trenches and holes or in caves. They only farmed at night.
{Each} of the informants, without any exception, had his village
completely destroyed. In the last phase, bombings were aimed at
the systematic destruction of the (material} basis of the civilian
society. 12

A staff study by a Kennedy subcommittee concluded that a main pur-
pose of the U.S. bombardment was "to destroy the physical and social
infrastructure" in areas held by the Pathet Lao, a conclusion well
supported by the factual record. >^

There were also eyewitness reports of the destruction of northern
Laos by Western reporters, but published overseas. T. D. Allman flew
over the Plain of Jars in late 1971, reporting that "it is empty and
ravaged" by the napalm and B-SZ saturation bombing being "used in
an attempt to extinguish all human life in the target area"; "All vegeta-
tion has been destroyed and the craters, literally, are countless" and
often impossible to distinguish among the "endless patches of churned
earth, repeatedly bombed." At the same time, the V^afhington Post
published the statement of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans, who
reported from northern Laos that "I have seen no evidence of indis-
criminate bombing"; it is the North Vietnamese who are "rough," and
the people are not "against the United States-just the opposite." The
Lao-speaking Australian reporter John Everingham traveled in 1970
"through dying village after dying village" of the Hmong tribesmen
who had been "naive enough to trust the CIA" and were now being
offered "a one-way 'copter ride to death' " in the CIA clandestine army,
in the remains of a country where bombing had "turned more than half
the total area of Laos to a land of charred ruins where people fear the
sky" so that "nothing be left standing or ahve for the communists to
inherit." No U.S. journal, apart from the tiny pacifist press, was inter-
ested enough to run his story, although later the media were to bewail
the plight of the miserable remnants of the Hmong, put on display as
"victims of Communism." In 1970, the Bangkok World (Oct. 7) pub-
lished an AP report on U.S. bombing that was "wiping out" towns, and
by ]972 such repons sometimes appeared in the U.S. press.''* Later,
Nayan Chanda visited the Plain of Jars, reporting overseas that from
the air it "resembles a luna. landscape, pockmarked as it is with bomb

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 259

craters that are a stark testimony to the years of war that denuded the
area of people and buildings" during "six years of 'secret' bombing" by
U.S. aircraft, while "at ground level, the signs of death and destruction
are even more ubiquitous," including the provincial capital, "com-
pletely razed," as had been reported earlier by refugees who were
ignored. Following the practice of American volunteers during the war,
American relief workers with long experience in Laos attempted to
bring information about postwar Laos to the media-with little effect-
and inform us privately that their accounts were seriously distorted by
New York Times reporters "by the device of omission and taking the
negative side of balanced statements we made" and similar means.

The U.S. government officially denied all of this, continuing the
deception even after the facts were exposed and known in some detail
to those concerned enough to learn them. Many regarded the U.S. war
in Laos as "a success" (Senators Jacob Javits and Stuart Symington),
or even "A spectacular success" (a former CIA officer in Laos, Thomas
McCoy). 16

In scale and care, the extensive analysis of refugee reports by a few
young American volunteers in Laos compares very favorably to the
subsequent studies of refugees from Cambodia that received massive
publicity in the West after the Khmer Rouge takeover, and the story
was both gruesome and highly pertinent to ongoing U.S. operations.
But there was little interest, and published materials, which appeared
primarily outside of the mainstream, were virtually ignored and quickly
forgotten; the agency of terror was inappropriate for the needs of the
doctrinal system. Media failure to report the facts when they were
readily available, in 1968, and to investigate further when they were
undeniable, by late 1969, contributed to the successful deception of the
public, and to the continuing destruction.

When the war ended, ABC News commentator Harry Reasoner
expressed his hope that Laos and its "gentle folk" could return to
peaceful ways after "the clowning of the CIA and the vicious invasion
of the North Vietnamese." 17 The "clowning of the CIA" included the
destruction of "the rebel economy and social fabric" in northern Laos,
with unknown numbers killed in areas that may never recover, and the
decimation of the Hmong who were enlisted in the CIA cause and then
abandoned when no longer useful. Nothing remotely comparable may
be attributed to "the vicious invasion of the North Vietnamese"-
which did, however, include such atrocities as killing twelve U.S. Air
Force men in Match 1968 at a U.S. radar base near the North Viet-
namese border used to direct the bombing of Nonh Vietnam and
operations in North Vietnam by U.S. -led mercenaries.'^

260 MANDFACTUKING COHSEMT

The New York Times reviewed the war in Laos at the war's end,
concluding that 350,000 people had been killed, over a tenth of the
population, with another tenth uprooted in this "fratricidal strife that
was increased to tragic proportions by warring outsiders." The "fratri-
cidal strife" might well have been terminated by the 1958 coalition
government had it not been for "outsiders," with the United States
playing a decisive role throughout, a role completely ignored in this
purported historical analysis apart from a few misleading comments. At
this late date, the Times continued to pretend that the U.S. bombing
was directed against North Vietnamese supply trails -nothing else is
mentioned. The crucial events of the actual history also disappear, or
are grossly misrepresented. Subsequent reporting also regularly
obliterated the U.S. role in creating the devastation and postwar "prob-
lems" attributed to the Communists alone, a shameful evasion in the
light of the undisputed historical facts.

Once again, the media record, less than glorious, is well explained
throughout by the propaganda model.

6.2. CAMBODIA

6.2.1. "The decade of the genocide"

Few countries have suffered more bitterly than did Cambodia during
the 1970s. The "decade of the genocide," as the period is termed by the
Finnish Inquiry Commission that attempted to assess what had taken
place,20 consisted of three phases-now extending the time scale to the
present^ which bears a heavy imprint of these terrible years:

Phase I: From 1969 through April 1975, U.S. bombing at a histori-
cally unprecedented level and a civil war sustained by the United
States left the country in utter ruins. Though Congress legislated
an end to the bombing in August 1973, U.S. government participa-
tion in the ongoing slaughter continued until the Khmer Rouge
victory in April 1975.^^

Phase II: From April 1975 through 1978 Cambodia was subjected j
to the murderous rule of the Khmer Rouge (Democratic Kampu- j
chea, DK), overthrown by the Vietnamese invasion of CTambodiaj
in December 197^' ^ \

]

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 261

Phase III: Vietnam installed the Heng Samrin regime in power in
Cambodia, but the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) coalition, based
primarily on the Khmer Rouge, maintained international recogni-
tion apart from the Soviet bloc. Reconstructed with the aid of
China and the United States on the Thai-Cambodia border and
in Thai bases, the Khmer Rouge guerrillas, the only effective DK
military force, continue to carry out activities in Cambodia of a
sort called "terrorist" when a friendly government is the target.

We turn now to the travail of Cambcdia during these grim years, and
the way it has been depicted, first with some preliminary observations
and then in further detail, phase by phase.

6.2.2. Problems of scale and
responsibility

The three phases of the "decade of the genocide" have fared quite
differently in the media and general culture, and in a way that conforms
well to the expectations of a propaganda model. Phase I, for which the
United States bore primary responsibility, was little investigated at the
time, or since, and has never been described with anything like the
condemnatory terms applied to phase II. The vast number of Cambodi-
ans killed, injured, and traumatized in this period were, in our concep-
tualization of chapter 2, "unworthy" victims.

Phase II, the Pol Pot era, is the "holocaust" that was widely com-
pared to the worst atrocities of Hitler and Stalin, virtually from the
outset, with massive publicity and outrage at the suffering of these
"worthy" victims.

Phase III renewed the status of the people of Cambodia as worthy
victims, suffering under Vietnamese rule. The Vietnamese being official
enemies of the United States, they quickly became the villains of the
piece, responsible for unspeakable conditions within Cambodia and
guilty of unprovoked aggression. Meanwhile, the United States backed
its ally China as it conducted a punitive invasion of Vietnam in Febru-
ary 1979 and reconstructed the defeated Pol Pot forces.

In the early Stages of phase III, it was alleged "that the Vietnamese
are now conducting a subtle 'genocide' in Cambodia," a charge tacitly
endorsed in a CIA demographic study, which estimated a population
drop of 700,000 during "the first year of the Heng Samrin rtde."22 This
new "holocaust" was constructed on the basis of serious misinterpreta-

262 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

tion of available evidence, as was demonstrated by Michael Vickery in
a response to William Shawcross's warnings of "the end of Cam-
bodia, "23 but not before it had left its mark on popular perceptions, and
many distortions and, indeed, contradictions persist. In his Quality of
Mercy, Shawcross agrees that, as Vickery had concluded, there was no
large-scale famine of the chaiacter initially reported,24 but he later
wrote that the Heng Samrin regime "was responsible for creating many
of the conditions that caused the famine" in Cambodia. These conflict-
ing accounts were noted by Australian Cambodia scholar Ben Kiernan,
who suggested a partial explanation: "There was a threat of famine, as
the Heng Samrin government proclaimed in mid-1919. But it was offset
by the small but crucial December- January harvest, which Shawcross
hardly mentions, and by the massive international aid program, which
he regularly denigrates. "2'*

The eagerness to uncover Vietnamese villainy in "ending Cam-
bodia," the easy reliance on sources known to be unreliable,^' and the
subsequent evasions after the accusations dissolve are readily explained
by U.S, (indeed, general Western-bloc) hostility to Vietnam, which led
the United States to aMgn itself quietly with Pol Pot and to transform
its alleged concern over Cambodians to the victims of the Vietnamese
occupation.

Phase III also had a domestic U,S. aspect that is highly relevant to
our concerns. In an intriguing exercise, characteristic of system-sup-
portive propaganda campaigns, it was charged that the horrors of phase
II were passed over in "silence" at the time. This alleged fact, devel-
oped in William Shawcross's influential book Quality ojMercy, elicited
much commentary on "Holocaust and Modem. Conscience," the subti-
tle of Shawcross's book, and on the failure of civilized people to react
appropriately to ongoing atrocities. In "Phase III at home" (p. 288), we
will turn to the merits of this charge with regard to phase 11. As for
phase I of "the decade of the genocide," the charge of silence is dis-
tinctly applicable, but it was never raised, then or now, nor is phase I
designated a period of "holocaust" or "genocide" in mainstream litera-
ture. Phase 1 elicited no calls for international intervention or trials for
crimes against humanity, and it has since been largely expunged frotti
the record. In retrospect, the harshest critics within the mainstream
attribute "the destruction of Cambodian society" during phase I to
"years of warfare" and "careless policies ofthe White House," nothing
more,27 The issue of U.S, bombing of Cambodia did arise during the
Watergate hearings, but the primary concern there was the failure to
notify Congress.

Michael Vickery suggests an "interesting comparison which an in-

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 263

vestigative journalist might make" if truly concerned about the prob-
lems of the region-namely, between Cambodia, during phase III, and
Thailand, "where there has been no war, foreign invasion, carpet
bombing, nor revolution, and where foreign investment is massive and
the sympathy of the most advanced western powers is enjoyed," but
where conditions in the peasant society were so terrible that "since 1980
substantial foreign 'refugee' aid near the border has been given to
'Affected Thai Villagers,' whose health and living standard, much to the
shock of foreign aid personnel, were found to be little better than the
condition of Cambodian refugees."^* No such comparison was under-
taken, nor was there even a flicker of concern over simultaneous re-
ports, buried in appropriate obscurity, about the tens of thousands of
children, many under ten years old, working as "virtual slaves" in Thai
factories resembling concentration camps,^' nor over the normal condi-
tions of peasant life in the region, now exposed to the visitors flocking
to the border camps to witness the consequences of Communist terror
and express their compassion for its victims.

The actual scale of the slaughter and destruction during the two
authentic phases of large-scale killings during the "decade of the geno-
cide" (phases 1 and 11) would be difficult to estimate at best, and the
problems have been compounded by a virtual orgy of falsification serv-
ing political ends that are all too obvious. 3° The Finnish Inquiry Com-
mission estimates that about 600,ooo people in a population of over
seven million died during phase 1, while two million people became
refugees. 31 For the second phase, they give 75,ooo to i50,ooo as a
"realistic estimate" for outright executions, and a figure of roughly one
million dead from killings, hunger, disease, and overwork. Vickery's
analysis is the most careful attempt to sort out the confused facts to
date. He accepts as plausible a "war loss" of over 500,000 for the first
phase, calculated from the CIA estimates but lower than their conclu-
sions (see note 31), and about 750,000 "deaths in excess of normal and
due to the special conditions of OK," with perhaps 200,000 to 300,000
executed and a total population decline for this period of about

400,000.3^

These estimates, the most careful currently available in print to our
knowledge, suggest that the toll under phase II of "the genocide" is
somewhat greater than that under phase I, although not radically dif-
ferent in scale. But before accepting these figures at face value we must
bear in mind that part of the death toll under phase II must be at-
tributed to the conditions left by the U.S. war. As the war ended, deaths
from starvation in Phnom Penh alone were running at about 100,000
a year, and the U.S. airlift that kept the population ahve was immedi-

I64 MANUFACTUKING CONSENT

ately terminated. Sources close to the U.S. government predicted a
million deaths in Cambodia if U.S. aid were to cease. A Western doctor
working in Phnom Penh in 1974-75 reported that

This generation is going to be a lost generation of children. Mal-
nutrition is going to affect their numbers and their mental capaci-
ties. So, as well as knocking off a generation of young men, the war
is knocking off a generation of children.

The V.S. embassy estimated that available rice in Phnom Penh would
suffice for at most a few weeks. The final V.S. AID report observed that
the country faced famine in 1975, with 75 percent of hs draft animals
destroyed by the war, and that rice planting for the next harvest, eight
months hence, would have to be done "by the hard labor of seriously
malnourished people." The report predicted "widespread starvation"
and "Slave labor and starvation rations for half the nation's people" for
the coming year, and "general deprivation and suffering . . . over the
next two or three years before Cambodia can get back to rice self-
sufficiency."'^

There is also the matter of the effect of the U.S. bombing on the
Khmer Rouge and the peasant society that provided their social base,
a factor noted by all serious analysts. Cambodia specialist Milton Os-
borne concludes that Communist terror was "surely a reaction to the
terrible bombing of Communist-held regions" by the U,S. Air Force.
Another Cambodia scholar, David Chandler, comments that the bomb-
ing turned "thousands of young Cambodians into participants in an
anti-American crusade," as it "destroyed a good deal of the fabric of
prewar Cambodian society and provided the CPK (Khmer Rouge] with
the psychological ingredients of a violent, vengeful, and unrelenting
social revolution," a "class warfare between the 'base people: who had
been bombed, and the 'new people' who had taken refuge from the
bombing and thus had taken sides, in CPK thinking, with the United
States." "French intransigence had turned nationalists into Commu-
nists," Philip Windsor observ'eSj while "American ruthlessness now
turned Communists into totalitarian fanatics."^ One may debate the
weight that should be assigned to this factor in determining Khmer
Rouge policies, embittering the peasant society of "base people," and
impelling them to force those they perceived as collaborators in their
destruction to endure the lives of poor peasants or worse. But that it
was a factor can hardly be doubted.

Assessing these various elements, it seems fair to describe the re-

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 265

sponsibility of the United States and Pol Pot for atrocities during "the
decade of the genocide" as being roughly in the same range.

Little is known about phase I of "the genocide." There was little
interest in ascertaining the facts, at the time or since. The Finnish
Inquiry Commission Report devotes three cursory pages to the topic,
because the information available is so meager. The second phase has
been far mOre intensively studied, and by now substantial evidence is
available about what took place. David Chandler and Ben Kiernan
observe that as a result of the intense interest in phase II, "we know
a great deal more about the texture of daily hfe in Democratic Kampu-
chea, supposedly a 'hermit' regime, than we do about the ostensibly
open regimes of the Khmer Republic (1970-1975) or the Sihanouk era
(1954-1970) which preceded it,"'^ Despite this already large imbalance
in knowledge, the Cambodia Documentation Center in New York City
concentrates on phase II of the genocide. The dramatic difference in
the information available for the two phases, and the focus of the
ongoing research effort, are readily explicable in terms of a propaganda
model.

Outside of marginal Maoist circles, there was virtually no doubt from
early on that the Khmer Rouge regime under the emerging leader Pol
Pot was responsible for gruesome atrocities. But there were differing
assessments of the scale and character of these crimes.

State Department Cambodia specialists were skeptical of the allega-
tions that had received wide publicity by 1977-rightly, so subsequent
inquiry revealed. The Far Eastern Economic Review based its January
1979 conclusion that the population had actually risen during the Pol
Pot period on CIA sources, and its very knowledgeable correspondent
Nayan Chanda, discussing the background for the Vietnamese inva-
sion, reported that "some observers are convinced that had the Cambo-
dian regime got a year's reprieve, its internal and international image
would have been improved enough to make any Vietnamese drive
difficult if not impossible."36

Differing assessments persisted even after the abundant evidence
provided by the flow of refugees to Thailand in 1979 and visits to
Cambodia, which also provided the first significant information about
the years 1977-78. At one extreme, Pol Pot continued to be described
as having forged new patterns of genocide comparable to the worst
excesses of Hitler and Stalin. At the other extreme, we have the postwar
evaluation by U.S. government specialist Douglas Pike, now head of the
University of California Indochina Archives, the "independent-
minded" scholar lauded by Freedom House and the exemplar of the

266 MAKUFACTDHNfi CONSENT

new, nonideological scholarship much admired by the Nev) York Times.
Pike described Pol Pot in November 1979 as the "charismatic" leader
of a "bloody but successful peasant revolution with a substantial resi-
due of popular support," under which "on a statistical basis, most of
them [peasants] - - - did not experience much in the way of brutality."37
The 1980 CIA demographic study assigns the Pol Pot-era executions
to the period ending in January 1977, and for 1977-78 merely says that
"living conditions most likely did not vary during these two years from
the conditions during 1976." although as was known when the CIA
study was undertaken, these later years were the worst, by far. in the
context of internal purges and the escalating conflict with Vietnam at
a time when the United States was beginning its "tilt" toward China
and Pol Pot. The CIA concludes that among the "old people," the
"rural population" who were "the foundation for the new Khmer
Rouge revolutionary society." there was a slight increase in population
through the DK period. A still more muted assessment is provided by
the close U.S. ally Deng Xiaoping, who emerged as "party strongman"
in China in December 1978 and soon implemented his plan to "punish
Vietnam," and who remained the main supporter of Pol Pot. He bitterly
opposed attempts to remove the Khmer Rouge from their leading role
in the DK coalition in 1984. stating in a rage that "I do not understand
why some people want to remove Pol Pot. It is true that he made some
mistakes in the past but now he is leading the fight against the Viet-
namese aggressors. "38 Deng has been backed in this stance by the
Reagan administration (see "Phase III in Indochina," p. 285).38

In addition to such real examples of less harsh interpretations of the
Pol Pot period, there are also mythical ones to which we return.

6.2.3. The "not-so-gentle" land:
some relevant history

Part of the illusory story constructed about Cambodia during the 1970S
and since is that this "gentle land" with its "smiling people" had known
little suffering before the country was drawn into the Indochina war and
then subjected to Pol Pot "autogenocide." The reality is different.
Behind the famous "Khmer smile," as Prince Sihanouk's French ad-
viser Charles Meyer observed, lies ample bitterness and violence. 39
Vickery observes that earlier chronicles "are filled with references to
public executions, ambushes, torture, village-burnings and forced emi-
gration," with the destruction of villages and landscapes, torture, and

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 267

killing a matter of course, and few institutional restraints on terror. The
peasantry of inner Cambodia, largely unknown to Western scholarship
or to the urban population, appear to have hved under conditions of
extreme violence and hatred for the oppressors from outside the village.

During the French war of reconquest in the late 1940s, up to "per-
haps one million rural inhabitants .. . were forcibly 'regrouped.' " The
huge flow of refugees to Phnom Penh during phase f of the "decade
of the genocide" was not the first massive dislocation in recent history,
Vickery continues, adding that it is, furthermore, "a strange kind of
history" that regards the displacement of people fleeing from U.S.
bombs and savage fighting "as somehow less abhorrent or more 'nor-
mal' than the reverse movement of 1975," the forcible evacuation when
the peasant army of the Khmer Rouge conquered the city. Leaders of
the anti-French resistance after World War II describe horrifying
atrocities conducted with obvious pleasure as a "normal" part of
"Khmer mores." In the same years, government forces led by Lon NOl,
who was to head the U.S. -backed client government in the early 1970s,
carried out wholesale massacres in villages as the French withdrew,
induding such "individual tests of strength" as "grasping infants by the
legs and pulling them apart," actions that "had probably not been
forgonen by the men of that area who survived to become the Khmer
Rouge troops" whose later atrocities in this "gentle land" aroused such
outrage in the West. "Thus for the rural 80-90 percent of the Cambo-
dian people," Vickery concludes, "arb.itrary justice, sudden violent
death, political oppression, exploitative use of religion and anti-reli-
gious reaction, both violent and quiescent, were common facts of life
long before the war and revolution of the 1970s." These conditions
elicited no interest in the West. "The creations of Pol Pot-ism were all
there in embryo," Vickery continues, to be "directed first of all at the
urban population" after a war which was in large measure "a war
between town and countryside in which the town's battle was increas-
ingly for the sole purpose of preserving its privileges while the rural
areas suffered."**

It is superfluous to observe that the United States deployed its ample
means of violence in defense of urban privilege. But, in fact, these tasks
were only of secondary importance. For the United States, the destruc-
tion of rural Cambodia was ancillary to the goal of maintaining in power
the client regime in South Vietnam.

Contrary to the arrangements in Laos and Vietnam, the Geneva
Accords afforded no recognition lo Ihe anti-French resistance in Cam-
bodia, a source of much binerness. The country was ruled by Prince
Sihanouk until March 1970, when he was overthrown in a coup sup-

268 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

ported by the United States. 41 Throughout this period, Sihanouk at-
tempted a difficult balancing act both internally and externally. Within
Cambodia, he repressed the left and peasant uprisings and attempted
to hold off the right, although powei largely remained in the hands of
right-wing urban elites throughout. Externally, he tried to preserve a
measure of neutrality against the background of the expanding Indo-
china war, which, he expected, would end in a Communist victory.42

Sihanouk's neutralist efforts were unappreciated by the United
States and its allies. Diem's troops attacked border regions from 1957,
and there were also Thai provocations. A coup attempt in 1959, proba-
bly backed by the CIA, as generally assumed in Cambodia, was foiled;
this should be seen in the context of general U.S. subversion in the
region in the post-Geneva period, induding a CIA-backed coup and
invasion aimed at overthrowing Sukarno in Indonesia in 1958, subver-
sion of the elected government of Laos in the same year, and the efforts
to destroy the anti-French resistance within South Vietnam and to
consolidate the Diem dictatorship while undermining the political ar-
rangements at Geneva. By 1963, CIA-backed Khmer Serei forces fre-
quently attacked Cambodia from South Vietnamese and Thai bases at
a time when the United States was intensifying its clandestine opera-
tions in Laos and maneuvering, with increasing violence, to block a
political settlement in South Vietnam. By 1966, the Khmer Serei "de-
clared war on Cambodia and claimed responsibility for incursions
across the border. "43

Attacks by U.S. and Saigon anny forces against border posts and
villages in Cambodia intensified from the early 1960s, causing hundreds
of casualties a year. Later, Vietnamese peasants and guerrillas fled for
refuge to border areas in Cambodia, particularly after the murderous
U.S. military operations In South Vietnam in early 1967, giving rise to
cynical charges from Washington, echoed in the media, about Commu-
nist encroachment into neutral Cambodia. By the time of the 1970 coup
that overthrew Sihanouk, Vietnamese were scattered along border areas
to a maximum depth of about twenty-five kilometers, according to most
sources. The first evidence of Vietnamese encampments in Cambodia
was discovered in late 1967, close to the unmarked border. While there
was much outrage in the United States about "North Vietnamese ag-
gression," the internal view In Washington was considerably more
nuanced. From the Pentagon Papers we learn that as late as May 1967-
weU after the U.S. operations that caused cross-border flight-high
Pentagon officials believed that Cambodia was "becoming more and
more imponant as a supply base-now of food and medicines, perhaps
ammunition later. " A yeai earlier, an American study team investigated

TRE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 269

specific charges by the U.S. government on the scene and found them
without substance although they did come across the site of a recent
U.S. helicopter-gunship attack on a Cambodian village (one of many,
according to the local population), first denied by the U.S. government,
then conceded, since American eyewitnesses (including CBS-TV) were
present-the usual pattern.

The Cambodian government reported many such incidents. Thus
Cambodia complained to the United Nations that on February 24, 1967,
"a large number of armed forces elements consisting of Americans,
South Vietnamese and South Koreans entered Cambodian territory
and fired heavily on the Khmer village of Chrak Kranh . . . [which 1 was
then invaded and burnt by the United States-South Vietnamese
troops" who occupied the village until March 3. By April 1969, rubber
plantations were subjected to defoliation by air attack. In January 1970,
an official Cambodian government White Paper reported thousands of
such incidents with many deaths, giving pictures, dates, and other
details, and also noting that not a single Viet Cong body had ever been
found after U.S. -Saigon bombardments or ground attacks.

Virtually none of this was ever reported in the United States-even
the official White Paper- although the information was readily availa-
ble in official documents and reputable foreign sources, and in easily
ignored peace-movement literature.** The agency of violence was once
again the wrong one.

The occasional media reaction to these incursions was instructive.
On March 25, 1964, New York Times correspondent Max Frankel, now
executive editor, reported a Saigon army (ARVN) attack on the Cam-
bodian village of Chantrea with armored cars and bombers, leaving
many villagers killed and wounded. The ARVN forces were accom-
panied by U.S. advisers, including a U.S. army pilot "dragged from the
wreckage" of an observer plane "shot down in the action." Diplomats
on the scene confirmed that "at least one troop-carrying helicopter had
landed at Chantrea with three Americans on board." Frankel was out-
raged-at Cambodia, which had the gall to demand reparations, leaving
Washington "alarmed and saddened, but confused." The headline
reads: "Stomping on U.S. Toes: Cambodia Typical of Many Small
Nations Putting Strain on a Policy of Patience." Cambodia has "bor-
rowed a leaf from Fidel Castro's book," Frankel stormed, by requesting
compensation for this U.S. atrocity: "It is open season again for the

weaker nations to stomp on the toes of big ones Leading the pack

in big-power baiting these days is one of the smallest of nations, the
Southeast Asian kingdom of Cambodia" with its "clever, headstrong,
erratic leader," whom Washington finds "lacking some of the talent and

270

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

temperament for the job," although "the Administration's instinct has
been to try to save a wayward young nation's independence in spite of
itself and, at times, despite its own leaders." Washington is also alarmed
by "Cambodia's current effort to force the United States into a major
conference that would embarrass its Thai and Vietnamese friends,"
Frankel continues, an effort that will "be resisted" -referring to a
conference that would settle border questions and guarantee Cam-
t>od5a'$ neutrality at a time when the United States was desperately
seeking to undermine international efforts to neutralize South Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia so as to avert the major war toward which the
United States was driving because of its political weakness in Indo-
china.

This classic of colonialist paternalism reflects quite accurately the
general mood of the day-as does the refusal ro report such trivial
matters as the regular V.S.-ARVN attacks on Cambodia, which have
largely passed from history in the United States, apart from the dissi-
dent literature.

6.2.4. Phase I: The U.S. destruction
of Cambodia

On March 18, 1969, the notorious "secret bombings" began. One week
later, on March 26, the Cambodian government publicly condemned
the bombing and strafing of "the Cambodian population living in the
border regions . . . almost daily by U.S. aircraft," with increasing killing
and destruction, alleging that these attacks were directed against
"peaceful Cambodian farmers" and demanding that "these criminal

attacks must immediately and definitively stop " Prince Sihanouk

called a press conference on March 28 in which he emphatically denied
reports circulating in the United States that he "would not oppose U.S.
bombings of communist targets within my frontiers." "Unarmed and
innocent people have been victims of U.S. bombs," including "the
latest bombing, the victims of which were Khmer peasants, women and
children in particular." He then issued an appeal to the international
press: "I appeal to you to publicize abroad this very clear stand of
Cambodia-that is, 1 will in any case oppose all bombings on Cambo-
dian territory under whatever pretext. "45

It wUl come as no surprise that his appeal went unanswered. Further-
more, this material has been suppressed up to the present time, apart
from the dissident literature.**- The standard position within the main-

THE INDOCHINA WARS (Jl): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 271

Stream, adopted by defenders of the bombing and critics as well, is that
"Sihanouk did not protest" (William Shawcross). When the "secret
bombings" became public knowledge in 1973, it was claimed that Siha-
nouk had privately authorized bombing of Vietnamese bases near the
border areas. True or false, that is irrelevant to the suppression of
Sihanouk's impassioned appeals, which referred to the bombing of
Khmer peasants. Furthermore, as we observed in earlier discussion,
"while commentators and media analysts may draw whatever conclu-
sions they please from the conflicting evidence available, this does not
entitle them to suppress what is, by any standards, crucial evidence, in
this case, Sihanouk's attempt to arouse international protest over the
U.S. bombing of the civilian society. "47

Reviewing this period in his Cambodia Year Zero, Fran90is Pon-
chaud remarks that Sihanouk called the U.S. bombings of "Vietcong
bases" a "scandal and a crime over Radio Phnom Penh, but nobody was
deceived." Ponchaud and his readers, however, are deceived: Sihanouk
publicly denounced the bombing and other attacks on Klimer peasants,
and not only over Radio Phnom Penh but in quite public documents
and appeals to the international press. In his Sideshow, Shawcross says
only that Cambodia "continued to denounce" American air and artil-
lery attacks through 1969, but "made no public protest that specifically
mentioned B-52 attacks" (p. 94) — truCj but irrelevant for the reasons
repeated in the last paragraph.^^

In May 1969, William Beecher reported B-52 raids on "Vietcong and
North Vietnamese supply dumps and base camps in Cambodia," citing
U.S. sources. Beecher stated that "Cambodia has not made any pro-
test," disregarding Sihanouk's appeals and his protest against the mur-
der of "Khmer peasants, women and children in particular," not
Vietnamese military bases. Beecher also commented that "in the past,
American and South Vietnamese forces had occasionally fired across
the bOrder and even called in fighters or helicopter gunships to counter
fire they received from enemy units there," ignoring the somewhat
more important fact that U.S. aircraft and U.S.-ARVN- South Korean
forces had been attacking Cambodian villages, according to the
"friendly" government of Cambodia. The headline for his article states
falsely: "Raids in Cambodia by U.S. Unprotested." Beecher's article
caused consternation in Washington, setting olf the first stage of what
later became the Watergate scandaL As we have commented elsewhere,
"It is remarkable that Beecher's unique though quite inadequate ac-
count is now held up as evidence that the press maintained its honor
throughout this period, despite the crimes of Richard Nixon."49

Once again, the U.S. escalation of the war against Cambodia in 1969

272 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

coincided with similar efforts in Laos and Vietnam. The general reac-
tion was similar throughout, and remains so. The post-Tet accelerated
pacification campaign, which thoroughly demolished the civilian base
of the NLF, was regarded as 80 uninteresting that it is passed over in
virtual silence in the popular retrospectives. As for the wars in Laos and
Cambodia, Elterman comments, after reviewing the major media cover-
age, that apart from the "alternative press," they were virtually "invisi-
ble" in the press in 1969 when they were expanding to new heights as
the U.S. Air Force was shifted from North Vietnam to Laos and Cam-
bodia after the "bombing halt, -so

In March 1970, Cambodia was drawn irrevocably into the carnage
sweeping Indochina. On March 18, Sihanouk was overthrown in "an
upper-class coup, not a revolution," carried out for "interests of domes-
tic and political expedience," and with at least "indirect U.S. support,"
if not more.''' Two days later, ARVN ground and air operations began
in Svay Rieng Province, at the Vietnamese border, continuing through
April and leading to the U.S. -ARVN invasion on April 29, conducted
with an extreme brutality sometimes vividly depicted in the media,
which were particularly appalled by the behavior of the ARVN forces.
Much of the enormous civilian toll, however, resulted from air power,
including U.S. bombing strikes that leveled or severely damaged towns
and villages. One effect of the invasion was to drive the Vietnamese
forces away from the border and deeper into Cambodia, where they
began to support the growing peasant resistance against the coup lead-
ers. A second effect, as described by U.S. correspondent Richard Dud-
man, who witnessed these events at first hand after his capture by the
Cambodian resistance, was that "the bombing and shooting was radi-
calizing the people of rural Cambodia and was turning the countryside
into a massive, dedicated, and effective revolutionary base."" Cam-
bodia was now pluAged into civil war, with increasing savagery on both
sides.

U.S. bombing continued at a high level after the withdrawal ofU.S.
forces from Cambodia. By late 1971, an investigating team of the Gen-
eral Accounting Office concluded that U.S. and Saigon army bombing
is "a very significant cause of refugees and civihan casualties," estimat-
ing that almost a third of the seven-million population may be refugees.
U.S. intelligence reported that "what the villagers feared most was the
possibility of indiscriminate artillery and air strikes," and refugee re-
ports and other sources confirm that these were the major cause of
civilian casualties and the flight of refugees.^'*

Information about what Vfas happening in the peasant society of
Cambodia in the early 1970S was limited but not unavailable. There

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II); LAOS AND CAMBODIA 273

were, first of all, many refugees with stories to tell, although the media
were not interested. There was also an eyewitness account by French
Southeast Asia specialist Serge Thion, who spent two weeks in regions
controlled by the Cambodian guerrillas. His reports were offered to the
Washington Posh but rejected. They were of no more interest than the
reports of Ufe under the bombing in Laos, or similar questions regard-
ing Vietnam throughout the war and in the retrospectives.

As in Laos, the escalating war remained largely "invisible" in the
media. Surveying a five-month period in early 1972 in the national
press, Elterman found that "In terms of war casualties, the focus in
The New York Times and Time was on military -related deaths and
almost always only those that occurred in Vietnam, ignoring also the

civilian deaths and refugees in that country too During the winter

and spring of 1972, the war in Cambodia and Laos was ignored more
than usually with most of the Indo-China news coverage given to the
North Vietnamese offensive into South Vietnam and the United States

bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong Time, in fact, had more coverage

on civilian casualties in Northern Ireland during the first half of 1972
than it did on the Indo-China War."56

Meanwhile, Cambodia was being systematically demolished, and the
Khmer Rouge, hitherto a marginal element, were becoming a significant
force with substantial peasant support in inner Cambodia, increasingly
victimized by U.S. terror. As for the U.S. -backed Lon Nol regime,
Michael Vickery points out that their "client mentality" and subse-
quent "dependency led them to acquiesce in, or even encourage, the
devastation of their own country by one of the worst aggressive on-
slaughts in modern warfare, and therefore to appear as traitors to a
victorious peasant army which had broken with old patron-client rela-
tionships and had been self-consciously organized and indoctrinated
for individual, group, and national self-reliance."*'

In early 1973, U.S. bombing increased to a scale that might truly
merit the term "genocidal" used by the Finnish Inquiry Commission.
In the five-month period after the signing of the Paris peace accords,
the bombing matched the level of the preceding three years,58 and it was
to continue at that level until Congress forced a halt in August-
although bombing and shelling of the countryside by armies of the
U.S. -backed regime were to continue on a substantial scale, with U.S.
guidance and supply, until the war's end. Over a million refugees fled
to Phnom Penh, which became a horror chamber while the countryside
was laid waste, including B-S2 bombing targeted "on the most heavily
populated areas of Cambodia," where U.S. Air Force maps showed
"thousands of square miles of densely populated, fertile areas . . .

274

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

marked black from the inundation" -"the careless policies of the White
House" criticized by William Shawcross.^' At just this time, Khmer
Rouge programs became extremely harsh, so available studies indicate,
including a refugee study by Kenneth Quinn, of the National Security
Council staff, who never considers a possible causal connection, how-
ever, between the harshening of policy and the sharp increase in the
program of saturation bombing. Timothy Carney, the second of the
three major U.S. government specialists on Cambodia (Quinn, Carney,
Charles Twining), also notes that "sometime in 1973 the party appar-
ently decided to accelerate its program to alter Khmer society," for no
suggested reason. 60

6.2.5. Phase I in the media

During this period, there was extensive media coverage of Cambodia,
and there was no dearth of evidence on what was taking place in the
regions subjected to U.S. Air Force atrocities. It was not necessary to
undertake a difficult expedition to the Thai-Cambodia border to find
refugees who would tell what they knew, but the victims of phase I of
"the decade of the genocide" who were huddled in the slums of Phnom
Penh or other towns and villages to which they fled were of no more
interest than those in the miserable camps on the outskirts of Vien-
tiane-unless they had tales of terror by the Cambodian insurgents to
recount (the Vietnamese long having faded into the background).6I No
books or articles were written by Father Ponchaud, who lived among
the peasants and sympathized deeply with their plight, so he informed
us when the time came to expose atrocities of the Khmer Rouge. The
same was true of many others who were later to expres^ their heartfelt
concerns for Cambodians suffering under Khmer Rouge terror, but
who did not seek to investigate and publicize the plight of the rural
population during phase I of the genocide, when such efforts might
have had a crucial impact on the policies that were destroying Cam-
bodia, a fact that might merit some thought.

The standard U.S. media picture of phase I is something like this.
"Umil the turning point in 1973, ... on the surface, Cambodians smiled
and were full of pleasantries, "62 but afterwards the mood of "Cambodi-
ans" became one of "apathy" and "resignation" because "impoverished
farmers, refugees and soldiers" (most of whom were press-ganged into
service from among the poor and refugee communities) felt that their
"leaders seem powerless to defend them against human and natural
adversities. "63 There is a "spirit of doom" as the government is "teeter-

THE INDOCHINII WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 275

ing on the wreckage of the democratic republic it set out to create" with
the coup that overthrew Sihanouk. S"* The Americans try, but with little
success, to "give the Cambodians some sense of confidence in their
leadership," but, nevertheless, "Cambodian morale has been sliding
steadily for a long time." However, "Rather than any sense of urgency
here [in Phnom Penh], there is the grand fatalism that is so much a part
of Cambodia's Hindu-influenced Buddhism,"65 although it somehow
does not seem to affect "the enemy," whose "determination" in the face
of the awesome firepower unleashed against them "baffles" the Ameri-
cans. But there is still "a feeling that the Americans will save the
Cambodians at the last minute because they cannot save themselves."
"Almost every conversation with a Cambodian now is the same,"
namely, fear that the "demoralized army will collapse" when the
American bombing terminates on August 15. The impending bombing
cutoff is "painful" to the "Cambodians" because of "the recent steady
successes of enemy troops" against overwhelming odds. In his final
summary report from Phnom Penh as the U.S. bombing ended, Sydney
Schanberg raised "the key unanswered question: How have the insur-
gents-without any planes of their own, and without the extensive
artillery support the Government troops have, with only small arms and
mobile weapons ...-been able not just to match the Government
forces, which are more than twice their size, but to push the Govern-
ment forces back and sustain the offensive for six months without any
significant lull?" "Since the insurgents are not superhuman, there must
be other explanations for their success." Perhaps they are so "deter-
mined and capable" because they "are less fatalistic than the Khmers
on this side" and "believe they can change their environment" (U.S.
embassy official). In this regard, "the enemy" are quite different from
"the Cambodian villager," who "usually has no politics" and "is not
interested in taking sides, only to be left alone to farm and fish and feed
his family and once in a while to celebrate on a Buddhist holiday. "66
The civil war, then, pits "the Cambodians" against "the enemy,"
Cambodian peasants who were surely not full ofpleasantries during the
pre-1973 U.S. bombings. "The Cambodians," fatalistic and resigned,
either want to be left alone ("the Cambodian villager") or hope that the
United States will save them and their government, striving for democ-
racy ("the Cambodians" generally). The enemy struggle on successfully
against overwhelming odds, baffling the Americans-exactly as Ameri-
cans building "democracy" have been baffled by the same problem in
South Vietnam, Central America, and many other places. Since these
are the conclusions drawn from "almost every conversation with a
Cambodian," they are surely realistic, at least as long as we understand

276 MANUPACTUKING CONSENT

that "Cambodians" are those Cambodians who are not "the enemy" of
the objective press, just as "South Vietnamese" were South Vietnamese
collaborating with the U.S. aggressors.

The framework is the usual one, although perhaps a shade more
egregious in the light of what might have been passing through the
minds of those Cambodians who were not "Cambodians" during phase
I of the genocide.

About that topic, we learn very little from the media. The refugees
flooding Phnom Penh and other areas where U.S. reporters traveled
were virtually ignored. To gain a measure of this remarkable fact, let
us review the reports during these months in the New York TimeSy most
of them by its Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent Sydney Schan-
berg, who, more than any other U.S. reporter, came to be regarded as
the conscience of the media with regard to Cambodia.

Schanberg arrived in Phnom Penh in May 1973. at the height of the
intensified bombing, which continued until the mid- August halt. Dur-
ing this period, the Times published twenty-seven of his reports from
Cambodia, many of them long and detailed, along with a column in
which he expressed his contempt for the "so-called international press
corps" who spend their time "interviewing each other" in the Hotel Le
Phnom.67

From the outset, Schanberg reports "refugees pouring into the city,"
but there are no interviews with refugees who relate the circumstances
oflife under the bombs. We hear a "well to do Cambodian woman" who
tells us that "The bombing is terrible"; she is "not frightened, just
annoyed-because it wakes my baby up every night in the middle of
the night, and I have to get up " (May 3). But those villagers who want
to be left alone are not granted the opportunity to relay their accounts
of somewhat more serious concerns, apart from a few scattered phrases,
and there is not a word to suggest that refugees might have had any
attitude, apart from fear, with regard to those "determined" fighters
who "believe they can change their environment:' although plainly
they had a solid base in the peasant society that was being torn to shreds
by saturation bombing. As in Laos a few years earlier, the refugees
simply had the wrong tale to tell, and the kinds of stories that readily
flow if one is sufficiently interested to inquire are lacking here.

Running through the columns seriatim for relevant material, number
5 (May II) quotes a Western European diplomat who says that "Ameri-
can men in American planes are bombing the hell out of this place,"
and notes that the U.S. aircraft "do not always receive accurate an-
swers" about civilians in the targeted areas "from the Cambodian com-
manders" who direct the jet fighter-bombers. The Cambodians, then,

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 277

are to blame for the civilian casualties that must result, although "no

reliable figures are available" and refugees are not asked to supplement
with their personal knowledge. The next two columns (May 24, 27) are
the only ones concerned directly with the effect of the bombing in the
countryside. The first reports "extensive" destruction from bombing
that has wiped out "a whole series of villages" along the main highway,
with often not even a piece of a house left standing for miles, while " a
few people wander forlornly through the rubble, stunned by what has
happened, skirting the craters, picking at the debris." A group ofvillag-
ers from Svay Rieng Province) abutting Vietnam) report the destruction
of seven villages) with many killed. "The frightened villagers uprooted
by the bombing have a great deal to say," Schanberg comments, but we
do not read it here. Rather, he explains that "There is no doubt that
the Seventh Air Force is making a marked effort to avoid civihan
casualties-at least outside the eastern third of the country, which is
solidly held by the enemy"; and if there are casualties it is the fault of
Cambodian military officials who request air strikes with "almost no
concern about civilian lives or property." The second column informs
us that "the refugees frequently tell about the bombing," which has
destroyed villages and "terrified all the rest of the villagers)" a Western
diplomat reports. But the refugees are granted only two phrases, an
"incongruously polite" request that "I would be very glad if the Gov-
ernment would stop sending the planes to bomb," and a plea from a
monk to ask the United States and other governments: "Don't destroy
everything in Cambodia."

We hear no more from the refugees until column 15 (July 26), a
graphic account of "a terror attack on the civilian population "-by
Communist forces who shelled the outskirts of Phnom Penh. A weeping
child describes how her little brother's hand was cut off, and the blood-
stained road and doorsteps testify to Communist barbarity, as distinct
from the operations of the scrupulous American command. Column 19
(Aug. 5) tells of thousands of new refugees "fleeing from enemy as-
ssuhSy" and column 21 (Aug. 7) describes Cambodian soldiers looting
a recaptured village that "looked as if struck by a storm with a tongue
of fire," with many houses "smashed in by shells," but no word from
the victims, who had fled. Then follow three columns (Aug. 7, 9, 12)
describing in extensive detail the bombing of the village of Neak
Luong-in error-killing many government soldiers and their families.
This is the sole example of American bombing that was shown in the
film The Killing Fields^ the only depiction there of phase I of the
genocide) a memory that is acceptable since it was plainly an error.

We located eighteen additional reports datelined Cambodia) from

278

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

March 25 through August 18. ° One quotes a villager who says "The
bombers may kill some Communists but they kill everyone else, too"
(Browne, April II), but we found no other examples of reactions by the
victims, although there is a picture of a Cambodian soldier weeping for
his wife and ten children killed in the bombing ofNeak Luong by error
(Aug. 10).

In forty-five columns, then, there are three in which victims of U.S.
bombing are granted a few phrases to describe what is happening to
Cambodia. Not a single column seeks to explore the reactions of the
refugees not far from the Hotel Le Phnom, or in Banambang, or in the
far more miserable refugee camps in the countryside nearby; or to
attempt to develop some sense of what must have been happening
under the frenzied bombing of these months. Recall that in Phnom
Penh alone there were almost 1.5 million refugees who had fled from
the countryside, some, surely, who must have had some information to
relate about phase I of the genocide at its peak. The reader could no
doubt ascertain that terrible things were happening in the Cambodian
countryside, but what they were remains obscure, and the Americans
are explicitly exonerated, apart from the error of bombing the wrong
village.

The story remained much the same as phase I of the genocide
continued. The horrors in Phnom Penh itself were sometimes vividly
descjibcd, primarily abroad,69 but there was little effort to determine
what was happening in the areas held by the enemy of the U.S. govern-
ment-hence the enemy of the U.S. press; virtually the entire country
as "the Cambodians" were confined to urban centers swelled by a huge
flood of refugees who remain as hidden from view as those in the
teeming slums of Saigon or the camps around Vientiane.

Western correspondents evacuated from Phnom Penh after the
Khmer Rouge victory were able to obtain a fleeting picture of what had
taken place in the countryside. British correspondent Jon Swain sum-
marizes his impressions as follows:

The United States has much to answer for here, not only in terms
of human Uves and massive material destruction; the rigidity and
nastiness of the un-Cambodian like fellows in black who run this
country now, or what is left of it, are as much a product of this
wholesale American bombing which has hardened and honed their
minds as they are a product of Marx and Mao. . . . [The mass
evacuation of the cities] does not constitute a deliberate campaign
of terror, rather it points to poor organisation, lack of vision and
the brutalisation of a people by a long and savage war The

THE INDOCHINA WARS (ll); LAOS AND CAMBODIA 279

war damage here {in the countryside], as everywhere else we saw,
is total. Not a bridge is standing, hardly a house. I am told most
villagers have spent the war years living semi-permanently under-
ground in earth bunkers to escape the bombing. . . . The entire
countryside has been churned up by American B-52 bomb craters,
whole towns and villages razed. So far I have not seen one intact
pagoda. ''°

The conditions are much like those reported in 1970 by refugees from
the Plain of Jars, in Laos; in both cases, these accounts were almost
entirely excluded from the mainstream media.

So ended phase I of the genocide. In later years, those who had
transmitted narrowly selected fragments of this tale of horror expressed
their bitterness that Cambodia had been "forgotten." On the tenth
anniversary of the Khmer Rouge takeover, Sydney Schanberg wrote
two columns in the New York Times entitled "Cambodia Forgotten."
The first highlights the phrase: "Superpowers care as little today about
Cambodians as in 1970," the second dismisses Richard Nixon's 1985
claim that there was no "indiscriminate terror bombing" but only
"highly accurate" strikes "against enemy military targets." Schanberg
comments that "Anyone who visited the refugee camps in Cambodia
and talked to the civiHan survivors of the bombing learned quickly
about the substantial casualties." He recalls that "the Khmer Rouge
were a meaningless force when the war was brought to Cambodia in

1970 In order to flourish and grow, they needed a war to feed on.

And the superpowers-including this country, with the Nixon incur-
sion of 1970 and the massive bombing that folio wed-pro vided that war
and that nurturing material." He does not, however, inform us about
which superpower, apart from "this country," invaded Cambodia and
subjected it to massive bombing. With comparable even-handedness we
might deplore the contribution of the superpowers, including the
USSR, to the destruction of Afghanistan, or the attitude of the great
powers, including Nazi Germany, toward the victims of the death
camps, whom Schanberg brings up in a later column the same month
entitled "Memory is the Answer." He also does not comment on what
the reader of his columns might have learned about life in the Cambo-
dian countryside from his reporting during the peak period of the
bombing.^'

Others too stress that "memory is the answer." Commenting on the
award-winning film The Killing Fields, Samuel Freedman writes that
"While Holocaust survivors have helped perpetuate the memory of
Nazi infamy, the Cambodian genocide is already being forgotten,"

280 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

referring to phase II of the genocide, phase I having passed into obliv-
ion wih no concern. The New York Times reminds us that "Cambodia
remains perhaps the most pitiful victim of the Indochina wars," as it
is caught between the forces of Pol Pot and Hanoi, which used Pol Pot
attacks against Vietnamese villages as "a long-sought pretext to invade"
and now exploits "Po] Pot's Khmer Rouge army of 30,ooo inside Cam-
bodia" (in fact, mostly inside Thailand) as "the pretext for remaining
in Cambodia." "Unimaginable slaughter, invasion, brutal occupation
have followed famine and pestilence," all attributable to the Commu-
nists, although the suffering has been "aggravated by the cynicism of
big powers," not further differentiated. As for the United States,
"When Vietcong guerrillas used a neutral Cambodia as a sanctuary, it
was pounded by American bombs and drawn into a war it hoped to
avoid," but that is aU. In a later comment, the editors concede that
"murderous aerial bombing followed by brutal revolution, famine and
civil war" brought Cambodia to ruin, but of aU of this, "what cannot
be sponged away are the Khmer Rouge's butcheries" and the actions
of Hanoi, which has "subjugated and impoverished" Cambodia: phases
II and III of "the decade of the genocide."73

"Memory is the answer," but only when focused on proper targets,
far from home.

6.2.6. The Pol Pot era

Phase II of "the decade of the genocide" began with the Khmer Rouge
takeover in April 1975. Within a few weeks, the Khmer Rouge were
accused in the national press of "barbarous cruelty" and "genocidal
policies" comparable to the "Soviet extermination of the Kulaks or
with the Gulag Archipelago. "74 This was at a time when the death toll
was perhaps in the thousands; the half million or more killed during
phase I of the genocide never merited such comment, nor were these
assessments of the fiist days of phase II (or later ones, quite generally)
accompanied by reflection on the consequences of the American war
that were anticipated by U.S. officials and relief workers on the scene,
reviewed earlier, or by any recognition of a possible causal link between
the horrors of phase II and the American war against the rural society
during phase 1.

We win not document here the flood of rage and anger directed
against the Khmer Rouge from the outset and the evidence on which
it was based, having done so elsewhere in detail. Several facts docu-
mented there bear emphasis: (I) the outrage, which was instant and

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 28x

overwhelming, peaked in early 1977 and, until the overthrow of Pol Pot,
was based almost exclusively on evidence through 1977, primarily 1975-
76;76 (2) apart from a few knowledgeable journalists, the State Depart-
ment's Cambodia experts, and probably the majority of the small group
of Cambodia scholars-that is, most of those with a basis for judg-
ment-the most extreme accusations were adopted and proclaimed
with a great show of indignation over Communist atrocities, the integ-
rity of which can be measured by comparison to the reaction to phase
I of the genocide and U.S. responsibility for it; (3) these skeptical
assessments, almost entirely suppressed in the media, proved fairly
accurate for the period in question; (4) the evidence that provided the
crucial basis for the denunciations of Communist genocide was of a
kind that would have been dismissed with derision had something of
the sort been offered with regard to phase I of the genocide or other
U.S. atrocities, including faked interviews and photographs and fab-
ricated statements anributed to Khmer Rouge officials, constantly re-
peated even after they had been conceded to be frauds; fabricated
casualty estimates based on misquoted studies that became unquestion-
able doctrine even after they were publicly withdrawn as inventions;
and highly selective refugee reports that ignored much refugee testi-
mony, including detailed studies by Cambodia scholars, that could not
be exploited for what soon became a propaganda campaign at a level
of deceit of astonishing proportions.^''

As we also noted from the first paragraph of our earlier review of this
material, to which we wiU simply refer here for specifics, "there is no
difficulty in documenting major atrocities and oppression, primarily
from the reports of refugees"; there is little doubt that "the record of
atrocities in Cambodia is substantial and often gruesome" and repre-
sents "a fearful toll"; "when the facts are in, it may tum out that the
more extreme condemnations were in fact correct," although if so, "it
will in no way alter the conclusions we have reached on the central
question addressed here: how the available facts were selected, modi-
fied, or sometimes invented to create a certain image offered to the
general population. The answer to this question seems clear, and it is
unaffected by whatever may yet be discovered about Cambodia in the fu-
ture." As we repeatedly stressed, in this chapter of a two-volume study
on U.S. policy and ideology, our concern remained the United States,
not Indochina; our purpose was not to "establish the facts with regard to
postwar Indochina" on the basis of the evidence available, but rather to
examine the constructions developed on the basis of this evidence,
to analyze the way this evidence was refracted "through the prism of
Western ideology, a very different task."78 The conclusions drawn there

282

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

remain valid. To our knowledge, no error or even misleading statement
or omission has been found.

This review of an impressive propaganda exercise aroused great
outrage-not at all surprisingly: the response within Soviet domains is
similar, as are the reasons, when dissidents expose propaganda fabrica-
tions with regard to the United States, Israel, and other official enemies.
Indignant commentators depicted us as "apologists for Khmer Rouge
crimes"8°-in a study that denounced Khmer Rouge atrocities (a fact
always suppressed) and then proceeded to demonstrate the remarkable
character of Western propaganda, our topic throughout the two-vol-
ume study in which this chapter appeared. There was also a new wave
of falsification, often unanswerable when journals refused to permit
response. We will not review these further propaganda exercises here,
but merely note that they provide an intriguing expression of what, in
other contexts, is described as the totalitarian mentality: it is not enough
to denounce official enemies; it is also necessary to guard with vigilance
the right to lie in the service of power. The reaction to our challenge
to this sacred right again fits neady within the expectations of a propa-
ganda model, standing alongside the Freedom House attack on the
media for failure to serve state policy with sufficient vigor and opti-
mism.

By early 1977, denunciations of the Khmer Rouge for having caused
unprecedented "murder in a gentle land" and "autogenocide" extended
from mass circulation journals such as Reader's Digest (with tens of
millions of readers) and TV Guide (circulation nineteen million), to the
New York Revim of Books and the media generally, in addition to a
best-selling book by John Barron and Anthony Paul based on their
Reader's Digest article and the widely misquoted study by Francois
Ponchaud mentioned earlier. Similar material continued to flow in
abundance in the press and newsweeklies, the New York Times Maga-
zine, and elsewhere. Evidence about the 1977-78 period became availa-
ble primarily after the Vietnamese expulsion of the Khmer Rouge
regime, which brought phase II of the genocide to a close, eliciting new
outrage over the alleged "genocide" brought about by the "Prussians
of Asia."

The picture created by this chorus of denunciation, from the first
days of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) in 1975, is described sardonically
by Michael Vickery as "the standard total view" (STV). According to
the STV, prior to the Khmer Rouge victory in April 1975, Cambodia
had been a "gentle land" (Barron and Paul) of "gentle if emotional
people" who "wanted only to live in peace in their lush kingdom" (Jack
Anderson), a land in which hunger was "almost unknown" (Henry

THB INDOCHINA WARS (11): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 283

Kamm). But in 1975, the "formerly fun-loving, easy-going Cambodi-
ans" were subjected to the "harsh regime" of the Khmer Rouge, who
ordered that all those not under their rule before the victory can be
"disposed of because they are "no longer required," even if only one
million Khmers remain (Donald Wises, citing several of the frequently
quoted Khmer Rouge statements that were conceded to be fabrica-
tions).81

According to the STV, during the pre- 1977 period on which the
conclusions were based, the Khmer Rouge leadership was engaged in
a policy of systematic extermination and destruction of all organized
social and cultural hfe apart from the Gulag run by the "nine men at
the top," Paris-trained Communists, without local variation and with
no cause other than inexplicable sadism and Marxist-Leninist dogma.
By early 1977, it was alleged that they had "boasted" of having slaugh-
tered some two million people (Jean Lacouture in the New York Re-
view). This figure remained the standard even after Lacouture
withdrew it a few weeks later, acknowledging that he had misread his
source (Ponchaud) and that the actual figure might be in the thousands,
but adding that he saw little significance to a difference between thou-
sands killed and a "boast" of two million killed. This position expresses
with some clarity the general attitude toward fact during this period and
since, as does his further statement that it is hardly important to deter-
mine "exactly which person uttered an inhuman phrase"-the case in
question had to do with inhuman phrases he attributed to Khmer
Rouge officials but which turned out to be mistranslations of phrases
that had been fabricated outright by his source (Ponchaud) or that had
appeared not in a Cambodian journal, as he asserted, but in a Thai
journal mistranslated by Ponchaud that expressed virtually the oppo-
site of what was claimed. The two-million figure was later upgraded to
three million or more, often citing Vietnamese wartime propaganda.
The examples are quite typical.

Not everyone joined in the chorus. The most striking exceptions
were those who had the best access to information from Cambodia,
notably, the State Department Cambodia speciahsts. Their view, based
on what evidence was then available (primarily from northwestern
Cambodia), was that deaths from aU causes might have been in the
"tens ifnot hundreds of thousands," largely from disease, malnutrition,
and "brutal, rapid change," not "mass genocide." These tentative con-
clusions were almost entirely ignored by the media-we found one
important exception in our review-because they were simply not use-
ful for the purpose at the time, just as refugee testimony that did not
conform to the STY was ignored. Overseas, journalists who had special

284 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

knowledge of Indochina also gave rather nuanced accounts, notably,
Nayan Chanda.^^

In his detailed, region-by-region study, Vickery shows that the STY
was a picture with little merit, and that the few skeptics had been
essentially accurate for the period in question, although in 1977-78,
something approaching the STY came to be correct in the context of
brutal inter-party purges and the expanding war with Vietnam. He also
makes the obvious logical point that "the evidence for 1977-78," which
only became available after the Vietnamese conquest in 1979, "does not
retrospectively justify the STV" which reigned on the basis of evidence
from the 1975-76 period; "and the Vietnamese adoption of some of the
worst Western propaganda stories as support for their case in 1979 does
not prove that those stories were valid."83 Recent work indicates that
the worst massacres, including those that left the mass graves and
horrifying heaps of skulls found by journalists who entered Cambodia
after the Vietnamese conquest, were in the eastern zone bordering
Vietnam in mid- to late 1978,**

The nature of the Western agony over Cambodia during phase 1 1 of
the genocide, as a sociocultural phenomenon, becomes clarified further
when we compare it to the reaction to comparable and simultaneous
atrocities in Timor. There, as in phase I of the Cambodia genocide, the
United States bore primary responsibility and could have acted to
reduce or terminate the atrocities. In contrast, in Cambodia under D K
rule, where the blame could be placed on the official enemy, nothing
at all could be done, a point that was stressed by government experts
when George McGovern caned for international intervention in August
1978, eliciting much media ridicule. Neither McGovern nor anyone
else recommended such intervention against the United States during
phase] of the genocide, or against Indonesia and the United States
during the Timor atrocities, to which the United States (and, to a much
lesser extent, other powers) lent material and diplomatic support, just
as there has been no call for intervention as the armies of El Salvador
and Guatemala proceeded to slaughter their own populations with
enthusiastic U.S. support in the early 1980s.

The comparison between Timor and phase 1 1 in Cambodia was
particularly striking, and was occasionally noted after the fact. The
excuses now produced for this refusal to report what was happening in
Timor, or to protest these atiociti&s or act to stop them, are instructive
in the present context. Thus, William Shawcross rejects the obvious
interpretation of the comparative response to Timor and Cambodia in
favor of a "more structurally serious explanation": "a comparative lack
of sources" and lack of access to refugees/* Lisbon is a two-hour flight

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 28S

from London, and even Australia is not notably harder to reach than
the Thai -Cambodia border, but the many Timorese refugees in Lisbon
and Australia were ignored by the media, which preferred "facts"
offered by the State Department and Indonesian generals. Similarly,
the media ignored readily available refugee studies from sources at least
as credible as those used as the basis for the ideologically serviceable
outrage over the Khmer Rouge, and disregarded highly credible wit-
nesses whQ reached New York and Washington along with additional
evidence from church sources and others. The coverage of Timor
actually declined sharply as massacres increased with mounting U.S.
support. The real and "structurally serious" reason for this difference
in scope and character of coverage is not difficult to discern (see chapter
1), although not very comfortable for Western opinion, and becomes
still more obvious when a broader range of cases is considered that
illustrate the same conclusions.^^

6.2.7. Phase III in Indochina:
Cambodia and the bleeding of
Vietnam

As we write in 1987, Western moralists remain silent as their govern-
ments provide the means for Indonesia to continue its campaign of
terror and repression in Timor. Meanwhile, the United States backs the
DK coalition, largely based on the Khmer Rouge, because of its "conti-
nuity" with the Pol Pot regime, so the State Department informed
Congress in 1982. The reason for this differential reaction to the Fretilin
guerrillas resisting Indonesian aggression in Timor, and the Khmer
Rouge guerrillas attacking Cambodia from Thai bases, is also explained
by the State Department: the Khmer Rouge-based coalition is
"unquestionably" more representative of the people of Cambodia than
Fretilin is of the Timorese. There iSj therefore, no need to puzzle over
the apparent inconsistency during the late 1970S in U.S. attitudes to-
ward Pol Pot and the Indonesian generals: the former, the object of
hatred and contempt for the massacres in Cambodia under his rule
during phase II; the latter, our friends whom we cheerfully supplied
and supported as they conducted comparable massacres in Timor at the
same time. This apparent inconsistency, which briefly troubled even the
editors of the Wall Street Journal in the early 1980s,89 is now happily
resolved: we support both the Khmer Rouge and the Indonesian
generals.

286 MANDFACTUIING CONSBNT

The current U.S. support for the Khmer Rouge merits little atten-
tion in the media, just as little nouce is given to the Vietnamese posi-
tion: a poJitical settlement among Cambodians excluding Khmer Rouge
leaders Pol Pot and his close associate leng Sary.9(I As noted earlier,
U.S. aid to the Khmer Rouge is reported by congressional sources to
be extensive. Furthermore, the Reagan administration, following "Chi-
nese rather than Southeast Asian inclinations," has refused to back the
efforts of its Southeast Asian alhes "to dilute the strength of China's
ally, the deposed Pol Pot regime, by giving greater weight to non-
Communist guerrillas and political groupings."'* Nayan Chanda re-
ported in 1984 that the United States had "more than doubled its
financial assistance to the resistance forces," mainly through funds
earmarked for humanitarian assistance that permit U.S. allies to divert
funds to arms purchases, a familiar ploy .92 While it is claimed that the
funds are limited to the (generally ineffectual) non-Communist resist-
ance, this is a shallow pretense. "Both Sihanouk's army and Son Sann's
KPNLF," the two components of the non-Communist resistance, "are
completely discounted in Phnom Penh," James Pringle reports from
Phnom Penh in the Par Eastern Economic Review. '"AU they do is sit
drinking coca-cola on the border,' said one well-informed Soviet bloc
diplomat." From the Thai border areas, Barbara Crossette reports that
"Trucks loaded with men and boys, 150 or 200 at a time, pull away from
settlements controlled by Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge and rurcvble into
Cambodia," where the supplies are carried "into the Cambodian inte-
rior to stockpile supplies for the Khmer Rouge," in the expectation that
they wUl be able to prevail by military force and terror once the Viet-
namese withdraw as demanded by the United States. A spokesman for
the Sihanoukisr National Army in Bangkok comments that "The main
problem we now have is how to get the Vietnamese to pull out without
bringing back the Khmer Rouge," the probable consequence of U.S.
policy. Fonner Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke com-
ments that the U.S. aid "will end up going to Pol Pot and his people,"
a fact noted also by several journalists. Sydney Schanberg's Cambodian
associate Dith Prant whose story of suffering under DK terror was the
basis for the widely publicized film The Killing Fields and much media
commentary, found somewhat greater difficulty in reaching the public
with his view that "Giving U.S. weapons [to the Khmer resistance] is
like putting gasoline on afire," and is the last thing Cambodia needs.
David Hawk alleges that "it is common knowledge that Reagan-
administration political officers and defence attaches from the US Em-
bassy in Bangkok have visited Khmer Rouge enclaves."9J

The reasons for supporting the Thai-based OK coalition go beyond

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 287

their "continuity" with the Khmer Rouge regime. A more fundamental
reason was outlined by our ally Deng Xiaoping in 1979: "It is wise to
force the Vietnamese to stay in Kampuchea because that way they wiU
suffer more and more and will not be able to extend their hand to
Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore."94 This motive of "bleeding Viet-
nam" to ensure that it does not recover from its victimization at the
hands of the West has additional advantages. By acting in such a way
as to enhance suffering and repression in Indochina, we demonstrate
retrospectively the "benevolence" of our "noble crusade" of earlier
years.

As we discussed earlier, thft Cambodians were "worthy victims"
when they were being terrorized by the Khmer Rouge under phase II
of the genocide> and they achieved this status once again after the
Vietnamese invasion brought phase II of the genocide to an end, al-
though with a change in the cast of characters, as the United States
joined China in support of the Khmer Rouge. After early efforts to
charge the Vietnamese with "genocide," the condemnation of the offi-
cial enemy shifted to the terrible acts of "the Prussians of Asia," who
have "subjugated and impoverished" Cambodia since overthrowing Pol
Pot, according to the editors of the New York Times. Recall that of all
the horrors of the past years, including the atrocities of phase I, "what
cannot be sponged away" are "the Khmer Rouge's butcheries "-evi-
dently of lesser moment in Washington now that the Pol Pot forces
qualify as resistance forces under the Reagan doctrine.

One would be hard pui to find any serious observers of the current
Cambodian scene who believe that the Vietnamese have reduced Cam-
bodia to a level below that of the DK period, as these comments imply.
Rather, among people who are concerned about the people of Cam-
bodia for themselves and not merely because of their value for propa-
ganda exercises, few would question that "it is clear that hfe for the
people is far better now than under Democratic Kampuchea,"95 and
some Cambodia speciahsts have suggested that the current regime com-
pares favorably with any of its predecessors. Consistent opponents of
aggression would have a moral basis for condemning the Vietnamese
invasion, despite the rapidly escalating atrocities of 1977-78 and the
murderous raids against Vietnam by Cambodian forces under Pol Pot's
rule.** It is a little difficult to take this argument seriously, however,
when it is put forth by people who condemn the West for not having
undertaken more vigorous actions to "rescue" the Cambodians from
Pol Pot- a "rescue" that would have been no less self-serving in intent
than the Viecnamese invasion, as history makes clear. And we need not
tarry over the argument when it is offered by those who tolerate or

288 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

applaud murderous aggression when it suits their ends: the Indonesian
invasion of Timor, the "liberation" of Lebanon by Israeli forces in 1982
(as the Times editors called it), or the "defense of South Vietnam," to
mention a few obvious cases.

6.2.8. Phase III at home: the great
silence and the hidden potency of

the left

Turning to the home front, phase III illustrates the expectations of a
propaganda model in yet a different way. The truth about the response
to the Pol Pot atrocities in the media and "the culture" in general, and
the dramatic contrast to comparable examples where the United States
bears primary responsibility, is not pleasant to contemplate. Since the
facts are too overwhelming to refute, it is a better strategy simply to
dispatch them to the memory hole. This task having been achieved with
the customary alacrity, we may now observe with wonder that "The
West awoke to the suffering of Kampuchea in autumn, 1979" (William
Shawcross), and then go on to ruminate about the curious inability of
the West, always consumed with self-flagellation, to perceive the atroci-
ties of its enemies.*' And so matters have proceeded in the latest phase
of the sad tale of Cambodia.

"There was silence in the mid-1970s during the mass murders by the
Khmer Rouge" (Floyd Abrams), and "The atrocity stories coming out
of Cambodia after 1975 quite simply were not believed" (David
Hawk)-at a time when accusations of genocide of the Hitler-Stalin
variety were resounding from the New York Times and Washington Post
to the Reader's Digest and TV Guide to the New York Review ofBO<Jks,
and the mass media extensively. "The West woke up to the horror of
what had happened only after the Vietnamese invasion" (Economist)'
and "hardly anyone outside, on Left or Right, had noticed [the horrors
of the Pol Pot regime] at the time they were actually going on (1975-
1978)" (Conor Cruise 0'Brien)-that is, at the time when Jimmy Carter
branded Pol Pot "the world's worst violator of human rights," and a
British Foreign Office report condemned the regime for the death of
"many hundreds of thousands of people."'^ One might imagine that
such outlandish claims could not pass without a raised eyebrow at least,
but that is to underestimate the ability of the ideological institutions to
rally to a worthy cause: in this case, the cause of suppressing the truth

THE INDOCHINA WARS (U); LAOS AND CAMBODIA 289

about the Western response to "the decade of the genocide" and other
atrocities.

That there was "silence" over Pol Pot atrocities was also an insistent
claim right at the peak of the bitter outrage over Pol Pot genocide. Time
magazine published a major article by David Aikman on July 31, 1978,
claiming that the Khmer Rouge "experiment in genocide" was being
ignored, and adding a new twist that was also taken up with enthusiasm
in the subsequent reconstruction of history: "there are intellectuals in
the West so committed to the twin Molochs ofour day-'liberation' and
'revolution'-that they can actually defend what has happened in Cam-
bodia"; "some political theorists have defended it, as George Bernard
Shaw and other Western intellectuals defended the brutal social engi-
neering in the Soviet Union during the 1930s." Noone was mentioned,
for the simple reason that no one could be found to fit the bill, although
Time did vainly attempt to elicit positive statements about the Pol Pot
regime from antiwar activists to buttress this useful thesis.

Each of these themes-the "silence" of the West, the defense of Pol
Pot by Western intellectuals-is unequivocally refuted by massive evi-
dence that is well known, although ignored, by the mobilized intellec-
tual culture. But this level of misrepresentation in the service of a noble
cause still does not suffice. The two themes were combined by William
Shawcross in an inspired agitprop achievement that carried the farce
a step further. 99 This new contribution evoked much enthusiasm; sev-
eral of the comments just cited are from reviews of his book, or are
obviously inspired by it.

In his study of "Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience,"
Shawcross muses on the relative "silence" of the West in the face of
Khmer Rouge atrocities. The facts are radically different, but the idea
that the West ignores Communist atrocities while agonizing over its
own is far more appealing to the Western conscience. Shawcross then
proceeds to adopt Aikman's second thesis, applying it in an ingenious
way to explain the mechanism that hes behind this unwillingness of the
West to face up to Communist atrocities, so notable a feature of West-
em life. The silence over phase 1 1 of the genocide, he argues, resulted
from "the skepticism (to use a mild term) displayed by the Western left
toward the stories coming OUt of Democratic Kampuchea. That skepti-
cism was most fervently and frequently expressed by Noam Chomsky
. . ., [who] asserted that from the moment of the Khmer Rouge victory
in 1975 the Western press colluded with Western and anti-Communist
Asian governments, notably Thailand, to produce a 'vast and unprece-
dented' campaign of propaganda against the Khmer Rouge. "100

290

MANUFACTURING CONSENT

To buttress this claim, Shawcross provides what purports to be a
quote-but without citing an identifiable source, for two good reasons.
First, the quote does not exist,101 although even his version undermines
his basic claim, with its reference to "the grim reality" of Cambodia
under Khmer Rouge rule. Second, the source of the manufactured
quote is a work published in November 1979, almost a year after the
fall of the Pol Pot regime. To cite the date would have raised the
question of how this "fervent and frequent" expression of skepticism
could have intimidated governments and the media from 1975 through
1978. Furthermore, we made it crystal clear that the record of atrocities
was "gruesome," perhaps even at the level of the most outlandish
fabrications.

Note that Shawcross could have cited real examples of "skepticism";
for example, the skepticism of State Department analysts at the height
of the furor over Cambodia, or the retrospective comments of Douglas
Pike and others cited earlier (pp. 265-66), or the comments of journal-
ists during phase II who were willing to conclude only that refugee
accounts "suggest that the Khmer Rouge is finding it hard to govern
the country except by coercion" and "even suggest that terror is being
employed as a system of government," noting that refugees "did not
appear to be in a sorry condition" and that if the Khmer Rouge are
perpetrating an "atrocity," as claimed, then "the atrocity did not begin
in April [1975J-it simply entered its sixth year" (William Shaw-
cross).102 But the truth plainly would not have served the purposes of
this exercise.

Perhaps there was some other example of this "fervent and frequent"
expression of skepticism that silenced the West. Shawcross is wise to
avoid examples, because as he knows well, his primary source, Pon-
chaud, went out of his way to praise Chomsky for "the responsible
attitude and precision of thought" shown in what he had written on
Cambodia, referring to our 1977 review of his book cited earlier and
unpublished correspondence he had seen, which exhausts anything
relevant that appears during the DK period. So Shawcross would
have us believe that a single 1977 article in The Nation silenced the
West, an article in which, furthermore, we praised the book written by
his primary source, Ponchaud, as "serious and worth reading," with its
"grisly account of what refugees have reported to him about the bar-
barity of their treatment at the hands of the Khmer Rouge," and stated
that we are in no position to draw any conclusion about the actual
extent of the atrocities, in conformity to State Department specialists
and other informed sources at the time.

To be clear, in our one article, to which Ponchaud alludes, we did

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 291

express some "skepticism," not only about claims that had already been
withdrawn as fabrications but also about others that remained to be
assessed. Thus in reviewing Ponchaud, we expressed skepticism about
his estimate of casualties caused by American bombing, which appeared
to us excessive and possibly based on misinterpretation of figures he
cited; and we raised questions about some of the quotes attributed to
the Khmer Rouge on which he (and later others) crucially relied, but
which he had presented in very different forms on different occasions-
and which he later conceded to have no basis whatsoever. los It is
noteworthy that our skepticism about charges against the United
States, although based mereJy on suspicion, has elicited no comment,
while our skepticism about charges against the Khmer Rouge, which
was based on textual evidence and, as it later turned out, was much
understated, has aroused great fury in what Vickery describes as "in-
competent, even dishonest" and "often scurrilous" commentary.106
The differential reaction is easily explained. It is taken for granted that
U.S. actions must be recounted with scrupulous care and in nuanced
manner, so our insistence on this is simply what is to be expected,
meriting no comment. (We agree.) In contrast, the acts of official ene-
mies merit no such scruples, and it is an unforgivable crime to question
propaganda exercises undertaken in the service of power.

Notice that even had the "skepticism" of "the Western left" to which
Shawcross alludes existed to any significant degree, the idea that this
could have the consequences he describes, coming from people sys-
tematically barred from the media and mainstream discussion, is a
construction of such audacity that one must admire its creator. Shaw-
cross argues further that this alleged "left-wing skepticism" not only
silenced Western media and governments but also prevented any mean-
ingful Western response to Khmer Rouge atrocities. This thesis is too
ludicrous to merit comment, and we can assess Shawcross's seriousness
in advancing it by turning to his own proposals at the time as to what
could be done, recalling that he had easy access to the mainstream
media throughout. We find not a word suggesting what might be
done '"''-for the simple reason that neither he nor anyone else could
think of anything useful. The situation was, of course, quite different
during phase I of the genocide, or with regard to Timor during phase
II and since, and in innumerable other cases where Shawcross's charge
would indeed be vahd. We learn a good deal about "holocaust and the
modem conscience" by observing this exercise and the reaction it
elicited.

Shawcross attributes this "left-wing skepticism," which had such
awesome consequences because of the influence of the left on Western

292 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

institutions, in part to Vietnamese propaganda. Vietnam's "spokesmen
had undercut the refugee stories about Khmer Rouge conduct," he
writes, "thus adding to disbelief in them, particularly on the Western
left, "108 which naturally takes its cues from Hanoi and closely parrots
its doctrines, according to approved dogma- although it is interesting
that Shawcross also insinuates that the influence of Hanoi extended
beyond its acolytes. And why not? If we have reached the point of
claiming that the Western left silenced the media and governments,
why not proceed to maintain that even outside these dangerous circles,
Vietnamese propaganda is a powerful force in shaping opinion? Natu-
rally Shawcross does not make even a pretense of providing any evi-
dence for what he knows perfectly well to be the sheerest fantasy, from
beginning to end.

We may place this outlandish explanation of the "silence" of the
West alongside the similar claims that State Department Communists
lost China, that the media are threatening the foundations of democ-
racy with their "adversarial stance," etc. The reaction, however, was
not ridicule, but rather great enthusiasm. To cite just one typical exam-
ple, David Hawk observes that Shawcross "attributes the world's indif-
ference" to "the influence of antiwar academics and activists on the
American left who obfuscated Khmer Rouge behavior, denigrated the
post-1975 refugee reports and denounced the journalists who got those
stories. "109 He accepts this thesis as valid but cites no evidence either
for the "indifference" to the atrocities, which were being denounced
worldwide as genocidal, or for the alleged behavior of the American
left, nor does he explain the mechanisms whereby this behavior, had
it existed, could have controlled the mainstream media, or even margin-
ally influenced them. Convenient mythologies require neither evidence
nor logic. Nor do they require any attention to Hawk's own perform-
ance at the time, as an Amnesty International official and specialist on
Southeast Asia. The Al Annual Report for 1977 noted that the number
of alleged executions in Cambodia was "fewer than during the preced-
ing year," and while it summarizes a number of reports of executions
and disappearances, its account is restrained. The 1978 Annual Report,
while stronger in its allegations of violence, pointed out that refugee
reports, on which it was necessary to rely heavily, "are often imprecise
or conflicting," thus leaving Al and Hawk in the Shawcross-Hawk
category of those who "denigrated the post-1975 refugee reports." It is
so easy to moralize in retrospect.

Shawcross develops his thesis further in interesting ways.UO To show
that Western commentators refused to recognize that "the Khmer
Rouge was a Marxist-Leninist government," he states that British jour-

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAMBODIA 293

natist John Pilger "constantly compared" the Khmer Rouge with the
Nazis, suppressing the fact that he explicitly compared their actions
with "Stalin's terror," as Pilger noted in a response to one of the many
reviews that repeated Shawcross's inventions. 1 1 1 Shawcross claims fur-
ther that the present authors "were to believe for years" that "the
refugees were unreliable, that the CIA was cooking up a bloodbath to
say, 'We told you so.'" He cites our one article (The Nation, 1977), in
which there is no hint of any such thesis, as there is none elsewhere.
In that article we were clear and explicit, as also subsequently, that
refugee reports left no doubt that the record of Khmer Rouge atrocities
was "substantial and often gruesome," and that "in the case of Cam-
bodia, there is no difficulty in documenting major atrocities and oppres-
sion, primarily from the reports of refugees." 112 To support his
contention with regard to our alleged denial of the rehability of re-
fugees, Shawcross cites our comment on the need to exercise care in
analyzing refugee reports, carefully suppressing the fact that we are
quoting Ponchaud, his primary source, and that the comment he cites
is a familiar truism. His reference to the CIA cooking up a bloodbath
is pure fantasy, although we might add that by the time he wrote,
although after our book appeared, Michael Vickery did present evi-
dence that the Barron-Paul Reader's Digest account was in part a CIA
disinformation effort. I n Shawcros$ states further his view, "contrary to
Chomsky and Herman," that the U.S. government was "remarkably
inactive" in anti-Khmer Rouge propaganda. We proposed no U.S.
government role whatsoever in orchestrating the deceit we docu-
mented, by William Shawcross and others, and in fact endorsed State
Department reports as the most plausible then available. And so on,
throughout.

But Shawcross and others who are deeply offended by our challenge
to the right to Ue in the service of one's favored state understand very
well that charges against dissident opinion require no evidence and that
ideologically useful accusations wiU stand merely on the basis of end-
less repetition, however ludicrous they may be-even the claim that the
American left silenced the entire West during the Pol Pot period.

Shawcross's charges against other enemies follow the same pattern-
another factor, presumably, in the appeal of his message. Thus in
pursuit of his fashionable quest to attribute primary responsibility for
the continuing tragedy of Cambodia to Vietnam, not to those who were
responsible for phase I of the genocide with their "careless" pohcies
and who are now supporting Pol Pot, Shawcross rationalizes the cur-
rent support for Pol Pot as a natural response to Vietnamese actions.
Given Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia and subsequent conduct, he ex-

Z94 Mtr.NUFtr.CTURING CONSENT

plains, China and the ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia (not to speak
of their "Western partners") were bound "to seek to apply all possible
forms of pressure upon Hanoi" to renounce its intentions, and "the
Vietnamese could have predicted that such pressures would include
support for the Khmer Rouge." Thus the Vietnamese are to blame if
China and the United States support Pol Pot, along with such dedicated
advocates of human rights and the strict reliance on peaceful means as
Indonesia and Thailand. Such analysis is, however, not extended to the
Vietnamese, who are always carrying out cold-blooded strategies in a
world without threats from China or the United States, threats that
might allow us to "predict" (and thus implicitly exonerate) these strate-
gies. According to Shawcross, "Vietnam's conduct since its invasion of
Cambodia rarely suggested that it wished to see a compromise in which
the Khmer Rouge were removed as a viable force in Cambodia-which
was what the ASEAN countries and their Western partners insisted was
their aim." "It is impossible to predict whether any such suggestion
[from Hanoi] would have been accepted by the Chinese or the ASEAN
countries, but the point is that it was never made," Shawcross asserts
without qualification. "4 Hanoi has repeatedly offered to withdraw in
favor of an indigenous regime, the only condition being the exclusion
of the top Khmer Rouge leadership. Whether these offers were serious
or not, we do not know, as they have been dismissed by the Deng-
Reagan alliance and, with more vacillation, the ASEAN countries.
These rejections, in favor of continued support for Pol Pot, have not
been featured in the media, which would hardly surprise a rational
observer. But these facts are hardly supportive of Shawcross's analysis,
to say the least.

In a further effort to cast the blame on the approved enemy, Shaw-
cross asserts that the Vietnamese "placed more confidence in the tor-
turers than in their victims, that many of those people were actually
being promoted by the new order into positions of new authority over
them." As his sale evidence, he cites a story, told twice in his book,
about an old woman he met in Cambodia "who described with great
passion how the Khmer Rouge murderer of her son was hving, unpun-
ished, in the neighboring village." He repeated the same story in the
New York Reviev) of Books, eliciting a letter from Ben Kiernan, who
accompanied him when this alleged incident took place (and was his
interpreter). Kiernan cited the tape of the woman's statement, which
reveals that she had simply said that the murderer had "run away" to
a neighboring "district," suggesting, as Kiernan notes, that he feared
punishment, but not that he had been "promoted" to "new authority."
Confronted with this evidence, Shawcross maintained his position

THE INDOCHINA WARS (II): LAOS AND CAM SOD I A 295

while retreating to the claim that some officials he met "seemed rather
unpleasant," which suffices to prove the point, according to his logic.
These examples are quite typical."^

6.2.9. Summary

Summarizing, prior tQ "the decade of the genocide," media treatment
of Cambodia was as predicted by the propaganda model, and the same
is true, quite dramatically, during the two phases of this terrible period
aod since. During phase I, refugee testimony was considered uninter-
esting, and little is known today apart from the fact that there was
obviously vast slaughter and destruction; this phase does not enter the
record as a "holocaust" or exercise in "genocide," and the source is
forgotten. During phase II, the myth ofthe "gentle land" was extended
through 1975, and the U.S. role and responsibility for what then took
place was also quite commonly effaced, although some did not sink to
this level of vulgarity. Refugee testimony was eagerly sought, although
only if it lent support to the STV, and evaluations by State Department
specialists and other knowledgeable commentators that gave a more
nuanced (and in retrospect, essentially accurate) picture were dismissed
as lacking utility. There was massive outrage, reaching its peak in early
1977 when the death toll was still well below that of phase I, with a
record of deception that is highly illuminating. 117 As something like the
STV came to be realized in 1977-78, its horrors were downplayed in
official government circles, and subsequent U.S. support for Pol Pot
arouses little notice.

Phase III proceeded along a dual course. In a fanciful reconstruction
that maintains the level of integrity shown throughout, it is alleged that
"left-wing skepticism" so dominated Western opinion and governments
that there was "silence" throughout the DK period; the wide accept-
ance of this thesis, despite the quality of the evidence provided and its
manifest absurdifj'j counts as yet another example of how readily the
most implausible contentions can become doctrine, as long as they are
serviceable. In Indochina, a new phase of Western concern about the
victimization of Cambodia began, with outrage now directed not
against Pol Pot but against the new oppressors who overthrew him. The
United States took a leading role in orchestrating the new concern,
which combined Chinese and U.S. interest in "bleeding Vietnam" with
a renewed exhibition of the Western conscience, properly bounded to
exclude phase I and its long-term effects, and bypassing the U.S. role
in support of Pol Pot-in part via its Chinese allies, who have been

296 MANUFACTURING COhfSENT

admirably frank in explaining their stand. This carefully channeled
benevolence succeeded in the goal of keeping the Pol Pot forces active
and injuring Vietnam and also, incidentally, the suffering people of
Cambodia who are the objects of our profound concern. The relief
effort in 1979-80 did succeed in aiding Cambodians in distress, but it
has also sustained the Pol Pot forces and thereby impeded Cambodia's
recovery and, perhaps, its independence, although about this we can
only speculate.

Putting aside the undoubtedly sincere reactions of many people who
were exposed to evidence of properly selected atrocities that passed
through the media filter, the only rational conclusion from this il-
luminating record is that the West was consumed with horror over
Khmer Rouge atrocities during phase II not because of a sudden pas-
sion for the fate of the suffering people of Cambodia-as the record
during phase I, and elsewhere, makes sufficiently clear-but because
the Khmer Rouge had a useful role to play: namely, to permit a retro-
spective justification for earlier French and American crimes in Indo-
china, and to facilitate the reconstruction of Western ideology after the
Vietnam trauma, so as to overcome the dread "Vietnam syndrome" and
prepare the ground for a "resurgent America" pursuing its historical
vocation of defending freedom and justice. The actual facts were, and
remain, of little interest, for the same reason.

c 7

Conclusions

DEFENDING THE MEDIA AGAINST THE CHARGE THAT THEY HAVE
become too independent and too powerful for the public good, Anthony
Lewis of the New York Times writes that

The press is protected [by the First Amendment] not for its own
sake but to enable a free political system to operate. In the end,
the concern is not for the reporter Or the editor but for the
citizen-critic of government.

What is at stake when we speak about freedom of the press "is the
freedom to perform a function on behalf of the polity. "1 Lewis cites
Supreme Court Justice Powell, who observed: "no individual can obtain
for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his

political responsibilities By enabling the public to assert meaningful

control over the political process, the press performs a crucial function
in effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment." Therefore,
as Judge Gurfein ruled in supporting the right of the New York Times

2$8 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

to publish the Pentagon Papers after the government had failed to show
any threat of a breach of security but only the possibility of embarrass-
ment: "a cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press
must be suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the even
greater values of freedom of expression and the right of the people to
know."

We do not accept the view that freedom of expression must be
defended in instrumental terms, by virtue of its contribution to some
higher good; rather, it is a value in itself. But that apart, these ringing
declarations express valid aspirations, and beyond that, they surely
express the self-image of the American media. Our concern in this book
has been to inquire into the relation between this image and the reality.
In contrast to the standard conception of the media as cantankerous,
obstinate, and ubiquitous in their search for truth and their inde-
pendence of authority, we have spelled out and applied a propaganda
model that indeed sees the media as serving a "societal purpose," but
not that of enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the
political process by providing them with the information needed for the
intelligent discharge of political responsibilities. On the contrary, a
propaganda model suggests that the "societal purpose" of the media is
to inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of
privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state. The
media serve this purpose in many ways: through selection of topics,
distribution of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information,
emphasis and tone, and by keeping debate within the bounds of accept-
able premises. We have sought to show that the expectations of this
model are realized, and often considerably surpassed, in the actual
practice of the media in a range of crucial cases. We quite agree with
Chief Justice Hughes, whom Lewis also cites, on "the primary need of
a vigilant and courageous press" if democratic processes are to function
in a meaningful way. But the evidence we have reviewed indicates that
this need is not met or even weakly approximated in actual practice.

It is frequently asserted that the media were not always as indepen-
dent, vigilant, and defiant of authority as they allegedly are today;
rather, the experiences of the past generation are held to have taught
the media to exercise "the power to root about in our national life,
exposing what they deem right for exposure," without regard to exter-
nal pressures or the dictates of authority (Lewis). It is this period, then,
that poses a challenge to a propaganda model, and we have therefore
taken it as the focus of our inquiry. Many of the examples we discuss
are from the past decade, when the liberal media were allegedly in
confrontation with a "conservative" administration that they would

CONCLUSIONS 299

have been expected to oppose vigorously. In a further effort to ensure
that we are not selecting exceptional cases, we have cast the net widely.
We have selected for close examination cases that pose the most severe
challenge to our model, namely, those put forth by critics as demon-
strating that the media have gone too far in their exuberant indepen-
dence and challenge to authority, so far that they must be curbed if
democracy is to survive: for example, the coverage of the Tet offensive,
the prime illustration of alleged excesses of the media offered in the
1970S and 1980s. Even these cases demonstrate the subordination of the
media to the requirements of the state propaganda system. At the peak
of alleged media independence, as the Vietnam War entered its final
period and the media were threatening Nixon's presidency, the subor-
dination to these demands never flagged, as illustrated by the media
coverage of the Paris peace treaty of 1973, one of the most flagrant
examples of media misrepresentation based on an uncritical reiteration
of official claims and adherence to the political agenda of the state.

We may illustrate the point in yet another case, chosen by those who
defend the standard version of the media as their strongest ground: the
Watergate affair. To many critics of the media, this incident illustrates
their irresponsible excesses; to those who prOUdly defend the media, it
illustrates their independence of higher authority and commitment to
the values of professional journalism. What, then, are the lessons of
Watergate?

The major scandal of Watergate as portrayed in the mainstream
press was that the Nixon administration sent a collection of petty
criminals to break into the Democratic party headquarters, for reasons
that remain obscure. The Democratic party represents powerful do-
mestic interests, solidly based in the business community. Nixon's ac-
tions were therefore a scandal. The Socialist Workers party, a legal
political party, represents no powerful interests. Therefore, there was
no scandal when it was revealed, just as passions over Watergate
reached their zenith, that the FBI had been disrupting its activities by
illegal break-ins and other measures for a decade, a violation of demo-
cratic principle far more extensive and serious than anything charged
during the Watergate hearings. What is more, these actions of the
national political police were only one element of government programs
extending over many administrations to deter independent political
action, stir up violence in the ghettos, and undermine the popular
movements that were beginning to engage sectors of the generally
marginalized public in the arena of decision-making. ^ These coven and
illegal programs were revealed in court cases and elsewhere during the
Watergate period, but they never entered the congressional proceedings

300 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

and received only limited media attention. Even the complicity of the
FBI in the police assassination of a Black Panther organizer in Chicago
was not a scandal, in marked contrast to Nixon's "enemies list," which
identified powerful people who were denigrated in private but suffered
no consequences. As we have noted, the U.S. role in initiating and
carrying out the first phase of "the decade of the genocide" in Cam-
bodia entered the Watergate proceedings only marginally: not because
hundreds of thousands of Cambodians were slaughtered in the course
of a major war crime, but because Congress was not properly notified,
so that its privileges were infringed, and even this was considered too
slight an infraction to enter the final charges. What was true of Con-
gress was also cruc of the media and their inve&tigativc reporting that
"helped force a President from office" (Lewis) in what is held to be a
most remarkable display of media independence, or arrogance, depend-
ing on one's point of view.

History has been kind enough to contrive for us a "controlled experi-
ment" to determine just what was at stake during the Watergate period,
when the confrontational stance of the media reached its peak. The
answer is clear and precise: powerful groups are capable of defending
themselves, not surprisingly; and by media standards, it is a scandal
when their position and rights are threatened. By contrast, as long as
illegalities and violations of democratic substance are confined to mar-
ginal groups or distant victims of U.S. military attack, or result in a
diffused cost imposed on the general population, media opposition is
muted or absent altogether.) This is why Nixon could go so far, lulled
into a false sense of security precisely because the watchdog only
barked when he began to threaten the privileged.

Exactly the same lessons were taught by the Iran-contra scandals
and the media reaction to them."* It was a scandal when the Reagan
administration was found to have violated congressional prerogatives
during the Iran-contra affair, but not when it dismissed with contempt
the judgment of the International Court of Justice that the United
States was engaged in the "unlawful use of force" and violation of
treaties-that is, violation of the supreme law of the land and custom-
ary international law-in its attack against Nicaragua. The sponsorship
and support of state terror that cost some 200,000 Mves in Central
America in the preceding decade was not the subject of congressional
inquiries or media concern. These actions were conducted in accord
with an eMte consensus, and they received steady media support, as we
have seen in reviewing the fate of worthy and unworthy victims and the
treatment of elections in client and errant states. '

In the case of the Vietnam War as well, as we showed in chapter 5.

CONCLUSIONS

301

even those who condemn the media for their alleged adversarial stance
acknowledge that they were almost universally supportive of U.S. pol-
icy until after large numbers of U.S. troops had been engaged in the
"intervention" in South Vietnam, heavy casualties had been taken,
huge dollar sums had been spent, and elite protest had surfaced on
grounds of threats to ehte interests_ Only then did elements of the
media undertake qualified reassessments of the "cost-benefit" trade-off.
But during the period of growing involvement that eventually made
extrication difficult, the watchdog actually encouraged the burglar to
make himself at home in a distant land, and to bomb and destroy it with
abandon.

In short, the very examples offered in praise of the piedia for their
independence, or criticism of their excessive zeal, illustrate exactly the
opposite. Contrary to the usual image of an "adversary press" boldly
attacking a pitiful executive giant, the media's lack of interest, investi-
gative zeal, and basic news reporting on the accumulating illegalities of
the executive branch have regularly permitted and even encouraged
ever larger violations of law, whose ultimate exposure when elite inter-
ests were threatened is offered as a demonstration of media service "on
behalf of the polity." These observations reinforce the conclusions that
we have documented throughout.

The existing level of media subordination to state authority is often
deemed unsatisfactory by critics. We have discussed several examples.
Thus, Freedom House and others who are concerned to protect state
authority from an intrusive public condemn the media for lack of
sufficient enthusiasm in supporting official crusades, and even the lim-
ited challenge to established authority during the Vietnam War and the
Watergate period aroused concerns over the excessive power of the
media. Quite commonly, the slight opening occasionally granted to
dissent is considered far too dangerous to permit. This perception
sometimes even takes the form of a paranoid vision of left-wing power
that sweeps all in its path: for example, the plea of Claire Sterling and
others who dominated media coverage of the Bulgarian Connection
that they could barely be heard above the din of Soviet propaganda. A
still more striking case is the Aikman-Shawcross fantasy, eagerly
echoed by many others, about the "silencing" of the international
media and governments by the left during the Pol Pot era. In reality,
there was a huge chorus of protest over Khmer Rouge atrocities, which
reached an extraordinary level of fabrication and deceit. The signifi-
cance of these facts, and of the pretense of left-imposed "silence," is
highlighted by the contrast with the real silence over comparable atroci-
ties in Timor at the same time, and the evasions and suppressions

302 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

during the first phase of "the decade of the genocide," to mention two
cases where the United States was the responsible agent and protest
could have been effective in diminishing or terminating large-scale
atrocities.

A propaganda model provides a ready explanation for this quite
typical dichotomous treatment. Atrocities by the Khmer Rouge could
be attributed to the Communist enemy and valuable propaganda points
could be scored, although nothing useful could be done, or was even
proposed, for the Cambodian victims. The image of Communist mon-
sters would also be useful for subsequent U.S. participation in terror
and violence, as in its crusades in Central America shortly after. In El
Salvador, the United States backed the murderous junta in its struggle
against what was depicted as "the Pol Pot left," while Jeane Kirkpatrick
mused darkly about the threat to EI Salvador of "well-armed guerrillas
whose fanaticism and violence remind some observers of Pol Pot"-
shortly after the archbishop had denounced her junta friends for con-
ducting a "war of extermination and genocide against a defenseless
civilian population. "6 Some are more circumspect-for example, Wil-
liam Buckley, who observes that "the Sandinistas have given their
people genocide" and are clearly heading in the direction of Pol Pot,
although they have not quite reached that level yet.'' The utility of the
show of outrage over Pol Pot atrocities is evident from the way the fate
of these worthy victims was immediately exploited to justify U.S. orga-
nization of atrocities that, in fact, do merit comparison to Pol Pot.

Atrocities in East Timor, however, have no such utilitarian function;
quite the opposite. These atrocities were carried out by our Indonesian
client, so that the United States could readily have acted to reduce or
terminate them. But attention to the Indonesian invasion would have
embarrassed a loyal ally and quickly disclosed the crucial role of the
United States in providing military aid and diplomatic support for
aggression and slaughter. Plainly, news about East Timor would not
have been useful, and would, in fact, have discomfited important do-
mestic power groups. The mass media-and the intellectual community
generally-therefore channeled their benevolent impulses elsewhere:
to Cambodia, not Timor.

As we have stressed throughout this book, the U.S. media do not
function in the manner of the propaganda system of a totalitarian state.
Rather, they permit-indeed, encourage-spirited debate, criticism,
and dissent, as long as these remain faithfully within the system of
presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a
system so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness. No
one instructed the media to focus on Cambodia and ignore East Timor.

CONCLUSIONS 303

They gravitated naturally to the Khmer Rouge and discussed them
freelyS-just as they naturally suppressed information on Indonesian
atrocities in East Timor and U.S. responsibility for the aggression and
massacres. In the process, the media provided neither facts nor analyses
that would have enabled the public to understand the issues or the bases
of government policies toward Cambodia and Timor, and they thereby
assured that the public could not exert any meaningful influence on the
decisions that were made. This is quite typical of the actual "societal
purpose" of the media on matters that are of significance for established
power; not "enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the
political process," but rather averting any such danger. In these cases^
as in numerous others, the public was managed and mobilized from
above, by means of the media's highly selective messages and evasions.
As noted by media analyst W. Lance Bennett,

The public is exposed to powerful persuasive messages from
above and is unable to communicate meaningfully through the

media in response to these messages . Leaders have usurped

enormous amounts of political power and reduced popular control
over the political system by using the media to generate support,
compliance, and just plain confusion among the public. ^

More significantly for our particular concerns here, the media typically
provide their own independent contribution even without being
"used," in the manner and for the reasons that we have discussed.
Another media analyst, Ben Bagdikian, observes that the institutional
bias of the private mass media "does not merely protect the corporate
system. It robs the public of a chance to understand the real world."lo
That conclusion is well supported by the evidence we have reviewed.

A propaganda model has a certain initial plausibility on guided free-
market assumptions that are not particularly controversial. In essence,
the private media are major corporations selling a product (readers and
audiences) to other businesses (advertisers). The national medja typi-
cally target and serve elite opinion, groups that, on the one hand,
provide an optimal "profile" for advertising purposes, and, on the
other, playa role in decision-making in the private and public spheres.
The national media would be failing to meet their elite audience's needs
if they did not present a tolerably realistic portrayal of the world. But
their "societal purpose" also requires that the media's interpretation of
the world reflect the interests and concerns of the sellers, the buyers,
and the governmental and private institutions dominated by these
groups.

304 MANUFACTURINe CONSENT

A propaganda model also helps us to understand how media person-
nel adapt, and are adapted, to systemic demands. Given the imperatives
of corporate organization and the workings of the various filters, con-
formity to the needs and interests of privileged seacrs is essential to
success. In the media, as in other major institutions, those who do not
display the requisite values and perspectives wiU be regarded as "irre-
sponsible," "ideological," or otherwise aberrant, and will tend to fall by
the wayside. While there may be a small number of exceptions, the
pattern is pervasive, and expected. Those who adapt, perhaps quite
honestly, will then be free to express themselves with little managerial
control, and they will be able to assert, accurately, that they perceive
no pressures to conform. The media are indeed free-for those who
adopt the principles required for their "societal purpose." There may
be some who are simply corrupt, and who serve as "errand boys" for
state and other authority, but this is not the norm," We know from
personal experience that many journalists are quite aware of the way
the system operates, and utilize the occasional openings it affords to
provide information and analysis that departs in some measure from the
elite consensus, carefully shaping it so as to accommodate to required
norms in a general way. But this degree of insight is surely not common.
Rather, the norm is a belief that freedom prevails, which is true for
those who have internalized the required values and perspectives.

These matters are of some importance. We can readily understand
why Guatemalan reporters do not report the atrocities of the 1980s;
some fifty corpses dramatically illustrate the costs of deviance from
authority on the part of independent journalists. To explain why
American reporters avoid such topics, and even go so far as to describe
Guatemala as a model for Nicaragua (see p. uS), requires further
explanation, and the same is true in innumerable other similar cases,
some of which we have analyzed in detail. A propaganda model pro-
vides a basis for understanding this pervasive phenomenon.

No simple model wiU suffice, however, to account for every detail of
such a complex matter as the working of the national mass media. A
propaganda model, we beheve, captures essential features of the pro-
cess, but it leaves many nuances and secondary effects unanalyzed.
There are other factors that should be recognized. Some of these con-
flict with the "societal purpose" of the media as described by the
propaganda model; some support it. In the former category, the human-
ity and professional integrity of journalists often leads them in direc-
tions that are unacceptable in the ideological institutions, and one
should not underestimate the psychological burden of suppressing ob-
vious truths and maintaining the required doctrines of benevolence

CONCLUSIONS 305

(possibly gone awry), inexplicable error, good intentions, injured inno-
cence, and so on, in the face of overwhelming evidence incompatible
with these patriotic premises. The resulting tensions sometimes find
limited expression, but more often they are suppressed either con-
sciously or unconsciously, with the help of belief systems that permit
the pursuit of narrow interest, whatever the facts.

In the category of supportive factors, we find, first of all, elemental
patriotism, the overwhelming wish to think well of ourselves, our insti-
tutions, and our leaders. We see ourselves as basically good and decent
in personal life, so it must be that our institutions function in accord-
ance with the same benevolent intent, an argument that is often persua-
sive even though it is a transparent non sequitur. The patriotic premise
is reinforced by the belief that "we the people" rule, a central principle
of the system of indoctrination from early childhood, but also one with
little merit, as an analysis of the sociahsnd political system will quickly
reveal. There are also real advantages in conformity beyond the re-
wards and privilege that it yields. If one chooses to denounce Qaddafi,
or the Sandinistas, or the PLO, or the Soviet Union, no credible evi-
dence is required. The same is true if one repeats conventional doc-
trines about our own society and its behavior-say, that the U.S.
government is dedicated to our traditional noble commitment to de-
mocracy and human rights. But a critical analysis of American institu-
tions, the way they function domestically and their international
operations, must meet far higher standards; in fact, standards are often
imposed that can barely be met in the natural sciences. One has to work
hard, to produce evidence that is credible, to construct serious argu-
ments, to present extensive documentation-all tasks that are super-
fluous as long as one remains within the presuppositional framework of
the doctrinal consensus. It is small wonder that few are willing to
undertake the effort, quite apart from the rewards that accrue to con-
formity and the costs of honest dissidence.

There are other considerations that tend to induce obedience. A
journalist or commentator who does not want to have to work too hard
can survive, even gain respectability, by publishing information (official
or leaks) from standard sources; 12 these opportunities may well be
denied to those who are not content to relay the constructions of state
propaganda as fact. The technical structure of the media virtually
compels adherence to conventional thoughts; nothing else can be ex-
pressed between two commercials, or in seven hundred words, without
the appearance of absurdity that is difficult to avoid when one is chal-
lenging familiar doctrine with no opportunity to develop facts or argu-
ment. In this respect, the U.S. media are rather different from those in

306 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

most Other industrial democracies, and the consequences are noticeable
in the narrowness of articulated opinion and analysis. The critic must
also be prepared to face a defamation apparatus against which there is
little recourse, an inhibiting factor that is not insubstantial. Many such
factors exist, related to the essential structural features brought to light
by a propaganda model but nevertheless worthy of derailed examina-
tion in themselves. The result is a powerful system of induced conform-
ity to the needs of privilege and power.

In sum, the mass media of the United States are effective and power-
ful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propa-
ganda function by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions,
and self-censorship, and without significant overt coercion. This propa-
ganda system has become even more efficient in recent decades with the
rise of the national television networks, greater mass-media concentra-
tion, right-wing pressures on public radio and television, and the
growth in scope and sophistication of public relations and news man-
agement.

This system is not all-powerful, however. Government and elite
domination of the media have oot succeeded in overcoming the Viet-
nam syndrome and public hostility to direct U.S. involvement in the
destabilization and overthrow of foreign governments. A massive Rea-
gan-era disinformation and propaganda effort, reflecting in large mea-
sure an ehte consensus, did succeed in its major aims of mobilizing
support for the U.S. terror states (the "fledgling democracies"), while
demonizing the Saodinistas and eliminating from Congress and the
mass media all controversy beyond tactical debate over the means that
should be employed to return Nicaragua to the "Central American
mode" and "contain" its "aggressiveness" in attempting to defend itself
from a murderous and destructive U.S. assault on al^ fronts. But it
failed to win public support even for proxy army warfare against
Nicaragua, and as the costs to the U.S. mounted, and the proxy war
accompanied by embargo and other pressures succeeded in restoring
the "Central American mode" of misery and suffering in Nicaragua and
aborting the highly successful reforms and prospects for development
of the early years after the overthrow of Washington's ally Somoza,
elite opinion too shifted-quite dramatically, in fact-toward resort to
other, more cost-effective means to attain shared ends.'^ The partial
failures of the very well organized and extensive state propaganda
effort, and the simultaneous rise of an active grass-roots oppositional
movement with very limited media access, was crucial in making an
outright U.S. invasion of Nicaragua unfeasible and driving the state
underground, to illegal clandestine operations that could be better

CONCLUSIONS 307

concealed from the domestic population-with, in fact, considerable
media complicity. 14

Furthermore, while there have been important structural changes
centralizing and strengthening the propaganda system, there have been
counterforces at work with a potential for broader access. The rise of
cable and satellite communications, while initially captured and domi-
nated by commercial interests, has weakened the power of the network
oligopoly and retains a potential for enhanced local-group access.
There are already some 3,000 public-access channels in use in the
United States, offering 20,000 hours of locally produced programs per
week, and there are even national producers and distributors of pro-
grams for access channels through satellites (e.g., Deep-Dish Televi-
sion), as well as hundreds of local suppliers, although all of them must
struggle for funding. Grass-roots and public-interest organizations
need to recognize and try to avail themselves of these media (and
organizational) opportunities. Local nonprofit radio and television
stations also provide an opportunity for direct media access that has
been underutilized in the United States. In France, many local groups
have their own radio stations. In a notable case, the progressive cooper-
ative Longo Mai, in Upper Provence, has its own 24-hour-a-day Radio
Zinzine, which has become an important community institution that
has helped inform and activate many previously isolated farmers. The
potential value of noncommercial radio can be perceived in sections of
the country where stations such as Pacifica Radio offer a view of the
world, depth of coverage, and scope of discussion and debate that is
generally excluded from the major media. Public radio and television,
despite having suffered serious damage during the Reagan years, also
represent an alternative media channel whose resuscitation and im-
provement should be of serious concern to those interested in contest-
ing the propaganda system, The steady commercialization of the
publicly owned air waves should be vigorously opposed. In the long
run, a democratic political order requires far wider control of and
access to the media. Serious discussion of how this can be done, and
the incorporation of fundamental media reform into political programs,
should be high on progressive agendas.

The organization and self-education of groups in the community
and workplace, and their networking and activism, continue to be the
fundamental elements in steps toward the democratization of our so-
ciallife and any meaningful social change. Only to the extent that such
developments succeed can we hope to see media that are free and
independent.

Appendix i

THE U.S. OFFICIAL OBSERVERS IN
GUATEMALA, JULY 1-2, 1984

For the July i, 1984, elections in Guatemala, the Reagan administration sent
an observer team, headed by Republican Congressman Ralph Regula, that also
included Congressmen Jack Hightower (Democrat, Texas) and Mickey Ed-
wards (Republican, Oklahoma); Secretaries of State Jack Brier, of Kansas, and
Ed Simcox, of Indiana; Father Kenneth Baker, editor of Homiletic and Pastoral
Review, New York City; John Carbaugh, a Washington attorney; Jesse Fried-
man, of the American Institute of Free Labor Development; Tom Kahn, of
the AFL-CIO; Max Singer, of the Potomac Organization; and Howard Penni-
man, the election specialist of the American Enterprise Institute.' This group,
in Guatemala for a very brief stay, was transported around the country to
"observe" on election day by helicopter, and made a brief statement and held
a press conference on July 2. That statement and the press conference pro-
ceedings were released by the U.S. embassy in Guatemala City on July 18, 1984,
and form the basis for the discussion below.

Although Guatemala had been assailed by human-rights organizations for
years for pohtical murder on a vast scale and record-breaking numbers of

"disappeared," the words "murder" and "disappeared" do not appear in the
remarks of any of the ten observers who spoke at the press conference. Other
words or phrases never uttered were: "National Security Doctrine," "Law of
Illicit Association," "state terrorism," "death squad," "massacre," "torture,"
"forced relocations," "civil-defense patrols," "freedom of the press," or "vot-
ing requirement." None of the observers doubted the authenticity of "posi-
tive" responses by Guatemalan peasants to questions by non-Spanish-speaking
foreigners flown in by helicopter in a country subject to military occupation.
AH of the observers felt quite capable of assessing the true feeUngs of the
Guatemalan people on the basis of long lines, facial expressions, and a handful
of responses to visitors under official protection. There was no dissent among
the observers from the conclusion that the election was fair, inspiring, a
testimonial to the eagerness of the Guatemalan people to participate and
express their patriotic sentiments, and a first step toward democracy. No
demonstration-election cliche was omitted-history was blacked out, and no
basic condition of a free election was examined by the observers.

Let us sample a few of the chches offered by these Guatemalan election
observers:

1. People full of hope — very positive start. This was a "dynamic begin-
ning, ... a first step," according to delegation head Ralph Regula. Father
Kenneth Baker found a "great sense of hope for the future . . . the spirit of
hopefulness." Jack Brier also observed "a spirit of hopefulness about the
future, but not necessarily confidence in whatever actions may come about as
a result of the elections." (This is a very nuanced distinction that Brier was
able to make on the basis of translated brief answers by a few voters.) Tom
Kahn claimed that "many of the workers whom we spoke to on the voting lines
told us that they had great hope, that this was a first step." Kahn was asked
during the press conference whether he had visited any of the embattled
Coca-Cola workers. He hadn't. Neither Kahn nor his AIFLD colleague, Jesse
Friedman, mentioned the enormous decline in union membership or the deci-
mation of union leadership by murder.

2. Long lines, patient voters. The observers were deeply impressed with
"the way the people patiently waited" to vote (Regula). Howard Penniman
noted "the extraordinary patience of the people voting." Ed Simcox pointed
out that the voters "did go out, they formed lines very early in the morning,
they waited in some instances two, three, four hours to go up and vote."
According to Congressman Hightower, "The thing that impressed us instantly
was the long lines." Tom Kahn was impressed with the "calm and order which
prevailed around the voting tables."

Long lines and patient voters are quite compatible with voting by a terror-
ized population desiring mainly to survive. The official observers, who never
once mention the record of spectacular state terror in Guatemala, merely
postulate that voters who get in line and wait patiently do so for reasons that
are benign.

3. The patriotic imperati'De. The main theme of this observer team is that
the voters are eager to vote as good patriots, loyal to the militarized terrorist

state that Ronald Reagan and the State Department find acceptable. Max
Singer says that "I did sense that Guatemalans feel that voting is important
to them." (This is correct, but Singer was not contemplating the possibility that
its importance to them might lie in fear and a desire to avoid retribution by
the omnipresent army.) Regula said that the people were patiently waiting "for
an opportunity to share in the process of choosing the constituent assembly."
According to Simcox, "They know that this was the patriotic thing to do, that
this was important for their country." Tom Kahn found that the people he
talked to in voting lines "expressed a great sense of national pride."

4. Absence of any sign of coercion. Father Kenneth Baker stated that
"there seemed to be a general atmosphere of no intimidation." Baker didn't
say how he sensed this atmosphere, -and whether it was assuredly reliable in
a foreign country observed for a day under military guard. Baker referred to
the bishops having urged people to vote, but he failed to note their extended
observations suggesting that a meaningful election couldn't be held in an
environment of disappearances, terror, and catastrophic socioeconomic condi-
tions. Jack Brier saw "absolutely no violence. I saw no evidence of direct
military involvement." A problem that Brier doesn't discuss is that if pacifica-
tion is thorough, no violence or substantial military presence wiU be necessary
to confirm military choices. There is absolutely no violence or evidence of
direct military involvement in elections in the Soviet Union. Brier plays dumb,
pretending that violence on election day is really relevant, and ignoring the
long-term violence that strips away institutional protections and produces a
terrorized population. ^ Congressman Mickey Edwards did find a military pres-
ence in Guatemala, but it was not "oppressive": "We did not find anything to
indicate that the people in those areas were under any pressure or intimida-
tion." How hard Edwards looked must remain in doubt. ^

5. Amazing turnout. Jack Brier referred to the "surprisingly large turnout,"
and Ed Simcox found the 60-70 percent turnout "really an incredibly positive
statistic." Even the U.S. embassy noted that voting in Guatemala is compul-
sory (although it tried to discount this by citing a Guatemalan official who said
that the law was only rarely enforced). The official observers, however, never
mentioned this small matter of a legal requirement, or the need to get an ID
card stamped, let alone the army warnings and the background of mass killings
and disappearances.

6. Human rights impro'Ding. Congressman Mickey Edwards found that
"by all objective observations, the human-rights record in this country has
improved tremendously over the last two or three years." He does not say what
objective observations he is referring to. Max Singer also found that "the
human-rights record is improving in Guatemala, as near as I can tell," partly
because the guerrilla movement has weakened, and that movement has been
a serious threat to the human rights of the Guatemalan people. Singer was
asked in the press conference how he determined this improvement. His
answer was "From the statements of people living in the countryside."

7. Reasonfor the blank and spoiled votes. Some 26 percent of the ballots
cast in the Guatemalan election, far exceeding the total for any party, were

312 APPENDIX I

blank or spoiled. This would seem to compromise the notion that the
Guatemalan people had gotten into long lines out of patriotic enthusiasm.
Howard Penniman explained, however, that this was a result of illiteracy.
Other possibilities are umnentioned. Why the illiteracy rates were so high
thirty years after the United States saved Guatemala for freedom is also not
discussed.

8. The caseforfurther aid. The observers showed their objectivity, and the
labor representatives Kahn and Friedman demonstrated their commitment to
liberal principles, by acknowledging that this election wa£ only a "first step,"
and that a full-fledged democracy such as that just established in EI Salvador
(Regula) was still to come. Some of the observers would sanction additional
aid immediately, Mickey Edwards urging that the Guatemalan army would
benefit from being "exposed to American values and to American training. "4
The others were more noncommittal, but agreed that the election was fair,
meaningful, and deserving of U.S. recognition and support.

In sum, this was a caricature of observation, but a fairly typical performance
of U.S. "official observers." The report of this group was cited by Stephen
Kinzer in the New York Times and elsewhere in the U.S. press as a serious
source of information on the Guatemalan election. The official report of the
Latin American Studies Association on the Nicaraguan election, written by
specialists in the region after an intensive eight-day investigation, Kinzer and
his mass-media colleagues never mentioned.

Appendix 2

TAGLIABUE'S FINALE ON THE
BULGARIAN CONNECTION:

A Case Study in Bias

To show in another way the propagandistic quality of the mass media's cover-
age of the Bulgarian Connection, we will examine in detail the article by John
Tagliabue, "Verdict on Papal Plot, But No Answer," published in the jqg^
York Tima on March 31, 1986. This piece, which provides a final wrap-up that
enters "history" as the mature judgment of the veteran Times newsman as-
signed to the Rome trial, is a model illustration of the systematic bias that we
believe characterized mass-media reporting of the Bulgarian Conrig£tiQn^ ^ijh
only minor exceptions. A close examination shows how Tagliabue incoiporates
a.11 of the elements, of the Sterling-Henze-Kalb (SHK) model of the connec-
tion, selects facts in accordance with the requirements of that model^ and
bypasses conflicting facts and interpretations.:

The Framing of the Issue: The Case
Still "Unresolved"

The court dismissal of the case against the Bulgarians in Rome confronted the
Times with a problem of framing. The Times had presented the case as plausi-
ble for years, and now had to confront the rejection of the case in a court
decision. The solution was to latch on to the peculiar feature of the Italian
judicial system whereby a party found not guilty can be declared positively
innocent or not guilty for reason of lack of evidence. Thus, as the title of
Tagliabue's article suggests, there was a verdict, but "no answer," and Taglia-
bue's &st paragraph focuses on the "unresolved" nature of the case. It would
have been possible to stress the fact that the Bulgarians were found not guilty
for lack of evidence, and to emphasize that Western law requires positive proof
of guilt. But the Times was not about to acknowledge defeat after five years
of finding the Bulgarians guilty.

Tagliabue also downplays the court decision by making it an unsurprising
event. "Few people were surprised by the verdict," states Tagliabue. But the
failure to find the Bulgarians guilty should have been quite surprising, given
the earlier assurances by Sterling and associates that the Bulgarians were
clearly behind the plot, and that, as Paul Henze stated, the "evidence" has
"steadily accumulated to the point where little real doubt is now possible. "2

An alternative frame would have been as follows: After a three-year investi-
gation and lengthy trial, backed by the resources of the Italian state, and
despite the powerful interests in Italy and the West with a stake in finding the
Bulgarians guilty, the prosecution still failed to persuade an Italian jury of
Bulgarian guilt. These vested interests and their propaganda vehicles were
given a bone to chew on, however, in the form of a decision to dismiss the
charge for "lack of evidence," rather than complete exoneration. This then
allowed the propaganda agencies to frame the case in the Tagliabue manner.

Protection of the Italian Judicial

Process

Throughout the history ofthe case, the U.S. mass media blacked out evidence
of the compromised quality ofthe Italian institutions involved in pursuing the
connection. Investigating Judge Martella was always treated as a model of
probity, and conflicting facts were ignored.^ Operating in this tradition, Taglia-
bue wastes space on a gratuitous and irrelevant accolade to Martella (which
is also given a subheading for emphasis). His statement that "Few people stood
up to assail the magistrate" is absurd, as the trial witnesses were asked to give
concrete evidence on the facts of the case; they were not in a position to assail
the pretrial investigating magistrate, and any such attempts would have been
impermissible in the courtroom. Only the Bulgarian defense was well qualified
and able to assail Martella, and they did so, in effective statements on March
4-8, 1986, that were unreported in the Times and the rest of the mass media.
Tagliabue points out that although the trial was supposed merely to verify the

findings of th* preliminary investigation, in fact the prosecution did a great
deal of new mvestlgatlve work. This suggests that the trial court may have
found Martella' s investigation sadly lacking, but Tagliabue never addresses the
point.

Agcats Desertion of the Case

An important part of the apologetic framework is the claim that Agca, who had
presented an allegedly coherent verSIOn of a connection up to the trial, sud-
denly did an about face and refused to testify altogether. Tagliabue devotes
several paragraphs to this theme, eventually suggesting that Agca's increas-
ingly erratic behavior "may have been designed to torpedo the efforts of the
court." He suggests that the prosecutor couldn't overcome this difficulty, so
that the loss ofthe case IS lodged in Agca's behavior rather than in any inherent
deficiencies in the prosecution's case.

In reality, Agca's claims emerged very slowly and contradictorily, with
dozens of retractions that, taken together, are best explained by coac^i^gj
outside information, and guesses by Agca as to what Martella and the press
would like to hear. There is no reason to believe that Agca ever offered or
settled upon a coherent, version of a Bulgarian connection. On the contrary.
It appears that hiS version changed continually, and that the final result in
Martella's report was Martella's own arbitrary synthesis.-*

The claim that Agca became more erratic during the trial is also not based
on evidence. Agca's persistently erratic behavior was obscured by the secrecy
of his earlier testimony, but it is clear from the Martella report that he was
already claiming to be Jesus and displaying other symptoms of irrationality.
Furthermore, Tagliabue's statement that Agca refused to cooperate during the
trial is false- Age a periodically withdrew from the proceedings when his
testimony became too incoherent, but he always returned to the stand, and he
answered a vast number of questions. One hypothesis that Tagliabue never
entertains is that if Agca's claims were based on coaching and/or imagination,
in an open court he would be vulnerable and quickly pushed to the wall.

Tagliabue also never asks this further question: Even if Agca had clammed
up (which was not true), given the extensive Martella investigation and report,
why would the court not be able to follow the already established leads to a
successful outcome? Why was not a single witness produced to confirm Agca's
allegations of numerous meetings and trips with Bulgarians in Rome? Why was
the car allegedly rented by the Bulgarians never found? Where is the money
supposedly given to Agca? Tagliabue fails to address these questions.

"Partial Confirmation" of Agcats

Ta le

Tagliabue describes some alleged partial confirmations of Agca's claims. The
first is that "Mr. Ozbey said the Bulgarians had indeed wanted to use Mr. Agca

to shoot the Pope, but did not trust him." But this is not a partial confirmation
if the net resuh was that the Bulgarians failed to hire Agca. Furthermore,
another reporter present when Ozbey testified in Rome claims that Ozbey did
not tell the court that the Bulgarians "wanted to use" Agca. According to
Wolfgang Achtner, of ABC-TV News, in Rome, the only thing Ozbey said was
that the Bulgarians "listened with interest, but behaved with indifference" (the
translation by the Turkish interpreter in court), or "listened with interest but
didn't take it seriously" (Achtner's own translation). In short, it would appear
that Tagliabue has doctored the evidence.

The other "partial confirmation" is that "Catli hinted at obscure secret
service contacts with West German intelligence, and of payments for unspeci-
fied purposes to Turks involved in the investigations." This vague statement
does not even mention the plot against the pope and is partial confirmation
of nothing. The most important Catli evidence bearing on this point was his
description of the attempt by the West German police to bribe Agca's supposed
co-conspirator Oral Celik to come to West Germany and confirm Agca's
claims. This supports the coaching hypothesis: accordingly, Tagliabue blacks
it out. The only other testimony by Catli mentioning the secret services in-
volved Gray Wolves leader Ali Batman, who told Catli he had heard from the
German secret police that at a meeting in Romania, the Warsaw Pact powers
had decided to kill the pope. This was apparently a leak of the forged SISMI
document of May 19, 1981, which had made this claim. Thus the hearsay
recounting of the substance of a forgery is Tagliabue's "partial confirmation"
of Agca's claims of a plot.

We should also note that while he cites these alleged "partial confirma-
tions," nowhere does Tagliabue list the contentions of Agca that remained
unconfirmed.

The Soviet-Bulgarian Motive

Two of Tagliabue's thirty-two paragraphs were devoted to expounding the
Soviet motive in allegedly sponsoring Agca's assassination attempt: "to crack
reUgiously inspired resistance to Communist rule in Poland." Tagliabue here
follows a long-standing Times tradition of absolutely refusing to allow a coun-
terargument to be voiced on this issue. Even if they covered their tracks well,
a Soviet- inspired murder of the pope would have been blamed on the Soviets,
solidified Polish hostility, and had enormously damaging effects on Soviet
relations with Western Europe. Thus it would have been risky without any
offsetting benefits. ^

Who gained and who lost from the plot? Were there any possible Western
motives that might bear on the case? Tagliabue follows the SHK line in faihng
to raise these questions. But once Agca was imprisoned in Italy, cold warriors
of the West had much to gain and little to lose by manipulating Agca to pin
the assassination attempt on the East. Tagliabue mentions that the charges of
a Bulgarian Connection surfaced "at the nadir" of U.S. -Soviet relations. While
he notes how this added to the credibility of the plot in the West, he never

hints at the possibihty that its serviceability to the new Cold War might explain
Agca's belated confession.

Agca's Stay in Bulgaria

This has always been critical in the Sterling-Times scenarios, and Tagliabue
drags it in. It is given further emphasis with the heading "Spent 2 Months in
Bulgaria." Tagliabue does not mention that Agca stopped in eleven other
countries. He fails to note here, and the Times suppressed throughout. Cadi's
testimony in Rome that the Gray Wolves liked to go through Bulgaria to reach
Western Europe because the heavy Turkish traffic made it easy to hide. Taglia-
bue fails to mention that bringing Agca for a long stay in Sofia would have been
a violation of the rule of plausible deniability. Even more so would be using
Bulgarians to help Agca in Rome. Tagliabue does not discuss the question of
plausible deniability. He also fails to note that if Agca had stayed in Sofia for
a while, this would allow a prima facie case to be made by a Western propagan-
dist that the East was behind the shooting, and could provide the basic materi-
als for working Agca over for the desired confession.

Bulgarian Involvement in Turkey

Tagliabue asserts that the Bulgarians were "purportedly" supporting both the
extreme left and right in Turkey "to promote instability" in a conflict "that
pitted violent leftist terrorists against their counterparts on the right." This is
a Sterling myth, with Tagliabue hiding behind "purportedly" to allow him to
pass off myth as purported evidence. The equating of left and right in the
Turkish violence ofthe 1970S is false: the great majority of violent attacks were
launched by the Gray Wolves, under the protection ofthe police and military.
Tagliabue also fails to discuss the fact that the extreme right actually par-
ticipated in the government in 1977 and had extensive hnks to the army and
intelligence services. The claim of Bulgarian support for both the right and left
has never been supported by evidence. Tagliabue never mentions that the
United States had more than "purported" links with the Turkish army, the
secret services, and the Fascist Nationalist Action party, and that the terrorist
events of the late 1970S eventually served U.S. interests well.

I^ey Question: How Agca Knew So

Much

The "key question" for Tagliabue is "how Agca knew what he knew and when
he knew it." This is an important issue, but there are others that he might have

raised if he had worked outside the SHK format. Why did it take Agca so lOjjg
tojiame Bulgarians^ W^s he subject to any coercion or offered any posl't^^
In ucements to rna e him talk. Why did he have to make major retractions?
Is It not SUSpi'CIOUS that when Agca finally talked, he said J'ust what his int^^.
rogators wanted him to say? How are we to evaluate a judicial process wh
the witness ^^a' was inTEgular contact with outside sources of informaf^'^^
and where he could lie and retract evidence without penalty? Ion,

"Even the Attorneys for the
Bulgarians .... "

In assessing how Agca knew so much, Tagliabue allocates only one paragraph
to the possibility that Agca was coached. On the other hand, he goes to great
pains to stress that Agca knew an awful lot-telephone numbers, personal
habits, nicknames. Tagliabue gives as the "simplest explanation" of Agca's
knowledge that he had access to books, newspapers, magazines, and other
materials from the outside. Interestingly, he fails to mention the numerous
prison contacts between Agca and secret service, Mafia, and Vatican agents
and emissaries. Agca even wrote a letter to the Vatican complaining of the
pressure from its representative in prison (also linked to the Mafia), a fact long
blacked out by the Times. These visits would point to the ease with which Agca
could have been fed information while in prison. Tagliabue will not admit facts
that get into this dangerous territory.

A major question is how Agca knew details about Antonov's apartment when
he later admitted to Martella tltat lie luid never been there. The Bulgarians and
Antonov's defense went to great pains to prove that the information Agca
provided about Antonov's apartment had never been divulged in the media
before Agca enumerated the details. This implied coaching, as did a mistake
in identification where Agca described a characteristic of Antonov's apartment
that fitted other apartments in the building, but not Antonov's. Tagliabue says
that "Even the attorneys for the Bulgarians acknowledge" that Agca named
things not available through reading the papers, as if they were conceding a
point, not making a devastating case for coaching. Newspaper work couldn't
be more dishonest than this.

"The More Sinister View"

In a single, late paragraph devoted to the possibility of coaching, Tagliabue
merely asserts it as a claim, without providing a single supportive point of
evidence, although there are many.6 He uses a double propagandist's put-
down-ironically designating the coaching hypothesis as "the more sinister
view," and stating that it is "espoused by critics of the case on the political
left, including Soviet bloc governments." Even Tagliabue, in his earlier news

reports, had mentioned Mafia official Giovanni Pandico's statement in Italy
outlining a scenario of coaching at which he claimed to be present, but Taglia-
bue doesn't even cite this or any other documents or facts that lend support
to the coaching hypothesis. He sticks to the ingredients that fit the SHK
format-good Martella, Agca the betrayer of the case, the Soviet motive,
Agca's visit to Bulgaria, and his knowledge of details. All other materials are
designated "sinister" or blacked out to enhance the credibility of the party line.

Agca Helped the Bulgarians

Tagliabue closes his article with a quote from Agca's attorney that the Bulgari-
ans "should be thankful" to Agca. This reiterates one of Tagliabue's preferred
themes-that Agca deliberately blew the case. This is derived from Sterling's
theory that Agca's vacillations were really "signals" to the Bulgarians, alter-
nately threatening and rewarding them, but aiming at getting them to help him
out of jail. In his earlier articles Tagliabue followed this line, and it is implicit
in this summing-up article, although it is a wholly unproven Sterling gimmick.'
What was Agca bargaining for in the trial? Did he expect the Bulgarians to
spring him? To admit their own involvement in the case by arranging a deal
for his release? And if he was sabotaging the case in order to win favor with
the Bulgarians, and since the Bulgarians obviously refused to respond, why did
he not finally decide to do them injury? Tagliabue never addresses these points.

In sum, this is a model case of propaganda under the guise of "news" or
"news analysis." In this instance there are a number of hes, but these are less
important than the other systematic distortions. Tagliabue and the Times
frame the issue in terms of probable Bulgarian guilt and the factors that caused
the case to be lost-exclusive of those suggesting that there was no case to
begin with. They refuse to discuss the failure to obtain confirmation of any
factual claims of meetings or deals with Bulgarians. They fail to discuss-or
even to mention-problems of plausible deniability. They reiterate the ele-
ments of the preferred SHK model without noting the illogic or the incompati-
ble facts. They ignore evidence that would support the coaching model. They
use invidious language only for the disfavored line of argument and spokesper-
sons, manipulating words and bending evidence to the desired end. This article
should be perfect for classroom use in courses on propaganda, media bias, and
related subjects.

Appendix 3

BRA EST R UPS BIG STORY:

Some "Freedom House Exclusives"

In "The Tet offensive" (p. 211), we considered the example that has regularly
been put forth to substantiate the charge that the media adopt an "adversarial
stance" with regard to established power-eoverage ofthe Tet offensive-and
the Freedom House study on which this charge is based. As we saw, in this
case too the behavior ofthe media conforms to the expectations ofthe propa-
ganda model, and the major theses advanced in the Freedom House study are
refuted even by their own evidence. What remains of their charge is the
possibility that media coverage of the Tet offensive was technically incompe-
tent, although subordinated to ehte requirements. Turning to a closer exami-
nation of this charge, we find that the shoe is on the other foot: when "Freedom
House exclusives" are corrected, the performance of the media appears quite
creditable, while the incompetence of the Freedom House study is seen to
transcend even the level already demonstrated. That this study has been taken
seriously, and permitted to set much of the agenda for subsequent discussion,
is a most intriguing fact.

According to Freedom House, television commentary and Newsweek are the

worst offenders in this "extreme case" of journalistic incompetence, so let us
begin by reviewing some of their sins. One example to which Braestrup reverts
several times is Walter Cronkite's "much publicized half-hour CBS 'special'
on the war" on February 27 (Big Seory, I, 158). According to Braestrug^
Cronkite's "assessment" here is "that U.S. troops would have to garrison jjjg
countryside" (I, 645). In his foreword, Leonard Sussman properly observes
that "We do not expect the reader to accept on faith our various analyses or
judgments," and so "the complete texts of many of the reports discussed" are
presented, primarily in volume II (I, x). Following his advice, we turn to
volume II, where we find the complete text of Cronkite's "special" (180ff.).
There is not even a remote hint of the "assessment" that Braestrup attributes
to him.

In this important "special," Braestrup claims, "In effect, Cronkite seemed
to say, the ruins, the refugees, the disruption of pacification that came at Tet
added up to a defeat for the alUes that would force President Johnson to the
negotiating table" (1, 158). Cronkite says nothing of the kind. He reports that
"there are doubts about the measure of success or setback," noting accurately
that "the experts do not agree on the objectives or on the amount of success
the communists had in achieving them." They "failed" in many of their aims,
but in a third phase the enemy might "recoup there what he lost in the first
two phases." In what he calls a "speculative, personal, subjective" judgment,

Cronkite states that he is "not sure who won and who lost," or to what

extent. He concludes that the United States is probably "mired in stalemate,"
and that historians may conclude that the Tet battle was "a draw"; "To suggest
we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism." He does
not say that Johnson wiU be "forced" to the negotiating table by a "defeat,"
but rather that if indeed there is a "stalemate," then "the only rational way
out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who
lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could."
Note the typical reiteration of government propaganda concerning American
aims, unsullied by the factual record-enormous in scale, by this time-of U.S.
goverimient efforts to undermine democracy and to destroy all popular
forces-the NLF, the Buddhist "third force," etc. -in South Vietnam, on the
assumption, openly admitted, that the forces placed in power by U.S. violence
could not survive political competition. Recall also that in these comments that
Freedom House derides, Cronkite reaches essentially the same conclusion as
did the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, in his sunmiary
to the president on the same day as Cronkite's broadcast, and the president's
advisers a month later.

We may note also that two weeks earlier, Cronkite had "assessed" the
impact of the Conomunist offensive, on the basis of U.S. and Vietnamese
sources, reporting that "first, and simplest, the Vietcong suffered a military
defeat" (I, 158). Similarly, on an NBC-TV special of March 10 that Braestrup
repeatedly condemns, Howard Tuckner stated that "Militarily the aUies won"
(I, 159), as did others repeatedly.

Cronkite's "special" is exhibit A in the Freedom House indictment. The
example is typical of the relation between their conclusions and the evidence
they cite.

Braestrup refers to a television comment by Robert Schakne on February
28 for which he gives the following paraphrase: "In short, the United States
would now have to take over the whole war, including the permanently dam-
aged pacification program, because of Saigon's failures" (I, 562-63). Braestrup
claims further that Schackne attributed "this argument" to Robert Komer.
This he calls "a CBS exclusive," his standard term of derision. In fact, "this
argument" is yet another "Freedom House exclusive." What Schackne said,
according to Braestrup, is that it was "likely" that Komer was in Washington
with General Wheeler to ask for more troops "to help get the Vietnam pacifi-
cation program back on the road." The preceding day. Wheeler had requested
that the troop level be raised from 525,000 to 731,756, one primary concern
being that "There is no doubt that the RD Program [pacification] has suffered
a severe set back," that "To a large extent the VC now control the country-
side," and that "US forces wiU be required in a number of places to assist and
encourage the Vietnamese Army to leave the cities and towns and reenter the
country. "1 While Braestrup's version of Schackne's "argument" has little re-
semblance to the actual words he attributes to Schackne, these words were,
if anything, understated.

Braestrup then goes on to claim that Cronkite "used the same argument
almost verbatim, but with an even stronger conclusion" in a February 28 radio
broadcast. There is no hint in the actual broadcast of Braestrup's "argument."
The closest Cronkite came to this "argument" is his statement that "presuma-
bly, A mbassador Komer told a sad tale to President Johnson " (Braestrup's empha-
sis). Cronkite then repeated accurately the basic facts presented by Komer in
a briefing four days earlier. He concluded that "it seems likely that today
Ambassador Komer asked President Johnson for more American troops so that
we can permanently occupy the hamlets and fulfill the promise of security [sic]
to their residents, a promise the Vietnamese alone apparently cannot honor,"
the NLF not being Vietnamese, as usual. Apart from the tacit assumption of
the propaganda system that the villagers yearn for the fulfillment of this
"promise of security" from the NLF, Cronkite's speculation that U.S. troops
would have to fulfill a promise that ARVN alone apparently could not honor
hardly seems unreasonable, three days after General Westmoreland had stated
that "additional U.S. forces would probably be required" (11,159), and that
with them "we could more effectively deny the enemy his objectives"; four
days after Komer had described the Tet offensive as a "considerable setback"
to pacification; a day after Cronkite had presented a television interview with
Captain Donald Jones, deputy pacification adviser for the district regarded as
"the bowl of pacification," who said that "for most of the District, pacification
does not exist," and travel there is impossible (CBS-TV "special" of February
27, cited above); and one day after General Wheeler had asked for a huge troop
increase justified in part by the need to overcome the fact that "To a large
extent the VC now control the countryside."

Television and radio are not alone in being subjected to "Freedom House
exclusives." Here are a few examples.

Exuding contempt and derision, the study informs us that "no one" except
for George McArthur (AP) and Don Oberdorfer (Knight) "reported ... on
what happened to Hue's civilians under Vietcong rule" (I, 299). Again demon-

strating his considerable gift for self-refutation, Braestrup cites reports on
Vietcong executions, kidnappings, burial of executed civilians in mass graves,
etc., in Hu6 under Viet Cong rule by Afewiweefc, UPI, Washington Post, William
Ryan, Reuters, New York Times, Time, London Times, and the NBC "Today"
show (I, 277, 281-84, 472). On page 283, Braestrup writes that "The television
networks, as far as our records show, made no mention of the executions at
all"; on page 472, he refutes this claim, noting that on February 28, in an
"aftermath film report from Hue ... at battle's end," the NBC "Today" show
"hinted at the Hue massacre with this statement: 'Hundreds of government
workers were killed and thrown into temporary graves.'" A rather broad
"hint," it would seem. The example is typical of the Freedom House style of
handling evidence.

In this connection, we should observe that the numerous stories on the Hud
massacre cited by Braestrup in self-refutation referred to the official allega-
tions that 300 to 400 government officials were killed in Hu6, a considerable
massacre but "only one-tenth of the civilian toll in the fighting," so that "it
did not seem like a major story," Gareth Porter comments; he adds that "What
made the 'Hue massacre' a major story was the publicizing by U.S. embassy
propagandist Douglas Pike, who wrote a pamphlet on the subject in late 1969
at the request of the American ambassador to Saigon, Ellsworth Bunker."
Pike's account was given wide coverage when it appeared and has become the
basis for the standard versions since, despite the dubious source: "given the
fact that Pike was relying on the Saigon political warfare department for most
of his data, which was otherwise unverified, one might have asked for more
skepticism and reserve from the press," Porter observes-rather plausibly, it
would seem. Porter adds that the documents made available by the U.S.
mission in 1971 "contradicted Pike on every major point." According to former
CIA analyst Frank Snepp, "The whole idea of a bloodbath was conjured out
of thin air," and the stories were planted in the press by American officials "to
generate sympathy for the South Vietnamese abroad"-in short, the "careful
psychological warfare program pinning the blame on the communists" urged
by "seasoned observers," as John Lengel of AP reported from Hud.'

Presenting no evidence or argument, Braestrup accepts Pike's analysis and
the U.S. government position as correct. In a footnote, he remarks that "Pike's
account was challenged by D. Gareth Porter, a Cornell University graduate
student, admirer of the National Liberation Front, and, briefly, a Saigon
resident," but dismisses this as part of "a minor point of political contention"
(1, 285-86). He describes Pike, in contrast, as "the independent-minded USIA
specialist on the Vietcong" (1, 196),3 and makes no reference to the detailed
analysis of Pike's allegations that had been presented by Porter, one of the few
American scholars concerned with Vietnam. Similarly, Leonard Sussman takes
it as obvious, without argument, that the government position must be correct,
and that "the war's largest systematic execution of civilians" is the responsi-
bility of the Viet Cong-thus excluding the systematic slaughter of thousands
of civilians in Hud by U.S. firepower, possibly including many of those at-
tributed to the Viet Cong massacre." Also unmentioned here is the curious
timing of the exposures that have since become the standard version of the
Hud massacre, a few days after the belated exposure of the My Lai massacre
in late November 1969, when

Army officers in Saigon made available "newly found" captured Viet
Cong documents showing that Communist troops killed nearly 2,900
Vietnamese during the Hue offensive in February, 1968. Officers said the
documents went unnoticed in U.S. military files for nineteen months
until a correspondent's questions about Hue brought them to light. "I
know it sounds incredible, but that's the truth," one official said.'

We will not attempt to explore in this review what is not so much as attempted
in the Freedom House study, but merely note, once again, that we have here
not a work of scholarship but rather a government propaganda tract.

Max Frankel commented in the New York Times (Feb. II, 1968) that pres-
sures at home and in Vietnam "are thought to have raised once again the
temptation of further military escalation" (I, 584, italicized by Braestrup for
emphasis as an example of raising "straw men"). Frankel was quite accurate
in this measured statement. As Braestrup points out, "Wheeler and Westmore-
land agreed that it was also a good time to urge a bolder Vietnam strategy, with
more troops to gain quicker results: i.e., forays into Laos, Cambodia, and
possibly that part of North Vietnam just above the DMZ." Why then the
"straw man" charge? Because, Braestrup objects, escalation "was hardly a
tempting prospect for Johnson" (his emphasis), hardly Frankel's point. Brae-
strup claims further that Frankel, in this article, suggested "that escalation-
notably a reserve call-up— was probable" (I, 586). Frankel's article does not
appear in the accompanying volume of documents; turning to it, we discover
that Braestrup's claim is another Freedom House exclusive, suggested no-
where in Frankel's article, which is noteworthy only for its standard reiteration
of government propaganda about the goal ofbringing "security" to "the people
of South Vietnam"-by B-52 bombing of villages, the exploits of Task Force
Barker at and around My Lai at just that time as part of the general ravaging
of Quang Ngai Province, etc.

After television, Newsweek is the worst offender. Let us therefore inquire
further into its misdeeds. In what Braestrup describes as "Newsweek's major
statement on the Thieu-Ky regime," a March 18 feature entitled "Vietnam: A
Reappraisal," the journal commented accurately in an editorial entitled "The
Political Morass" that "land reform, a vital element in any effort to win the
loyalty of the peasantry, has not been tackled seriously" (I, 534-36), a truism
familiar to everyone from the American high coimnand to officials in Washing-
ton. Braestrup comments: "It is difficult, once again, to fathom Newsweek's
logic. Surely, neither Newsweek nor the Vietnamese peasant expected the
regime to tackle land reform seriously in the aftermath of Tet." It is perfectly
obvious that in this "reappraisal," Newsweek is referring to the general picture,
not specifically to the post-Tet period of one month.

According to Braestrup, "Newsweek, throughout the February-March 1968
period, was to refer, in passing, to the 'wily' Giap, 'tough' North Vietnamese
regulars, 'ominous' enemy activity, and in general, to a foe without setbacks
or flaws" (I, 229). Turning to the facts, on March ii, Newsweek presented an
analysis in which it reported that the Communists "were still plagued by the
confusion that is characteristic of all military operations." The report (11, 216f )
goes on to describe "inexplicable" failure to blow up a crucial bridge, failure
to use main forces adequately to maintain momentum, misassessment of popu-

lar moods and l^.S.-ARVN tactics, inadequate preparation of troops, etc
concluding t at r,e communists did not achieve most of their objectives.'*
The following week s article on Khe Sanh reports a marine view that "Charlie
missed liiS golden opportunity" by bad tactics. Newsweek's picture of "a fo
without setbacks or flaws" is another Freedom House exclusive. e
What of ^i^^ other sins? As for the reference to the "wily" Giap, compare
Newsweek with what Bracstrup regards as the outstanding analysis by Douglas
Pike, who describes Glap as a "master tactician," "one of the best tactical
commanders of the 20th century," etc. (I, 196f). On the "toughness" of the
North Vietnamese and their "ominous" activity, see the regular reports of the
U.S. mlhtary comnumd, and an extensive literature by Vietnam veterans.

Bracstrup claims that "one searches in vain through most of the media
descriptions of the foe, even well into March 1968, for indications that the
enemy s pfahnmg, tactics, executfOn, zeal, and weaponry were Isss than flaw-
less"; "there were few hints in Times analyses or battlefield reporting that the
foe was anythmg but shrewd, tenacious, ascetic, infallible and menacing, and
i° thi's case the paper had plenty of company" (I, 186, 216). Apart from
'flawless" and "infallible," further Freedom House exclusives, the adjectives
can be taken,from the mHItary reports and seem unexceptionable. The claim
that the media regarded the enemy as infallible is defended through pages 186
to 23 1, along with typical Freedom House self -refutation: example after exam-
ple to the contrary is cited, in addition to those just mentioned. The media
reported that the VC "undoubtedly" alienated the population, as they caused
"mdiscriminate slaugfetei^ and "totally misjudged the mood of the South
Vietnamese." They may be suffering "a severe manpower problem" and "hurt-
ing badly."6 They "failed to achieve their main objectives." Captured VC got
lost in Saigon and were falsely told that they would be welcomed. (This
appears under Braestrup's heading "Television: in praise of the VC") They
did not "get-or heed" important information. And so on. AH in all, hardly
the picture of an "infallible" and "flawless" enemy.

Note a^so the Freedom House assumption that a free press, militantly
guardmg ItS objectivity, should not only consider those who are resisting the
U.S. attack as "the enemy," "the foe," etc., but must also refrain from accu-
rately deacribing "the taancf* as tough, resolute, and courageous. To play its
proper role in a free society by Freedom House standards, the media should
never veer a moment from the kind of service to the state demanded and
secured, by force in totalitarian states, so it appears.

The Impact of the Freedom House study comes from the impression of
massive documentation and the huge resources that were employed to obtain
and analyze It. Case by case, the examples collapse on inspection. Here are a
few more examples, far from exhaustive.7

On pacification, "XV and radio commentators went far beyond the available
information to imply the dramatic worst." Three examples are cited to prove
the point (i, 565). Howard Tuckner, of NBC-TV, reported from New York the
views of "U.S. intelligence officials" and "Some U.S. officials in Vietnam"-
^°^5^4^'. ^ Bracstrup concedes in a footnote, adding that these were the views
of "CIA Jn Washington" and "Disheartened junior CORDS officials in Viet-
nam." By Freedom House standards, it is improper to cite such sources accu-
rately. The second example is a CBS radio report criticized only for being

"depressed "-as were pacification officials on the ground. The third example
is from an NBC-TV "special," in which Dean BreUs says that we don't know
what is happening in the rural areas but "can only imagine," and that "the
cities are no longer secure; perhaps they never were."s Hardly remarkable, and
far from the fevered conclusion drawn in Braestrup's paraphrase.

Examples of what Bracstrup calls "straw man journalism" abound in his
own presentation. Thus he faults the media for claiming that the pacification
program had been destroyed, whereas his own conclusion is that "pacification,
although hit hard, was not 'dead' ... it was a mixed picture, but clearly neither
a military nor a psychological 'disaster' " (I, 716). The media regularly reported
that pacification was hit hard, not dead, as his own evidence clearly shows-in
contrast to the Pentagon, which took a more pessimistic view, as we shall see
directly. Braestrup's "straw man journalism" may impress careless readers
skinaming the text for dramatic conclusions, but it presents no evidence and
amounts to no argument.

Bracstrup refers sarcastically to "insights into Vietnamese psychology," as
when Morley Safer, watching marines burning down huts in Cam Ne, con-
cluded that a peasant whose home was destroyed would find it hard to believe
"that we are on his side" (I, 43). How does Safer know? Perhaps the peasant
enjoyed watching the flames. Not all such "psychoanalyzing" is derided, how-
ever, as when General Westmoreland explains that "the people in the cities
are largely indignant at the Vietcong for violating the sanctity of the Tet period
and for their tactics which brought about damage to the cities" (II, 164), or
when he expounds on the peasant "state of mind" (1,78). Note that Safer is
not criticized for accepting the tacit assumption that the press is an agency of
the invading army {"we are on his side").

Bracstrup states that "the embassy fight became the wlwle Tet offensive on
TV and in the newspapers during that offensive's second day" (his emphasis;
1, 126); this illustration of the incompetence of the media is thoroughly refuted
by his story index. He also claims that the media exaggerated VC success in
the early confusion by claiming that the embassy had been entered-failing,
however, to compare these accounts with the reports by military police that
they were taking fire from inside the embassy, or the message log of the 716th
MP Battalion, which reads: "General Westmoreland calls; orders first priority
effort to recapture U.S. Embassy" (I, 92; our emphasis). It is intriguing to read
Braestrup's outrage over quite accurate press reporting of what was said by
Westmoreland, military police involved in the fight, and others, and in particu-
lar over the fact that the press did not simply rely on Westmoreland's later
account (his apparent belief that the embassy had been "captured" goes be-
yond any reporter's error that Bracstrup cites). A careful reading shows that
media reports were surprisingly accurate, given the confusion of the moment,
although one cannot fault Braestrup's profound conclusion that "first reports
are always partly wrong," which will come as a startling insight to the working
journalist.

Repeatedly, the study claims that the media were "vengeful" or bent on
"retribution" in reacting skeptically to government claims. An alternative
possibility is that this reaction reflected a newfound reaHsm. Bracstrup agrees,
for example, that "Westmoreland was wrong in publicly underestimating (in
November [1967]) the enemy" (I, 69), and cites many other false and mislead-

328 APPENDIX 3

ing optimistic statements, among them Robert Komer's prediction of "steady
progress in pacification" a week before the Tet offensive (I, 72; Braestrup's
paraphrase). In fact, part of the shock of the Tet offensive resuhed from the
faith of the media in previous government assessments, undermined by the Tet
offensive, as the U.S. military and official Washington were well aware.

Furthermore, General Westmoreland's accounts were hardly persuasive
during the offensive. Thus he claimed that "all II of the Vietnamese division
commanders . . . commanded their units effectively," whereas, as a journalist
learned, one "had gone into a state of shock during the Tet attacks" (I, 454-55).
Or consider Westmoreland's claim that allegations about inaccuracy and in-
flation of body counts were "one of the great distortions of the war" by the
media-there were at most "relatively small inaccuracies" (II, 163). His own
generals had a rather different view. In his study of the opinions of the
generals. General Douglas Kinnard reports that 61 percent of those responding
describe the body count as "often inflated," and only 26 percent "within reason
accurate." The responses include: "a fake-totally worthless," "often blatant
lies," "a blot on the honor of the Army," and "grossly exaggerated by many
units primarily because of the incredible interest shown by people like
McNamara and Westmoreland." Perhaps journalists had some reason for
skepticism, apart from "vengefulness."9

■To demonstrate the absurd extent of press efforts to find shock value,
Braestrup cites a story in Time on enemy tunneling at Khe 8anh, "as occurred
around Dienbienphu" (1,435; his emphasis), in general ridiculing the analogy-
but forgetting to ridicule the remark by Marine Commander General Cush-
man, who said that "He is digging trenches and doing other tricks of the trade
which he learned to do at Dienbienphu" (I, 4o3).

"All Vietnam, it appeared on film at home, was in flames or being battered
into ruins, and all Vietnamese civilians were homeless refugees," Braestnip
alleges (I, 234), in typically fanciful rhetoric, adding that "there were Virtually
no films shown or photographs published during this period of undamaged
portions of Saigon, Hue, or other cities" (his emphasis). This shows that
coverage was unbalanced, supportive of the enemy. One wonders how many
films and photographs of peaceful English villages or Hawaiian towns ap-
peared on the days that Coventry and Pearl Harbor were bombed, to balance
the picture.

Braestrup seeks the causes for the "exoneration of the Vietcong" for "killing
noncombatants or causing the exodus of refugees" (I, 234), overlooking the
fact chat before seeking the cause of x it is necessary to show that x is true.
In this case, it is not. The accounts he cites regularly blame the Viet Cong for
civilian suffering and emphasize Viet Cong atrocities. In fact, he himself points
out that "both Time and Newsweek put the onus on the Vietcong" Saigon
(I, 246)-as elsewhere. Newsweek titled an article "The VC's Week ofTerror"
(Feb. 12) and described VC terror squads executing civilians in Saigon (I, 49"^,
Typically, the media blamed the Viet Cong for having "brought bullets and
bombs into the very midst of heavily populated areas, causmg indiscriminate
slaughter of civilians caught in the cross fire and making homeless twice
the refugees who had fled to the cities for safety ..." (Time, [1,246]), adopting
the position of U.S. government propaganda that the enemy is to blame if the
United States kills and destroys, and failing to add that the refugees had fled

APPENDIX 3 329

to the cities for safety from massive U.S. violence and that such refugee
generation was explicit poUcy.IO In the Neto York Times, Charles Mohr wrote
that "In one sense the Vietcong have been responsible for civilian deaths by
launching the urban attacks," citing American officials who are "sure that the
population will be bitter about the guerrillas because of their 'callous disregard
for human life' " (I, 243). Meanwhile, AP, the Washington Post, NBC, and
others reported Viet Cong causing destruction, using civilians as shields, pre-
venting civilians from fleeing attack, murdering civilians, etc., often on the
basis of flimsy evidence that would elicit much Freedom House derision if used
to support accounts of American atrocities. In a typical misrepresentation,
Braestrup claims that NBC-TV "attributed Saigon's losses solely to an alUed
military decision to 'kill or maim some of the people' to protect the rest" (our
emphasis), citing Howard Tuckner's statement that there was a decision "that

in order to protect most of the people, they had to kill or maim some of

the people" -a statement that is quite different from the paraphrase and is
noteworthy only for its standard reference to "protecting" the victims (I, 249).

In general, far from "exonerating the Vietcong," the media bent over back-
wards to blame them for the casualties and destruction caused by the U.S.
forces who were "protecting" and "defending" South Vietnam and its popula-
tion, according to unquestioned dogma. While the reporting was generally
accurate in a narrow sense, the framework and the general picture presented
are outlandish, and conform closely to the demands of the state propaganda
system. It is, once again, highly revealing that Freedom House regards such
service to the state as unremarkable-indeed, insufficient, by its standards.

The more general summaries in the Freedom House study leave the evi-
dence presented far behind. Thus the ruins and destruction "were presented
as symbolic evidence of a stunning 'defeat' (variously implied or defined) for
alhed forces" (I, 621). "The Americans, by their heavy use of firepower in a

few cities, were impUcitly depicted as callously destroying all Vietnam ,

while the Vietcong's indiscriminate use of their own firepower, as well as the
Hue killings, were largely overlooked" (I, 286). The dominant themes in the
media "added up to a portrait of defeat for the allies" (I, 705). "At Tet, the
press shouted that the patient was dying" (I, 714). And so on.

We have already cited enough to show how much merit there is in these
characterizations. Furthermore, as already indicated, the media reports gener-
ally conformed to those of the U.S. military, although they were often less
extreme in suggesting enemy success, as we have seen. Braestrup is not un-
aware of this. He writes, for example, that "MACV spokesmen in Saigon
themselves contributed in February to a general journalistic perception that
no logistics, organizational, or manpower limitations inhibited the NVA's ca-
pacity, even after the 'first wave,' to strike anywhere at will ('No place was safe
any more')" (I, 190). Furthermore, "most eyewitness combat reporting, rare
and restricted as it was, showed up better in February than the MACV com-
muniques or the communique rewrites in Saigon" (I, 334). In fact, the military
briefings cited are closely similar to media commentary in basic content, e.g..
Brigadier General John Chaisson, February 3, who described "a real battle,"
"a very successful offensive in its initial phases," "surprisingly well coor-
dinated," "surprisingly intensive," conducted with "a surprising amount of
audacity"-for example, in Hud, where "the VC had the town," etc. Naturally

330 APPENDIX 3

the media varied more widely in content and style, but characterizations of the
sort cited above must simply be dismissed as hysteria, even apart from the
numerous misrepresentations and sheer fabrications.

If this is one of the great achievements of contemporary scholarship, as John
Roche claims, then scholarship is in a bad way indeed.

Notes

Preface

1. We use the term "special interests" in its commonsense meaning, not in the
Orwellian usage of the Reagan era, where it designates workers, farmers,
women, youth, blacks, the aged and infirm, the unemployed-in short, the
population at large. Only one group did not merit this appellation: corpora-
tions, and their owners and managers. They are not "special interests," they
represent the "national interest." This terminology represents the reality of
domination and the operational usage of "national interest" for the two major
political parties. For a similar view, with evidence of the relevance of this usage
to both major political parties, see Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right
Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1986), pp. 37-39 and passim.

2. Herbert Gans, for example, states that "The beliefs that actually make it
into the news are professional values that are intrinsic to national journalism

and that journalists learn on the job The rules of news judgment call for

ignoring story implications ..." ("Are U.S. Journalists Dangerously Liberal?"
Columbia Journalism Review [Nov. -Dec. 1985], pp. 32-33). In his hook Decid-
ing What's News (New York: Vintage, 1980), Gans contends that media report-

AI-All

ers are by and large "objective," but within a framework of beliefs in a set of
"enduring values" that include "ethnocentrism" and "responsible capitalism,"
among others. We would submit that if reporters for Pravda were found to
operate within the constraints of belief in the essential justice of the Soviet
state and "responsible communism," this would be found to make any further
discussion of "objectivity" pointless. Furthermore, as we shall document
below, Gans greatly understates the extent to which media reporters work
within a limiting framework of assumptions.

3. Neoconservative critiques of the mass media commonly portray them as
bastions of liberal, antiestablishment attacks on the system. They ignore the
fact that the mass media are large business corporations controlled by very
wealthy individuals or other corporations, and that the members of what the
neoconservatives describe as the "liberal culture" of the media are hired
employees. They also disregard the fact that the members of this liberal culture
generally accept the basic premises of the system and differ with other mem-
bers of the establishment largely on the tactics appropriate to achieving com-
mon ends. The neoconservatives are simply not prepared to allow deviations
from their own views. In our analysis in chapter I, we describe them as playing
the important role of "enforcers," attempting to browbeat the media into
excluding from a hearing even the limited dissent now tolerated. For an
analysis of the neoconservative view of the media, see Edward S. Herman and
Frank Brodhead, "Ledeen on the Media," in The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian
Connection (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1986), pp. 166-70;
George Gerbner, "Television: The Mainstreaming of America," in Business
and the Media, Conference Report, Yankelovich, Skelly and White, November
19,1981; Gans, "Are U.S. Journalists Dangerously Liberal?"

4. See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (1921; reprint, London: Allen &
Unwin, 1932); Harold Lasswell, "Propaganda," in Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1933); Edward Bernays, Propaganda (New
York: H. Liveright, 1928); M. J. Crozier, S. P. Huntington, and J. Watanuki,
The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Govemabi/ity of Democracies to the
Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975). For
further discussion, see Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War (New York:
Pantheon, 1982), chapter i. and references cited, particularly, Alex Carey,
"Reshaping the Truth: Pragmatists and Propagandists in America," Meanjin
Quarterly (Australia), vol. 35, no. 4 (1976).

5. Public Opinion, p. 248. Lippmann did not fmd this objectionable, as "the
common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be'
managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the
locality" (p. 310). He was distressed that the incorrigible bias of the press might
mislead the "specialized class" as well as the public. The problem, therefore,
was how to get adequate information to the decision-making elites (pp. 31-32).
This, he believed, might be accomplished by development of a body of inde-
pendent experts who could give the leadership unbiased advice. Lippmann
raised no question about possible personal or class interests of the "specialized
class" or the "experts" on whom they might choose to rely, on their ability,
or their right, to articulate "the common interest."

6. For example, Claire Sterling and the experts of the Georgetown Center for
Strategic and International Studies-Walter Laqueur, Michael Ledeen, and

NOTES TO PAGES xii-xiii 333

Robert Kupperman-have been established as the authorities on terrorism by
the mass media; on the Sterling and Paul Henze role in working up the
Bulgarian Connection in the plot against the pope, see chapter 4. In the case
of Latin America, the media have been compelled to avoid the usual resort to
the academic profession for expression of approved opinion, as the profession
largely rejects the framework of state propaganda in this instance. It has
therefore been necessary to create a new cadre of "experts" (Robert Leiken,
Ronald Radosh, Mark Falcoff, Susan Kaufman Purcell, etc.) to whom they can
turn to satisfy doctrinal needs. See Noam ChomsKyi Culture of Terrorism
(Boston: South End Press, 1988), for examples. On the process -of creating
experts to meet system demands, see our chapter 1 under "Sourcing Mass-
Media News."

7. Like other terms of political discourse, the word "democracy" has a techni-
cal Orwellian sense when used in rhetorical flights, or in regular "news report-
ing," to refer to U.S. efforts to establish "democracy." The term refers to
systems in which control over resources and the means of violence ensures the
rule of elements that will serve the needs of U.S. power. Thus the terror states
of El Salvador and Guatemala are "democratic," as is Honduras under the rule
of the military and oligarchy, and the collection of wealthy businessmen,
bankers, etc., organized by the United States as a front for the Somocista-Ied
mercenary army created by the United States is entitled "the democratic
resistance." See further, chapter 3.

8. In the eighty-five opinion columns on Nicaragua that appeared in the New

York Times and the Washington Post in the first three months of 1986, during
the "national debate" preceding the congressional votes on contra aid, not a
single one mentioned this elementary fact. For a detailed review, see Noam
Chomsky, "Introduction," in Morris Morley and James Petras, The Reagan
Administration and Nicaragua, Monograph i (New York: Institute for Media
Analysis, 1987).

9. Only two phrases in the eighty-five opinion columns cited in the previous
footnote mentioned that the Nicaraguan government had carried out reforms;
none of them compared Nicaragua with EI Salvador and Guatemala on this
important question.

10. See Dianna Melrose, Mcara^iM.- The Threat of a Good Example? (Oxford:
Oxfam, 1985); see also chapters 3, 5, and 7, below.

11. In an article highly critical of the Reagan "peace plan" for Nicaragua in

August 1987, Tom Wicker says, "Whatever his doctrine, the United States has
no historic or God-given right to bring democracy to other nations; nor does
such a purpose justify the overthrow of governments it does not like" ("That
Dog Won't Hunt," Neto York Times, Aug. 6, 1987). Wicker does not contest
the claim that Reagan seeks democracy in Nicaragua; it is just that his means
are dubious and his plan won't work. We should note that Wicker is at the
outer limits of expressible dissident opinion in the U.S. mass media. See
further, chapter 3. For additional references and discussion, see Chomsky,
Culture of Terrorism.

12. For example, in response to the Guatemala peace accords of August 1987,
the United States immediately escalated the supply flights required to keep its
forces in Nicaragua in the field to the phenomenal level of two to three per
day. The purpose was to undermine the accords by intensifying the fighting.

334 NOTES TO PAGES xiii-3

and to prevent Nicaragua from relaxing its guard so that it could be accused
of failing to comply with the accords. These U.S. initiatives were by far the
most serious violations of the accords, but they were virtually unmentioned in
the media. For a detailed review, see Noam Chomsky, "Is Peace at Hand?"
Z magazine (January 1988).

13. Jacques EUul, Propaganda (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 58-59.

14. A careful reader of the Soviet press could learn facts about the war in Af-
ghanistan that controvert the government line-see chapters, pp. 226-27-but
these inconvenient facts would not be considered in the West to demonstrate
the objectivity of the Soviet press and the adequacy of its coverage of this issue.

Chapter 1: A Propaganda Model

1. See note 4 of the preface.

2. Media representatives claim that what the government says is "news-
worthy" in its own right. If, however, the government's assertions are transmit-
ted without context or evaluation, and without regard to the goverimient's
possible manipulative intent, the media have set themselves up to be
"managed." Their objectivity is "nominal," not substantive.

In early October 1986, memos were leaked to the press indicating that the
Reagan administration had carried out a deliberate campaign of disinformation
to influence events in Libya. The mass media, which had passed along this
material without question, expressed a great deal of righteous indignation that
they had been misled. To compound the absurdity, five years earlier the press
had reported a CIA-run "disinformation program designed to embarrass Qad-
dafi and his government," along with terrorist operations to overthrow Quad-
dafi and perhaps assassinate him {Newsweek, Aug. 3, 1981; P. Edward Haley,
Qaddafi and the United States since 1969 [New York: Praeger, 1984], p. 272).
But no lessons were learned. In fact, the mass media are gulled on an almost
daily basis, but rarely have to suffer the indignity of government documents
revealing their gullibility. With regard to Libya, the media have fallen into line
for each propaganda ploy, from the 1981 "hit squads" through the Berlin
discotheque bombing, swallowing each implausible claim, faiUng to admit
error in retrospect, and apparently unable to learn from successive entrap-
ment- which suggests willing error. See Noam Chomsky, Pirates & Emperors
(New York: Claremont, 1986), chapter 3. As we show throughout the present
book, a series of lies by the government, successively exposed, never seems to
arouse skepticism in the media regarding the next government claim.

3. For a description of the goverimient's strategy of deflecting attention away
from the Nicaraguan election by the fabricated MIG story, and the media's
service in this government program, see chapter 3, under "The MIG Crisis
Staged during the Nicaraguan Election Week."

4. James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power Without Responsibility: The Press and
Broadcasting in Britain, 2d ed. (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 24-

5. Quoted in ibid., p. 23.

6. Ibid., p. 34.

NOTES TO PAGES 4-5 335

7- Ibid., pp. 38-39.

8. Alfred McClung Lee, The Daily Newspaper in Amen'ca (New York: Macmil-
lan, 1937), pp. 166, 173.

9- Earl Vance, "Freedom of the Press for Whom," Virginia Quarterly Review
(Summer 1945), quoted in Survival of a Free, Competitive Press: The Small
Newspaper: Democracy's Grass Roots, Report of the Chairman, Senate Small
Business Committee, 80th Cong., 1st session, 1947, p. 54.

10. Note that we are speaking of media with substantial outreach-mass
media. It has always been possible to start small-circulation journals and to
produce mimeographed or photocopied news letters sent around to a tiny
audience. But even small journals in the United States today typically survive
only by virtue of contributions from wealthy financial angels.

11. In 1987, the Times-Mirror Company, for example, owned newspapers in
Los Angeles, Baltimore, Denver, and Hartford, Connecticut, had book pub-
lishing and magazine subsidiaries, and owned cable systems and seven televi-
sion stations.

12. Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987),
p. xvi.

13. David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entman, Media. Power . Politics (New
York: Free Press, 1981), p. 7; Stephen Hess, The Government/Press Connection:
Press Officers and Their Offices (Washington: Brookings, 1984), pp. 99— 100.

14. The four major Western wire services-Associated Press, United Press
International, Reuters, and Agence-France-Presse-account for some 80 per-
cent of the international news circulating in the world today. AP is owned by
member newspapers; UPI is privately owned; Reuters was owned mainly by
the British media until it went public in 1984, but control was retained by the
original owners by giving lesser voting rights to the new stockholders; Agence-
France-Presse is heavily subsidized by the French government. As is pointed
out by Jonathan Fenby, the wire services "exist to serve markets," and their
prime concern, accordingly, "is with the rich media markets of the United
States, Western Europe, and Japan, and increasingly with the business com-
munity " They compete fiercely, but AP and UPI "are really U.S. enter-
prises that operate on an international scale Without their domestic base,

the AP and UPI could not operate as international agencies. With it, they must
be American organizations, subject to American pressures and requirements"
(The International News Services [New York: Schocken, 1986], pp. 7, 9, 73-74)-
See also Anthony Smith, The Geopolitics of Information: How Western Culture
Dominates the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), chapter 3.

15. The fourteenth annual Roper survey, "Public Attitudes toward Television
and Other Media in a Time of Change" (May 1985), indicates that in 1984, 64
percent of the sample mentioned television as the place "where you usually
get most of your news about what's going on in the world today ..." (p. 3).
It has often been noted that the television networks themselves depend heavily
on the prestige newspapers, wire services, and government for their choices
of news. Their autonomy as newsmakers can be easily exaggerated.

16. The members of the very top tier qualify by audience outreach, importance
as setters of news standards, and asset and profit totals. The last half dozen
or so in our twenty-four involve a certain amount of arbitrariness of choice,
although audience size is still our primary criterion. McGraw-Hill is included

TU I'AGES

because of its joint strength in trade books and magazines of political content
and outreach.

17. As noted in table i-i, note 7, Storer came under the temporary control of
the securities firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. in 1985. As its ultimate fate
was unclear at the time of writing, and as financial data were no longer
available after 1984, we have kept Storer on the table and list it here, despite
its uncertain status.

18. John Kluge, having taken the Metromedia system private in a leveraged
buyout in 1984 worth $1.1 billion, sold off various parts of this system in 1985-86
for $5.5 billion, at a personal profit of some $3 billion (Gary Hector, "Are
Shareholders Cheated by LBOs?" Fortune, Jan. 17, 1987, p. 100). Station
KDLA-TV, in Los Angeles, which had been bought by a management-outsider
group in a leveraged buyout in 1983 for $245 milUon, was sold to the Tribune
Company for $5IO million two years later (Richard Stevenson, "Tribune in TV
Deal for S5IO Million," New York Times, May 7, 1985). See also "The Media
Magnates: Why Huge Fortunes Roll Off the Presses," Fortune, October 12,
1987.

19. A split among the the heirs of James E. Scripps eventually resulted in the
sale of the Detroit Evening News. According to one news article, "Daniel
Marentette, a Scripps family member and a self described 'angry shareholder,'
says family members want a better return on their money. 'We get better yields
investing in a New York checking account,' says Mr. Marentette, who sells
race horses" (Damon Darlin, "Takeover Rumors Hit Detroit News Parent,"
Wall Street Journal, July 18, 1985). The Bingham family division on these
matters led to the sale of the Louisville Coun'er-Journal; the New Haven papers
of the Jackson family were sold after years of squabbling, and "the sale price
[of the New Haven papers], $185 million, has only served to publicize the
potential value of family holdings of family newspapers elsewhere" (Geraldine
Fabrikant, "Newspaper Properties, Hotter Than Ever," A^ew York Times, Aug.
17, 1986).

20. The Reagan administration strengthened the control of existing holders of
television-station licenses by increasing their term from three to five years, and
its FCC made renewals essentially automatic. The FCC also greatly facilitated
speculation and trading in television properties by a rule change reducing the
required holding period before sale of a newly acquired property from three
years to one year.

The Reagan era FCC and Department of Justice also refused to challenge
mergers and takeover bids that would significantly increase the concentration
of power (GE-RCA) or media concentration (Capital Cities-ABC). Further-
more, beginning April 2, 1985, media owners could own as many as twelve
television stations, as long as their total audience didn't exceed 25 percent of
the nation's television households; and they could also hold twelve AM and
twelve FM stations, as the 1953 "7-7-7 rule" was replaced with a "12-12-12
rule." See Herbert H. Howard, "Group and Cross-Media Ownership of Tele-
vision Stations: 1985" (Washington: National Association of Broadcasters,
1985).

21. This was justified by Reagan-era FCC chairman Mark Fowler on the
grounds that market options are opening up and that the public should be free
to choose. Criticized by Fred Friendly for doing away with the law's public-

NOTES TO PAGES 8-n 337

interest standard. Fowler replied that Friendly "distrusts the ability of the
viewing public to make decisions on its own through the marketplace mecha-
nism. 1 do not" (Jeanne Saddler, "Clear Channel: Broadcast Takeovers Meet
Less FCC Static, and Critics Are Upset," Wall Street Journal, June II, 1985).
Among other problems. Fowler ignores the fact that true freedom of choice
involves the ability to select options that may not be offered by an oUgopoly
selling audiences to advertisers.

22. CBS increased its debt by about $i billion in 1985 to finance the purchase
of 21 percent of its own stock, in order to fend off a takeover attempt by Ted
Turner. The Wall Street Journal noted that "With debt now standing at 60%
of capital, it needs to keep advertising revenue up to repay borrowings and
interest" (Peter Barnes, "CBS Profit Hinges on Better TV Ratings," June 6,
1986). With the slowed-up growth of advertising revenues, CBS embarked on
an employment cutback of as many as six hundred broadcast division em-
ployees, the most extensive for CBS since the loss of cigarette advertising in
1971 (Peter Barnes, "CBS Will Cut up to 600 Posts in Broadcasting," Wall
Street Journal, July i, 1986). In June 1986, Time, Inc., embarked on a program
to buy back as much as 10 milUon shares, or 16 percent of its coimnon stock,
at an expected cost of some $900 million, again to reduce the threat of a hostile
takeover (Laura Landro, "Time Will Buy as Much as 16% of Its Common,"
Wall Stt'eet Journal, June 20, 1986).

23. In response to the Jesse Helms and Turner threats to CBS, Laurence
Tisch, of Loews Corporation, was encouraged to increase his holdings in CBS
stock, already at 11.7 percent. In August 1986, the Loews interest was raised
to 24.9 percent, and Tisch obtained a position of virtual control. In combina-
tion with William Paley, who owned 8.1 percent of the shares, the chief
executive officer of CBS was removed and Tisch took over that role himself,
on a temporary basis (Peter Barnes, "Loews Increases Its Stake in CBS to
Almost 25%,' Wall Street Journal, Aug. 12, 1986).

24. The number would be eight if we included the estate of Lila Wallace, who
died in 1984, leaving the controlling stock interest in Reader's Digest to the care
of trustees.

25. As we noted in the preface, the neoconservatives speak regularly of "lib-
eral" domination of the media, assuming or pretending that the underlings call
the shots, not the people who own or control the media. These data, showing
the wealth position ofmedia owners, are understandably something they prefer
to ignore. Sometimes, however, the neoconservatives go "populist," and-
while financed by Mobil Oil Corporation and Richard Mellon Scaife-pretend
to be speaking for the "masses" in opposition to a monied elite dominating the
media. For further discussion, see Edward S. Herman's review of The Spirit
ofDemocratic Capitalism, "Michael Novak's Promised Land: Unfettered Cor-
porate Capitalism," Monthly Review (October 1983), and the works cited in the
preface, note 3.

26. Similar results are found in Peter Dreier, "The Position of the Press in the
U.S. Power Structure," Social Problems (February 1982), pp. 298-310.

27. Benjamin Compaine et al.. Anatomy of the Communications Industry: Who
Owns the Media? (White Plains, N.Y.: Knowledge Industry Publications, 1982),
P-463-

28. Ibid., pp. 458-60.

29. See Edward S. Herman, Corporate Cmif^ Corporate Power (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 26-54.

30. For the interests of fifteen major newspaper companies in other media
fields, and a checklist of other fields entered by leading firms in a variety of
media industries, see Compaine, Anatomy of the Communications Industry,
tables 2.19 and 8.1, pp. II and 452-53.

31. The merger had been sanctioned by the FCC but was stymied by interven-
tion of the Department of Justice. See "A broken engagement for ITT and
ABC," Business Week January 6, 1967.

32. Ibid.

33. On the enormous and effective lobbying operations of GE, see Thomas B.
Edsall, "Bringing Good Things to GE: Firm's Political Savvy Scores in Wash-
ington," Washington Post, April 13, 1985;

34. The widely quoted joke by A. I. Liebling-that if you don't like what your
newspaper says you are perfectly free to start or buy one ofyour own-stressed
the impotence of the individual. In a favorable political climate such as that
provided by the Reagan administration, however, a giant corporation not liking
media performance can buy its own, as exemplified by GE.

35. Allan Sloan, "Understanding Murdoch-The Numbers Aren't What Re-
ally Matters," Forbes, March 10, 1986, pp. II4ff.

36. On the Nixon- Agnew campaign to bully the media by publicity attacks and
threats, see Marilyn Lashner, The Chilling Effect in TV News (New York:
Praeger, 1984). Lashner concluded that the Nixon White House's attempt
to quiet the media "succeeded handily, at least as far as television is con-
cerned ..." (p. 167). See also Fred Powledge, The Engineering of Restraint: The
Nixon Administration and the Press (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1971),
and WilUam E. Porter, Assault on the Media: The Nixon Years (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1976).

37. Of the 290 directors in his sample of large newspapers, 36 had high-level
positions-past or present-in the federal government (Dreier, "The Position
of the Press," p. 303).

38. One study showed that of sixty-five FCC commissioners and high-level
staff personnel who left the FCC between 1945 and 1970, twel"e had come out
of the private-communications sector before their FCC sel :e, and thirty-
four went into private-firm service after leaving the commission (Roger Noll
et al.. Economic Aspects ofTelevision Regulation [Washington: Brookings, 1973],
p. 123).

39. "The symbiotic growth of American television and global enterprise has
made them so interrelated that they cannot be thought of as separate. They
are essentially the same phenomenon. Preceded far and wide by military
advisers, lobbyists, equipment salesmen, advertising specialists, merchandising
experts, and telefilm salesmen as advance agents, the enterprise penetrates
much of the non-socialist world. Television is simply its most visible portion"
(Erik Barnouw, The Sponsor [New York: Oxford University Press, 1978], p.
158). For a broader picture, see Herbert I . Schiller, Communication and Cultu-
ral Domination (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press,
1976), especially chapters 3-4.

40. Is it not possible that if the populace "demands" program content greatly
disliked by the owners, competition and the quest for profits wiU cause them

to offer such programming? There is some truth in this, and it, along with the
limited autonomy of media personnel, may help explain the "surprises" that
crop up occasionally in the mass media. One limit to the force of public
demand, however, is that the millions of customers have no means of register-
ing their demand for products that are not offered to them. A further problem
is that the owners' class interests are reinforced by a variety of other filters that
we discuss below.

41. Quoted in Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, p. 31.

42. Ibid., p. 41.

43. " producers presenting patrons [advertisers] with the greatest oppor-
tunities to make a profit through their publics will receive support while those
that cannot compete on this score will not survive" (Joseph Turow, Media
Industries: The Production of News and Entertainment [New York: Longman,
1984], p. 52).

44. Noncommercial television is also at a huge disadvantage for the same
reason, and will require a public subsidy to be able to compete. Because public
television does not have the built-in constraints of ownership by the wealthy,
and the need to appease advertisers, it poses a threat to a narrow ehte control
of mass communications. This is why conservatives struggle to keep public
television on a short leash, with annual funding decisions, and funding at a low
level (see Barnouw, The Sponsor, pp. 179—82). Another option pursued in the
Carter-Reagan era has been to force it into the commercial nexus by sharp
defunding.

45. Bagdikian, Media Monopoly, pp. 118-26. " 'The dominant paper ultimately
thrives,' Gannett Chairman Allen H. Neuharth says. 'The weaker paper ulti-
mately dies' " (Joseph B. White, " Knight- Ridder's No-Lose Plan Backfires,"
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 1988).

46. Quoted in Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, p. 43.

47. "Advertising and the Press," in James Curran, ed.. The British Press: A
Manifesto (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 252-55.

48. Ibid., p. 254.

49. CBS Annual Report, p. 13. This is a further refinement in the measure-
ment of "efficiency" in "delivering an audience." In the magazine business, the
standard measure is CPM, or "costs per thousand," to an advertiser to reach
buyers through a full-page, black-and-white ad. Recent developments, like
CBS's CAP, have been in the direction of identifying the special characteristics
of the audience delivered. In selling itself to advertisers, the Soap Opera Digest
says: "But you probably want to know about our first milestone: today Soap
Opera Digest delivers more women in the 18-49 category at the lowest CPM
than any other women's magazine" (quoted in Turow, Media Industries, P.55).

50. William Evan, Organization Theory (New York: WUey, 1976), p. 123.

51. Turow asserts that "The continual interaction of producers and primary
patrons plays a dominant part in setting the general boundary conditions for
day-to-day production activity" (Media Industries, p. 51).

52. Quoted in Todd Gitlin, Inside Prime Time (New York: Pantheon, 1983),
P-253-

53. Pat Aufderheide, "What Makes Public TV Public?" The Progressive (Janu-
ary 1988).

54. "Castor oil or Camelot?" December 5,1987. For further materials on such

340 NOTES TO PAGES 17-20

interventions, see Harry Hammitt, "Advertising Pressures on Media," Free-
dom of Information Center Report no. 367 (School of Journalism, University
of Missouri at Columbia, February 1977). See also James Aronson, Deadline
for the Media (New York: Bobbs -Merrill, 1972), pp. 261-63.

55. According to Procter & Gamble's instructions to tlieir ad agency, "There
will be no material on any of our programs which could in any way further
the concept of business as cold, ruthless, and lacking in all sentiment or
spiritual motivation." The manager of corporate communications for General
Electric has said: "We insist on a program environment that reinforces our
corporate messages" (quoted in Bagdikian, Media Monopoly, p. 160). We may
recall that GE now owns NBC-TV.

56. Bamouw, The Sponsor, p. 135.

57. Advertisers may also be offended by attacks on themselves or their pro-
ducts. On the tendency of the media to avoid criticism of advertised products
even when very important to consumer welfare [e.g., the effects of smoking],
see Bagdikian, Media Monopoly, pp. 168-73.

58. This is hard to prove statistically, given the poor data made available by
the FCC over the years. The long-term trend in advertising time/programming
time is dramatically revealed by the fact that in 1929 the National Association
of Broadcasting adopted as a standard of commercial practice on radio the
following: "Commercial announcements . . . shall not be broadcast between 7
and 11 P.M." William Paley testified before the Senate Commerce Committee
in 1930 that only 22 percent of CBS's time was allocated to commercially
sponsored programs, with t.he other 78 percent sustaining; and he noted that
advertising took up only "seven-tenths of I percent of all our time" (quoted
in Public Service Responsibility ofBwadcast Licensees, FCC [Washington: GPO,
Mar. 7, 1946], p. 42). Frank Wolf states in reference to public-affairs program-
ming: "That such programs were even shown at all on commercial television
may have been the result of FCC regulation" (Television Programmingfor News
and Public Ajfairs [New York: Praeger, 1972], p. 138; see also pp. 99-139).

59. Barnouw, The Sponsor, p. 134.

60. For Alcoa's post-antitrust-suit sponsorship of Edward R. Murrow, and
ITT's post-earlY-1970s-scandals sponsorship of "The Big Blue Marble," see
Bamouw, The Sponsor, ibid., pp. 51-52, 84-86. Bamouw shows that network
news coverage of ITT was sharply constrained during the period of ITT
program sponsorship.

61. Barnouw, The Sponsor, p. 150.

62. Mark Fishman, Manufacturing the News (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 198o), p. 143.

63- Ibid., pp. 144-45.

64. Gaye Tuchman, "Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of
Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity," American Journal of Sociology 77, no. 2
(1972), pp. 662-64-

65. United States Air Force, "Fact Sheet: The United States Air Force Infor-
mation Program" (March 1979); "News Releases: 600,000 in a Year," A ;> Force
Times, April 28, 1980.

66. ]. W. Fulbright, The Pentagon Propaganda Machine (New York: H. Live-
right, 1970), p. 88.

67. Ibid., p. 90.

NOTES TO PAGES 20-22 341

68. An Associated Press report on "Newspapers Mustered as Air Force De-
fends BIB," published in the Washington Post, April 3, 1987, indicates that the
U.S. Air Force had 277 newspapers in 1987, as compared with 140 in 1979-

69. "DOD Kills 205 Periodicals; Still Publishes 1,203 Others," Armed Forces
Journal International (August 1982), p. 16.

70. Its nine regional offices also had some public-information operations, but
personnel and funding are not readily allocable to this function. They are
smaller than the central office aggregate.

The AFSC aggregate public-information budget is about the same size as
the contract given by the State Department to International Business Com-
munications (!BC) for lobbying on behalf of the contras ($419,000). This was
only one of twenty-five contracts investigated by the GAO that "the Latin
American Public Diplomacy office awarded to individuals for research and
papers on Central America, said a GAO official involved in the investigation"
(Rita Beamish, "Pro-contra Contracts are Probed," Philadelphia Inquirer, July
22, 1987, p. 4A).

71. The NCC's news services are concentrated in the Office of Information,

but it has some dispersed staff in communications functions elsewhere in the
organization that produce a few newsletters, magazines, and some videotapes
and filmstrips.

72. In 1980, Mobil Oil had a public-relations budget of $21 million and a
public-relations staff of seventy-three. Between 1976 and 1981 it produced at
least a dozen televised special reports on such issues as gasoline prices, with
a hired television journalist interviewing Mobil executives and other experts,
that are shown frequently on television, often without indication of Mobil
sponsorship. See A. Kent MacDougall, Ninety Seconds To Tell It All (Home-
wood, 111.: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1981), pp. 117-20.

73. John S. Saloma 111, Ominous Politics: The New Conservative Labyrinth
(New York: Hill & Wang, 1984), p. 79.

74. MacDougall, Ninety Seconds, pp. 116-17.

75. Thomas B. Edsall, The New Politics oflnequality (New York: Norton, 1984),
p. no.

76. Peggy Dardenne, "Corporate Advertising," Public Relations Journal (No-
vember 1982), p. 36.

77. S. Prakash Sethi, Handbook ofAdvocacy Advertising: Strategies and Applica-
tions (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 22. See also Edsall, New Politics,
chapter 3, "The Politicization of the Business Community"; and Saloma,
Ominous Politics, chapter 6, "The Corporations: Making Our Voices Heard."

78. The April 14, 1986, U.S. bombing of Libya was the first military action
timed to preempt attention on 7 p.m. prime-time television news. See
Chomsky, P/rafe.? & Emperors, P. 147.

79. For the masterful way the Reagan administration used these to manipulate
the press, see "Standups," The New Yorker, December 2, 1985, pp. 81ff.

80. Fishman, Manufacturing the News, p. 153.

81. See note 70.

82. On January 16, 1986, the American Friends Service Committee issued a
news release, based on extended Freedom of Information Act inquiries, which
showed that there had been 381 navy nuclear-weapons accidents and "inci-
dents" in the period 1965-77, a figure far higher than that previously claimed.

342 NOTMS TO PAGES 22-25

The mass media did not cover this hot story directly but through the filter of
the navy's reply, which downplayed the significance of the new findings and
eliminated or relegated to the background the AFSC's full range of facts and
interpretation of the meaning of what they had uncovered. A typical heading:
"Navy Lists Nuclear Mishaps: None of 630 Imperilled PubKc, Service §ays,"
Washington Post, January 16, 1986.

83. The Harvard professor in charge of the program, Harvey Mansfield, stated
that the invitation to White had been a mistake anyway, as he "IS a representa-
tive of the far left," whereas the forum was intended to involve a debate
"between liberals and conservatives" (Harvard Crimson, May 14, 1986).

84. See Edward S. Herman and Frank. Brodhead, The Ri^^ .and Fall of the
Bulgarian Connection (New York: Shendan Square Publications, 19^6), pp.

123-24. .

85. Mark Hertsgaard, "How Reagan Seduced Us: InSIde the,;resldent ' "Op-
aganda Factory," Village Voice, September 18, 1984; see also Standups," cited

in note 79 above. _^

86. Stephen L. Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines (Chapel Hul! Umverslty

of North Carolina Press, 198o), p. 194-

87. Bruce Owen and Ronald Braeutigam, The Regulation Game: Strategic Use
of the Administrative Process (Cambridge, Mass.: BalKnger, 1978), p. 7-

88. See Edward S. Herman, "The Institutionalization of Bias in Economics,"
Media, Culture and Society (July 1982), pp. 275-91.

89. Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1969). p. 28.

90. Quoted in Alex Carey, "ManaglDg Pubhc Opinion: The Corporate Offen-
sive" (University of New South Wales, 1986, mimeographed), p. 32.

91. Ibid., pp. 46-47, quoting Feulner papers given 10.1978 arid 1985-

92. For a good discussion of many of these organizations and purpose,
funding, networking, and outreach programs, see Saloma, Omitious Politics,
chapters 4, 6, and 9-

93. See Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian Connection, p. 259; Fred LandiS,
"Georgetown's Ivory Tower for Old Spooks," Inquiry, September 30, 1979, pp.

94. The CSlS's expert on terrorism, Robert Kupperman, was probably
most widely used participant on radio and teleVISion talk shows on terronsm

in the last several years. j d ;

95. On Sterling's quahfications as an expert, see Herman and Brodhead, i»«<-
garian Connection, pp. 125-46; on Shevchenko, see Edward J. EpsteTO,
Invention of Arkady Shevchenko, Supermole: The Spy Who Came In to Be
Sold," Nea Republic, July 15-22, 1985.

95. See David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under
man and Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), pp. 114-3^,
stresses the importance of the lying informer. This McCarthyit.e pathology
replicated in Robert Leiken's 1982 book on "Soviet hegemomsin . stan-
dard Maoist phrase-which conjures up a Soviet strategy of t*^8 over ^
Western Hemisphere by means of Cuba and the Sandmistas, an'^ guemTIa
movements elsewhere (Leiken, Soviet Strategy in Latin America [New York.

Praeeer, 1982]). . bl

97. Then and now, former dissidents are portrayed as especially valua .e
experts for the seeming authenticity they can bring to the mistakes of their

NOTES TO PAGES 25-28 343

former associates. The fact that their claims are often fraudulent is not a
problem because the mass media refuse to point this out. Thus Jean Lacouture
lent credence to his criticisms of the Khmer Rouge by claiming to have been
a former sympathizer-not only a falsehood, as he was pro-Sihanouk, but an
absurdity, as nothing had been known about the Khmer Rouge. David Horo-
witz added to his value as a born-again patriot by claiming that along with
protesters against the Vietnam War generally, he came "to acquire a new
appreciation for foreign tyrants like Kim 1 1 Sung of North Korea" (Peter
Collier and David Horowitz, "Confessions of Two New-Left Radicals: Why
We Voted for Reagan," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, April 8,
1985). Robert Leiken became more potent as a critic of the Sandinistas as an
alleged former peace-movement activist and early supporter of the Sandinis-
tas. Each of these claims was a fabrication, but this fact went unmentioned in
the mass media. On Leiken's claims, and the "special force" his anti-Sandinista
writings gained by his alleged conversion from "fan of the Sandinistas," see
Michael Massing, "Contra Aides," Mother Jones (October 1987). While dis-
nussing this pretense. Massing credits Leiken's claim that he "was active in the
antiwar movement," but that is highly misleading. Activists in the Boston area,
where he claims to have been an antiwar organizer, recall no participation by
Leiken until about 1970-at which time McGeorge Bundy could also have
been described as an activist leader.

98. See above, note 55.

99. See "The Business Campaign Against 'Trial by TV,' " Business Week, June
22,1980, pp. 77-79; William H. Miller, "Fighting TV Hatchet Jobs," Industry
Week, January 12, 1981, pp. 61-64.

100. See Walter Schneir and Miriam Schneir, "Beyond Westmoreland: The
Right's Attack on the Press," The Nation, March 30, 1985.

101. An ad widely distributed by United Technologies Corporation, titled
"Crooks and Clowns on TV," is based on the Media Institute's study entitled
Crooks, Conmen and Clowns: Businessmen in TV Entertainment, which contends
that businessmen are treated badly in television entertainment programs.

102. John Corry, TV News and the Dominant Culture (Washington: Media
Institute), 1986.

r03. See S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda Lichter, The Media
Elite (Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1986). For a good discussion of the
Lichters' new center, see Alexander Cockburn, "Ashes and Diamonds," In

These Times, July 8-21, 1987.

104. Louis Wolf, "Accuracy in Media Rewrites News and History," Covert
Action Information Bulletin (Spring 1984), pp. 26-29.

105. aim's impact is hard to gauge, but it must be recognized as only a part
of a larger corporate-right-wing campaign of attack. It has common funding
sources with such components of the conservative labyrinth as AEl, Hoover,
the Institute for Contemporary Studies, and others (see Saloma, Ominous
Politics, esp. chapters 2, 3, and 6), and has its own special role to play. AIM's
head. Reed Irvine, is a frequent participant in television talk shows, and his
letters to the editor and commentary are regularly published in the mass media.
The media feel obligated to provide careful responses to his detailed attacks
on their news and documentaries, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
even helped fund his group's reply to the PBS series on Vietnam. His abihty

344 NOTES TO PAGES 28-31

to get the publisher of the New York Times to meet with him personally once
a year-a first objective of any lobbyist-is impressive testimony to influence.
On his contribution to the departure of Raymond Bonner from the Times, see
Wolf, "Accuracy in Media Rewrites News and History," pp. 32-33.

106. For an analysis of the bias of the Freedom House observers, see Edward
S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: U.S. -Staged Elections
in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and EI Salvador (Boston: South End
Press, 1984), appendix i, "Freedom House Observers in Zimbabwe Rhodesia
and EI Salvador."

107. R. Bruce McColm, "El Salvador: Peaceful Revolution or Armed Strug-
gle?" Perspectives on Freedom I (New York: Freedom House, 1982); James
Nelson Goodsell, "Freedom House Labels US Reports on Salvador Biased,"
Christian Science Monitor, February 3, 1982.

108. For a discussion of Ledeen's views on the media, see Herman and Brod-
head, Bulgan'an Connection, pp. 166-70.

109. Among the contributors to AIM have been the Reader's Digest Associa-
tion and the DeWitt Wallace Fund, Walter Annenberg, Sir James Goldsmith
(owner of the French L'Express), and E. W. Scripps II, board chairman of a

newspaper-television-radio system.

110. George Skelton, White House correspondent for the Los Angeles Times,
noted that in reference to Reagan's errors of fact, "You write the stories once,
twice, and you get a lot of mail saying, 'You're picking on the guy, you guys
in the press make mistakes too.' And editors respond to that, so after a while
the stories don't run anymore. We're intimidated" (quoted in Hertsgaard,
"How Reagan Seduced Us").

111. Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1978), pp. 95-99-

112. Jan K. Black, United States Penetration of Brazil (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), pp. 39-56.

113. See above, pp. 24-25; below, pp. 157-61.

114. "The Stalinists of An ti- Communism," in Ralph Miliband, John SaviUe,
and Marcel Liebman, Socialist Register, 1984^ The Uses ofAnticommunism (Lon-
don: Merlin Press, 1984), p. 337.

115. Daix, in 1949, referred to the Stalin concentration camps as "one of the
Soviet Union's most glorious achievements," displaying "the complete sup-
pression of man's exploitation of man" (quoted in Miliband et al.. Socialist
Register, p. 337). Kriegel, formerly a hard-line Communist party functionary,
was the author of a 1982 book explaining that the KGB organized the Sabra-
Shatila massacres, employing German terrorists associated with the PLO and
with the tacit cooperation of the CIA, in order to defame Israel as part of the
Soviet program of international terrorism. For more on this profound study,
and its influence, see Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle (Boston: South End
Press, 1983), pp. 291-92, 374-75.

116. Socialist Register, p. 345.

117. Where dissidents are prepared to denounce official enemies, of course,
they can pass through the mass-media filtering system, in the manner of the
ex-Communist experts described in "Anticommunism as a Control Mecha-
nism" (p. 29).

118. See chapter 2, "Worthy and Unworthy Victims." Of interest in the Turk-

NOTES TO PAGES 31-32 345

ish case is the Western press's refusal to publicize the Turkish government's
attacks on the press, including the U.S. press's own reporters in that country.
UPI's reporter Ismet Imset, beaten up by the Turkish police and imprisoned
under trumped-up charges, was warned by UPI not to publicize the charges
against him, and UPI eventually lired him for criticizing their badly compro-
mised handling of his case. See Chris Christiansen, "Keeping In With The
Generals," New Statesman, January 4, 1985.

119. We believe that the same dichotomization applies in the domestic sphere.
For example, both British and American analysts have noted the periodic
intense focus on- and indignation over- "welfare chiselers" by the mass
media, and the parallel de-emphasis of and benign attitudes toward the far
more important fraud and tax abuses of business and the affluent. There is also
a deep-seated reluctance on the part of the mass media to examine the struc-
tural causes of inequality and poverty. Peter Golding and Sue Middleton, after
an extensive discussion of the long-standing "criminalization of poverty" and
incessant attacks on welfare scroungers in Britain, point out that tax evasion,
by contrast, is "acceptable, even laudable," in the press, that the tax evader
"is not merely a victim but a hero." They note, also, that "The supreme
achievement of welfare capitalism" has been to render the causes and condi-
tion of poverty almost invisible (Images of Welfare: Press and Public Attitudes
to Poverty [Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982], pp. 66-67,98-100, 186, 193).

In a chapter entitled "The Deserving Rich," A. J. Liebling pointed out that
in the United States as well, "The crusade against the destitute is the favorite
crusade of the newspaper publisher," and that "There is no concept more
generally cherished by publishers than that of the Undeserving Poor" (The
Press [New York: Ballantine, 1964], pp. 78-79). Liebling went into great detail
on various efforts of the media to keep welfare expenses and taxes down "by
saying that they [the poor] have concealed assets, or bad character, or both"
(p. 79). These strategies not only divert, they also help split the employed
working class from the unemployed and marginalized, and make these all
exceedingly uncomfortable about participating in a degraded system of
scrounging. See Peter Golding and Sue Middleton, "Attitudes to Claimants:
A Culture of Contempt," in Images of Welfare, pp. 169ff President Reagan's
fabricated anecdotes about welfare chiselers, and his complete silence on the
large-scale chiseling of his corporate sponsors, have fitted into a long tradition
of cynical and heartless greed.

120. For a full discussion of this dichotomized treatment, see Edward S. Her-
man, "Gatekeeper versus Propaganda Models: A Critical American Perspec-
tive," in Peter Golding, Graham Murdock and Philip Schlesinger, eds..
Communicating Politics (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), pp. l82r-94,

121. Editorial, March i, 1973. The Soviets apparently didn't know that they
were shooting down a civilian plane, but this was covered up by U.S. officials,
and the false allegation of a knowing destruction of a civihan aircraft provided
the basis for extremely harsh criticism of the Soviets for barbaric behavior.
The Israelis openly admitted knowing that they were shooting down a civilian
plane, but this point was of no interest in the West in this particular case.

122. The New York Times Index, for example, has seven full pages of citations
to the KAL 007 incident for September 1983 alone.

123. Patriotic orgies, such as the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the

346 NOTES TO PAGES 32-35

space-shuttle flights, and "Liberty Weekend," perform a similar function in
"bringing us aU together." See Elayne Rapping, The Looking Glass World of
Nonfiction TV (Boston: South End Press, 1987), chapters, "National Rituals."

124. See below, chapter 6.

125. On issues where the elite is seriously divided, there will be dissenting
voices allowed in the mass media, and the inflation of claims and suspension of
critical judgment wiU be subject to some constraint. See the discussion of this
point in the preface, pp. xii-xiii, and examples in the case studies that follow.

126. The role of the government in these cases cannot be entirely discounted,
given the close ties of the Reader's Digest to the CIA and the fact that Paul
Henze, one of the primary sources and movers in the Bulgarian Connection
campaign, was a longtime CIA official. On the CIA-Reader's Digest connec-
tion, see Epstein, "The Invention of Arkady Shevchenko," pp. 40-41. On
Henze, see below, chapter 4. On the strong likelihood that an influential
Reader's Digest best-seller on Cambodia was in part a CIA disinformation
effort, see below chapter 6, p. 293, and sources cited.

127. We provide many illustrations of these points in the chapters that follow.

Watergate and, more recently, the late-Reagan-era exposures of Iran-Contra-
gate, which are put forward as counterexamples, are discussed in chapter 7,
below.

128. These points apply clearly to the case of the alleged Bulgarian Connection
in the plot to assassinate the pope. See below, chapter 4.

129. We have noted elsewhere that the New York Times regularly relied upon
Indonesian officials in "presenting the facts" about East Timor, which was
being invaded by Indonesia, and ignored refugees, church sources, etc. In
contrast, refugees, not state officials, were the prime source in the Times's
reporting on postwar events in Vietnam and Cambodia (The Washington Con-
nection and Third World Fascism [Boston: South End Press, 1979J, pp. 151-52,
169-76, 184-87). On attempts to evade the obvious implications, see chapter
6, under "The Pol Pot Era" (pp. 284-85).

130. Thus when the CIA directs Nicaraguan contras to attack such "soft
targets" as farming cooperatives, with explicit State Department approval, the
media commentators, including doves, either applaud or offer philosophical
disquisitions on whether such targets are legitimate, given that they are de-
fended by lightly armed militia. Terrorist attacks on Israeli kibbutzim, also
defended by armed settlers, are regarded somewhat differently. For details, see
Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (Boston: South End Press, 1988).

131. The variable use of agendas and frameworks can be seen with great clarity'
in the treatment of Third World elections supported and opposed by the
United States, as described in chapter 3.

132. Classic in their audacity are Michael Ledeen's assertions that: (I) Qad-
dafi's word is given more credence in the mass media than that of the U.S.
government; and (2) "Relatively minor human rights transgressions in a
friendly country (especially if ruled by an authoritarian government of the
Right) are given far more attention and more intense criticism than far graver
sins of countries hostile to us ..." ( Grave New World [New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985], p. 131; Qaddafi's superior credence is described on pp.
132-33). See chapter 2 of this book for documentation on the reality of mass-
media treatment of abuses by clients and enemy states.

NOTES TO PAGES 38-43 347

Chapter 2: \Vorthy and Unworthy
Victims

1. In a speech of July 19, 1986, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, in answer-
ing charges of religious persecution, asserted that of 138 religious persons
murdered and 278 kidnapped or disappeared in Central America since 1979 (a
figure that includes Lay Delegates of the Word), none had been victimized by
the Nicaraguan government. (Central Amen'ca News Update, Aug. 4, 1986)-
Many had been killed by the contras, however, in an ongoing tradition of
Somocista violence. See Andrew Reding, "The Church in Nicaragua,"
Monthly Review (July-August 1987), pp. 34-36. The large majority were mur-
dered by the army and security forces of U.S. client states, or the death squads
affiliated with them.

2. In The Real Terror Network (Boston: South End Press, 1982), Edward Her-
man shows that in the years 1976-81, the only massive coverage of the victimi-
zation of individuals abroad by the New York Times was of Soviet dissidents,
most notably Sharansky and Sakharov (pp. 196-99), although there were nu-
merous cases of comparable or far worse treatment within U.S. domains.

3. Computed by dividing the number of articles and CBS News reports (or
column inches) devoted to Popieluszko by the number dealing with the one
hundred religious victims and multiplying by 100.

4- Anthony Lewis says that the Soviet dissidents "are enough like us so that
we identify with them" ("A Craving for Rights," New York Times, Jan. 31,
1977), a partially vaUd point, as the vast majority of victims of U.S. foreign
policy are Third World peasants, but invalid in that victims in U.S. client states
as much "like us" as Soviet dissidents do not get comparable attention, as
shown in the cases mentioned and the reference in note 2.

5. It is not coincidental that the U.S. secretary of state, Alexander Haig, and
the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, actually de-
fended the assassinations of the American women, as described below.

6. Apart from the details by the New York Times shown in table 2-2, there were
at least four other Times articles that repeated such information, and similar
detail was given in Time and Newsweek and on CBS News. To give a sample
of one of many in Time, an article entitled "Grim Tale: Details of a Martyr's
Death" (Nov. 19, 1984), reads as follows: "Church officials who viewed
the martyred priest's body reported that he had been savagely beaten. A rope
had been tied around his neck, wrists and ankles so that he would strangle
himself if he struggled to get free. Three fingers of Popieluszko's left hand
were sliced through to the bone, and there were deep gouges on his arms.
His lungs contained enough water to indicate that he was still breathing,
even if unconscious, when he was tossed, bound hand and foot, into
a reservoir." Time repeats these details and others with obvious relish at
every opportunity. As we wiU see. Time is less lavish in details on unworthy
victims.

7. Time's account entitled "Memories of Father Jerzy" (Nov. 12,1984) has no
counterpart in the articles on the deaths of the unworthy victims discussed
below.

8. "A Polish General is Tied to Death.of Warsaw Priest," November 3, 1984;
"Pole in KilUng Tells of Hints of Top-Level Backup," January 9, 1985; "Pole

on Trial Names 2 Generals," January S, 1985; "Second Abductor of Polish
Priest Says Order Came 'From the Top,' " January 3, 1985.

9. See chapter 4, below.

10. On May 6, 1986, Laura Pinto, a member of the Salvadoran "Mothers of
the Disappeared," was picked up by three armed men, beaten, raped, and left
on the street. On May 29 she was again abducted and tortured, and shortly
thereafter twelve members of her group were detained by the poUce. The
British New Statesman expressed surprise that this kind of terror could take
place, given the fact that Laura Pinto had previously traveled to Europe and
made Western Europeans aware of her existence (Jane Dibblin, "EI Salvador's
Death Squads Defy European Opinion," June 13, 1986). Western Europeans
did, in fact, protest these abuses. What made this terror feasible, however, was
the fact that the power directly involved in EI Salvador, the United States, has
media well attuned to state policy. The two assaults on Laura Pinto and the
detention of the twelve members of the Mothers were totally suppressed by
the New York Times and its confreres. There was not a word in the quality
papers when a member of the "Mothers of the Disappeared" who had herself
been a victim of the atrocities of Duarte's security forces was denied entry to
the United States in March 1987, to visit several small towns where she had
been invited to speak on the occasion of International Women's Day. See
Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (Boston: South End Press, 1988).
The attention that the Times mentions as a constraint on Polish violence was
not available to protect an unworthy victim.

n. For a review of Times editorials on EI Salvador in the 1980s, exculpating

the state terrorists throughout, see Noam Chomsky, "U.S. Polity and Society,"
in Thomas Walker, ed., Reagan versus the Sandinistas (Boulder, Colo.: West-
view, 1987), pp. 295-96.

12. The press may also have been constrained by the fact that reporters who
dig deeply and provide accounts unfavorable to the military regimes in Latin
America may be barred from the country, or even murdered. Western reporters
are very rarely physically threatened-let alone murdered-in Poland, the
Soviet Union, Cuba, or Nicaragua. They are often threatened and sometimes
murdered in EI Salvador, Guatemala, and other U.S. clients in Latin America.
This irony is not commented upon in the free press, nor are the effects of this
potential and actual violence against dissident reporters on the possibilities of
honest reporting. This point is discussed further in chapter 3, pp. 97~98-

13. Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People (New York: Doubleday, 1980), p. 73-

14. James R. Brockman, The Word Remains: A Life of Oscar Romero (Mary-
knoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1982), p. II.

15. We discuss this link later in this section.

16. Carter sent former New York mayor Robert Wagner to persuade the pope
to rein in Romero, which the pope then tried to do. See Raymond Bonner,
Weakness and Deceit (New York: Times Books, 1984), p. 176. The provincial
of the Jesuit order in Central America, Father C6sar Jerez, was called to Rome
shortly after to explain the Romero letter. Father Jerez, who had fled from
Guatemala after the military had threatened his Ufe, was very close to Arch-
bishop Romero. Subsequently he was forced to flee EI Salvador as well and
is now a refugee in Nicaragua, where he is rector of the Universidad Cen-

troamericana, unable to return to the two "fledgUng democracies" except for
brief (and dangerous) visits.

17. Quoted in Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, p. 172.

18. On September 27, 1981, Alan Riding wrote in the New York Times that
"under the Carter administration. United States officials said security forces
were responsible for 90 percent of the atrocities," not "uncontrollable right-
wing bands." In short, not only was Bushnell lying, but the media knew it, and
failed to use that information. Riding had an article on March 23, 1980, entitled
"EI Salvador's Junta Unable to Halt the Killing." On media coverage of EI
Salvador during 1980, including gross falsification and cover-up of even con-
gressional reports, see Noam Chomsky, Towards A New Cold War, pp. 3Sff.,
reprinted in James Peck, ed.. The Chomsky Reader (New York: Pantheon,
1987).

19. Church estimates were that the government was responsible for some nine
hundred civihan deaths in the first three months of 1980, exceeding the total
for all of 1979; a report of Amnesty International dated March 21, 1980,
contains seven pages of incidents in which security forces, army units, or
paramilitary groups under general military control or guidance killed unarmed
civilians, usually peasants (quoted in Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, p. 172).

20. This is a point that was conceded by Duarte himself, who admitted in an
interview with Raymond Bonner that the army ruled EI Salvador, but that he
hoped to do so in the future (see New York Times, Mar. I, 1982).

21. Weakness and Deceit, p. 146.

22. See chapter 3, pp. 101-102.

23. One proof of the fact that the paramilitary forces kill under official protec-
tion is that, year after year, paramilitary murders never resulted in arrests (see
Herman, Real Terror Network, pp. IIS- 19). As for the regular forces, through
1986, "there were no known instances of Inihtary officers or soldiers who were
criminally punished for human rights abuses against Salvadoran civilians"
(The Reagan Administration 's Record on Human Rights in 1986 [New York: The
Watch Committees and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, February
1987], p. 46).

24. Laurie Becklund, "Death Squads: Deadly 'Other War,'" Los Angeles
Times, December 18, 1983.

25. Michael McClintock, The American Connection, vol. 1 (London: Zed, 1985),
p. 221.

26. Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, p. 162.

27. "United States Network News Coverage of EI Salvador: The Law and
Order Frame" (manuscript, 1986), pp. 17-18. Andersen provides many illustra-
tions of how the networks continued to label the junta "moderate" throughout
1980, as atrocities mounted to what Archbishop Romero's successor. Bishop
Rivera y Damas, described in October 1980 as the armed forces' "war of
extermination and genocide against a defenseless civilian population" (Bonner,
Weakness and Deceit, p. 207).

28. "23 Die in EI Salvador As Clashes Continue; 3 Officials Step Down," New
York Times, March 29, 1980.

29. Quoted in Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, El Salvador: The Face of
Revolution (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p. 146.

350 NOTES TO PAGES 52-57

30. From White's cable to the State Department, quoted in Bonner, Weakness
and Deceit, p. 184.

31. This statement is quoted in Armstrong and Shenk, El Salvador, p. 152.
Others present claim that troops were on the scene, contradicting Duarte,
junta, and Treaster assertions to the contrary. Phillip Berryman, who was at
the funeral, told the authors that he saw quite clearly two truckloads of troops
in the vicinity. Treaster is cagey, though-he speaks only of troops in the plaza,
not near the plaza, or in the national palace and other buildings.

32. The view expressed in Ambassador White's cables was that the leftists
acted to provoke a response by the security forces, a self-destructive tactic not
supported by any evidence.

33. Quoted in Brockman, The Word Remains, p. 212.

34. See note 18. Time magazine did the same kind of misrepresenting as
Treaster, but with a little more finesse: "From his pulpit, he regularly con-
demned the tyranny and terrorism that have torn tiny, impoverished El Salva-
dor apart and brought it to the verge of civil war" (Apr. 7, 1980).

35. "Church in Salvador Now Follows the Middle Path," New York Times,
March 22, 1981.

36. For a more detailed discussion of Schumacher's manipulation of the arch-
bishop's cautious remarks for an apologetic purpose, see Herman, Real Terror
Network, pp. 178-79.

37. It is possible that this failure was based on an honest lack of knowledge
of the event. Lack of knowledge, however, reflects in part a lack of concern,
and a distorting perspective that removes certain questions from the focus of
investigation.

38. Actually, this may be true. The killer may have been a contra assassin hired
by the Salvadoran security forces.

39. For the numerous acknowledged attempts to murder Fidel Castro, and the
CIA-organized murder of Patrice Lumumba, see Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders, Senate Select Committee to Study Government
Operations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., November 20, 1975, S. Rep. 94-465, pp.
13-180.

40. Graham Hovey, "Salvador Prelate's Death Heightens Fear of War," New
York Times, March 26, 1980.

41. See Craig Pyes, "Who Killed Archbishop Romero?" The Nation, October
13, 1984.

42. Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, p. 178.

43. Stephen Kinzer, "Ex-Aide in Salvador Accuses Colleagues on Death

Squads," New York Times, March 3, 1984.

44. Craig Pyes, "Dirty War in the Name of Freedom," Albuquerque Journal,
December 18, 1983. In November 1987, Duarte announced new (and rather
flimsy) evidence implicating D'Aubuisson, but no one associated with the
reigning security forces, in the assassination. The announcement was a trans-
parent effort to maintain his image as a "moderate," holding the middle ground
between extremists of right and left. It was carefully timed to coincide with
a daring visit to El Salvador by two actual "moderates," FDR leaders Rub£n
Zamora and Guillermo Ungo, who have lived in exile under threat of assassi-
nation in this terror state.

NOTES TO PAGES 57-65 351

45. Noam Chomsky, Turning the Tide (Boston: South End Press, 1985), p. 103.

46. Armstrong and Shenk, El Salvador, pp. 160-61.

47. In an article of February ii, 1982, datelined San Salvador, the Mexican
paper El Dia quoted D'Aubuisson telling two European reporters, one a
German, that "You Germans are very intelligent; you realized that the Jews
were responsible for the spread of communism and you began to kill them."
While the U.S. press played up the fabricated claims of Sandinista anti-
Semitism, this statement of approval of the Holocaust was not picked up by
the elite media.

48. "Peace Is Still a Long Shot in EI Salvador," New York Times, September
27, 1987, Week in Review.

49. This statement was left out of the edition of the report finally released to
the public.

50. Report, p. 8.

51. Ana Carrigan, Salvador Witness (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p.
271.

52. Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982, part I, Hearings before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st sess., March 1981, p.
163. Letter from David E. Simcox, State Department, to William P. Ford,
dated April 16, 1981. At the time Haig made his statement, the evidence was
quite clear that the women had been raped, and killed by close-range shots
from behind. Haig himself never apologized for this insulting lie, nor did he
suffer any serious attack for this in the mass media, with the honorable excep-
tion of Anthony Lewis. This episode also appears to have had no noticeable
effect on Haig's reputation.

53. "We ought to be a little more clear about this than we actually are [sic].
They were political activists on behalf of the Frente and somebody who is
using violence to oppose the Frente killed these women" (interview in Tampa
Tribune, Dec. 16, 1980, quoted in Carrigan, Salvador Witness, p. 279.) Former
ambassador Robert White pointed out that remarks like these by Kirkpatrick,
in the context of El Salvador, were "an incitement to murder" (T. D. Allman,
Unmanifest Destiny [New York: Doubleday, 1984], p. 17)-

Jean Donovan asked Ambassador Robert White, "What do you do when
even to help the poor, to take care of the orphans, is considered an act of
subversion by the government?" (quoted in Allman, p. 3). Helping orphans in
the Salvadoran countryside was also regarded as an act of subversion by
officials of the Reagan administration.

54. The New York Times' s version, shown on table 2-2, gives a succinct and
inaccurate version of the use of the underwear.

55. "Statement by Revolutionary Governing Junta," December 8, 1980. The
statement also notes that "the Revolutionary Government repudiates and
condemns violence and the irrational crimes it generates"!

56. Juan de Onis, December 24. The question does not arise for the Times of
why the security forces would want to conceal the bodies if they were unin-
volved in the murders.

57. We discussed this myth in "Archbishop Oscar Romero" (p. 48).

58. Juan de Onis, "Rightist Terror Stirs Argentina," New York Times, August
29,1976.

352 NOTES TO PAGES 65-71

59. See below, note 67.

60. John Dinges, "Evidence Indicates Military Planned Missionaries'
Deaths," National Catholic Reporter, July 17, 1981.

61. Stephen Kinzer, "Ex-Aide in Salvador Accuses Colleagues on Death
Squads," March 3, 1984. Note the "soft" headline. An option forgone by the
Times was a headline like: "Duarte and Defense Minister Casanova Accused
of Cover-up of Murder of Four American Women." Santivanez was paid
$50,000 to give his evidence, a sum he requested on the ground of the risk he
was taking and the probability that he would be income-short in the future as
a result of his confession. This payment was given unusual publicity as sug-
gesting a compromising quality to his testimony, and the New York Times
squelched a second installment of his evidence on this principled ground-
which they never apply to Soviet defectors, who are less in need of protection.
The revelation that the "leading democrats" who were formed into a civilian
front for the contras by the CIA have been receiving over $80,000, tax-free,
annually from the CIA for years has never compromised their integrity as
media sources. Nicaraguan defector Miranda got $800,000 for his services
without being discredited.

62. Excellent accounts were produced by Michael Posner and the Lawyers'
Committee for International Human Rights in a series of investigatory reports,
dated September 1981, July 20, 1982, and February i, 1983, which contain
detailed and crushing evidence of a completely broken-down judicial process
and an official cover-up. Once again, as with the Dinges report, these docu-
ments were essentially ignored in the U.S. mass media and their facts and leads
suppressed. News coverage of the lawyers' committee documents was neghgi-
ble. Michael Posner and Scott Greathead did succeed in placing an Op-Ed
article in the Times on December 6, 1983, entitled "3 Yeeirs after Killings, No
Justice in Salvador."

63. Both Tim.e and Newsweek had articles featuring stonewalling in February
1981-Time's article was entitled "Stonewalling" (Feb. 23)-but although the
stonewalling continued for years, this was the end of the news magazines'
interest in the matter.

64. Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights, Update.-Justice in El
Salvador: A Case Study, February i, 1983, p. 17.

65. Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, p. 80.

66. Larry Rohter, "Salvador Defense Lawyer Charges Cover-Up in Slaying of
U.S. Nuns," New York Times, May 6, 1985.

67. In the same month that Hinton was asserting with assurance that the
low-level guardsmen were acting on their ovra, internal State Department
memos were stating that "Reading the documents provoked several questions
which we think should have occurred to an investigator whose real aim was
to determine who committed the crime" (quoted in Update, p. 3l).

68. Quoted in Update, pp. 30-31.

69. On the Tyler investigation, see Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, pp. 7&- 80.

70. Stephen Kinzer, "Ex- Aide in Salvador Accuses Colleagues on Death

Squads," New York Times, March 3, 1984-

71. Carrigan, Salvador Witness, p. 265.

72. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Biller Fruit (New York:
Doubleday, 1982), pp. 32-47 , 54-63.

NOTES TO PAGES 71-7 3 353

73. Virtually all independent observers were of the view that land reform was
also highly desirable for both equity and efficiency. See, especially, Jos6 M.
Aybar de Soto, Dependency and Intervention: The Case of Guatemala in 1954
(Boulder: Westview, 1978), chapter 6.

74. Ibid. See also Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1982).

75. See Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (New York: Dou-
bleday, 1981), p. 222.

76. Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala: Crisis and Response," in Richard B. Fagen
and Olga Pellicer, The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S.
and Mexico (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 188.

77. Ibid., pp. 191-92.

78. Ibid., p. 192.

79. U.S. officials have often pressed for purely formal democratic reforms and
reductions in rates of murder, but they have consistently supported and helped
organize theframework that eroded the democratic reforms and increased rates
of murder. In Guatemala (and elsewhere), the reasons for the regular backing
of antidemocratic institutions have been the fear of the left and the chronic
hostility of U.S. officials and businessmen to popular organizations (unions,
peasant organizations, mass political parties), for both economic and political
reasons. Thus the periodic support for liberalforms has been rendered nuga-
tory by the systematic bolstering up of institutions that regularly undermine
the substance of liberalism. As Lars Schoultz points out, the function of "mili-
tary authoritarianism," beginning with the U.S. -backed Brazilian coup of 1964
and widely prevalent in Latin America and elsewhere within the U.S. sphere
of influence, has been "to destroy permanently a perceived threat to the
existing structure of socioeconomic privilege by eliminating the participation
of the numerical majority, ..." (Human Rights and United States Policy toward
Latin America [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981], p. 7). We may let
them "participate," however, with elections held after extended periods of
military pacification and the dismantling of popular organizations. See chap-
ter 3.

80. See "Counterrevolution and the 'Shakedown States,' " in Noam Chomsky
and Edward S. Herman, The Washington Comtection and Third World Fascism
(Boston: South End Press, 1979), pp. 61-66.

81. From 1977, Guatemala turned for aid to Israel, which has provided similar
services regularly for the U.S. government. For details, see Bishara Bahbah,
Israel and Latin America: The Military Connection (New York: St. Martin's,

1986) ; Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection (New York: Pantheon,

1987) ; and Jane Hunter, Israeli Foreign Policy (Boston: South End Press, 1987).
On the continued flow of arms from the United States to Guatemala during
the Carter years, see Lars Schoultz, "Guatemala," in Martin Diskin, ed..
Trouble in our Backyard (New York: Pantheon, 1983), pp. 187ff.

82. Piero Gleijeses estimates that "the Guatemalan army has killed close to
100,000" since 1979 ("The Reagan Doctrine and Latin America," Current
History [December 1986]).

83. See, for example. Amnesty International, Guatemala: A Government Pro-
gram of Political Murder (London: AI, 1981); Parliamentary Human Rights
Group, "Bitter and Cruel ," Report of a Mission to Guatemala by the

354 NOTES TO PAGES 73-80

British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, October 1984; Americas Watch,
Civil Patrols in Guatemala (New York: AW, 1986).

84. Amnesty International, Guatemala: Massive Extrajudicial Executions in
Rural Areas under the Government of General Efrain R£os Monu, October 1 1 ,
1982.

85. According to State Department testimony of July 20, 1981, "We need to try
a new, constructive policy approach to Guatemala ..." (quoted in Americas
Watch, Guatemala Revisited: How the Reagan Administration Finds "Improve-
ments" in Human Rights in Guatemala [New York: AW, 79857, P- 4).

86. Quoted in Americas Watch, Guatemala Revisited, p. S.

87. See Amnesty International, Guatemala: A Government Program of Political
Murder, p. 8.

88. Americas Watch, Guatemala Revisited, p. 6.

89. State Department 1984 Human Rights Country Report, quoted in Ameri-
cas Watch, Guatemala Revisited, p. IS.

90. Guatemala: A Government Program of Political Murder, p. 5.

91. While this is true almost without exception for news articles, there were
perhaps a dozen Op-Ed columns in the New York Times and the Washington
Post, and some letters, in the period 1980-86, that criticized Guatemalan state
terrorism; some of these were harshly critical of U.S. policy.

92. A few of the opinion pieces cited in the previous note did discuss the U.S.
role.

93. "Requiem for a Missionary," August 10, 1981.

94. The documents include the following four put out by Amnesty Interna-
tional: Guatemala: A Government Program of Political Murder, February 1981;
"Disappearances": A Workbook, 1981; Guatemala: Massive Extrajudicial Execu-
tions in Rural Areas under the Government of General Efrain Rios Manu, Oc-
tober 1982; "Disappearances" in Guatemala under the Government of General
Oscar Humberto Mej£a Victores, March 1985. We also included six studies by
Americas Watch: Human Rights in Guatemala: No Neutrals Allowed, Novem-
ber 1982; Guatemala Revisited: How the Reagan Administration Finds "Im-
provements" in Human Rights in Guatemala, September 1985; Liule Hope:
Human Rights in Guatemala, January 1984-January I98S, February 1985;
Guatemala: The Group for Mutual Support, 1985; Civil Patrols in Guatemala,
August 1986; Human Rights in Guatemala during President Cerezo's First Year,
1987.

95. This letter is reproduced in Americas Watch, Human Rights in Guatemala:

No Neutrals Allowed, November 1982.

96. For a full discussion of the last of these murders, that ofMarianela Garcia
Villas, on March IS, 1983, see Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demon-
stration Elections: U.S. -Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam,
and El Salvador (Boston: South End Press, 1984), pp. x-xi.

97. Quoted in Americas Watch, Guatemala: The Group for Mutual Support,.
I984-I98S, p. 2 (hereafter, AW, Mutual Support).

98. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, News and Analysis, April 26, 1986, p. 222.

99. McClintock, American Connection, vol. 2, p. 83.

100. AW, Mutual Support, p. 3.

101. "Bitter and Cruel," British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, October
1984.

NOTES TO PAGES 81-89 355

102. AW, Mutual Support, p. 8.

103. Ibid., p. 7.

104. An open letter of November 15, 1984, quoted in AW, Mutual Support,
?■ 24-

105. AW, Mutual Support, pp. 24-2S.

106. Ibid., p. 36. This was, of course, a complete fabrication. What Mejia
Victores is referring to is an investigative body that he established, manned
entirely by government personnel, including the deputy minister of defensci
and that, predictably, gave the government a clean bill of health.

107. Ibid., p. 38.

108. Ibid., p. 41.

109- Two very terse exceptions should be noted: On April 13, an article on the
case mentions that Gomez was tortured; and one on April 19 notes that his
tongue was cut out. No details whatsoever were provided about the murders
of Godoy de Cuevas and her brother and son.

110. As we will see in the next chapter, the new civilian government did nothing
to stem the army assault on the civilian population; but as we might also
expect, the optimism of the press on the promise of the new civilian adminis-
tration was not followed up with reports on what actually happened.

111. As we pointed out earlier, the U.S. press entirely ignored the administra-
tion's refusal to allow one of the EI Salvador "Mothers of the Disappeared"
to come to speak in the United States. See note 10, above.

112. This press release was featured in an "Urgent Action" memo of the
Guatemala Human Rights CommissionAJSA, dated October 3, 1986.

Chapter 3: Legitimizing versus
IVIeaningless Third World Elections

1. See Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: U.S.-
Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador (Boston:
South End Press, 1984), passim.

2. In the case of the Salvadoran elections of 1982 and 1984, the government
relied on the media to play down not only this plan, but also the fact that the
rebels were driven into rebellion by decades of refusal of the army to allow
any democratic option, and that the rebels could not have participated in the
election anyway because they would run heavy risks of being murdered-the
five leaders of the political opposition in EI Salvador were tortured, murdered,
and mutilated in San Salvador in November 1980.

3. As we pointed out in chapter i, the government and other power groups try
to monopolize media attention not only by flooding the media with their own
propaganda, but also by providing authentic and reliable "experts" to validate
this propaganda.

4. For a model illustration of observer bias and foolishness, see appendix i on
the findings of a U.S. official-observer team at the Guatemalan election of July
I, 1984.

S- "The observer delegation's mission was a simple one: to assess the fairness,
honesty and propriety of the voting, the counting of ballots and the reporting

356 NOTES TO PAGES 89-94

of final results in the Salvadoran elections" (Senator Nancy Kassenbaum,

Report of the U.S. Official Observer Mis.sion to the El Salvador Constituent
Assembly Elections of March 28, 1982, Report to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 97th Cong., 2ci sess., p. 2. This agenda does not include considera-
tion of any of the basic framework conditions-like free speech and the
absence of state terror- that determine in advance whether an election can be
meaningful. See the text below.

6. The New York Times even allowed the right-wing Freedom House observers
to dominate its reports on the election staged by Ian Smith in Rhodesia in 1979
(articles of April 22 and May 1 1 , 1979). Although a brutal civil war raged and
the rebel black groups were off the ballot. Freedom House found the election
feiir. In a rerun held a year later under British government auspices, the black
candidate sponsored by Ian Smith who had received 65 percent in the "fair"
election got only 8 percent of the vote, whereas the previously excluded black
rebels received a commanding majority. Freedom House found the second
election doubtful! See Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections, appen-
dix I, "Freedom House Observers in Zimbabwe Rhodesia and EI Salvador."

7. Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections, pp. 71-72.

8. Philip Taubman, "Shultz Criticizes Nicaragua Delay," New York Times,
February 6, 1984; Security and Development Assistance, Hearings before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 98th Cong., 2d sess., February 22, 1984,
p.83-

9. George Orwell, 1984 (New York: Signet, 1950), p. 163.

10. "The Electoral Process in Nicaragua: Domestic and International Influ-
ences," Report of the LASA Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General
Election of November 4, 1984, Latin American Studies Association (Nov. 19,
1984), p. 32 (hereafter, LASA, Report).

11. The U.S. media quite properly condemned in advance the January 1947
elections held in Poland, under Soviet control and with security forces omni-
present in the country, although not killing on anywhere near the scale seen
in EI Salvador and Guatemala, l97$>-87. See Herman and Brodhead, Demon-
stration Elections, pp. 173-80.

12. LASA, Report, p. 5.

71 Nicaragua: The Threat of a Good Example? (Oxford: Oxfam, 1986), p. 14.
Oxfam's U.S. affiliate also has warm words for the Sandinista effort, stating
that

Among the four countries in the region where Oxfam works [Guatemala,
EI Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua], only in Nicaragua has a sub-
stantial effort been made to address inequities in land ownership and to
extend health, educational, and agricultural services to poor peasant
feimiUes. ( Oxfam America Special Report: Central America, Fall 1985).

14. See below, under "Free speech and assembly" (p. 93) and "Freedom of the
press" (p. 97).

15. See Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections, pp. 119-20.

16. See Amnesty International, Guatemala: A Government Program of Political
Murder (London: AI, 1981); Michael McClintock, The American Connection,
vol. 2 (London: Zed, 1985).

17. UN General Assembly, Report of the Economic and Social Council: Situation

NOTES TO PAGES 94-101 357

of Human Rights in Guatemala, November 13, 1985, p. 15. On Viscount Col-
ville's apologetics, see Americas Watch, Colvillefor the Defense: A Critique of
the Reports of the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Guatemala (February 1986).

18. Guatemala Human Rights Commission, "Report for the 39th General As-
sembly of the United Nations on the Human Rights Situation in Guatemala"
(New York, 1984), p. 18 (Hereafter, HRC, Report).

19. Ibid., p. 23.

20. "Bitter and Cruel ," Report of a Mission to Guatemala by the British

Parliamentary Human Rights Group, October 1984, p. 21.

21. Bishop Maurice Taylor and Bishop James O'Brien, "Brief Report on Visit
to Guatemala," October 27-November 3, 1984, quoted in Americas Watch,
Little Hope: Human Rights in Guatemala, January I984-I985 (New York: AW,
1985), p. 25-

22. InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, Civil and Legal Rights in
Guatemala (1985), p. 156. Development Poles are organizational units estab-
lished by the army, nominally to foster "development," actually mere conve-
nient units for control and surveillance.

23. International Human Rights Law Group, The 1985 Guatemalan Elections:
Will the Military Relinquish Power? (Washington: December 1985), p. 56 (here-
after, IHRLG, Report).

24. Ibid., p. 61.

25. LASA, Report, p. 27.

26. Ibid., p. 25.

27. See further, Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections, pp. 120-21.

28. "Journalists Killed and Disappeared since 1976," Committee to Protect
Journalists (December 1986), pp. 6-8.

29. Council on Hemispheric Affairs and the Newspaper Guild, "A Survey of
Press Freedom in Latin America, 1984-85" (Washington: 1985), p. 38.

30. See IHRLG, Report, pp. 59-60.

31. Howard H. Frederick, "Electronic Penetration," in Thomas S. Walker, ed.,
Reagan versus the Sandinistas (Boulder: Westview, 1987), pp. 123ff.

32. For a full account of media conditions, see John Spicer Nichols, "The
Media," in Thomas S. Walker, ed., Nicaragua: The First Five Years (New York:
Praeger, 1985), pp. 183-99.

33. Ibid., pp. 191-92. For comparison of media conditions in Nicaragua with
those of the United States in wartime and its leading client state, Israel, see
Noam Chomsky, "U.S. Polity and Society: The Lessons of Nicaragua," in

Walker, ed., Reagan verms the Sandinistas.

34. For a discussion of this decimation process and a tabulation of murders by
group, see Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections, pp. 121-26.

35- "The Grass Roots Organizations," in Walker, ed., Nicaragua, p. 79.
36. Ibid., p. 88.

37- It has often been observed by serious students of American democracy that
the relative weakness of intermediate organizations (unions, political clubs,
media not under corporate control, etc.) is a severe impediment to meaningful
political democracy in the United States-one reason, no doubt, why voter
participation is so low and cynicism about its significance so high.
38. Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit (New York: Times Books, 1984),
pp. 278-79-

39. Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elec ^Bi pp. 122-24.

40. Enrique A. Baloyra, who argues that there was a real choice, says that
people voted "primarily because they wanted to make use of this massive
action to urge an end to violence and civil war." But Baloyra nowhere discusses
Duarte's and D'Aubuisson's views on a negotiated settlement of the war, which
allows him to convey the erroneous impression that one of them supported a
nonmilitary route to ending the violence and civil war (El Salvador in Transi-
tion [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982], p. 175).

41. See Dennis Hans, "Duarte; The Man and the Myth," Covert Action Infor-
mation Bulletin 26 (Summer 1986), pp. 42-47; Noam Chomsky, Turning the
Tide (Boston: South End Press, 1985), pp. 109ff.

42. Weakness and Deceit, p. 205.

43. The top leadership of the Social Democratic party had been murdered in
1980, and its remaining officials fled the country. Only a portion of this exiled
leadership returned for the 1985 election.

44. The guerrilla position was that with the army having set up a national
control system, military domination had been institutionalized and elections
would have no meaning. See "Guerrillas' View of Elections: Army Will Hold
Power Despite Polls," Latin America Weekly Report, October 25, 1985, p. II.
45- HRC, Report, p. 7.

46. Americas Watch, Civil Patrols in Guatemala (New York: AW, 1986), p. 2.

47. "El Sefior Presidente?" An interview of Cerezo by George Black in Octo-
ber 1985, NACLA Report on the Americas (November-December 1985), p. 24.

48. "In a meeting several months ago with the ultra-rightist organization
Amigos del Pais, which allegedly has strong death squad connections, PDCG
deputies to the Constituent Assembly pledged that if the party came to power,
they would refrain from agrarian and banking reforms, investigation into
human rights abuses by the armed forces, and any interference in the coun-
terinsurgency program" ("Guatemala Votes," Washington Report on the Hemi-
sphere, Nov. 27, 1985). Stephen Kinzer also reports on a private meeting
between Cerezo and right-wing landowners, in which "he said we aU needed
each other at this moment ..." ("When a Landslide Is Not a Mandate," Nem
York Times, Dec. 15, 1985).

49. Allen Nairn and Jean-Marie Simon, in their "The Bureaucracy of Death,"

New Republic, aune 30, 1986), describe the "tactical alliance" between Cerezo
and the army, which protected them against any accountability for past ac-
tions, in exchange for which the army would allow Cerezo to occupy office.

50. See "Cerezo Adapts to Counterinsurgency," Guatemala, Guatemala News
and Information Bureau (May- June 1986).

51. American Watch, Human Rights in Guatemala during President Cerezo's
First Year, February 1987. Cerezo argued for not prosecuting the military for
old crimes on the ground that everyone wanted to start afresh. But Americas
Watch points out that if terrible crimes of the past are exempt from the rule
of law, it suggests that Cerezo doesn't have the power to stop further military
crimes. "It is a sign that the rule of law has not been established in Guatemala,
and that it cannot be established" (p. 4). This point is supported by Cerezo's
inaction in the face of a hundred violent deaths a month-many of them
poUtical murders by the army-after he assumed office.

52. See Michael Parenti, "Is Nicaragua More Democratic Than the United

States?" Covert Action Information Bulletin 26 (Summer 1986), pp. 48-52.

53. Wayne S. Smith, "Lies About Nicaragua," Foreign Policy (Summer 1987),
p. 93. Smith states that Cruz "now says that he regrets not taking part and that
his failure to participate in the 1984 elections was one of his major political

mistakes."

54. See LASA, Report, pp. 24-25, 29-31. We discuss this point, and the likeli-
hood that Cruz's withdrawal was part of a public-relations strategy, in our
treatment below of the media's handling of the Nicaraguan election.

55. LASA, Report, p. 23-

56. Doherty's statement appears in U.S. Policy toward El Salvador, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Inter- American Affairs of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 290; Gomez's statement is in
Presidential Certification of El Salvador, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, vol. I, p. 330.

57. AW, Little Hope, p. 1.

58. IHRLG, Report, p. 4-

59. They were being murdered on a regular basis by U.S. -sponsored terrorists
entering Nicaragua from Honduras and Costa Rica, however.

60. Rev. Daniel Long and seven other ecumenic£il group observers, "March
25, 1984, Elections in EI Salvador" (1984, mimeographed), p. 4-

61. Based on conversations with voters, the Long group states that "most
people waited these long hours because of their desire to have their cedula
stamped and their finger inked to avoid fines for not voting and/or possible

reprisals from the government and military " They note that at many places

voting officials stamped the cedulas of those unable to vote because of crowding
just so they could leave (ibid., p. 6).

62. In the July 1, 1984, election for a constituent assembly, null and blank votes
exceeded those of any party and were a staggering 26 percent of the total.

63. IHRLG, Report, p. 54.

64. This procedure was put into the rules at the request of several opposition
parties (LASA, Report, p. 15).

65. The media generally suppressed the fact that the number of voting booths
was sharply restricted in 1982, allegedly for security reasons but making for
longer lines.

66. "Media Coverage ofEI Salvador's Election," Socialist Reviea (April 1983),
P-29-

67. "Salvadorans Jam Polling Stations; Rebels Close Some," NetB York Tinier
March 29, 1982.

68. See further, Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections, pp. 164-67.

69. Warren Hoge did quote Garcia, but only to suggest an open election:
"Without any lies, you can see here what it is that the people want ..."
("Salvadorans Jam Polling Stations," New York Times, Mar. 29, 1982).

70. Eleven days before the 1982 election, four Dutch journalists were mur-
dered by the Salvadoran security forces. The foreign press corps was trooped
into the morgue to see the bodies, whose ripped genitals were exposed to media
view. This episode-described in the 1984 documentary film In the Name of
Democracy-was suppressed in the U.S. mass media, led to no large outcries
and generalizations about the qualities of the Salvadoran government, and may
have contributed to the remarkable silence of journalists in EI Salvador on the

300

TO PAGES lOU-nS

unfavorable media (as well as other) conditions in the incipient democracy.

71. "Salvador Vote: Uncertainty Remains," April 5 1982.

72. The Times devoted an entire article to the Salvadoran chief of staffs
promises that "his troops would provide adequate security for the election of
March 25" (1984); Blandon is quoted as saying "I'm giving you the assurance
that there will be secure elections for all of the country" (Lydia Chavez,
"Salvadoran Promises Safe Election," New York Times, Mar. 14, 1984).

73. Time, July 16, 1984. "Moderation" is a favorite media word in descriptions
of demonstration elections. Newsweek's article of May 7, 1984, on Duarte and
the Salvadoran election of May 1984 is entitled "EI Salvador; A Miracle of
Moderation." For a discussion of some of the ways in which the media use the
word "moderate," see Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism, (Boston:
South End Press, 1988), chapter 2.8.

74. The Guatemalan extreme right-wing leader, Mario Sandoval Alarcon,
often described as the godfather of the death squads in Central America, was
present at Reagan's first inauguration, met with his defense and foreign-policy
advisers, and claimed that "verbal agreements" were entered into at that time
to cut back on criticism of Guatemalan human-rights abuses and to renew
military aid. See Marlise Simons, "Guatemala: The Coming Danger," Foreign
Policy (Summer 1981), p. 101; Scott Anderson and John Lee Anderson, Inside
the League: The Shocking Exposd of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American
Death Squads Have Infiltrated the Anti-Communist League (New York: Dodd,
Mead, 1986), p. 175; and Alan Nairn, "Controversial Reagan Campaign Links
with Guatemalan Government and Private Sector Leaders," Research Memo
for Council on Hemispheric Affairs, October 30, 1980, p. 11.

75. The Polish election of January 1947 was so designated by the U.S. mass
media, although Polish state terrorism was much less severe than that of
Guatemala in 1984-85. See Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections,
pp. 173-80.

76. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, News and Analysis, February 6, 1987.

77. We may be quite certain that Time will not assert that "Much of the killing
in Afghanistan is linked to General Zakov's success against the insurgents."

78. For evidence of the complete servility and dishonesty of Time in its cover-
age of the elections in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam in the 1960s, see
Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections, pp. 45, 46, 51-52, 83-86.

79. A summary of this document was given in Enfoprensa News Agency,
"Information on Guatemala," June 22, 1984. This excellent weekly bulletin of
news on Guatemala reports a continuing flow of seemingly newsworthy
itcms-rcgrettably, however, on unworthy victims, and therefore not of inter-
est to the mass media.

80. This statement, dated October 1985, is reproduced in IHRLG, Report.
8!. The two stories that follow were discussed in Enfoprensa, "Information on
Guatemala."

82. "A New Chance in Guatemala," December 12, 1985. The Times never
found that the Sandinistas had "honored" a promise in 1984, but then neither
did the Reagan administration. Nor did the editorial consider the meaning of
the fact that the ruling generals had declared an amnesty-for themselves-
before allowing the electoral "project" to proceed.

83. The Times' s editorial of December 12, 1985, congratulates Cerezo for

NOTES TO PAGES IIS-II8 361

pledging to "take charge without vengeance against the military for its murder-
ous rule." Translated from the propaganda format, this means Cerezo is too
weak to promise minimal justice for terrible crimes, which raises serious doubts
about whether he has any real power. The newspaper of record makes this
exoneration of mass murderers a virtue, and pretends that it is just an act of
mercy on Cerezo's part! The Times also does not speculate on what would
happen to President Cerezo if he chose to wreak "vengeance against the
military," or how exactly he might proceed with this mission under conditions
of effective military rule.

84. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit (New York: Double-
day, 1982).

85. Of course, there was an even deeper hypocrisy in failing to call attention
to the administration's devotion to a free election in Nicaragua but not in
Chile, Indonesia, Namibia, or South Korea, among many others, and its pre-
tense that the elections in the terror states of EI Salvador and Guatemala are
free and have anything to do with democracy.

86. The New York Times had an article on the numerous observers in Nicara-
gua, but before the election ("Election Draws Many U.S. Observers," Nov. 4,
1984). The thrust of the article was to suggest observer bias favorable to the
Sandinistas, a subject the Times never addresses in regard to official observers.
In later discussion of the elections, the 450 observers, including even the
professional society of Latin American scholars, were entirely ignored by the
Times. An excellent study by Lucinda Broadbent, "Nicaragua's Elections: A
Cruz Around the Issues; Comparative Analysis of Media Coverage of the 1984
Elections," as yet unpublished, parallels our findings in detail, based on an
analysis of a wide sample, including U.S. network TV and the British as well
as U.S. press. Broadbent points out that in her sample, the opposition to the
Nicaraguan government is given more than twice the space accorded the
government, "an unusual priority for media usually so wedded to 'official
sources' in whichever country they find themselves" (p. 77). Broadbent
stresses, as we do, the domination of the Reaganite frame, even in Britain and
in the liberal press, and the massive distortion of reality that resulted from this
biased framing. She notes also that the media never addressed the programs
of the contesting parties in Nicaragua, which allowed Reaganite cliches about
Sandinista intentions and policies to prevail. The media portrayals were
"roughly the opposite of what was witnessed by international observers of the
election" (p. 99), which is why, in our view, these observers had to be ignored.

87. For further details, see Noam Chomsky, "Introduction," in Morris Morley
and James Petras, The Reagan Administration and Nicaragua, Institute for
Media Analysis, Monograph i (New York: 1987), note 32, which also discusses
the distortion of the Dutch observers' report by Robert Leiken in the New York
Review of Books, December 5, 1985. Leiken dismisses the LASA report without
comment as pro-Sandinista, i.e., as coming to the wrong conclusions.

88. LASA, Report, p. 2.

89. This was partially true, as the Sandinistas were trying to alter their image.
But the same was true in EI Salvador, with the added problem that the election
was held in an environment of ongoing state terror. Time never used the word
"theatre" to describe either of the two Salvadoran elections.

90. As in 1982, the FMLN carried out no military operations directed at the

362 NOTES TO PAGES 118-126

election-day process, and made no threats against Salvadoran voters. But as
in 1982, this has no impact on Time reporting. The real threats, broadcast to
voters in Nicaragua by contra radio, and the several contra killings of poll
watchers, were never reported by Time.

As we have noted, the stress on superficialities like long hues is part of the
propaganda agenda for a demonstration election. So is blacking out the fact
that the length of the lines might be a function of the restricted number of
voting booths, as was the case in EI Salvador. Time provides both the emphasis
on long lines and the suppression of relevant evidence on why the lines were
so long. See Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections, pp. 126-27.

91. Cruz was mentioned by Kinzer in eleven, and quoted, usually at some
length, in five, of the fourteen articles he wrote on the Nicaraguan election;
disruption and harassment are mentioned or featured in seven of the articles.

92. See particularly his "Sandinista Is Favored but Runs Hard" (Oct. 30,
1984), "Going Through the Motions in Nicaragua" (Nov. 4), and "Sandinistas
Hold Their First Elections" (Nov. 5).

93. We will see below that Time even tries to make out a coercive threat that
produced the vote in Nicaragua.

94. See the quotation from Warren Hoge given above, on p. 108.

95. These points were discussed in the LASA report, as we note below, but
for Kinzer and the rest of the mass media, they were off the agenda.

96. Note that the exact opposite is true in the United States, reflecting the
recognition on the part of the general public in both societies of who stands
to gain through the electoral process.

97. The rate was, in fact, far higher than in the 1984 U.S. presidential election,
in which just over half the electorate participated.

98. "Sandinistas Hold Their First Election," New York Times, November 5,
1984.

99. Duarte is quoted to this effect by Edward Schumacher in the New York

Times, February 21, 1981.

100. On April 23, 1985, the Wall Street Journal revealed that Cruz was on the
CIA payroll. Oliver North then took over his financing, hoping that this might
divert attention from the fact that Cruz had been funded by the CIA during
the period when the U.S. government was trying to discredit the Nicaraguan
elections. See Stephen Engelberg, New York Times, July 15, 1987.

101. Stephen Kinzer, "Ex-Contra Looks Back Finding Much to Regret," New
York Times, January 8, 1988. Cruz now expresses the belief that the anti-
Sandinista coalition (the Coordinadora) that nominated him "was dominated
by people who never intended to go through with an election campaign," and
"sought to embarrass the Sandinistas by withdrawing."

102. See note 91, above, and tables 3-2 and 3-3, below.

103. Philip Taubman, "U.S. Role in Nicaragua Vote Disputed," New York
Times, October 21, 1984. Robert McCartney, in the Washington Post of June
30, 1984, stated that "Opposition leaders admitted in interviews that they never
seriously considered running in the Nov. 4 election but debated only whether
to campaign for two months and then withdraw from the race on grounds that
the Sandinistas had stacked the electoral deck against them."

104. Lord Chitnis, a veteran British election observer who attended the Sal-
vadoran election on behalf of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group,

NOTES TO PAGES 126-139 363

noted that "First, and crucial to the whole standing of the exercise, was the
fact that no politicians to the left of the Christian Democrats [PDC], and not

all of them, were free to contest the election [Exclusion of the FDR made

the election] a contest of vague promises and inferences by two candidates who
already bore a heavy responsibility for the situation in which El Salvador finds
itself today." The 1984 elections in El Salvador, he continued, were held in an
"atmosphere of terror and despair, of macabre rumour and grisly reality"
(Pratap 0. Chitnis, "Observing El Salvador: The 1984 Elections," Third World
Quarterly [October 1984], pp. 971-73). Chitnis was never cited as a source
anywhere in the U.S. mass media.

105. Stephen Kinzer, "Ortega: Can He Be Trusted?" New York Times Maga-
zine, January 10, 1988; Kinzer, "Ex-Contra Looks Back" New York Times,
January 8, 1988. On the reahties of the peace accords, and the media contribu-
tion to effacing them in serving the government's agenda, see Chomsky, Cul-
ture ofTerrorism, and articles updating the record inZ magazine (January 1988,
March 1988).

106. There is also an elaborate media pretense that La Prensa is the journal
that courageously opposed Somoza, and whose editor was a victim of this
U.S. -backed gangster. But the media are surely well aware that the relation
of the two journals is barely more than that of a shared name. The editor left
in 1980, after a conflict with the owners, to form the new journal El Nuevo
Diario, and was joined by 80 percent of the staff It is this journal, if any, that
can fairly cMm to be the descendant of the old La Prensa (Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, Washington Report on the Hemisphere, July 23, 1986).

107. The leading church opponent of the state in El Salvador, Archbishop
Oscar Romero, was murdered, and his murderers have never been ap-
prehended. In Nicaragua, the leading church opponent of the state, Cardinal
Obando, continues to Uve and speak out without fear. This difference is never
pointed out in the free press.

108. For a more detailed discussion of the Times's articles on these subjects,
see Edward S. Herman, " 'Objective' News as Systematic Propaganda: The
New York Times on the 1984 Salvadoran and Nicaraguan Elections," Covert
Action Information Bulletin 21 (Spring, 1984).

109- In a larger framework, too, Nicaragua is playing the dangerous game of
trying to defend itself against external attack, resisting the demands of the
godfather. The absurdity of the claim that Nicaragua would become a military
"threat" to its neighbors with added MIGs, when the Reagan administration
has been looking for an excuse to attack Nicaragua and would welcome any
such Nicaraguan move as an opportunity to intervene directly, never strikes
the U.S. mass media. The possibility that the administration wants to constrain
Nicaraguan arms imports to reduce its capacity to defend itself against ongoing
aggression against it also never arises for the press. Note that unlike guerrilla
forces, the contras can survive only with regular airdrops, reaching the level
of thirty to forty a month by mid-1987, and two or three times that amount
after August, as the U.S. sought to undermine the Guatemala accords. Hence
Nicaragua would have good reason to obtain vintage 1950S jet planes to defend
itself from the U.S. proxy army.

110. For an account of the performance of U.S. official and semi-official ob-
servers in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, El Salvador, and Zimbabwe, see

Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections. Appendix i provides a sum-
mary of the views of an official U.S. observer team to Guatemala in July 1984.
All of these fully confirm the statement made in the text.
III. LASA, Report, p. 5.

Chapter 4: The KGB-Bulgarian Plot to
Kill the Pope

1. Some qualification is required by the fact that the three principal sources
hired by and/or relied upon by the private media-Claire Sterling, Paul
Henze, and Michael Ledeen-all had long-standing relations with the govern-
ment, and that various Italian government organizations such as the intelli-
gence agency SISMI played a role in the genesis and propagandizing of the
charges, as described in the text below.

2. The limited exceptions to these generalizations will be noted below.

3. See further, Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of
the Bulgarian Connection (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1986), pp.
66-71; also Philip Paull, "International Terrorism: The Propaganda War"
(M.A. thesis in international relations, San Francisco State University, June
1982).

4. The reasons why this was important to Begin are discussed in the works
cited in the previous footnote.

5. Tying the assassination attempt to the Soviet Union and KGB was espe-
cially helpful in discrediting the Soviet leadership in 1982 and early 1983, as
Yuri Andropov, who had just succeeded Brezhnev as head of state, was at one
time head of the KGB. The Bulgarian, Sergei Antonov, was arrested in Italy
within three weeks of Andropov's assuming power.

6. See Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian Connection, pp. 102-3, 206-7.

7. For an analysis of these NBC-TV programs, see Edward S. Herman and
Frank Brodhead, "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case Study in
Free World Disinformation," Covert Action Information Bulletin 19 (Spring-
Summer 1983), pp. 13-24.

8. Both Sterling and Henze asserted this many times, without providing any
evidence and without attempting to explain how destabilization would serve
Soviet interests, given the likelihood-eventually realized, in fact-that insta-
bility and internal disorder in Turkey would bring into power a military regime
even more closely aligned with the United States. Sterling and Henze were
fortunate that they were never called upon to explain these things to Western
audiences.

9. Marvin Kalb expounded this precise sequence, without the benefit of a
single piece of evidence beyond the fact that Agca had had a brief stay in
Bulgaria-among twelve countries-asserting that "it seems safe to conclude
that he had been drawn into the clandestine network of the Bulgarian secret
police and, by extension, the KGB-perhaps without his even being aware of
their possible plans for him" (transcript of the Sept. 21, 1982, show, pp. 44-45)-

10. See how Sterling handles the problem of Agca's gun, in the text below.

n. SHK regularly assume that the Soviet leadership is wild, and regularly
engages in "Dr. No"-type plots, and the mass media do not challenge this
image. On the conservative reality, see George Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion:
Soviet-Amen 'can Relations in the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon, 1982);
John Lowenhardt, Decision-Making in Soviet Politics (New York: St. Martin's,
1981); and Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

12. NBC-TV stressed an alleged note sent by the pope to Brezhnev threatening
that in case of a Soviet invasion, the pope would give up his papal crown and
return to Poland to lead the Polish resistance. Thus the assassination attempt
was to get the pope out of the way to clear the ground for a prospective

invasion. This note has never been produced, and the Vatican has denied its
authenticity. See page 162. For a further discussion of these issues, see Herman
and Brodhead, Bidgarian Connection, pp. 14-15, 200.

13- Papa, Mafya, Agca (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1984), pp. 213-20. Mumcu
also wrote a substantial volume on Agca and his record, Agca Dosyasi (Ankara:
Tekin Yayinevi, 1984).

14- After Agca decided to "confess," he explained to the Italian magistrates
that he was a killer for hire by anyone who wanted a reliable "international
terrorist." He sounded just as Claire Sterling said he ought to sound. This was
taken quite seriously by the Italian judiciary and Western press. See Herman
and Brodhead, Bidgarian Connection, pp. 113-14.

15- For a full analysis of this theory, see Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian
CommMm, pp. 138-4°.

16. Michael Dobbs, "Child of Turkish Slums ... ," Washington Post, October
14, 1984. Agca's shooting of the pope may have been motivated in part by his
quest for notoriety.

17- For a full account of this strategy and the other matters dealt with in this
paragraph, see Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian Connection, pp. 71-98.
18. Criminal Court oiKomt, Judgment in the Matter of Francesco Pazienza, et

July 29, 1985, signed by Francesco Amato, president of the court.
19- Diana Johnstone, "Latest Scandal Leads to Reagan Administration," In
These Times, December 5-11, 1984.

20. Tana de Zulueta and Peter Godwin, "Face to Face with the Colonel
Accused of Plotting to Kill the Pope," Sunday Times, May 26, 1983, p. 50.

21. "Behind the Scenes of the 'Agca Investigation,'" Milliyet, November 1984.
This excellent two-part series by Milliyet's correspondent in West Germany
describes the Italian investigation then in process as an extremely biased and
incompetently managed exercise. Its many inconvenient but highly relevant
facts may also have contributed to it being entirely ignored in the Western
press.

22. For a discussion of the various suspicious aspects of this photo identifica-
tion, see Herman and Brodhead, Bulgan'an Connection, pp. 110-11.

23- De Zulueta and Godwin, "Face to Face with the Colonel . . . ,' p. 50. Even
during the investigative phase of the case, it was disclosed that Agca's sensa-
tional knowledge of the telephone numbers of the Bulgarian embassy in Rome
was slightly compromised by the disclosure that he had "inadvertently" been
left alone with a copy of the Rome phone directory. For other illustrations,
see Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian Connection, pp. 112, 118-i9.

366 NOTES TO PAGES 155-159

24. The first significant departure in the mass media ft'om the SHK model,
even though no alternative was ofi'ered, did not occur till May 12, 1983, on
ABC-TV's "20/2Q." On the pattern of deviations here and later, see note 26
below.

25. Late in this long article, Newsweek does state in passing that "It is difl'icult
to beheve that the Soviets would expect the murder of the pope to solve their
PoUsh problem. To some, it seems odd that the Soviets would put their fate
in the hands of Bulgarians and Turks, depriving themselves of the control that
is so essential to a ticklish intelligence operation." These sentences, unusual
in the mass media for raising such questions, sit alone and undeveloped, after
a lengthy discourse that accepts the SHK analysis as vahd.

26. The only programs on national television that challenged the propaganda
frame were on ABC: one, and the only program in five years of television
coverage that showed the slightest degree of network enterprise, critical capa-
bility, and honesty, was a program "To Kill the Pope," aired on "20/20" on
May 12, 1983. Subsequently, ABC also had a program in which Sterling debated
with Alexander Cockburn, although this was arranged unbeknownst to Ster-
ling, who was enraged at having to have her views contested. (See Herman and
Brodhead, Bulgarian Connection, pp. 123-24, for the story of this encounter.)
Among the newspapers, a propaganda conformity prevailed until the time that
prosecutor Albano's report was made public in June 1984, when Michael
Dobbs, of the Washington Post, began to take a more critical view, along with
Don Schanche, of the Los Angeles Times. While skeptical of Agca's claims over
the next several years, Dobbs remained equally skeptical of the idea that Agca
was coached, which he referred to as "the Bulgarian view." Dobbs never
seriously explored the coaching hypothesis. See Herman and Brodhead, Bul-
garian Connection, "The Small Voices of Dissent," pp. I99~202.

27. Martella visited Washington, D.C., in October 1982, during which time he
benefited not only from the insights of Arnauld de Borchgrave, but was also
given a special viewing of the NBC-TV special on "The Man Who Shot the
Pope" (see Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian Connection, pp. 24-27). Ledeen
may have had a more direct involvement in the initiation of the case in Italy,
a charge made by Francesco Pazienza. See Diana Johnstone, "Bulgarian Con-
nection: Finger-pointing in the Pontiff Plot Labyrinth, " In These Times, Janu-
ary 29-February 4, 1986.

28. For a statistical tabulation of the extent of this bias, see table 7-1, "Sterling-
Henze-Ledeen Dominance of Media Coverage of the Bulgarian Connection,
September 1982-May 1985," in Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian Connection,
pp. 182-83-

29. Their coercive tactics were effective because their preestablished promi-
nence and drawing power made them important to program organizers, which
gave them leverage. This is the basis for "tying agreements," outlawed under
section 3 of the Clayton Act.

30. This Sterling theme and the ends sought by these conferees also reflected
an elite consensus in the United States; otherwise the mass media would not
have accepted her views so readily.

31. See Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian Connection, chapter 6, "The Disin-
formationists."

32. In a characteristic he, Sterling says in her Terror Network ([New York:

NOTES TO PAGES 159-161 367

Holt, Rinehart & Winston/Reader's Digest Press, 1984], p. 290) that Sejnagot
out of Czechoslovakia "a jump ahead of the invading Soviet army," when in
fact Sejna defected in the middle of the Czech Spring, long before the Soviet
invasion, and in the midst of a corruption scandal in which Sejna was a
principal. See Leslie Gelb, "Soviet-Terror Ties Called Outdated," New York
Times, October 18, 1981. In his book Veil, Bob Woodward notes that CIA
analysts had at once dismissed Sterling's concoctions as "preposterous," giving
some examples, including her reliance on Italian press stories that had been
planted in CIA disinformation operations ([New York: Simon & Schuster,
1987], pp. 124-29). For detailed refutation, see Edward S. Herman, The Real
Terror Network (Boston: South End Press, 1982).

33. Sejna, of course, failed this test by "recognizing" the forged document,
which had slipped his mind, and used it in later years for its spectacular
disclosures. See Lars-Erik Nelson, "The Deep Terror Plot: A Thickening of
Silence," Nea York Daily News, June 24, 1984; Alexander Cockburn, "Beat the
Devil," The Nation, August 17-24, 1985. Sterling was introduced to this Sejna
information windfall by Michael Ledeen. (see Sterling, Terror Network p. 34).

34. See also "Why Is the West Covering Up for Agca? An Exclusive Interview
with Claire Sterling," Human Events, April 21, 1984.

35. This quotation and Une of thought was presented by Sterling in her speech
given at the Conference on Disinformation, in Paris, December 5, 1984, spon-
sored by Internationale de la Resistance, a coalition of right-wing resistance/
"liberation" organizations and support groups. We quote from page 2 of the
copy of her speech distributed by the sponsor organization. The booklet by
Andronov to which she attributes such great influence was, to our knowledge,
never mentioned in the U.S. mass media except by Sterling and Henze.

36. Even Michael Dobbs failed to deal with the fact that the Bulgarian defense
claimed that no publicly available sources-i.e., newspapers, or radio and
television programs-had ever had details on Antonov's apartment before Agca
provided those details to the investigating magistrate. This would seem to
imply that Agca got the details by some form of coaching while in prison.
Dobbs dismisses coaching as the "Bulgarian view," but never explains what
other view could account for Agca's knowledge of places he had never visited.
37- Panorama, May 26, 1985, p. 107.

38. Ugur Mumcu's books, cited earlier, are a running commentary on what
Mumcu repeatedly and explicitly calls Henze's "lies."

39. CO-" I beheve we are past the point where it serves the interests of any party
except the Soviets to adopt the minimalist, legalistic approach which argues
that if there is no 'documentary evidence' or some other form of incontroverti-
ble proof that the Government of the U.S.S.R. is behind something, we must
assume that it is not" (Paul Henze, "The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey,"
Atlantic Community [Winter 1981-82], p. 468).

40. Ledeen had three Op-Ed articles in the New York Times in the years
1984-87.

41. New York Times Book Review, May 19, 1985. For an analysis of Ledeen's
neoconservative theory of the media, see Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian
Connection, pp. 166-70.

42. For documentation and sources, see Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian
Connection, pp. Wr^k 160-61; see also Jonathan Kwitny, "Tale of Intrigue:

368 NOTES TO PAGES 161-169

Why an Italian Spy Got Closely Involved in the Billygate Affair," Wall Street
Journal, August 8, 1985.

43. The comprehensiveness of the Times's protection of its disinformation
sources was shown amusingly in February 1987 when Charles Babcock, of the
Washington Post, revealed that Ledeen had very possibly been dismissed from
Washington University in St. Louis in 1972 for plagiarism. On the very same
day, an article by Stephen Engelberg in the Times, on Ledeen, describes
Ledeen's history as follows: "Mter being denied tenure at Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis in 1972, Mr. Ledeen bec£une . . . . " This was aU the news fit
to print about a useful asset.

44. "McNeil-Lehrer News Hour," program of May 27, 1985.

45 . See our reference earlier to its wholly uncritical presentation in the News-
week article of January 3, 1983.

46. For a discussion of the compromised character of the photo identification
of the Bulgarians on November 9,1982, as well as the general conduct of the
case by Investigating Judge Martella, see Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian
Connection, chapter 5.

47. On the likelihood that this Antonov photo had been "manufactured" as an
instrument of disinformation, see Howard Friel, "The Antonov Photo and the
'Bulgarian Connection,' " Covert Action Information Bulletin 21 (Spring-Sum-
mer 1984), pp. 20-21.

48. This was treated outstandingly in the ABC "20/20" program of May 12,
1983; and Agca's shifting testimony was also discussed well by Michael Dobbs
in the Washington Post, beginning in June 1984. These were exceptional,
however, as pointed out in note 26 above.

49. Dobbs is an honorable exception, although he remained very cautious in
generalizing about Martella's handling of the case, and, as noted, he failed to
take seriously the obvious alternative model.

50. Initially, Sterling suggested obliquely that any retracted claims had already
been "corroborated"-a falsehood. Later, Sterling followed Italian prosecutor
Albano's solution to the problem: that Agca really was in Antonov's apartment
but was denying it to signal the Bulgarians that they had better break him out
of jail.

Chapter 5: The Indochina Wars (I)

1. Among these, the most comprehensive, to our knowledge, are unpublished
studies by Howard Elterman; The State, The Mass Media and Ideological He-
gemony: United States Policy Decisions in Indochina, 1 945 -75 -Hiscorical Record,
Government Pronouncements and Press Coverage (Ph.D. diss.. New York Uni-
versity, 1978); and The Circle of Deception: The United States Government, the
National Press and the Indochina War, 1954-1984 (ms., n.d.). See also Daniel
C. Hallin, The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam (New York; Oxford
University Press, 1986). The latter is based on a complete coverage of the New
York Times from 1961 through mid-1965, and an extensive sample of television
network news from August 1965 through January 1973. Elterman's work covers

NOTES TO PAGES 169-173 369

the New York Times and the newsweeklies, contrasting their coverage with that
of the "alternative press." The most extensive analysis of a particular incident
is Peter Braestrup, Big Story, 2 vols. (Boulder: Westview, 1977), on the Tet
offensive, published in cooperation with Freedom House. For detailed exami-
nation of this highly influential study, to which we return in "The Tet Offen-
sive," pp. 211-228, and appendix 3, see Noam Chomsky, "The U.S. Media and
the Tet Offensive," Race & Class (London) XX, 1 (1978), and an excerpted
version in the journalism review More (June 1978); also Gareth Porter, "Who
Lost Vietnam?" Inquiry, February 20, 1978.

2. Inside Story Special Edition: Vietnam Op/ED, Press and the Public Project,
Inc. (1985), transcript of the AIM critique with discussion; Robert Elegant,
cited from Encounter by narrator Charlton Heston, on camera. Transcripts of
the PBS series Vietnam: A Television History are published by WGBH Tran-
scripts (Boston: 1983). See also the "companion book" by the chief correspond-
ent for the PBS series, Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York:
Viking, 1983).

3- Samuel Huntington, in M. P. Crozier, S. J. Huntington, and J. Watanuki,

The Cn"sis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the
Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975), pp. 98,
102, 106, 113. The final remarks are from the summary of discussion by commis-
sion members, appendix I, 4.

4. "Introduction" to Braestrup, Big Story, p. xviii; the latter phrase is the title
of a 1967 Freedom House pamphlet inspired in part by Vietnam War coverage;
see also p. vii.

5. John P. Roche, Washington Star, October 26,1977, commenting on Braest-
rup 's study.

6. John Corry, "Is TV Unpatriotic or Simply Unmindful?" New York Times,
May 12, 1985. Corry alleges that this is true with regard not only to Vietnam
but also to Central America-and, in fact, generally.

7. General Kinnard, now a military historian, was field commander for the
1970 Cambodia invasion. One of the commentators is the French historian
Philippe Devillers, elsewhere a critic of the war but appearing here only in
endorsement of one element of the AIM critique.

8. In Braestrup, Big Story, I, xix.

9. Bernard Fall, "Vietnam Blitz," New Republic, October 9, 1965. A French
military historian and journalist. Fall was one of the few genuine experts on
Vietnam writing in the United States at that time. He was also an extreme
hawk, although he turned against the war when he saw that it was simply
destroying the country and society of Vietnam.

10. Hallin, "Uncensored War, " pp. 192ff.

11. Editorial, New York Times, May 7, 1972.

12. "An Irony of History," Newsweek, April 28, 1975; final document in William
Appleman Williams, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner, and Walter
LaFeber, America in Vietnam: A Documentary History (New York: Anchor,
1985)-

13- Lewis, New York Times, April 21, 24, 1975; December 27, 1979. For these
and similar comments by perhaps the most outspoken critic of the war in the
mainstream media, see Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War (New York:
Pantheon, 1982), pp. 28, 144f and 417n.

370 NOTES TO PAGES 173-179

14. Karnow, Vietnam, pp. 9, 439, 650.

15. John King Fairbank, "Assignment for the '70'S," American Historical Re-
view 74.3 (February 1969); Irving Howe, Dissent (Fall 1979); Stanley Hoff-
mann, International Security (Summer 1981).

16. David Fromkin and James Chace, "WhatAre the Lessons of Vietnam?" in
"Vietnam: The Retrospect," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1985).

17. McGeorge Bundy, Foreign Affairs (January 1967); secret memorandum of
February 7, 1965, in Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel edition (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1972), HI, 309; henceforth PP.

18. The notion that the United States seeks American-style democracy in areas
of intervention persists in liberal thought despite obvious and durable U.S.
satisfaction with regimes such as those of Somoza, Pinochet, or Mobutu, and
despite regular intervention to overthrow or bar democratic regimes, as in
Guatemala in 1954 and since, among many other examples, some discussed
earlier. To postulate otherwise would be to acknowledge something other than
benevolent ends. This would be intolerable.

19. For extensive references, see Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War, particu-
larly chapter 4.

20. Lawrence Lifschultz, Far Eastern Economic Review, January 30, 19^1.

21. "Don't Forget Afghanistan," Economist, October 25, 1980.

22. See Noam Chomsky, A r War with Asia (New York: Pantheon, 1970; here-
after, A WWAj, pp. 213-44, noting also an exception: D. S. Greenway, Life,
April 3, 1970. See also pp. 214ff and Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New York:
Pantheon, 1973; hereafter, FRS), 179, for a review of official data readily
available to journalists, had they been interested to ascertain the facts. See also
Fred Branfman, "Presidential War in Laos," in Nina S. Adams and Alfred W.
McCoy, eds., Laos: War and Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

23. See Hallin, "Uncensored War, " pp. 39f , for discussion.

24. Hallin, "Uncensored War, " p. 53. In 1962, the USIA announced a contest
in Saigon to fmd a term more effective than "Vietcong" in inspiring "con-
tempt," or "disgust," or "ridicule" among the country's illiterate masses (AP,
New York Times, June 4, 1962). Apparently, no more effective term of abuse
could be devised.

25. E. W. Kenworthy, New York Times, May 10, 1961; David Halberstam, New
York Times, January 20, 1963; New York Times, May 13, 1961; cited in Hallin,
"Uncensored War, " 53-54-

26. "Where Washington Reporting Failed," Columbia Journalism Review
(Winter 1970-71), cited by James Aronson, "The Media and the Message," in
Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn, eds.. Critical Essays and Index, vol. 5 of
PP.

27. New York Times, September 28, 1987; our emphasis.

28. State Department, "Policy and Information Statement on Indochina"
(July 1947), cited by George C. Herring, America's Longest War (New York:

Wiley, 1979), p. 8.

29. Department of Defense, United States -Vietnam Relations, I94S~^7 (the
U.S . government version of the Pentagon Papers), bk. 8, pp. I44~45> Choms^,
FRS, pp. 7, 32 (see this book for documentation when, not specifically cited

below). For general discussion of the war see, inter aha, Herrmg, Amencd's
Longest War; Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War (New York: Pantheon, 19^5),

NOTES TO PAGES 179-182 371

with particular focus on Vietnamese Communist planning; R. B. Smith, A n

International History of the Vietnam War (New York: St. Martin's, 1983, 1985),
the first two volumes of a projected four- volume history, a somewhat mistitled
study focusing on "international Communist strategy." For the pre-1965 pe-
riod, see particularly George M. Kahin, Intervention: How Amen'ca Became
Involved in Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 1986). A useful documentary record
and commentary appears in Williams et al., America in Vietnam.

30. In R. Lindholm, ed., Vietnam: The First Five Years (Lansing: Michigan
State University Press, 1959), p. 346.

31. Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 9I-92,
101. For some samples of Pike's rhetoric in this study, see Appendix 3, note

3, below.

32. Douglas Pike, War, Peace and the Vietcong (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1969), p. 6; the estimate was common in the U.S. government and by outside
specialists. Pike, Viet Cong, pp. 110, 362. Henry Cabot Lodge, in PP, II, 376.

33. Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1978). For detailed discussion of this vulgar propaganda exercise disguised as
"scholarship," see our review, reprinted in Chomsky, Towards a New Cold
War, chapter 5. Lewy tacitly concedes the accuracy of this critique by evasion;
compare the review with his response to critics, Washington Quarterly (Au-
tumn 1979). For further insight into the commitments and intellectual level of
a man taken seriously as a scholar, see his discussion of the need for the state
to take stern action to protect the public from "lies" by subversives, and to
ensure that the public is not deceived by the "hidden agenda" of such groups
as Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military
Policy, NACLA, and others who seek to conceal "their espousal of Cuban-
style Communism" and who are engaged in "deception" and "subversion." As
he correctly notes, and inadvertently reveals in his discussion, "to totalitarian-
ism, an opponent is by definition subversive" (Lewy, "Does America Need a
Verfassungsschutzbericht?" Orbis [Fedl 1987]-a respected journal with a dis-
tinguished editorial board).

34. Unpublished memorandum on pacification problems circulated within the

military in 1965, a copy of which was given by Vann to Professor Alex Carey,
University of New South Wales, Australia.
35- Pp, II, 304-

36. Interview in Stern, reprinted in New Advocate (Los Angeles), April 1-15,
1972; Maxwell Taylor, in PP, III, 669.

37. U.S. involvement dates back to the export of Diem from the United States
to Vietnam in 1954, and his forcible imposition as a "leader" of the southern
part of the country, in a context where U.S. officials readily admitted that the
great majority of South Vietnamese supported Ho Chi Minh and that Diem
lacked an indigenous base of support.

38. We saw in chapter 3 that in El Salvador, too, while it was admitted by the
media that the population wanted peace above all else, the elections under U.S.
auspices-again, held only after the ground had been cleared by mass killing
for reasons that the media never confronted or tried to explain-produced
governments dedicated to military victory.

39. Walter LaFeber, in WilUeims et al., America in Vietnam, p. 236, with the
text of the resolution.

372 NOTES TO PAGES

40. PP, 715-16, Stevenson's speech before the UN Security Council, May 21,
1964. See PRS, 114f., for documentation on the U.S. concept of "aggression."

41. Bernard Fall, " Vietcong-The Unseen Enemy in Vietnam," New Society
(London), April 22, 1965, reprinted in Bernard B. Fall and Marcus G. Raskin,
eds., The Viet-Nam Reader (New York: Vintage, 1965). See note 9.

42. Bernard Fall, Last Reflections on a War (New York: Doubleday, 1967).

43. Samuel Huntington, Foreign Affairs (July 1968).

44. Paul Quinn-Judge reports that deaths from 1965 on in Vietnam alone may
have passed three million (Far Eastern Economic Review, Oct. II, 1984). A
standard Western estimate is about 500,000 kiUed in the U.S. -backed French
war. Hundreds of thousands more were killed in South Vietnam before 1965,

in Laos, and in Cambodia.

45. According to congressional sources that cite unpublished studies of the
Congressional Research Service, which are alleged to give the figure $84.5
million, in fiscal-year 1987 dollars, from FY 1980 through FY 1986. We return

to this matter in the next chapter.

46- See Charles Kadushin, The American Intellectual Elite (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1974). This study was based on lengthy interviews taken in May 1970,
after the Cambodia invasion, when public opposition to the war reached its
highest peak. Virtually all of those interviewed were "doves," some active in
opposition to the war. Virtually none opposed the war on the principled
grounds of opposition to aggression (called "ideological grounds" by the au-
thor) that all would have adopted had they been asked about the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia.

47. Philadelphia Inquirer, August 30, 1987.

48. Charles Mohr, quoting a "South Vietnamese official" (New York Times,
Oct. 24, 1966). One of the authors (Herman) published in 1971 a compilation
of quotations, many from Saigon generals and other officials, on the need for
time because of their lack of indigenous support, which made political compe-
tition intolerable. See "Free Choice or Subjugation," American Report, May
7, 1971.

49. Kahin, Intervention, pp. 89, 60-61; on the secret record revealed in the
Pentagon Papers, see FRS, pp. 104-5.

50. See FRS, pp. lOof

51. March 13, 1964; Kahin, Intervention, pp. 91, 208.

52. Elterman, Circle of Deception, reviewing stories from May 1955 through
July 1956; Elterman, State-Media-Ideological Hegemony, pp. 182f.

53. Susan Welch, "The American Press and Indochina," in Richard L. Merritt,
ed.. Communications in International Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1972). Only the isolationist Chicago Tribune was opposed to U.S. inter-
vention and challenged administration assumptions, in her sample.

54. Fall, "Vietcong-The Unseen Enemy," cites as credible the figure 66,000
killed between 1957 and 1961. Gabriel Kolko gives the figure of 12,000 killed
as a "conservative" estimate for 1955-57, with 40,000 political prisoners, reach-
ing 150,000 by 1961-5°, 000, according to the government (Anatomy ofa War,
p.89)-

55. "Losung fur Vietnam," Neues Forum (August/September 1969); see our
Political Economy of Human Rights (Boston: South End Press, 1979; hereafter
PEHR), 1,3°2,422.

56. See, among others, U.S. government specialist Douglas Pike, Viet |^^|
and particularly Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1972), the major study of the period preceding the outright
U.S. invasion, by a U.S. military adviser with extensive access to U.S. and
Saigon intelligence as well as direct evidence.

57- "The Situation and Tasks for 1959," from the Race document collection^
cited by Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and [fjg
Paris Agreement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 281.

58. Race, War Comes to Long An. Essentially the same picture is presented-
despairingly-in Pike's 1966 study.

59. New York Time.s, September 15, 1969.

60. Kahin, Intervention, p. 208; chapters 8, 9.

61. Kahin, Intervention, pp. 183f William Bundy, January 21, 1970, cited by
Kahin, p. 183.

62. Lyndon Johnson, March 20, 1964; Maxwell Taylor, November 27, 1964.
See FRS, pp. 127f , for documentation and more extensive discussion based

on the Pentagon Papers record.

63- Kahin, Intervention, pp. 238, 241, 245.

64- For references and further discussion, see PRS, pp. Uof See also Wallace
J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam
Conflict, 1964-68 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

65- E. W. Kenworthy, New York Times, November 17, 1%1, reporting President
Kennedy's decisions; Kenworthy, New York Times, May 10, 1961, reporting
Lyndon Johnson's mission to Asia; Hallin, "Uncensored War", pp. 31, 53.

66. Robert Trumbull, February 18, 1962; Hanson Baldwin, September 16, 1962,
May 13, 1961; Tom Wicker, February II, 1965; David Halberstam, January 20,
1963, March II, 1963; Homer Bigart, April 1, 15, 1962. Hallin, "Uncensored WoXx"
pp. 51-56, 84.

67. Kahin, Intervention, p. 142.

68. James Reston, New York Times, April 25, 1965; Peter Jennings, ABC-TV,
March 8, 1966; Jack Perkins, NBC-TV, January II, 1966; Hallin, "Uncensored
War," pp. 89, 91, 229, 137, 140, 141.

69. Kahin, Intervention, p. 287.

70. For an extensive collection of press reports, see Seymour Melman, ed..
In the Name of America (Annandale, Va.: Turnpike Press, 1968). For analysis
of the material available at the time, see Edward S. Herman, Atrocities in
Vietnam: Myths and Realities (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1970).

77. New York Times, May 6, 1972.

72. Takashi Oka, Christian Science Monitor, December 4,1965; Bernard Fall,
"Vietnam Blitz," New Republic, October 9, 1965.

73. Sidney Hook, "Lord Russell and the War Crimes 'Trial,' " New Leader,
October 24, 1966.

74. See AWWA, PP.98f.

75- "Truck versus Dam," Christian Science Monitor, September 5, 1967.

76. Henry Kamm, New York Times, November 15, 1969; New York Times, April
6, 1971. See PRS, pp. 225f., for more details.

77. E.g., Amando Doronila, "Hanoi Food Output Held Target of U.S. Bomb-
ers," AP, Christian Science Monitor, September 8, 1967, three days after Joseph
Harsch's philosophical reflections just cited.

374 NOTES TO PAGES 196-209

78- See Kahin, Intervention, pp. 338f., 384, 400, on these perceived risks.

79. See FRS, pp. 4f., 70ff., for documentation from the official record.

80. Seymour Hersh, My Lai Four (New York: Random House, 1970); Hersh,
Cover-up (New York: Random House, 1972); and Hersh, New York Times, June
5, 1972, on My Khe. FRS, pp. 251, xx.

81. Henry Kamm, "New Drive Begins in Area of Mylai," New York Times,
April I, 1971; Martin Teitel, "Again, the Suffering of Mylai," New York Times,
June 7, 1972; see above, p. 196.

82. FRS, p. 222.

83. Cited in PEHR I, 316f., from Buckley's unpublished notes provided to the
authors. See pp. 313f on Operation Speedy Express; and our review of Guenter
Lewy, note 33, on his falsification and apologetics for this and other atrocities.

84. "Five years later. My Lai is a no man's town, silent and unsafe," AP, New
York Times, March 16, 1973; our emphasis.

85. Edward Jay Epstein, "The War in Vietnam: What Happened vs. What We
Saw," TV Guide, September 29, October 6, October 13, 1973; repnnted "» his
Between Fact and Fiction (New York: Vintage, 1975)-

86. The character of the bombing of North Vietnam is denied by apologists-
notoriously, the respected "scholar" Guenter Lewy, who proves that it was
directed solely at military targets on the grounds that the U.S. government says
so, discounting eyewitness reports from a wide range of sources; see our
review, cited in note 33, for a few examples.

87. Hallin, "Uncensored War, " pp. HO, 161-62; Johnson cited in Herring, A mer-
ica's Longest War, p. 204, from Roger Morris, Aw Uncertain Greatness

88. Ibid., pp. 201-3. On the elections, see Edward S. Herman and Frank
Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: U.S. -Staged Elections in the Dominican
Republic, Vietnam, and EI Salvador (Boston: South End Press, 1984), and
chapter 3, above.

89. CBS-TV August 23, 1965; our emphasis. Hallin, pp. 118, 130-4L

90. Kevin Buckley; see PEHR, I, 313f., for more details on this major war
crime. Hallin points out that the delta looked like a wilderness because "it was
devastated by B-52 strikes in the late 1960s."

91. Hallin, pp. 172, 143-

92. Ibid., pp. 148-58.

93. Ibid., pp. 209-10.

94. PP, II, 668-69, 653. See Pike, Viet Cong; PP, II, III; and for detailed
discussion, Kahin, Intervention.

95. PP, III, 150; Kahin, Intervention, p. 205.

95. Kahin, Intervention, pp. 219f.; Smith, International History, II, 280.

97. Smith, International History, II, 277, 280; Kahin, Intervention, pp. 219^.

98. Hallin, "Uncensored War, " pp. 19, 16, 20, 7of.

99. See Elterman, State-Media-Ideological Hegemony, pp. 274ff., and Circle of
Deception, chapter 6, for detailed documentation and analysis.

100. Time, cover story, August 14; Newsweek, August 17, 24; U.S. News &
World Report, August 17; cited with discussion by Elterman.

101. Hallin, "Uncensored War," p. 21.

102. New Statesman, August 7, 14; National Guardian, August 8, 15 (three
articles), 22; IF. Stone's Weekly, August 10, 24, September 7; cited with discus-
sion by Elterman, who notes also that the New Republic accepted the U.S.

NOTES TO PAGES 209-218 375

government version with no question, although with some pessimism about the
prospects, echoed in The Nation.

103. Pp, III, io7.

104. PP, 111,531, 207.

105. James Reston, New York Times, February 26, 1965.

106. Braestrup, Big Story,- see section I, note I; hereafter cited with volume and
page number only. Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post Magazine, January 29,
1978; Oberdorfer is the author of Tet! (New York: Doubleday, 1971), praised
as a "fine" study (I, xiii). Diamond, New York Times Book Review, December
4, 1977; a journalist, he headed the News Study Group in the MIT Political
Science department. Roche, see note 5. Mohr, "Hawks and Doves Refight Tet
Offensive at Symposium," New York Times, February 27, 1978; Smith, "Read-
ing History: The Vietnam War," History Today (October 1984).

107. Hening, America's Longest War, pp. 200-201.

108. On the record of Freedom House in service to the state and in opposition
to democracy, see Herman and Brodhead, Demonstration Elections, appendix
I, a small fragment of a record that merits more detailed exposure.

109. For additional evidence and discussion, see the review in Race & Class
and More, from which we will draw extensively, particularly in appendix 3, and
Porter's review, both cited in note I, above.

no. Thies, When Governments Collide, p. 201. This analysis, familiar in the
scholarly literature, is quite different from Braestrup's conclusions, which, as
Porter comments, he attributes to a consensus of historians without a single
reference. Porter adds that "few independent historians" would endorse
Braestrup's conclusions or his analysis of Communist objectives, quoting CIA
analyst Patrick McGarvey and others. See his A Peace Denied, pp. 67f., for
further discussion of these issues.

ni. New York Times, February 20, April 4, 1968. On internal U.S. government
assessments, see below, and Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p. 329. Kolko goes on
to describe how these assessments underestimated the success of U.S. terror
in decimating the NLF infrastructure in rural areas, and were thus overly
"pessimistic." Note that oy virtue of these conclusions, Kolko counts as "opti-
mistic" by Freedom House logic, that is, supportive of U.S. goals. In fact, quite
the opposite is true, still another illustration of the absurdity of the Freedom
House assumptions-or, more accurately, of their blind adherence to the
doctrines of state propaganda, reaching to the way in which the issues are
initially framed.

112. Heiiing, America's Longest War, p. 189. Hoopes quoted from his Limits of
Intervention (New York: McKay, 1969), p. 145, by Herring and Thies.

113. PP, IV, 548, 558. April USG study cited by Porter, review of Big Story.
McNamara, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Jan. 22,
1968 (II, 20).

114. See Kahin, Intervention, pp. 386f

n5. Yierring, America's Longest War, p. 204.

116. Braestrup, Big Story, I, 6713.; Burns W. Roper in Big Story, I, chapter 14.

117. For serious interpretations of the basis for the shift of government policy,
putting Freedom House fantasies aside, see Herbert Schandler, The Unmaking
of a President (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Thies, When
Governments CoUide,' Kolko, Anatomy of a War, noting particularly the crucial

376 NOTES TO PAGES 218-224

issue of the perceived economic crisis resulting from the costs of the war.

118. See Kahin, Interventim, pp. 421ff., for discussion of these important
events.

119. Oberdorfer, Tet!, ' Porter, A Peace Denied, p. 66. On this forgotten massa-
cre, and the various attempts to shift attention to the massacre carried out by
the retreating NLF forces, see our PEHR, I, 345ff , and sources cited, particu-
larly Gareth Porter, "The 1968 'Hu^ Massacre,' "Congressional Record, Febru-
ary 19, 1975, pp. S2189-94,' and Porter's review oi Big Story. Porter notes that
Braestrup's estimate of destruction in Hu6 is far below that of US AID, which
estimated in April that 77 percent of Hui's buildings were "seriously dam-
aged" or totally destroyed.

120. Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p. 309.

121. PP, IV, 539. On third-country forces, introduced well before the first
sighting of a battalion of North Vietnamese regulars in the South, see Kahin,
Intervention, pp. 333f. Korean mercenaries began to arrive in January 1965,
while Taiwanese soldiers had reached "several hundred" by mid-1964, in
addition to "a considerable number of soldiers seconded from Chiang Kai-
shek's army on Taiwan," possibly as early as 1959 but certainly under the
Kennedy administration, often disguised as members of the Nung Chinese
ethnic minority in Vietnam and employed for sabotage missions in the North
as well as fighting in the South. For MeNamara's estimate, see his statement
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 22, 1968; excerpts in
Big Story, 1 1 , 14ff.

122. Bernard Weinraub, New York Times, February 8, 1968; Lee Lescaze,
Washington Post, February 6, 1968; in Big Story, 1 1 , 116ff.

123. New York Times, April 4, 1968. See appendix 3 for similar comments from

news reporting.

124. Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Saigon," The New Yorker, March 2, 1968.
He estimates the NVA component of the forces engaged at 10 percent of some
50,000 to 60,000.

125. Jean-Claude Pomonti, Le Monde hebdomadaire, February 4-8, 1968.
Pomonti was expelled from the country soon after. The head of the Newsweek
Saigon bureau had already been expelled.

126. Charles Mohr, New York Times, February 14, 1968. On Mohr, see Big
Story, I, 718.

127. CBS-TV, February 14, 1968, Hallin, "Uncensored War, " 171; Big Story, I,
158.

128. We return in appendix 3 to the evidence that Braestrup presents, compar-
ing the facts with his rendition of them, including Cronkite's reports.

729. Boston Globe, February 24, 1968.

130. See note 118, above.

131. Marc Riboud, Le Monde, April 13, 1968; Newsweek, February 19 (banned
from Saigon), March 30; "CBS-TV Morning News," February 12, 1968, cited
in Big Story, I, 274; John Lengel, AP, February 10, 1968, cited in Big Story,
I, 269. Such a psychological warfare program was indeed conducted, although
not recognized as such by the media; see note 119 above and Appendix 3.

132. Philip Jones Griffiths, Vietnam Inc. (New York: Macmillan, 1971), with
pictures of the ongoing fighting. We return to coverage of Hu6 in appendix
3. See also note 119 above, and sources cited.

NOTES TO PAGES 225-237 377

133- PP, IV, 546f

134- Paul Quinn- Judge, "Soviet Publication Paints Bleak Picture of War in
Afghanistan," Christian Science Monitor, Moscow, July 21, 1987. Quotes are
Quinn-Judge's paraphrases.

135' Bill Keller, "Soviet Official Says Press Harms Army," New York Times,
January 21, 1988.

136. PP, IV, 441; his emphasis. On Komer's role, as he sees it and as the record

shows it, see FRS, pp. 84f

137- See Seymour Hersh, The Pn'ce of Power (New York: Summit, 1983), pp.
582,597, citing presidential aide Charles Colson and General Westmoreland.
138. For explicit references on these matters, here and below, see Noam
Chomsky, "Indochina and the Fourth Estate," Social Policy (September-
October 1973), reprinted in Towards a New Cold War, expanding an earlier
article in Ramparts (April 1973). See also Porter, A Peace Denied,' Kolko,
Anatomy of a Warj and Hersh, Price of Power. On the media during the
October- January period, see also Elterman, State-Media-IdeologicalHegemony,
p. 347f., documenting overwhelming media conformity to the U.S. government
version of the evolving events.
139- Cited by Hersh, Price of Power, p. 604.

140. New Republic, January 27, 1973. He notes that the Paris Agreements were
"nearly the same" as the October agreements that "broke apart two months
later," for reasons unexamined.

141. James N. Wallace, U.S News & World Report, February 26,1973.

142. Boston Globe, January 25, 1973, cited by Porter, A Peace Denied, 181.

143- January 25, 1973; see State Department Bulletin, February 12, 1973, with
slight modifications.

144- For a detailed examination, see Chomsky "Indochina and the Fourth
Estate."

145- Boston Globe, April 2, 1973.

146. New York Times, March i, 1973.

147- New Republic, February 17, 1973.

148. Newsweek, February 5, 1973.

149- Chn'stian Science Monitor, March 30, 1973.

150. For documentation, see our article in Ramparts (December 1974); May-
nard Parker, Foreign Affairs (January 1975); Porter, A Peace Denied. See Porter
on Pentagon assessments of North Vietnamese military activities and opera-
tions, very limited in comparison to the U.S.-GVN offensive in violation of the
cease-fire and the agreements generally.

151. Robert Greenberger, Wall Street Journal, August 17; Neil Lewis, Afew York
Times, August 18, 1987. For further details and the general background, see
Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (Boston: South End Press, 1988)-
part 2, chapter 7.

152. "Proper Uses of Power," New York Times, October 3°, 1983. On the ways
the task was addressed in the early postwar years, see our PEHR, vol. 2, leirgely
devoted to the media and Indochina during the 1975-78 period.

153' See the Trilateral Commission study cited in note 3.

154- PP, IV, A^^; Journal of International Affairs 25.1 (1971).

155- Mark McCain, Boston Globe, December 9, 1984; memo of May 19, 1967,
released dUring the Westmoreland-CBS Ubel trial.

378 NOTES TO PAGES 238-243

156. Memorandum for the secretary of defense by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
February 12, 1968, in Gareth Porter, ed., Vietnam: A History in Documents
(New York: Meridian, 1981), pp. 354f; Pp, IV, 541, 564, 482, 478 2I7, 197.

157. John E. Rielly, Foreign Policy (Spring 1983, Spring 1987). Rielly, ed.,
American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy IfS^i Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, p. 33. In the 1986 poll, the percentage of the public that
regarded the Vietnam War as "fundamentally wrong and immoral" was 66
percent, as compared with 72 percent in 1978 and 1982. Among "leaders"
(including representatives of churches, voluntary organizations, and ethnic
organizations), the percentage was 44 percent, as compared wltli 45 percent
in 1982 and 50 percent in 1978. The editor takes this to indicate "some waning
of the impact of the Vietnam experience with the passage of time"; and,
perhaps, some impact of the propaganda system, as memories fade and people
are polled who lack direct experience.

ISg'New Republic, January 22, 1977; see Marilyn Young, "Critical Amnesia,"
The Nation, April 2, 1977, on this and similar reviews of Emerson's Winners
and Losers.

159. John Midgley, New York Times Book Review, June 30, 1985; Drew Middle-
ton, New York Times, July 6, 1985.

160. Review of Paul Johnson, MoJem Times, in New York Times Book Review,
June 26, 1983, p. 15-

161. New York Times, May 28, 1984. A CIA analysis of April 1968 estimated that
"80,000 enemy troops," overwhelmingly South Vietnamese, were killed during

the Tet offensive. See note 44, above.

162. Arthur Westing, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February 19^1); Colin
Norman, Science, March II, 1983, citing the conclusion of an international
conference in Ho Chi Minh City; Jim Rogers, Indochina Issues, Center for
International Policy (September 1985). On the effects of U.S. chemical and
environmental warfare in Vietnam, unprecedented in scale and character, see
SIPRI, Ecological Consequences of the Second Indochina War (Stockholm:
Ahnqvist & Wiksell, 1976).

163. Ton That Thien, Pacific Affairs (Winter 1983-84); Chltra Subramaruam,
Pacific News Service, November 15, 1985; both writing from Geneva.

164. News conference, March 24, 1977; New York Times, March 25, 1977-

165. Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times, March 3, I985.

166. Barbara Crossette, New York Times, November 10, 1985, February 28,
1988; AP, April 7, 1988.

167. John Corry, New York Times, April 27, 1985.

168. Time, April 15, 1985. The discussion here is in part drawn from Noam
Chomsky, "Visions of Righteousness," Cultural Critique (Spring I986).

1^9. Wall Street j^grtU^ April 4, 1985. An exception was Newsweek (Apr. 15,
1985), which devoted four pages of its thirty-three-page account to > tepott by
Tony Clifton and Ron Moreau on the effects of the war on the wounded
land." The New York Times retrospective includes one Vietnamese, a defector
to the Westj who devotes a few paragraphs of his five-page denunciation of
the enemy to the character of the war, and there are scattered references in
other retrospectives.

170. Presidential adviser Walt W. Rostow, formerly a professor at MFT, now
a respected commentator on public affairs and economiC historian at the

University of Texas, The View from the Seventh Floor (New York: Harper &
Row, 1964), p. 244. Rostow's account of Mao and North Korea is as fanciful
as his remarks on Indochina, as serious scholarship shows.

171. Stuart Creighton Miller, "Benevolent Assimilation" (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982), p. 271.

172. AUan E. Goodman and Seth P. Tillman, New York Times, March 24, 1985.
775. New York Times, March 31, 1985. Charles Krauthammer, New Republic,
March 4, 1985.

174. On Lebanese opinion and the scandalous refusal of the media to consider
it, and the general context, see Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle (Boston:
South End Press, 1983).

175. It is widely argued that the United States supported France in Indochina
out of concern for French participation in the U.S. -run European military
system. This appears to be a minor factor at best, and one can also make a case
that the reverse was true: that support for France in Europe was motivated by
concern that France might "abandon Indochina" (see Geoffrey Warner, "The
USA and the Rearmament of West Germany," International Affairs [Spring
1985]). This factor also fails to explain U.S. efforts to keep the French in
Indochina, and to take up their cause after they withdrew.

176. Cited by Porter, A Peace Denied, p. 36, from 1966 congressional hearings.

177. See, inter alia, essays in PP, V, by John Dower, Richard DuBoff, and
Gabriel Kolko; FRS, chapter I.V; Thomas McCormick, in Williams et al.,
America in Vietnam; Michael Schaller, "Securing the Great Crescent," JoMr-
nal of American History (September 1982).

178. See p. 187, above, and PEHR, vol. i, chapter 4.

179. Gelb, "10 Years After Vietnam, U.S. a Power in Asia," New York Times,
April 18, 1985, quoting Professor Donald Zagoria.

180. See FRS, pp. 48f., citing upbeat analyses from the Far Eastern Economic
Review in 1972.

181. Far Eastern Economic Review, October II, 1984.

182. See A WWA, p. 286.

183. Fox Butterfield, "The New Vietnam Scholarship: Challenging the Old
Passions," New York Times Magazine, February 13, 1983, referring specifically
to Race's study cited earlier, an in-depth analysis of the NLF victory in rural
areas prior to the escalation of the U.S. war in 1965, "invalidated" by events
that occurred years later, according to Butterfield's interesting logic.

184. See our PEHR, II, 84, 166ff., 342; Daniel Southerland, "No Pens and
Pencils for Cambodia," Christian Science Monitor, December 4, 1981; AP,
"U.S. Bars Mennonite School Aid to Cambodia," A^ew York Times, December
8,1981; Joel Charny and John Spragens, Obstacles to Recovery in Vietnam and
Kampuchea: U.S. Embargo of Humanitarian Aid (Boston: Oxfam America,
1984), citing many examples of "explicit U.S. policy" under the Reagan ad-
ministration "to prevent even private humanitarian assistance from reaching
the people of Kampuchea and Vietnam."

185. Louis Wiznitzer, Christian Science Monitor, November 6, 1981; Kamm, "In
Mosaic of Southeast Asia, Capitalist Lands Are Thriving," New York Times,
November 8, 1981.

186. See p. 187 and note 2.

187. For a point-by-point response, demonstrating that the accusations are a

380 NOTES TO PAGES 248-256

melange of falsehoods and misrepresentations apart from a few minor points
changed in subsequent broadcasts, see the "Content Analysis and Assess-
ment," included in Inside Story Special Edition: Vietnam Op/Ed, cited in note
2, above.

188. Kamow, Vietnam. For a detailed critique of this highly praised best-seller,
see Noam Chomsky, "The Vietnam War in the Age of Orwell," Race & Class
4 (1984 [Boston Review, January 1984]). See Peter Biskind, "What Price Bal-
ance," Race & Class 4 (1984 [parts in The Nation, Decembers, 1983]), on the
PBS television history.

189. Kahin, Intervention, pp. 307-8.

190. Later, in another context, we hear that "to many peasants, [the U.S.
Marines] were yet another threatening foreign force" (episode 6, on "Amer-
ica's Enemy" and their point of view).

191. Biskind, citing a London Times account; Butterfield, New York Times,
October 2, 1983.

Chapter 6: The Indochina Wars (II)

1. Cited by Bernard Fall, Anafomyo/a Cn'sis (1961; reprint. New York: Double-
day, 1969), p. 163, from congressional hearings. The reasons were political: the
Pentagon was not in favor. See also Walter Haney, "The Pentagon Papers and
U.S. Involvement in Laos," in Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel edition (Bos-
ton: Beacon Press, 1972; hereafter PP), vol. 5.

2. State T)t^?iXtmtni Background Notes (March 1969); Denis Warner, Reporting
Southeast Asia (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1966), p. 171.

3. On this period, see, among others, Haney, "U.S. Involvement in Laos";
Noam Chomsky, At War with Asia (New York: Pantheon, 1970; hereafter
A WWA); Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds., Laos: War and Revolu-
tion (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Charles Stevenson, The End ofNowhere
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

4. Howard Elterman, The State, the Mass Media and Ideological Hegemony:
United States Policy Decisions in Indochina, 1974-7S — HistOtica} Record, Gov-
ernment Pronouncements and Press Coverage (Ph.D. diss.. New York University,
1978), p. 198.

5. Fall, Anatomy of a Crisis.

6. A request to the (very cooperative) American embassy in Vientiane to obtain
their documentation would have quickly revealed to reporters that the claims
they were relaying on the basis of embassy briefings had little relation to the
facts, as one of us discovered by carrying out the exercise in Vientiane in early
1970. For a detailed review of the available facts concerning foreign (North
Vietnamese, Thai, Chinese Nationalist, and U.S.) involvement through the
1960s, and their relation to what the media were reporting, see A V/WA, pp.
203-36; and Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New York: Pantheon, 1973;
hereafter FRS), pp. 178-79. See also chapters, p. 177, and note 22.

7. In Adams and McCoy, Laos; excerpts in A WWA, pp. 96-97.

8. On attempts by former Times Saigon bureau chief A. J. Langguth to explain

NOTES TO PAGES 256-259 381

away the suppression of the bombing of northern Laos by obscuring the crucial
distinction between the bombing of the civilian society of the North and the
bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail in the South (acceptable within the doctrinal

system in terms of "defense of South Vietnam against North Vietnamese
aggression"), see Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War (New York:
Pantheon, 1982), p. 402.

9- Elterman, State-Media-Ideological Hegemony, pp. 332ff. and appendixes.

10. The report states that "until early this spring, when North Vietnamese
troops began a series of advances in northeast Laos," the war had been "lim-
ited," U.S. bombing had been aimed at "North Vietnamese supply routes" and
"concentrations of enemy troops," and "civilian population centers and farm-
land were largely spared." Extensive refugee reports were soon to show that
this account was inaccurate, as Decomoy's eyewitness reports had done fifteen
months earlier.

11. See references cited above, and, shortly after, Fred Branfman, Voices from
the Plain of Jars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Walter Haney, "A
Survey of Civilian Fatalities among Refugees from Xieng Khouang Province,
Laos," in Problems of War Victims in Indochina, Hearings before the
[Kennedy] Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, U.S. Senate, May 9,
1972, pt. 2: "Laos and Cambodia," appendix 2. There were some 1970 reports
in the media: e.g., Daniel Southerland, Christian Science Monitor, March 14;
Laurence Stern, Washington Post, March 26; Hugh D. S. Greenway, Life,
April 3; Carl Strock, New Republic, May 9; Noam Chomsky, "Laos," New York
Review of Books, July 23, 1970, with more extensive details (reprinted in
AWWA).

12. Haney, PP, V. See FRS, pp. 176f , on Sullivan's misrepresentation of
Haney's conclusions.

13- Refugee And Civilian War Casualty Problems in Indochina, Staff Report for
the [Kennedy] Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, U.S. Senate, Sep-
tember 28, 1970.

14- One of the authors participated in a public meeting of media figiu"es in
New York, in 1986, at which a well-known television journalist defended
media coverage of the bombing of northern Laos on the grounds that there
was a report from a refugee camp in 1972. One wonders how much credit
would be given to a journal that reported the bombing of Pearl Harbor in
1945-

15- T. D. Allman, Manchester Guardian Weekly, January I; Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, January 8, 1972 (hereafter FEER); see FRS, pp. 173f, for a
lengthy excerpt. Robert Seamans, cited by George Wilson, Washington Post-
Boston Globe, January 17, 1972; see FRS, pp. 172f, for this and similar testi-
mony before Congress by Ambassador William Sullivan. John Everingham and
subsequent commentary on the Hmong (Meo) tribes, cited in Noam Chomsky
and Edward S. Herman, Political Economy of Human Rights (Boston: South
End Press, 1979; hereafter PEHR) II, II9f.; Chanda, FEER, December 23,
1977; see PEHR, II, 131f , 340, for these and other direct testimonies, far from
the mainstream, with a few noteworthy exceptions cited. Bangkok World, cited
by Haney, "U.S. Involvement in Laos," p. 292, along with a Jack Anderson
column in the Washington Post (Feb. 19,1972). On postwar experiences of U.S.
relief workers, see PEHR, pp. 132f., 34o .

16. McCoy's emphasis, in a letter to the Washington Post; cited by Haney,
"U.S. Involvement in Laos," p. 293.

17. Television commentary reprinted in Christian Science Monitor, June lo,
1975-

18. See A WWA, pp. 119f., and Haney, "U.S. Involvement in Laos," citing
congressional hearings and the Washington Post, March 16, 1970.

19. Walter Saxon, A^ew York Times, August 24,1975. See PEHR, chapters, for
further details on this report and general discussion of postwar reporting of
Laos.

20. Kimmo Kiljunen, ed., Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide, Report of a
government-backed Finnish Inquiry Commission (London: Zed, 1984). See
also Kiljunen, "Power Politics and the Tragedy of Kampuchea during the
Seventies," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (April-June 1985).

21. See William Shawcross, Sideshow (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979),
and Seymour Hersh, TJie Price of Power (New York: Summit, 1983).

22. William Shawcross, "The End of Cambodia?" New York Review of Books,
January 24, 1980, relying on reports by Francois Ponchaud, a French priest
whose work provided the major source of evidence about Khmer Rouge atroci-
ties in 1975-76: Fran9ois Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero (New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1978), a revised version of a 1977 French study that
became perhaps the most influential unread book in recent political history
after a review by Jean Lacouture ("The Bloodiest Revolution," New York
Review of Boohs, Mar. 31, 1977); see also his "Cambodia: Corrections," New
York Review of Books, May 26, 1977, withdrawing the most sensational claims.
Our review (The Nation, June 25, 1977) was the first, to our knowledge, to
attend to the actual text, which appeared in English a year later. See our
PEHR, 11.6, on the record of falsification based on this book, and on Pon-
chaud's own remarkable record, further analyzed by Michael Vickery in his
Cambodia: 1975-1982 (Boston: South End Press, 1984). CIA Research Paper,
Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe (Washington: CIA, May 1980). For a
critique of this study revealing extensive falsification conditioned by U.S.
government priorities-specifically, suppression of the worst Pol Pot atrocities
during the later period-see Michael Vickery, "Democratic Kampuchea-
CIA to the Rescue," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars \AA (1982), and
his Cambodia. The latter is the major study of the Khmer Rouge period,
by one of the few authentic Cambodia scholars, widely and favorably re-
viewed abroad by mainstream Indochina scholars and others but virtually
ignored in the United States, as was the Finnish Inquiry Commission
report. See Noam Chomsky, "Decade of Genocide in Review," Inside Asia
(London, February 1985, reprinted in James Peck, ed., The Chomsky Reader
[New York: Pantheon, 1987]), on several serious studies of the period, in-
cluding these.

23. Michael Vickery, "Ending Cambodia-Some Revisions," submitted to the
New York Review ofBooks in June 1981 but rejected. See his Cambodia for more
extended discussion. Shawcross himself had had second thoughts by then (see
"Kampuchea Revives on Food, Aid, and Capitalism," The Bulletin [Australia],
March 24, 1981). See his Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modem
Conscience (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), for a later version, now recast
in ways to which we return.

24. Page 370, blaming Vietnamese deception for the account he had relayed
in 1980.

25. Shawcross, The Nation, September 21, 1985; Ben Kiernan, letter to The
Nation, October 3,1985, unpublished. For evaluation of the international relief

efforts, see Vickery, Cambodia; Kiljunen, Kampuchea; Joel Charny and John
Spragens, Obstacles to Recovery in Vietnam and Kampuchea: U.S. Embargo of
Humanitarian Aid (Boston: Oxfam America, 1984); Shawcross, Quality of
Mercy.

26. Fran90i8 Ponchaud, on whom Shawcross relied, is a highly dubious source

for reasons that have been extensively documented; see note 22. No one with
a record of duplicity approaching his would ever be relied on for undocu-
mented charges of any significance if the target were not an official enemy.

27. Shawcross, Quality ofMercy, pp. 49-50. He observes that "those years of
warfare saw the destruction of Cambodian society and the rise of the Khmer
Rouge from its ashes, in good part as a result of While House policies"; "with
the forces of nationalism unleashed by the war at their command, the Khmer
Rouge became an increasingly formidable army," while in the "massive Ameri-
can bombing campaign" to which the Khmer Rouge were subjected through
August 1973, "their casualties are thought to have been huge." The phrase
"their casualties" presumably refers to Khmer Rouge military forces; there is
no mention of civilian casualties. On the limited scope of Shawcross's "quality
of mercy," see "Phase III at home" (p. 288), below.

28. Vickery, Cambodia, p. 293.

29. AP, Boston Globe, September 24, 1978, citing the Report of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization in Geneva on over fifty million child laborers in the
world, with Thailand singled out as one of the worst offenders, thanks to
grinding poverty, an effective military government backed by the United
States, lack oflabor union power, and "wide-open free enterprise. " See PEHR,
11.6, 359, for excerpts and other examples that have elicited even less interest,
and PEHR, II, xv, on a World Bank description of the situation in Thailand.
On the brutal treatment of many of the estimated 10.7 milhon child laborers
in Thailand, see Human Rights in Thailand Report 9.1. (January-March 1985)
(Coordinating Group for Religion in Society, Bangkok); Thai Development
Newsletter 3.1 1985 (December 1986) (Bangkok). On the treatment of women
in "the brothel of Asia," with its estimated 500,000 prostitutes, masseuses, and
bar-waitresses, 20 percent of them under fourteen years of age, drawn to
Bangkok (and sometimes sold off to Europe) from the impoverished rural areas
through "a huge underground network of brothels and workshops feeding on
child flesh and labor," see several articles in Beyond Stereotypes: Asian Women
in Development, Southeast Asia Chronicle (January 1985).

30. For extensive evidence on this matter, see PEHR, 11.6, and Vickery,
Cambodia, extending the story to phase III.

31. Others give higher estimates. Ponchaud gives the figure of 800,000 killed,
but, as noted in our 1977 review, he seems to have exaggerated the toll of the
U.S. bombing, and as shown in the references of note 22, he is a highly
unreliable source. "US Government sources put the figure unofficially at
600,000 to 700,000" (CIA demographic study, which accepts the lower figure) .

32. Vickery, Cambodia, pp. 184f. Other estimates vary widely. At the low end,
the CIA demographic study gives the figure of 50,ooo to 100,000 for people

384 NOTES TO PAGES 263-267

who "may have been executed," and an estimate of deaths from all causes that
is meaningless because of misjudgment of postwar population and politically
motivated assessments throughout; the Far Eastern Economic Review reported
a substantial increase in the population under DK to 8.2 million, "mostly based
on CIA estimates" (Asia 1979 and Asia 1980 yearbooks of the FEER, the latter
reducing the estimate from 8.2 to 4.2 milhon, the actual figure apparently being
in the neighborhood of 6.5 milhon); in the U.S. government journal Problem!,
of Communism (May-June 1981), Australian Indochina specialist Carlyle
Thayer suggests a figure of deaths from all causes at 500,000, of which 50,000
to 60,000 were executions. At the high end, estimates range to three milhon
or more, but without any available analysis. As all serious observers emphasize,
the range of error is considerable at every point.

33. George Hildebrand and Gareth Porter, Cambodia: Starvation and Revolu-
tion (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), based on U.S. and international
aid reports, cited by Vickery, Cambodia, p. 79; FEER correspondent Nayan
Chanda in several articles, cited in PEHR, 1.6, 229f ; Western doctor is Dr.
Penelope Key, of the World Vision Organization, cited by Hildebrand and
Porter, along with similar reports from Catholic Relief Services and Red Cross
observers; Shawcross, Sideshow, pp. 370f. Hildebrand and Porter's book, the
only extensive study of the situation at the war's end, was highly praised by
Indochina scholar George Kahin but ignored in the media, or vilified. See
PEHR, 11.6, 232f , for a particular egregious example, by William Shawcross
in the A^ew York Review of Books. When PEHR, 11.6 was circulating to Cam-
bodia scholars and journalists in manuscript, we received a letter from Shaw-
cross demanding that references to him be eliminated. We responded that we
would be glad to consider any specific case that he found wrong or misleading
and delayed publication of the book awaiting his response, which never ar-
rived. On his public response, see below.

34. Milton Osborne, Before Kampuchea (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 191;
David Chandler, Pacific Affairs (Summer 1983); Philip Windsor, The Listener,
BBC (London), July ii, 1985.

35. David Chandler and Ben Kiernan, eds.. Revolution and Its Aftermath in
Kampuchea, Monograph 25/Yale University Southeast Asia Series (1983),
p. I.

36. See note 32, above; FEER, January 19, 1979-

37. Douglas Pike, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 29, 1979, and Chn'stian
Science Monitor, December 4, 1979; cited by Vickery, Cambodia, p. 65. On the
Freedom House and Times assessments of Pike's work, see p.p. 324,326; Fox
Butterfield, "The New Vietnam Scholarship," New York Times Magazine
cover story, February 13, 1983, where Pike is regarded as the exemplar of the
"new breed" of dispassionate scholars.

38. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,

1986), pp. 329, 394, for a detailed analysis of the maneuverings during this
period. See also Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War
(London: Verso, 1984).

39. Derriire le sourire khmer (Paris: Plon, 1971); see FRS, chapter 2, section 2.

40. Vickery, Cambodia, pp. 7, 17, 5-6, 17, 43; ViCKery, "Looking Back at
Cambodia," Westerly (Australia) (December 1976). See PEHR, 11.6 for ex-
cerpts from the latter study.

NOTES TO PAGES 268-274 385

41. See FRS, pp. 192ft'., and sources cited, particularly the fall 1971 studies by
T. D. Allman, based on interviews with members of the Cambodian elite.

42. See Elizabeth Becker, When The War Wcls Over (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1987), p. 28, citing a 1963 U.S. embassy cable quoting Sihanouk;
Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 61£ See A WWA and FRS on contemporary
studies of the Sihanouk period that provide more detail.

43. Michael Leifer, "Cambodia," Aii'aw Survey (January 1967). Becker, When
the War Was Over, p. 27, asserts that the CIA was behind the 1959 plot. For
sources on these developments here and below, largely French, see A WWA
and FRS. See Peter Dale Scott in PP, V, on the regional context of the 1963
escalation.

44. See A WWA and FRS for references and other examples.

45. Bombing in Cambodia, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, 93d Cong., 1st sess., July / August 1973, pp. 158-60, the primary
source on the "secret bombings."

46. See PEHR, 11.6,288.

47- PEHR, 11.6, 380; also 383. Shawcross, Quality of Mercy, p. 49, referring
solely to B-52 bombings of Vietnamese "sanctuaries" in the border areas, the
standard evasion of the issue.

48. See PEHR, 11.6, 383, where the same point is noted, and its irrelevance
discussed. These matters had been specifically brought to Shawcross's atten-
tion during the period when he was working on his Sideshow, in commentary
(which he had requested) on earlier articles of his on the topic in the British
press.

49. William Beecher, New York Times, May 9, 1969; PEHR, 11.6, 271, 289,
383.

50. Elterman, State-Media-Ideological Hegemony, p. 344. Note that the post-
Tet operations were in part reported at the time, although often in the highly
distorted framework already discussed. For samples, see A WWA. On media
coverage of the Laos bombings in 1969, see "Laos" (p. 253).

51. T. D. Allman, FEER, April 9, 1970; Manchester Guardian, September 18,
1971. See note 41.

52. See FRS, p. 194, and sources cited; see A WWA on media coverage of the
invasion.

53. Richard Dudman, Forty Days with the Enemy (New York: H. Liveright,
1971), p. 69-

54. Terence Smith, New York Times, December 5, 1971; Iver Peterspn, New
York Times, December 2, 1971. See FRS, pp. 188f , for citations from U.S. and
primarily French sources. See also Fred Branfman, in PP, V.

55. See FRS, pp. 190-92, for excerpts from Le Monde.

56. Elterman, State-Media-Ideological Hegemony, pp. 335f

57. Vickery, Cambodia, p. 15.

58. UPI, New York Times, June 22, 1973, citing Pentagon statistics.

59. Shawcross, Sideshow, pp. 272, 297; see p. 262, above.

60. See PEHR, 11.6, 154f, 22of , 365f, for sources, excerpts, and discussion.

61. E.g., Henry Kamm, New York Times, March 25, 28, 1973.

62. Becker, When the War Was Over, P. 32.

63. Malcolm Browne, "Cambodians' Mood: Apathy, Resignation," New York
Times, June 29, 1973- On the forceful recruiting from "the poorer classes.

386 NOTES TO PAGES 274-283

refugees and the unemployed," including the "poor peasants" who have

"poured into the capital" after their villages were destroyed, but not the
children of the wealthy elites, see Sydney Schanberg, New York Times, August
4,1973-

64. Kamm, New York Times, March 25, 1973.

65. See Vickery, Cambodia, pp. 9f., on Buddhism, about which "probably more
arrant nonsense has been written in the West . . . than about any other aspect
of Southeast Asian life," particularly with regard to Cambodia.

66. Schanberg, New York Times, May 3, 8, July 19, July 30, August 16, August
12, 1973.

67. August 22, 1973. The material reviewed here is from May 3 to August 16.

68. Mostly Malcolm Browne; also Henry Kamm, wire services, specials. We
omit brief reports here, and this record may not be complete.

69. Compare, for example, Jon Swain's horrifying account of the situation in
the hospitals in Phnom Penh at the time of the 1975 evacuation with Sydney
Schanberg's cursory remark that "many of the wounded were dying for lack
of care" (Swain, Sunday Times (London), May II; Schanberg, A^ew York Times,
May 9, 1975); see PEHR, 11.6, 370-71, for details.

70. Sunday Times (London), May ii, 1975. See PEHR, 11.6, 249f., for longer
excerpts.

71. Schanberg, New York Times, April 6, 8, 23, 1985.

72. New York Times, October 28, 1984.

73. Editorials, New York Times, April II, 1985; April 7, September 9, 1985.
Others do note "America's role in the tragic destruction of Cambodian civiliza-
tion," which "renders suspect any belated show of concern for Cambodian
sovereignty" (Editorial, Boston Globe, April 12, 1985).

74. Editorial, New York Times, July 9, 1975; also Jack Anderson, Washington
Post, June 4, 1975-

75. See PEHR, 11.6.

76. Our review cited in the preceding footnote was therefore limited to materi-
als based on this earlier period, all that was available at the time we wrote.

77. See PEHR, 11.6, VI; Vickery, Cambodia.

78. PEHR, 11.6, 135-36, 290, 293, 140, 299.

79. In the only scholarly assessment, Vickery concludes that "very little of [the

discussion in PEHR, 11.6] requires revision in the light of new information
available since it appeared." He also comments on the "scurrilous," "incompe-
tent," and "dishonest criticism of Chomsky and Herman which has character-
ized media treatment of their work," noting falsifications by WilUam
Shawcross, among others (Cambodia, pp. 308, 310).

80. Guenter Lewy, Commentary (November 1984), a typical example of a
substantial literature. To our knowledge, Lewy, like other infuriated critics,
did not condemn the Khmer Rouge in print as harshly, or as early, as we did.
Recall that Lewy has experience with these matters, given his record as an
apologist for war crimes, which reaches levels rarely seen. See chapter 5, notes
33,86.

81. John Barron and Anthony Paul, Murder in a Gentle Land (New York:
Reader's Digest Press, 1977). Anderson, Washington Post, October i, 1978.
Kamm, New York Times MfigilMiw^ November 19, 1978, including fabricated
photographs; see PEHR, 1 1.6,202,253; and 367, 372, on the scholarly literature

NOTBs TO PACB^ iitfaaaBifc ■jjftr

describing a country where "the population is ever on the edge of starvation"
in earlier years and completely lacking an economy by 1975. Wise, PEER,
September 23, 1977- See PEHR, 11.6, for further examples HH details, here
and below; and Vickery, Cambodia, for additional evidence.

82. See our citations from his writings in the Far Eastern Economic Review
(Hong Kong) and Le Monde diplomatique (Paris), in PEHR, II.

83. Cambodia, p. 48. See also the review of his book by British Indochina
scholar R. B. Smith, emphasizing the same point (Asian Affairs [February
1985]).

84. Cambodia, chapter 3. Also essays by Vickery and Ben Kiernan in Chandler
and Kiernan, Revolution and Its Aftermath; and Ben Kiernan, Cambodia: The
Eastern Zone Massacres, Center for the Study of Human Rights, Documenta-
tion Series, nO.l [c. 1986], (New York: Columbia University).

85- PEHR, 11.6, 138-39, 152-53,156-57, 163.

86. Shawcross, in Chandler and Kiernan, Revolution and Its Aftermath.

87. See PEHR, and Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network (Boston:
South End Press, 1982), for extensive discussion. See particularly chapter 2,
above.

88. John Holdridge (State Department), Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d sess., September 14, 1982, p. 71.

89. For discussion of their qualms, and how they resolved them, and similar
concerns elsewhere, see Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War, chapter 13.

90. Nayan Chanda, PEER, November i, 1984; November 7, 1985, with minor
modifications, their general position from early on in phase III.

91. Henry Kamm, New York Times, November 8, 1981. See chapter 5, note 45
above, on the reported level of U.S. support for the Khmer Rouge.

92. PEER, August 16, 1984. Essentially the same story appeared in the Wash-
ington Post, July 8, 1985, with no acknowledgment of their source, as the PEER
commented editorially with some annoyance on August 8, 1985.

93. Pringle, PEER, February 25, 1988; Crossette, New York Times, April i,
1988. Holbrooke, quoted in Indochina Issues (June 1985). See also Robert
Manning, South (September 1984), and Elizabeth Becker, "U.S. Backs Mass
Murderer," Washington Post, May 22, 1983, on U.S. pressures to force the
non-Communist resistance "into an ignominious coalition with Pol Pot." Dith
Pran, quoted by Jack Colhoun, Guardian (New York), June 5, 1985. Hawk,
letter, PEER, August 2, 1984, with a picture of Alexander Haig "meeting, drink
in hand, a smiling leng Sary" (Khmer Rouge foreign minister) in New York.

94. Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 379.

95. Chanthou Boua, "Observations of the Heng Samrin Government," in
Chandler and Kiernan, Revolution and Its Aftermath.

96. Our own expressed view at the time was that "the Vietnamese invasion can
be explained, but it cannot be justified" (pEHR, II, preface, xix). With the
information that has since appeared about the Pol Pot terror in 1977-78 and
the border attacks against Vietnam, that judgment might have to be qualified,
even in terms of a rather restrictive interpretation of the right of self-defense
under international law.

97. London Guardian, October 26, 1984.

98. Abrams, letter. New York Times, January 8, 1985; also Abrams and Diane

388 NOTES TO PAGES 288-295

Orentlicher, Washington Post Weekly, September 9, 1985. Hawk, New Republic,
November 15, 1982; Economist, October 13, 1984; O'Brien, London Observer,
September 30, 1984.

99. Quality ofMercy; Washington Post, September 2,1984; his article in Chan-
dler and Kiernan, Revolution and Its Aftermath.

100. Quality ofMetCf, pp. 55; Washington Post, September 2, 1984.

101. It is concocted from a series of phrases that appear in various places in
the introduction to volume I of PEHR, pp. 19-20, with crucial omissions-not
noted-that would at once demonstrate the absurdity of the argument he
presents.

102. Cited by Vickery, Cambodia, pp. 58f., in a discussion of Shawcross's
subsequent effort "to efface his earlier good judgment and claim to have been
a purveyor of a sensationalist STV, when he clearly was not."

103. Shawcross may indeed have had other motives; see note 33.

104. See author's preface, American edition of Ponchaud's Cambodia: Year
Zero. On Ponchaud's remarkable deception concerning this matter, see PEHR,
11.6, 278f

105. For a record based on further inquiry, see PEHR, 11.6, 253-84.

106. See note 79 above.

107. To be precise, we have found one suggestion, although well after'the
event. In TTie Times Higher Education Supplement, December 6, 1981, along
with a series of falsifications of our position of the sort discussed here, Shaw-
cross states that given our "political influence," we could have played an
important part in mobihzing world opinion to bring pressure on China to call
off Khmer Rouge atrocities-as he was no doubt desperately trying to do, but
failing, because of his lack of outreach comparable to ours. Comment should
be superfluous. Evidently the editors of the journal so believed, refusing
publication of a response, despite our awesome "political influence." It seems
doubtful that Shawcross would have published such childish absurdities had
he not been assured that no response would be permitted.

108. Quality ofMercy, P.357.

109. Review of Quality of Mercys Washington Post Weekfy^ July 30,1984, Book
Worid.

110. See his essay in Chandler and Kiernan, Revolution and Its Aftermath, his
only attempt to provide evidence for his widely heralded claims.

///. New Statesman, November 2, 1984. On the question of whether DK was
"Marxist-Leninisf'-whatever that is supposed to mean, exactly-see Vick-
ery, Cambodia.

112. The opening pages of our chapter on Cambodia in PEHR, 1 1 , 135-36. For
some of our comments in the article in question, see p. 290, above.
n3. See references of note 22.

114- Quality ofMercy, p. 357.

115- Ibid., pp. 358-59; New York Review of Books, September 27, 1984. We
emphasize that the correctness of his accusation is not at issue here, but,
rather, the evidence he uses to support it.

116. For many earlier cases, see PEHR, 11.6, and Vickery, Cambodia.
n7. And, significantly, comparable and ongoing atrocities for which the
United States bore primary responsibility were suppressed (and still largely
are), with shameful apologetics when the facts could no longer be denied.

NOTES TO PAGES 297-304 389

Chapter 7: donclusions

1. Lewis, "Freedom of the Press-Anthony Lewis Distinguishes Between Brit-
ain and America," London Review of Books, November 26, 1987. Lewis is
presenting his interpretation of the views of James Madison and Justice Bren-
nan (in the case of The New York Times v. Sullivan that Lewis describes as
the "greatest legal victory [of the press] in modern times"), with his endorse-
ment.

2. See, among others, N. Blackstock, ed., COINTELPRO (New York: Vin-
tage, 1976); Frank J. Donner, The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods
of America's Political Intelligence System (New York: Knopf, 1980); Robert J.
Goldstein, Political. Repression in America (Cambridge: Schenkman, I973);
Morton h. Halpenn et al.. The Lawless State (New York: Penguin, 1976);
Chnsty Macy and Susan Kaplan, eds.. Documents (New York: Penguin, 19go).

3- The diffused-cost cases would include the multi-billion-dollar outlays borne
by the taxpayers for CIA covert operations and the subsidization of client
regimes, the overhead costs of empire and the arms race, the enormous ripoffs
by the military-industrial complex in providing unneeded weapons at inflated
prices, and the payoffs to campaign contributors in the form of favorable tax
legislation and other benefits (e.g., the huge tax bonanzas given business
following Reagan's election in 1981, and the increase in milk prices given by
Nixon in 1971 immediately after substantial gifts were given by the milk lobby
to the Republican party).

4- In fact, the scandals and illegaUties detailed by the Tower Commission and
congressional inquiries were largely known long before these establishment
"revelations," but were suppressible; see Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Ter-
rorism (Boston: South End Press, 1988).

5- See also the preface. On the persistence of the elite consensus, including the
media, through the period of the Iran-contra hearings and beyond, see

Chomsky, Culture of Terrorism.

6. Laurence R. Simon and James C. Stephens, Jr., EI Salvador Land Reform
l^8o-ig8l. Impact Audit (Boston: Oxfam America, February 1981), p. 51, citing
Ambassador Robert White and land-reform adviser Roy Prosterman on "the
Pol Pot left"; Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit (New York: Times
Books, 1984), p. 88, citing Ambassador White, and p. 207, citing Archbishop
Rivera y Damas, who succeeded the assassinated Archbishop Romero. Jeane
Kirkpatrick, "U.S. Security and Latin America," Commentary (January 1981).
7- Washington Post, May 21, 1987. The "genocide" to which Buckley refers is
"of the Miskito Indians," of whom perhaps several dozen were killed by the
Sandinistas in the context of attacks by U.S. mercenary forces, at a time when
the U.S. -backed Guatemalan military were in the process of slaughtering tens
of thousands of Indians, but not coimnitting "genocide" by Buckley's lights.
8. Although, as we noted, with little constraint on passing along useful fabrica-
tions and rumors, even relaying tales long conceded to be fabrications.
9- W. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion, 2d ed. (New York: Long-
man, 1988), pp. 178-79.

10. Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press, 1980), p. x.

11. Edgar Chamorro, who was selected by the CIA as press spokesman for the
contras, describes Stephen Kinzer of the New York Times as "like an errand

boy, building up those stories that fit in with Reagan's agenda--one day it's
the church, the next day the Miskitos, then the private sector. In the last two
weeks I've seen at least eight articles by Kinzer which say exactly what the
White House wants. Kinzer always raises questions about Sandinista inten-
tions, whether they're truly democratic, and so on. When you analyze his
articles you see he's just responding to what the White House is saying"
(Interview, Extra! [the newsletter of FAIR, Fairness & Accuracy in Report-
ing], October-November 1987). FAIR is a left- liberal counterpart to the right-
wing organization Accuracy in Media, therefore underfunded and regularly
excluded from debate, as distinct from AIM. Its letters to editors often are
refused publication, even when their accuracy is privately conceded; see the
same issue for some remarkable examples.

12. For classic accounts, see Warren Breed, "Social Control in the Newsrooms:
A Functional Analysis," Social Forces (May 1955), pp. 326-35; Gaye Tuchman,
"Objectivity as Strategic Ritual," A merican Journal ofSociology (January 1972),
pp. 660-70. For a useful application, see Jim Sibbison, "Environmental
Reporters: Prisoners of Gullibility," Washington Monthly (March 1984),
PP-27-35-

13. See Chomsky, inZ magazine (March 1988), for discussion of these tenden-
cies.

14. For evidence on these matters, see the specific examples discussed above
and, for a broader picture, Chomsky, Culture of Terrorism, and sources cited.

15. The Cable Franchise and Telecommunications Act of 1984 allows cities to
require public-access channels, but it permits cable operators to direct these
channels to other uses if they are not well utilized. Thus nonuse may provide
the basis for an elimination of public access.

16. On the differences between commercial and public television during the
Vietnam War years, see Eric Bamouw, The Sponsor (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1978), pp. 62-65.

17. See the programs spelled out for Great Britain in James Curran, Jake
Ecclestone, Giles Oakley, and Alan Richardson, eds., Bending Reality: The
State of the Media (London: Pluto Press, 1986).

Appendix 1

1. On Penniman's background, and for a study of his methods as an observer,
see "Penniman on South Vietnamese Elections: The Observer-Expert as Pro-
moter-Salesman," in Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration
Elections: U.S. -Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El
Salvador (Boston: South End Press, 1984), appendix 2.

2. In a letter of December 20, 1984, to one of his constituents who had
complained of his gullibility as an observer. Brier asserted that his obligation
was to report "observed election fraud, coercion of the voters, or denials of

the right to vote " On fundamental conditions, Brier wrote: "I made and

make no statements concerning pre-election day freedom of speech, although
the election I just witnessed in Guatemala would lead me to beUeve it existed

because of the 14 to 16 different political parties and based on press accounts,
we have been led to believe it does not exist in Nicaragua as they prepare for
elections." Actually, the occasional press accounts in the United States about
state-organized murder in Guatemala might have alerted Brier to the possibil-
ity of some constraints on freedom there, but he apparently asked no questions
and did no reading up on the subject. His inference from numerous parties to
freedom of speech is a non sequitur-an authoritarian and terror-ridden state
can easily allow, and may even encourage, a proliferation of candidates within
a prescribed political spectrum. Brier cites press accounts on constraints on
freedom of speech in Nicaragua as if this is a relevant subject, but he failed
to pursue the matter with regard to Guatemala. He also makes the patriotic
assumption that press accounts in the United States about conditions in client
and disfavored states are objective. Brier wears blinders in U.S. -sponsored
elections that he is prepared to set aside in talking about the integrity of an
election in an enemy state. This dichotomization is openly employed by the
State Department, and was followed by Hedrick Smith, of the Times, and the
media more generally, as we have seen.

Brier distinguished himself as a member of the official delegation to the
Philippines election of February 1986 won by Ferdinand Marcos by attacking
the media's focus on negatives like "violence, vote-buying and fraud," with the
result that "they missed entirely the fact that 20 million people conscientiously
went to the polls without intimidation and wrote down their choice for Presi-
dent" (Robert Pear, quoting Jack Brier, "U.S. Observers Disagree on Extent
of Philippines Fraud," New York Times, Feb. 12, 1986). Brier was so accus-
tomed to focusing on the superficial in his apologies for client-state elections
that he failed to grasp the fact that the administration's line was in the process
of shifting-which caused him some embarrassment a few days later, when the
freedom-loving Marcos was escorted out of the country.

3. He did not mention or attempt to evaluate actual institutions in Guatemala,
such as the civil-defense patrols, nor did he or any other member of the
observer team even mention the pacification program and killings of peasants,
which had been the subject of innumerable reports. We suspect that Edwards's
"research" consisted of advice by the U.S. embassy, in addition to the fact that
he did not see any peasants killed in his presence.

4. In the text above, we point out that the terror in Guatemala began with the
U.S. intervention in 1954, and that its subsequent growth was correlated with
enlarged U.S. counterinsurgency and police aid and training. See also Edward

5. Herman, The Real Terror Network (Boston: South End Press, 1982), pp.
175-76.

Appendix 2

I. Immediately after the shooting of the pope in 1981, Tagliabue, then a Times
correspondent in West Germany, wrote some enlightening articles on Agca's
Turkish Fascist connections. All of this material was ignored by Tagliabue
after he became the Times's correspondent at the Rome trial in 1985. His first

392 NOTES TO PAGES 313-326

story on the trial, significantly, was coauthored with Claire Sterling, and his
coverage of the trial remained faithful to her model.

2. The Plot to Kill the Pope (New York: Scribner's, 1985), p. 196.

3. For example, Martella's lack of control over Agca's visitors and reading
materials badly compromised the case, as did the distressing number of leaks
that came out of his supposedly secret investigation. See Edward S. Herman
and Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection (New York:
Sheridan Square Publications, 1986), pp. 118-20.

4. Ibid., pp. 102ff.

5. Ibid., pp. 14-15, for further discussion of the alleged Soviet motive.

6. Ibid., chapter 5.

7. Ibid., pp. 139-41, for an analysis of Sterling's signaling theory.

Appendix 3

/. Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), IV,
548-49; see p. 225, above. As to what Schakne actually said, we cannot be sure,
since Braestrup presents only a few scattered phrases embedded in his own
highly unreliable paraphrases, unsubstantiated by any text.

2. Gareth Porter, "Who Lost Vietnam?" Inquiry, February 20, 1978; see refer-
ences of chapter 5, note 119; also Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman,
Political Economy of Human Rights (Boston: South End Press, 1979), 1,5.2.3.
Lengel, Big Story, 1, 269; see p. 209, above.

3. As revealed, no doubt, by his book Viet Cong (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1969), where he contrasts our side, which sympathizes with "the usual
revolutionary stirrings . . . around the world," with the backers of revolutionary
guerrilla warfare, which "opposes the aspirations of people while apparently
furthering them," and expresses his contempt for the "gullible, misled people"
who were "turning the countryside into a bedlam, toppling one Saigon govern-
ment after another, confounding the Americans," etc. The fact that Pike was
an employee of the U.S. government and an "admirer" and avid defender of
its policies does not suggest to Braestrup that he might be something other than
"independent-minded" ; only Porter's alleged political preference is relevant to
"Freedom House objectivity."

4. Big Story, I, xxviii; the seime is true of Don Oberdorfer's Tet! (New York:
Doubleday, 1971) and Stanley Karnow's Vietnam: A History (New York:
Viking, 1983), among others.

5. Seymour Hersh. My Lai Four (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 139-
40.

6. Recall that "whatever losses the DRV/VC forces did suffer in the initial
assaults were largely offset by the unimpeded recruiting that they conducted
in the rural areas in the weeks that followed" (Wallace J. Thies, When Govern-
ments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, I964-I968
[Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980], p. 201); see p. 215, above, and
General Wheeler's comments, cited above, p. 225.

7. See the reviews cited in chapter 5, note i, for many further examples.

NOTES TO PAGES 327-329 393

8. Elsewhere (Big Story, 1,159), the same quote is attributed to Frank McGee.
9- Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of
New England, 1977), pp. 75,47. In fact, the "body count" was unknown, since
much of the air and artillery barrage was directed against targets where casual-
ties could never be counted or even guessed at, as Kinnard and many other
sources confirm. Westmoreland's subsequent writings show that reporters
would have been quite justified to treat his reports with skepticism. See George
M. Kahin, fnteruentton: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York:
Knopf, 1986), p. 536, on his falsification of the record concerning the suppres-
sion of the Buddhist movement in Danang and Hud in 1966.
10. For evidence from the Pentagon Papers, see Noam Chomsky, For Reasons
of State (New York: Pantheon, 1973), pp. 86ff